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Understanding Resistance to Foreign Occupation
Simon Collard-Wexler
There have been some 163 foreign occupations since 1900. In many cases, military occupations
have led to bloody and protracted resistance, while in most cases occupiers faced little resistance
at all. This dissertation seeks to answer the puzzle: under what conditions do foreign occupations
produce consequential resistance? Conventional wisdom holds that resistance is driven by nation-
alism. However, states exhibit different levels of resistance to different occupiers, indicating that
not only the nature of the occupied but also the nature and the policies of occupiers play a role.
Specifically, I look at the role of political dislocation and trust. First, domestic groups that would
have otherwise waited out the occupation may be driven to resistance when occupiers implement
policies or establish institutions that permanently weaken their relative domestic position, what I
call political dislocation. Second, resistance will be muted when occupiers can credibly commit to
treating the population benignly and vacating occupied territory promptly. I argue that democra-
cies, international organizations, and co-religionists are better able to make credible commitments
and therefore more likely to elicit trust among occupied communities. Conversely, occupiers that
victimize the occupied population will face greater resistance. I test these hypotheses on an origi-
nal dataset of occupier fatalities in every occupation since 1900. Drawing on geospatial data, I then
conduct a sub-national quantitative and qualitative study of resistance in Afghanistan. Finally, in
order to ensure that these findings are generalizable, I conduct a set of case studies comparing the
Soviet and German occupations of Lithuania; the Vietnamese and UN occupations of Cambodia;
and the Syrian, Multinational, UN, and Israeli occupations of Lebanon. I find that political dis-
location, in the form of forceful regime change, increases the likelihood of resistance. I also find
that occupations led by democracies, international organizations, and co-religionists are generally
less likely to face resistance. Thus, the nature and context of occupation are some of the most
important predictors of resistance.
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“My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”
- Vice-President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, 16 March 2003
1.1 The Puzzle of Resistance
Governments and international organizations frequently choose to intervene overseas in counter-
terrorism, peacekeeping, and nation-building operations. These missions can require short to
long-term military occupation and such occupations can generate local resistance.
The phenomenon of resistance remains a puzzle for International Relations. As Clausewitz
noted: “Sometimes, stunned and panic-stricken, the enemy may lay down his arms, at other times
he may be seized by a fit of enthusiasm: there is a general rush to arms, and resistance is much
stronger after the first defeat than it was before” ([1832] 2007, 569). Two historical cases help
illustrate the wide variation in resistance to occupation. The Franco-Belgian occupation of the
Ruhr is an example of a low resistance occupation. Following the First World War and the Treaty
of Versailles, Germany was forced to pay punitive reparations. When the German government
defaulted, France and Belgium occupied the wealthy industrial region of the Ruhr to extract repa-
rations themselves. The occupation lasted from 1923 until 1925. Occupying forces faced mainly
passive resistance, losing a total of 12 troops during the entire course of the occupation (Liberman
1996, 92; Reynolds 1928). In contrast, the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia is a classic example of
a high resistance occupation. Yugoslavia was invaded by Italy and Germany, with the support
1


















Figure 1.1: Occupier-force fatalities per occupation
of Bulgarian and Hungarian formations, in April 1941. Soon guerrilla warfare was launched by
Serbian nationalist Chetniks and pan-Yugoslav Communist partisans. Yugoslav resistance was
fierce, far greater than any other occupied territory during the Second World War. Indeed Ger-
man SS officer Edmund Veesenmeyer declared: “A day in Yugoslavia was more dangerous than
a year in Hungary” (Eby 2007, 36). By the end of the occupation in 1944, Axis occupying forces
lost some 24,000 troops. Despite six massive counterinsurgency campaigns, some deploying as
much as 66,000 troops, Yugoslavia was never pacified. On the contrary, Yugoslavia became the
only country to liberate itself from Axis occupation during the Second World War (Trifkovic 2011).
Some descriptive statistics further help illustrate this puzzle. Occupation is a frequent tool of
statecraft, but violent resistance is not. Between 1900 and 2010, resistance to foreign occupation
caused over 544,000 fatalities, not including fatalities from anti-colonial struggles. Fatalities per
occupation range from zero to 49,721 in the case of the US occupation of Vietnam (see Figure 1.1).
These figures are undoubtedly high, but the median occupation generated just under 20 fatalities.
Beyond fatality statistics, it is important to remember that rather than generating resistance, many
occupations benefit from the support of occupied societies.
These statistical and historical illustrations show the wide variation in resistance to occupation.
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This variation has real human, military, and political consequences. The puzzle this dissertation
therefore seeks to answer is: what accounts for variation in violent resistance to occupation?
This puzzle is not merely academic and explaining this variation is by no means obvious.
Policy-makers tend to be poor predictors of resistance to occupation. Prior to Operation Just Cause
the US invasion and occupation of Panama in 1989 President George H. W. Bush asked: “Would
the plan work. . . How many casualties would there be? How much damage would be done?” Ulti-
mately, after consulting with his advisors he said: “Okay, let‘s do it. The hell with it!” (Cole 1995).
Two years into the US’ post-war occupation of Japan, General Macarthur told the US Congress:
“History points to an unmistakable lesson that military occupations serve their purpose at best for
only a limited time, after which deterioration rapidly sets in” (1947). Yet, the seven year American
occupation was largely peaceful.
Policy-makers tend to greatly over- or underestimate the likelihood of resistance. Most often,
assessments are based on the last intervention rather than systematic analysis of the causes of re-
sistance. The American experiences in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), Haiti (Operation Uphold
Democracy), and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) provide cases in point. The Clinton Administration
was shocked when 19 US Rangers were killed in a brutal firefight in Mogadishu during Operation
Restore Hope. After all, who would attack forces serving to protect humanitarian convoys in one
of the poorest countries in the world? A year later when the US was considering sending 20,000
troops to assist Haiti, a Pentagon official warned: “If you liked Somalia, you’ll love Haiti” (Mar-
quis 1993). John McCain took to the US Senate floor to announce his opposition to the occupation:
“I do not think it is worth the risk of American lives . . . the chances of their succeeding are about
the same as those of the multinational force that tried and failed in Somalia” (Benjamin 2008). As
Washington Post Op-Ed counseled: “Before the Clinton Administration deploys American armed
forces in Haiti, it ought to re-examine the painful lessons driven home last year by the Somalian
warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid” (Anderson and Binstein, 1994, S16). Contrary to these dire
expectations, Operation Uphold Democracy ended with only one US fatality.
In contrast to Haiti, American risk assessment disastrously underestimated the likelihood of
resistance in Iraq. A pre-war US Department of Defense document titled “Overview of Require-
ments” referred to “a short, extremely intense period of combat operations using a full range of
U.S. and coalition forces. This phase will eliminate any significant organized resistance to U.S.
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coalition forces and will end the current regime.” This assessment followed Gen. Curtis Lemay‘s
adage: “if you can lick the cat, you can lick the kitten”; if other words if you can defeat a state in
inter-state war, you can easily defeat insurgents in smaller wars of occupation (Kaplan 2013, 3). In
a February 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, former Reagan defense official Ken Adelman stated: “I
believe demolishing Hussein‘s military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk.” During
Congressional testimony on 27 February 2003, Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated:
“it‘s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than
it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam‘s security forces and
his army.” Appearing on the television program Face the Nation on 16 March 2003, Vice-President
Dick Cheney said the war in Iraq would be “weeks rather than months.” Later on Meet the Press,
Cheney said, “I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi peo-
ple, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.” Similarly, chairman of the Pentagon‘s
Defense Policy Board Richard Perle, said the regime of Saddam Hussein is “much weaker than
we think he is. . . support for Saddam, including within his military organization, will collapse at
the first whiff of gunpowder.”1 In the first weeks of the Iraq War, Ken Adelman wrote a follow up
Op-Ed where he crowed: “Administration critics should feel shock over their bellyaching about
the wayward war plan. All of us feel awe over the professionalism and power of the U.S. mili-
tary” (Adelman 2003). Of course, all these assessments proved to be misguided, not because the
invasion was a failure —it was, in fact, a success— but rather because the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein did not represent the end of the conflict. Soon after the defeat of the Iraqi military, a fierce
insurgency emerged against American occupation. Ultimately, the Operation Iraqi Freedom caused
4,804, fatalities among the US-led coalition, with the peak number of fatalities occurring some 4
years after the declared end of hostilities (iCasualties 2012).2
That uncertainly exists in war and peace is nothing new (Blainey 1973, Fearon 1995, Gartzke
1999). However, this uncertainty exists both in war and in its aftermath. More than a mere byprod-
uct of conflict, resistance can be decisive factor in inter-state war. Consider, for example, that the
1There were, no doubt, many dissenting opinions within the American national security establishment regarding the
wisdom of intervening in Iraq. Political manipulation also played a role in preventing more informed risk assessment
(see Kaufmann 2004).
2Academics have been equally bad at predicting insurgencies. A statistical model developed by Bennett and Stam
correctly predicted the duration of the conventional phase of the 2003 Iraq War but missed the insurgency that ulti-
mately caused more military fatalities than the conventional phase of the conflict (Bennett and Stam 1996, 2006).
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longest war in US history, the Afghanistan War, was mainly resistance to occupation. The variation
in resistance presents a real puzzle for International Relations scholars and a potential challenge
for states. Ultimately, policy-makers need to know the risks of occupation prior to interventions,
and to adopt appropriate measures to mitigate these risks should intervention be deemed neces-
sary.
1.2 Explanations and Shortfalls
While there are numerous historical accounts of resistance to occupation, and renewed interest in
the topic of insurgency and counterinsurgency as a result of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the
field of International Relations (and Comparative Politics) offers relatively few systematic expla-
nations of this phenomenon.3 What explanations do exist can be divided into three categories:
nationalism, opportunity structure, and international context. Nationalism is the most common
explanation of resistance to occupation (in this dissertation, I refer specifically to civic national-
ism). Nationalism is the ideology that political and national boundaries should be congruent. By
violating this principle, occupiers generate resentment that is translated into violence. According
to opportunity structures theories, nationalism may well motivate resistance, but rational individ-
uals are also sensitive to factors that shape the relative costs of such an undertaking, such as mil-
itary capacity, terrain, economic conditions, foreign support, and social structures. International
context theories tend to emphasize the role of the threat environment. Occupied populations may
come to accept foreign occupation as a temporary evil, so long as it protects them from the threat
posed by third-party states.
I argue that these explanations fail to explain variation in resistance to occupation. Ideological
explanations of resistance, such as nationalism, tend to over-predict the likelihood of resistance
while under-predicting their location. Moreover, they fail to account for the anomaly that many
individuals actively seek to collaborate with, rather than fight against, foreign occupiers. Oppor-
tunity structure theories, for their part, fail to explain why the same countries exhibit different
levels of resistance to different occupiers when structural characteristics remain constant. Lastly,
international context theory relies too heavily on the perception of third-party threats, which are
3Notable exceptions include Edelstein 2004, 2008a; and Darden Forthcoming.
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relatively rare, and whose perception often varies within the occupied state itself. All in all, these
explanations tend to emphasize the characteristics of the occupied state rather than those of the
occupying force.
1.3 Argument
The central claim of this dissertation is that resistance is not simply a nationalist reflex to occupa-
tion: the nature and the behavior of occupiers also matter in explaining resistance. Specifically, I
argue that resistance can be explained by political dislocation and the breakdown in trust between
occupiers and occupied societies.
I begin by positing that under most circumstances, resistance to occupation should be deemed
irrational. Violent resistance is a dangerous activity for individuals and their communities and
occupations are usually temporary. Moreover, occupation does not necessarily lead to a deteriora-
tion of governance quality, and resistance does not necessarily shorten the period of occupation. If
occupied populations could obtain guarantees that occupation would be peaceful and temporary,
individuals should rationally choose to wait for occupiers to leave rather than fight.
Resistance may become a rational course of action when these assumptions break down. First,
groups might undertake resistance when occupiers permanently weaken their political power
within occupied society, what I call political dislocation. Political dislocation can take the form
of leadership decapitation, regime change, or broader social and economic reforms, among oth-
ers. Occupiers sometimes undertake political dislocation in a bid to address the root causes of
conflict with the occupied state, and therefore to secure their gains over the longer term. While
affected groups would have preferred to wait rather than fight, political dislocation forces them to
choose between resistance and a permanent reduction of their political clout. Indeed, resistance is
usually only undertaken by certain segments of the occupied society, and such resistance is usu-
ally organized along political lines. A corollary of political dislocation theory is that resistance is
not simply a way of achieving national liberation, but also as a way of gaining political power
within occupied society itself. The political and security vacuum in the aftermath of occupation
pushes groups to arm to protect their interests. In so doing, they may clash in an effort to rule
post-occupation societies, what I call the factional politics dimension of resistance. This helps ex-
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plain why resistance groups often fight against each other even when they should rationally pool
their resources against numerically superior occupying forces. It also helps explain the robust
empirical connection between occupation, foreign imposed regime change, and post-occupation
civil war (Reiter and Peic 2010, Downes 2011). Thus, political dislocation theory focuses on the
domestic balance of power within occupied societies to explain resistance.
Second, resistance may emerge in response to a breakdown in trust in occupied societies. Oc-
cupiers and occupied exist in a state of anarchy: there is nothing to hold occupiers to account
should they victimize occupied civilians or fail to vacate occupied territory. This generates an
inherent level of mistrust and animosity towards occupiers. Occupiers that victimize the pop-
ulation of the occupying state are more likely to generate resistance. Indeed, when faced with
the prospect of indiscriminate punishment, citizens of occupied states will turn to resistance as a
strategy of survival. Moreover, the “type” of occupying state varies on spectrum from predatory
to benign and it may be difficult for occupied populations to discern which type of occupier they
face. Factors that allow occupiers to credibly commit their benign intentions should be expected
to reduce the likelihood of resistance. I propose three such factors: regime type, international or-
ganization mandate, and religious affinity, can help assure local populations that the use of force
will be restrained and judicious. They do so by providing greater transparency, oversight, checks,
balances, and guarantees to the occupied population.
In sum I provide a novel theoretical framework, one based on the nature and behavior of oc-
cupying forces, to explain variation in resistance to occupation. Unlike nationalist explanations of
resistance to occupation, which effectively treat resistance as a public good, political dislocation
and trust theories understand resistance as a private good or a club good, intended to promote the
political interest of specific groups or to protect those who join resistance groups. In many ways
the competing explanations of political dislocation, trust and victimization, and nationalism cor-
respond to Hobbes’ explanations of the causes of war, namely competition, diffidence (insecurity),
and glory. According to Hobbes: “The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety;
and the third, for reputation” ([1651] 1994, 62).
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1.4 Outline
With these hypotheses in mind, I then set out to explain the phenomenon of resistance to occupa-
tion as follows. In Chapter 2, I frame the parameters of the debate by defining the terms resistance
and occupation. This task is essential since both occupation and resistance are highly politicized
terms and how one conceives of the universe of cases could affect findings. I focus narrowly on
violent resistance to occupation, with a specific interest in fatalities incurred by occupying forces.
While non-violent resistance in undoubtedly significant, and in many instances effective, violent
resistance is politically salient and more consistently recorded (for an theory of non-violent re-
sistance see Chenoweth and Stephan 2008, 2011). I define occupation as the stationing of armed
forces by a state or an intergovernmental organization in all or part of a foreign state‘s territory
for at least one month, exercising coercive authority over the local population. This definition
includes certain kinds of peacekeeping but excludes the domination of separatist groups, what I
term “domestic occupation.” After reviewing the various types of occupations and their causes,
I take stock of existing theories of resistance to occupation and their limitations. Chapter 3 then
outlines in greater detail the main arguments of this dissertation.
Having set the parameters of the debate and advanced my hypotheses, I then turn to test-
ing my theory empirically using quantitative and qualitative data. Chapter 4 presents a novel
dataset of resistance to occupation. Based on extensive primary and secondary sources, I identify
every foreign occupation worldwide from 1900 until 2010 — 163 in total. This dataset presents
an unprecedented overview of the history of occupation, including the location and duration of
occupation, the number of occupier-force fatalities, and a series of other variables. The descriptive
statistics indicate that violent resistance to occupation tends to be the exception rather than the
norm. The median occupation generates just under 20 fatalities. Moreover, I note the qualitative
evolution of occupations, which are becoming more multilateral and less likely to emerge from
wars of aggression.
A key methodological challenge in assessing the causal effect of political dislocation and trust
is the risk of selection bias. This could occur if potential occupiers systematically avoided invad-
ing countries they expected to generate fierce resistance, thereby leading to a biased sample. I
tackle potential selection bias through a two-stage process. First, I model the onset of occupa-
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tion, looking at every country in the international system for every year going back to 1900 and
then saving the predicted probabilities of the model. Second, I test whether the predicted prob-
ability of occupation has a statistically significant effect on resistance to occupation, controlling
for other relevant factors. I find that the predicted probability of occupation fails to register any
statistically significant effect, thereby assuaging concerns that selection bias is driving the results.
Employing this dataset of occupation as well as a battery of controls, I then test competing the-
ories of resistance to occupation. I find support for political dislocation and trust theory, partial
support for opportunity structures, and little or no systematic effect for nationalism or the inter-
national context. I conclude this chapter by conducting survival analysis of occupation duration,
in order to see whether the factors that affect the virulence of resistance also affect the duration
of occupations. Although I do find that the motivation of occupation (liberation, aggression, in-
vited intervention), affects the duration of occupation, the survival model does not find that the
predictors of resistance intensity are related to those of occupation duration.
The cross-national quantitative evidence provides a first cut at understanding resistance to
occupation. But could the findings be spurious? Moreover, resistance varies within, as well as
across states, and this variation can tell us something about its causes. Chapter 5 therefore takes a
mixed methods approach to resistance in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Drawing on geo-
spatial data, I model the factors determining regional variations in resistance. The findings are
powerful, if counter-intuitive: more than poverty or terrain, political dislocation is the greatest
predictor of resistance. Resistance was not national, but largely concentrated in those areas in-
habited by Pashtuns, where the Taliban traditionally found bases of support. This indicates that
unless reconciliation efforts gain traction, no amount of economic development is likely to end the
insurgency. Moreover, since resistance efforts can be seen as a contest for power within Afghan
society, the end of occupation is likely to lead to civil war rather than peace.
But is Afghanistan unique? In order to see if these findings are generalizable, I select four well-
predicted cases from the cross-national chapter for deeper qualitative analysis. The selected cases
of Lithuania, Cambodia, and Lebanon represent a geographic and temporal cross-section of the
universe of occupations. They also provide within-case variation, as these states were occupied
several times during the period under study.
Chapter 6 examines the Soviet and German occupations of Lithuania between 1940 and 1953.
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Table 1.1: Case studies










Both the Soviet Union and Germany faced resistance, but they faced resistance from different
groups within Lithuanian society. For instance, resistance to German occupation was organized
by Communists and Jews fearing persecution, while right wing Lithuanian “nationalists” actively
collaborated with Nazi rule. In contrast, resistance to Soviet occupation was undertaken by a
broad spectrum of disenfranchised wealthier landowners, industrialists, and traditional political
parties who stood to lose from radical Soviet reforms, as well as Poles who resented the allocation
of Polish-inhabited territory to Lithuania. Interestingly, resistance groups feared and often fought
against each other, as they struggled to rule post-occupation Lithuania. The case of Lithuania also
demonstrates the role of trust and victimization: many Lithuanians did not take up arms against
the Soviet Union or Germany until the advent of forced deportation and the Holocaust. Religion
also provided occupied a prism through which to understand the intentions of occupying forces,
and the Catholic church proved to be an enable of resistance to Soviet rule.
Chapter 7 turns to Southeast Asia and the Vietnamese and UN occupations of Cambodia be-
tween 1979 and 1993. Cambodia is an ideal laboratory of occupation, as Vietnam and the UN
undertook different approaches to ruling the same foreign country. Whereas Vietnam installed a
pliant communist regime and excluded all other factions from power, the UN set out to conduct
elections and democratic reform. As political dislocation would predict, Vietnam faced resistance
among marginalized and disenfranchised monarchist, republican, and Khmer Rouge factions of
Cambodian society. The UN, in contrast, only experienced resistance from the Khmer Rouge,
which expected to gain more from spoiling the democratic process than from taking part in it.
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This case study also illustrates the role of trust in resistance. Whereas the UN could credibly guar-
antee to leave Cambodia promptly (some would say too promptly), many Cambodians feared
that Vietnam had come to colonize their country permanently and to brutalize its population. The
organization of the UN, as well as the democratic norms that governed the largest contributors to
UNTAC, helped assure a degree of oversight and accountability. As a consequence, the UN faced
far less resistance than did Vietnam.
Chapter 8 compares the occupations of Lebanon by Syria, Israel, the Multinational Forces, and
UNIFIL between 1976 and 2010. Lebanon is a deeply divided society that experienced sectarian
civil war during much of the period under study. The polarization of Lebanese society made
political factions particularly sensitive to the effects of political dislocation. Indeed resistance,
by Maronite Christians, Sunnis, Shias, and Druze was determined primarily by the impact of
occupation on the domestic balance of power. Many of these factions closely collaborated with
foreign occupiers when it suited their interests, as was the case with the Maronites and Israel or
the Shia and Syria. The case of Lebanon also provides strong indications of the risk of factional
politics in resistance struggles. Warring groups within Lebanon sought to check the influence of
their rivals, as much as that of their occupiers. For much of its occupation, UNIFIL managed to
maintain the trust of local factions, whereas the Multinational Forces led by the US, France, and
Italy suffered major resistance once they decided to take sides in the conflict.
Chapter 9 concludes by arguing that far from receding into the dustbin of history, foreign oc-
cupation will remain a tool of modern statecraft, albeit geared to address a different set of strategic
and humanitarian challenges. I also put forward a number of policy recommendations and pro-
pose avenues for further research.
1.5 Contribution
This dissertation makes a contribution to both academia and policy. It provides the first and only
dataset of every foreign occupation over the last century, which helps understand the extent of the
phenomenon as well as its qualitative evolution. Moreover, by collecting data on the number of
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occupier-force fatalities it also provides a first cut at understanding the true costs of occupation.4
This, in turn, helps overcome availability bias that might occur by focusing solely on widely-
publicized incidences of violent resistance to occupation (peaceful occupation, especially by non-
Western countries rarely garner media attention) (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). In addition,
this dissertation provides the first cross-national quantitative analysis of resistance to occupation.
While there exist many accounts of occupation in specific countries, regions, or conflicts, there
exists no comprehensive quantitative analysis of resistance to foreign occupation.
Second, this dissertation provides a novel theoretical framework for understanding resistance
to occupation. I undertake the only systematic review of the theoretical literature and propose
theories of resistance based on domestic politics in the occupied state and the nature and behavior
of the occupier. Usually understood as being a manifestation of nationalism, I demonstrate that
resistance in fact reflects a wider array of motives. This theoretical framework also helps bridge
the academic literature in International Relations and Comparative Politics. Indeed, foreign oc-
cupation is often a product of interstate war or foreign intervention, while resistance is often a
product of intrastate politics as well as the socio-economic factors often associated with civil wars.
Third, this dissertation provides policy-makers with a tool to better understand and predict
resistance to occupation. As discussed above, policy-makers have limited systematic information
on the probability of resistance, sometimes leading to costly foreign policy mistakes. At a time
when foreign interventions –including occupations– remain a policy option, understanding these
risks is as important as ever. Indeed, once states commit troops, they may fall prey to a “com-
mitment trap.” If and when they face violent resistance to occupation, moderately committed
states may maintain or increase their military commitment out of fear of losing face or displaying
weakness towards resistance groups. Poorly planned occupations can take lives of their own as
reputational concerns push occupiers to increase their commitment well beyond their initial polit-
ical aims, thereby making occupations more costly and resistance struggles harder to resolve. In
order to avoid this commitment trap, the risks of foreign occupation are therefore best assessed
prior to the commitment of troops to the ground.
4A more comprehensive account would identify both dead and wounded military casualties, as well as the civilian
casualties of occupation, which are often significant though less well documented.
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1.6 Caveats
This dissertation is ambitious in its scope but retains a number of caveats. It does not examine the
morality of occupation. Cognizant of the misery and suffering commonly caused by foreign occu-
pation (and that this suffering can lead to resistance), I do not examine the morality of occupation.
I treat the issue as an empirical puzzle, not a normative problem. Conversely, I do not assume
all resistance to occupation is inherently righteous. As I hope to demonstrate, resistance doesn’t
always seek to advance the public good, however it may be defined.
This dissertation also doesn’t seek to explain why occupations succeed or fail.5 I treat the
empirical question of why occupations generate resistance as separate from the political question
of what constitutes occupation success. Whether the costs of occupation are deemed acceptable
depends to a great degree on the objectives sought and the importance attached to such objectives.
Similarly, this dissertation does not seek to explain why resistance succeeds or fails. Mirroring the
question of occupation success and failure, the success of resistance depends to a large degree on
the willingness of occupiers to assume the costs necessary to achieve the objectives of occupation.
It cannot simply be deduced from the intensity of resistance. Moreover, it is difficult to identify
the causal link between the intensity of resistance and the end of occupation. For instance, did
the occupier relent because of resistance, in spite of resistance, or for other reasons entirely (e.g.
domestic considerations)? Lastly, this dissertation doesn’t answer how many troops are necessary
in order to stabilize an occupied territory. The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand
the causes of resistance, and to draw attention to the role of domestic politics, victimization, and
trust in the generation of political violence under occupation.
5This task is undertaken by Edelstein 2008a.
Chapter 2
Occupation and Resistance: Framing the
Issue
”The aggressor is always peace loving. . . He would always prefer to take over the country un-
opposed.”
-Carl von Clausewitz, On War 1
2.1 Introduction
The terms occupation and resistance tend to be emotive and politically charged. Precisely for
this reason groups and social movements often seek to appropriate these terms to advance social,
economic, or political goals. In order to provide the conceptual clarity necessary to undertake a
rigorous analysis of resistance, this chapter seeks to define and survey the academic literature on
resistance and occupation. First, I explain why resistance to occupation should be studied sepa-
rately from interstate and civil war. Second, I provide a working definition of the term occupation,
the unit of analysis of this study. I also provide a typology of occupations and seek to explain basic
variation in types of occupations. Third, I provide a working definition of the term resistance, the
main dependent variable of this study. Fourth, I take stock of existing theories of resistance to oc-
cupation, namely: nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context. For each theory,
1Clausewitz [1832] 2007, 370.
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I then note some of their main critiques and drawbacks. Although resistance is a significant issue
in international relations, I conclude that the concept has to date been poorly defined and that
existing theories provide only part of the answer. In the next chapter, I will introduce the theories
of political dislocation and trust to better explain variation in resistance to occupation.
2.2 Why Study Occupation Separately?
A legitimate question to ask is why study occupation separately from other forms of violent po-
litical conflict. After all, resistance is often an extension of interstate war and may even occur in
parallel with interstate war. There already exists a rich literature on civil wars and insurgencies,
much of which incorporates resistance struggles. Lastly, if occupations are not distinct or unique,
analyzing them in isolation might lead to inefficient or biased statistical estimates because we are
arbitrarily restricting analysis to a subsample of the data (Sambanis 2004, 261). What then makes
resistance to occupation different?
Resistance to occupation lies at the intersection of interstate and civil war, and yet is distinct
from each in significant ways. It is distinct from interstate wars because of the massive asymme-
tries of power involved. Even when resistance groups emerge to contest occupation, the occupier
is usually militarily dominant. Resistance groups are irregular and ad hoc since few countries
train citizens to take up arms once their national armies have been defeated. Such power imbal-
ances usually compel resisters to employ asymmetric tactics such as guerrilla warfare, sabotage,
and, occasionally, terrorism.2 On a political level, occupations are distinct from interstate war
since they may involve the direct administration of territory. In short, the actors, the tactics, and
the political roles of occupations are different from those of interstate wars.
Occupations are distinct from civil wars because, by definition, they involve foreign actors.
We should expect this to affect the dynamics of conflict since occupations emerge from an exoge-
nous process (usually interstate war), rather than an endogenous contest for power. Unlike civil
wars, both the occupier and the occupied are recognized members of the international commu-
nity. Occupations are regulated differently than civil wars under international law. The Hague
2The term guerrilla derives from Spanish, meaning “little war.” It emerged to describe resistance against Napoleon‘s
occupation of Spain beginning in 1808.
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Regulations and Geneva Conventions lay out specific roles and responsibilities for the occupier
and occupied. Many aspects of these conventions have no corresponding application to civil war.
Finally, occupations are unique insofar as they are meant to be temporally limited under inter-
national law. Similarly, unlike civil wars, occupiers can always leave the country. As will be
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the distinction between occupations and interstate
and civil wars are significant because they affect the strategic choices faced by relevant actors and
therefore the incentives to assume risk in undertaking resistance.
2.3 Occupation
2.3.1 Defining Occupation
Occupation is the unit of analysis of this dissertation. But what exactly do we mean when we
speak of occupation? This question is far from esoteric. Aside from understanding the impetus of
resistance, the application of the term has legal and moral implications.
Definitions of occupation in academia and international law are many and sometimes contra-
dictory. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land states: “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of
the hostile army.” According to the British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict: “classically, this
[belligerent occupation] refers to the occupation of enemy territory, that is, when a belligerent in
an armed conflict is in control of some of the adversary‘s territory and is directly responsible for
administering that territory” (MOD 2005). In a study on success and failure in military occupa-
tions, Edelstein defines occupation as: “the temporary control of a territory by a state (or group of
allied states) that makes no claim to permanent sovereignty over that territory” (2004, 52). Edel-
stein also notes: “the intended duration of a military occupation must be temporary and finite”
(2008a, 3). A major problem with Edelstein‘s definition of occupation is that it requires some
subjective knowledge of the state‘s intent at the onset of occupation. Such knowledge may be
impossible, especially since intentions may shift over time. Additionally, many well-known and
controversial occupations are not temporary and gradually become annexations. In a study of the
international law of occupation, Benvenisti defines military occupation as “the effective control of
a power. . . over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the violation of the
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sovereignty of that territory” (1993, 4). As will be discussed later, the issue of violation is highly
problematic in the context of foreign coercion. In his overview of the term, Roberts defines occu-
pations as “operations involving the armed forces of a state exercising some kind of domination or
authority over inhabited territory outside its borders” (1984, 300). Pape defines occupation as “the
exertion of political control over territory by an outside group” (2005, 83). He further adds that
the critical requirement is that the occupying power‘s political control must depend on employing
coercive assets that are controlled from outside the occupied territory. Occupation is deemed to
come to an end when an occupant withdraws from a territory, or is driven out of it (Oppenheim
1952).
It is important to be careful in defining occupation since its definition determines the universe
of relevant cases, which in turn can affect the findings of any analysis of resistance to occupation.
For the purpose of this dissertation, occupation is defined as: The stationing of armed forces by
a state or an intergovernmental organization in all or part of a foreign state‘s territory for at least one
month, exercising coercive authority over the local population. Occupation is distinct from interstate
war since one of the belligerents (the occupier) is no longer fighting the organized military forces
of the opposing state.3 In order to code this distinction consistently, in the case of interstate war
occupation is deemed to begin one month after the cessation of hostilities with the organized
military forces of the occupied state on enemy territory.
This definition attempts, as much as possible, to establish clear and replicable criteria for iden-
tifying cases of occupations. This definition is cumbersome, however, so it is useful to unpack its
component parts. First the stationing of armed forces of a state on the territory of another state is a
fundamental requirement of occupation, distinguishing it from other types of state activity such as
diplomatic postings, which involve stationing on foreign territory without a military function, and
airstrikes and naval operations, which involve a military function without stationing on foreign
territory. Second, occupations are conducted by states or intergovernmental organizations. Thus,
even the extensive presence of non-state actors, such as Hezbollah in South Lebanon or the PLO
in Jordan during the 1970s, do not constitute occupation. Third, consistent with the Hague Regu-
3When occupiers face resistance, it is generally not the organized military forces of the state. One potential exception
was the use by the Soviet Union of partisan forces in German-occupied territory. These forces were trained in the USSR
and deployed by the Soviet Union behind German enemy lines.
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lations, occupation can involve partial or complete control of foreign territory. Complete control
is not a prerequisite for occupation. Fourth, occupations take place on foreign territory, in states
that were independent prior to occupation. This distinction is made for legal and methodological
reasons. Under international law, separatist groups and colonies cannot claim to be “occupied” by
a central government, though they may still seek self-determination. Methodologically, in order
to understand the causes of resistance to occupation, it is important to look at cases where there
was resistance and at null cases where no resistance occurred. Therefore, it is necessary to estab-
lish the universe of potential cases. Independent states constitute a bounded universe of cases.
Sub-national separatist groups, in contrast, do not constitute a bounded universe of cases. Theo-
retically, the number of separatist groups could be as large as the population itself. It is impossible
to know a priori all potential separatist groups within a territory or to measure variables of interest
pertaining to all such groups. Therefore, occupation is only deemed to occur on the territory of
foreign states. Sixth, occupation occurs after the cessation of such hostilities. This feature distin-
guishes occupation from interstate war. It is important to note that occupation in one geographic
area can occur while states continue interstate war in another area. This is consistent with the con-
cept that territorial control need not be complete in order for occupation to occur. Moreover, not
all occupations occur after interstate hostilities. Some occupations occur to prevent or curtail civil
wars. Lastly, and most critically, the definition of occupation requires foreign forces to exercise
independent coercive authority over the local population. These functions can involve policing
and crowd control, governance and administration, or direct military activities such as counter-
insurgency. This distinguishes occupation from more circumscribed military activities such as
defending embassies, evacuating foreign nationals, providing military advisors to foreign states,
or establishing purely logistical military bases.
The definition and application of occupation is frequently contested. Occupiers have become
increasingly reluctant to refer to their activities explicitly as occupation. While not completely
banned under international law, occupations are increasingly seen as illegitimate (Zacher 2001).
The legitimacy of occupation has been challenged by prohibitions on the use of force, the sanc-
tity of state borders, and the widening practice of democracy. Rather than defining an objective
condition in International Relations, the term has acquired negative moral connotations. Upon
taking over as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, Paul Bremer stated: “Occu-
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pation is an ugly word, not one Americans feel comfortable with, but it is a fact” (Wilson 2003).
States have argued against the label of occupation on the basis that an occupation was conducted
in self-defense or to support human rights in a foreign country. However, intentions can never be
verified. Therefore, international law has considered occupation as a question of fact, not intent
(Chesterman 2004b, 61).4
The concept of occupation tends to be intertwined with the concept of resistance. Occupations
are more likely to be seen as such when they face resistance, because resistance movements claim
to be fighting against the exercise of illegitimate foreign rule. However, the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention clearly states that the laws of occupation apply “even if the. . . occupation meets with no
armed resistance” (1949). Resistance need not occur for the presence of foreign troops to be consid-
ered an occupation. Identifying occupation based on the presence of resistance causes selection
bias. By overlooking peaceful occupations, it leads to the false conclusion that all occupations
cause resistance. Alternatively, tying occupation to resistance would overlook the most brutal
cases of occupation where resistance is deterred by fear of retaliation (Willard-Foster 2009, 36).
According to Schelling ([1966] 2008, 30) “A well-behaved occupied country is not one in which
violence plays no part; it may be one in which latent violence is used so skillfully that it need not
be spent in punishment.”5
The concept of occupation also needs to be separated from the concept of state consent. States
occasionally invite foreign troops to occupy part of their territory in order to address domestic
security crises. The British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict excludes from its definition of
occupation liberation of allied territory, international administration of territory by the UN, and
the presence of armed forces in another state in accordance with some treaty or agreement (MOD
2005). This distinction is moot, however. Invited occupations share virtually all the characteristics
of imposed occupation, bar consent. Even consent can be cajoled, manipulated, or coerced. For
4Interestingly occupiers may resist this appellation because international law assigns costly responsibilities on the
occupier. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations imposes burdens on the occupier to restore and maintain public order
and civil life, including public welfare, in an occupied territory. During the multilateral UNITAF mission in Somalia
in 1992-1993 Australian forces recognized the application of the law of occupation. However the commanders of the
UNITAF subsequently rejected recognition in order to restrict broader responsibility in what it considered to be a strictly
humanitarian mission (Stirk 2009, 50).
5Lyall (2010a, 178) makes a mistake in this regard by arguing that “military occupation is typically a losing proposi-
tion” because he observes that occupiers are less likely to defeat insurgencies than native counter-insurgents. However,
Lyall‘s assessment selects on the dependent variable: occupiers may be less successful counterinsurgents, but the vast
majority of occupiers never face a sustained insurgency to begin with, therefore not factoring into his analysis.
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example, the process of Anschluss in Austria was sanctioned by a legislative act that was subject
to ratification by a plebiscite in Austria. Prior to the plebiscite, Social Democrat and Communists
dissenters, as well as Jews, were imprisoned or sent to concentration camps. Ballots were not
secret and highly misleading (see Figure 2.1). While consent was technically sought and obtained,
it was meaningless in the shadow of coercion.
Figure 2.1: Ballot from 10 April 1938 Austrian plebiscite. The ballot reads: ”Do you agree with the reunification of
Austria with the German Reich that was enacted on 13 March 1938, and do you vote for the party of our leader Adolf
Hitler?” Note that the large circle indicates ”yes” and the smaller circle indicates ”no”.
In some instances, invited interventions slide into imposed occupations, as the invited troops
remain beyond their mandate. Moreover, reflecting a growing consensus among international
legal scholars, certain multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations constitute oc-
cupations under this definition (Chesterman 2004a; 2004b; Ratner 2005; Fox 2007; Stahn 2008;
Edelstein 2008a. For a contrary view see Sasso`li 2005). Consider, for example, “robust” peace-
keeping operations such UNMIL and UNAMSIL in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively. These
missions involved troops deployed overseas to patrol territory, police the local population, and
tackle rebel groups. Though the assignment of legal responsibility is more complex, the act of
occupation is essentially the same (Marten 2004).
As a matter of policy, the UN seeks to obtain consent from the occupied state. However, even
with the UN, such consent can be obtained under strong international pressure. In other circum-
stances multilateral humanitarian interventions occur precisely because there is no functioning
local government that could provide consent (Fox 2007, 10). Ultimately, the definition of occupa-
tion proposed here relies as much as possible on the actual behavior of states, which can be more
CHAPTER 2. OCCUPATION AND RESISTANCE: FRAMING THE ISSUE 21
easily observed and measured, rather than their intentions, which cannot.
2.3.2 Typology of Occupation
This section outlines a typology of occupation. There exists great variation among occupations.
Some are short, bloodless, and limited, while others are protracted, vicious, and radically restruc-
ture the occupied polity. On a broad level, occupations can be distinguished by two central at-
tributes: their context and their objectives. The context describes the origins of the occupation.
The objective describes the policies undertaken by occupiers.
Context
Occupations emerge from aggression, retaliation, liberation, or invited intervention. First, occu-
pation can be the result of state aggression when a state initiates the invasion of another state‘s
territory. Aggression can be pursued for a variety of objectives such as expanding territory, plun-
dering, responding to perceived security needs, conducting humanitarian intervention in support
of a subnational group, or promoting an ideology. Examples of occupation in the context of ag-
gression include the Libyan invasion of the Aouzou Strip in Chad in 1973 and the Iraqi occupation
of Kuwait in 1990. Aggression can at times occur without a shot being fired, through the threat of
the use of force.
Second, occupation can be the result of retaliation when a state responds to aggression by
another state by occupying all or part of the aggressor‘s territory. Retaliatory occupation may
serve to defeat the enemy‘s army, to remove its leadership, to change its regime, or to annex it
altogether. The difference between aggression and retaliation is mainly one of sequence rather
than intent. Aggression initiates an interstate dispute whereas retaliation succeeds it.
Third, occupation can be the outcome of liberation. Liberation, occurs when a first state in-
vades a territory of a second state to liberate it from occupation by a third state. Examples of
occupation in the context of liberation include the UN occupation of East Timor between 1999 and
2002.
Lastly, occupation can result of invited intervention by the occupied state. States jealously
guard their sovereignty, but at times invite temporary foreign occupation in order to help counter
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domestic or foreign threats. For example, during the North Yemen civil war, republican President
Abdullah al-Sallal called upon Egyptian support to defeat royalist forces. Both liberation and
invited intervention involve foreign forces occupying territory in favor of the occupied state. The
key distinction between the two is the locus of sovereignty. Liberation occurs when the occupied
state has already lost sovereignty. Invited intervention occurs when the occupied state retains
sovereignty.6
Objectives
The objectives of occupation can involve decapitation of leadership, regime change, nation-building,
or annexation. Occupation can also be the residual outcome of interstate conflict. The objectives
of occupation are often nested. Annexation necessarily involves regime change, decapitation, and
tactical occupation. Nation building can involve regime change and decapitation, and so forth.
The following section describes the different objectives of occupations, listed from least to most
intrusive.
Tactical Occupation. First, occupation can be tactical. In the course of conflict, states invade
foreign territory to engage military forces, hold strategically important terrain, or neutralize en-
emy economic resources, infrastructure, and communications. Here, invasion is purely a military
instrument. Not all occupations are imposed. States occasionally call upon allies to help quell
domestic unrest. For example, in 1968, 1973, 1978, and 1983, Chad called upon France to help
suppress FROLINAT (Tanca 1993). The US‘s role in South Vietnam was also ostensibly to support
the existing regime. Sullivan and Karreth term these occupations as “foreign regime maintenance
interventions” (2010). Weak or failing states have also invited regional and international organi-
zations to maintain law and order and build institutions. For example, in 1999 the Democratic
Republic of Congo requested that the UN send troops to help police its restive eastern provinces
(Prunier 2009). Whether invited or not, tactical occupations tend to impose temporary or regional
military administration and leave the political and administrative structure in place.
Residual Occupation. At the end of an interstate conflict, foreign military forces find themselves
6As with other political phenomena, context is highly controversial. Context is tied to legitimacy, and legitimacy
affects the social costs of foreign policy. States have strong incentives to manipulate the perceived context of occupation.
No state wants to be labeled as an aggressor. Instead, they will seek to have aggression masquerade as liberation.
Similarly, states will seek to portray aggression as retaliation to some action undertaken by the occupied state.
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on enemy territory. Residual occupation reflects the simple fact that it takes time to redeploy
military forces from theaters of operation. For example, at the end of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese
War, Chinese forces were 15-20 kilometers into Northern Vietnam before withdrawing back to
Chinese territory (Jencks 1979). Residual occupation corresponds most closely to the principles of
occupation outlined under the Hague Convention. Indeed, delegates to the Hague Convention
saw occupation as a transient situation, for short periods between end of hostilities and signing
of peace treaty. The Hague convention‘s focus on temporary occupation made sense given the
patterns of warfare during the 19th century (Benvenisti 1993, 16). Because this dissertation only
counts occupations lasting at least one month, it includes few residual occupations.
Decapitation. Third, occupiers can decapitate the leadership of the occupied state. Decapitation
is usually only possible if the occupier controls most of the enemy territory including the capital
or if occupiers happen to capture the leader of the enemy state. The purpose of decapitation is
to mete punishment, strengthen deterrence, and ensure a sustainable outcome to the dispute. At
war‘s end occupying leaders, forces, or domestic audiences may demand to punish those it consid-
ers responsible for conflict by removing them from power, pushing them into exile, or executing
them. Leadership decapitation can also serve to deter other foreign leaders from undertaking
undesirable courses of action by raising the potential personal costs of conflict.7
Regime Change. Fourth, occupiers can undertake regime change in the occupied state. Unlike
decapitation, regime change involves removing both the incumbent leader and the institutions
for selecting leaders or organizing society. Regime change can be accompanied by other mea-
sures such as the formal renunciation of war as an instrument of policy, banning the deployment
of troops outside national borders, or accepting limits on the size of the military. For example,
in 1944, US Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau had planned to permanently incapacitate
Germany by abolishing its military, annexing its main centers of mining and industry, disman-
tling all heavy industry, and dismembering its territory into two independent states (Beschloss
2003). Similarly, following the Second World War in Japan, the US Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers (SCAP) sought to bury Japanese industrial militarism by disbanding the army and
breaking up the Zaibatsu conglomerates (Dower 2000). As such, regime change seeks to hardwire
7Leadership decapitation can have unintended consequences. See Goemans 2000 and Downs and Rocke 1995.
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pacifism into the constitutions or laws of defeated nations.8
Nation Building. Fifth, in conjunction with decapitation and regime change, occupiers can un-
dertake nation-building in occupied territory, what Edelstein terms “comprehensive occupation”
(2004, 53). Nation building involves reinforcing the capacity of the state to carry out security and
governance functions. A prime example of nation-building occupation is US/International Secu-
rity and Assistance Force (ISAF)‘s occupation of Afghanistan since 2001. Having overthrown the
Taliban regime, the international community sought to strengthen the capacity of the Afghan gov-
ernment in order to prevent the Taliban from recapturing power and terrorist groups from using
the territory of Afghanistan as a staging point for attacks on the West. As with tactical occupations,
not all nation-building occupations are imposed. Poor, weak, and vulnerable states may request
the support of foreign states or international organizations in order to spur economic growth and
strengthen state institutions in order to maintain domestic security.9
Annexation. Fifth, occupying states may annex the occupied state. Unlike decapitation, regime
change or nation-building, annexation entails the permanent loss of sovereignty of all or part
of the occupied territory. There has been a secular decline in the number of annexations since
1945, due to innovations in military technology and changes in international law. Militarily, the
emergence of nuclear weapons, extended nuclear deterrence by nuclear-armed allies, as well as
cheaper, lighter, and more effective conventional weapons have raised the cost of both war and
annexation (Mueller 1989, Sagan and Waltz 2002). Changes in international law in the later half
of the 20th century have reinforced the concept of state sovereignty and the immutability of state
borders. Article II of the 1945 UN Charter instructs member states to “refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN
1945). The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations from 1970 states:
8It should be noted that regime change of occupied territory is technically illegal under the laws of war. Article
43 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land states: “The authority of the
legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power
to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country” (emphasis added).
9Of course the occupier‘s intention to pursue nation-building by no means entails that nation-building will succeed.
Nation building is not a “settled technology, like building bridges or removing gallbladders” (Payne 2005, 14).
CHAPTER 2. OCCUPATION AND RESISTANCE: FRAMING THE ISSUE 25
“the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force
in contravention of the provisions of the Charter” (UN 1970). Thus since the Second World War,
occupation and occupation law itself has seemed at odds with other core tenets of international
law (Chesterman 2004b, 51). In many ways, the increase of “transformative occupations” through
decapitation, regime change, and nation-building increased as a result of opposition to annexation
and colonialism (Fazal 2007).
Ambiguous. Sixth, occupying states can maintain an ambiguous policy towards occupied terri-
tory. They may undertake extended tactical occupation, without formally replacing the leadership
of the state, nor restoring full sovereign powers. The best example of this phenomenon is Israel‘s
occupation of the West Bank. Israel claims it has not annexed the West Bank. Instead, it claims
it is “holding” the disputed territory. Ambiguity has its uses. Territories held under ambiguous
occupation can be used as a political bargaining chip for other concessions. Ambiguous occupa-
tion can serve as a stepping-stone towards annexation at a time when outright annexation has
become unacceptable (Roberts 1990). Indeed, it may be difficult to distinguish indefinite tactical
occupation from annexation.
2.3.3 Explaining Variation in Types of Occupation
States undertake a range of occupations strategies with different objectives. These different types
of occupations serve to address the perceived root cause of the conflict and to overcome the cred-
ible commitment problem of the defeated state.
Commitment Problem
States generally pursue occupation to overcome commitment problems. According to Powell
(2006, 170) the commitment problem refers to a situation in international politics where states
may be unable to commit themselves to following through on an agreement and may also have
incentives to renege on it. The commitment problem is common in international politics because
of the condition of anarchy, which precludes the automatic enforcement of agreements. As noted
by Reiter (2009), credible commitment problems loom large in war termination. Although their
forces are defeated today, the defeated state cannot credibly commit to respecting the outcome of
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the war in the future once the occupier has left and their forces have regained strength. Clause-
witz‘s famous dictum is particularly relevant here: “In war the result is never final. The defeated
state may consider the outcome a ‘transitory evil’ that can be remedied as soon as capabilities
are reconstituted” ([1832] 2007, 80). Since war is costly, victors wish to ensure that the political
outcome achieved by the war is maintained in the foreseeable future. From this perspective, oc-
cupation is a way of anchoring political gains. A US Army handbook, distributed to soldiers in
occupied Germany, illustrates the commitment problem:
“Don’t forget that you’re ordered to Germany now partly because your fathers forgot
so soon what the war was about last time. They took it for granted that the friendly
reception the Germans gave them after the Armistice in 1918 proved that Germany
meant well after all. Our whole country let down its guard too easily last time” (US
Army 1944, 6-7).
Similarly, the handbook states: “The occupation of Germany will give you your chance to build
up a personal guarantee that as soon as you turn your back to go home, the German will not pick
up his shooting irons and start throwing lead and lies at an unsuspecting world once more” (US
Army 1944, 1). Ultimately, states may use occupation to install friendly leaders or regimes in order
to help overcome the credible commitment problem, at least in the near term. The next sections
discuss this point in greater detail.
Causes of War
The commitment problem provides only part of the answer of why states pursue different forms
of occupation. After all, if anarchy and the attendant commitment problem are constants in In-
ternational Relations, why is there variation in forms of occupation? The answer is the perceived
cause of war. Victors seek to overcome the commitment problem by addressing what they per-
ceive to be the root causes of the war. So long as the root causes are not addressed, war losers
cannot credibly commit to respecting its outcome. Broadly speaking, the causes of war fall un-
der the three “images” described by Waltz (1959): the individual, the state, and the international
system. Where resources permit, victors will pursue forms of occupation that seek address the
perceived cause of war.
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The first image is the individual. States will pursue a policy of decapitation (usually figura-
tively) when they believe particular leaders are the cause of conflict. For instance, in a 2002 speech
in Cincinnati outlining the case for war against Iraq, President George W. Bush argued:
“Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and must disarm. We agree that the Iraqi dictator
must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons, and
diseases, and gases, and atomic weapons” (New York Times 2002).
Although Bush was wrong about Iraq‘s possession of weapons of mass destruction, such ad
hominem attacks on opponents is common in international affairs. They highlight that victory
in war may not lead to sustainable outcomes if the leadership deemed responsible for the conflict
remains in power. After all, the leadership and its preferences remain the same and they may seek
revenge. The occupier cannot guarantee that the defeated state will remain contained should the
balance of power shift (Freedman 2006, 61; Downes 2008). Occupiers may therefore seek to ensure
a more sustainable outcome by permanently removing leaders from power and installing leaders
friendlier to their interests. A good example of decapitation occupation is the Uganda-Tanzania
War of 1978-1979. In 1978 Tanzania invaded Uganda after Ugandan President Idi Amin attempted
to annex parts of the Kagera region of Tanzania. The clash over Kagera and the subsequent inva-
sion of Uganda were the latest in a series of acrimonious disputes between the states. Seeing Amin
as irrevocably reckless and threatening, Tanzania decided to oust him once and for all (Ofcansky
1996). The same goes for occupations staged on humanitarian grounds. A state may invade and
occupy another state in order to halt human rights abuses, and overthrow the leadership to ensure
that such abuses do not reoccur as soon as the occupier leaves.
The second image is the state. Victors will pursue a policy of regime change or nation-building
when they believe the political structures and state weakness are causes of conflict. As with decap-
itation, occupiers seek regime change in order to solve credible commitment problems. Occupiers
may see not only leadership, but also the regime type of the occupied state as a root cause of con-
flict. If both leaders and regimes are a cause of conflict, replacing leaders will be insufficient to
secure post-war gains. Only a reform of the institutions for selecting leaders or organizing society
will provide the basis for sustainable gains. The most successful examples of regime change in
occupations are Germany and Japan following the Second World War. Through extensive politi-
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cal and economic reform, Western powers successfully pacified some of the most dangerous and
militaristic rivals. More broadly, empirical research indicates that peace is more likely to endure
between states following foreign imposed regime change (FIRC) (Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter 2008).
States may also impose regime change for broader ideological motives. For example, France, the
UK, and the US were deeply concerned about Bolshevik subversion in Germany and saw occu-
pation as a way to prevent negative post-war shifts in political allegiance. Similarly, Stalin noted:
“whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own
social system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise” (Djilas 1962, 114). The USSR
ensured that Eastern Europe adopted communism just as the US and the UK sought to establish
liberal democracies in Western Europe. Such transformational occupations provided physical and
ideological buffers between Cold War rivals.
Ideology aside, liberal International Relations theorists have argued there are strong pragmatic
reasons for seeking regime change. Liberal democracies, according to this school of thought, do
not go to war against each other (Kant [1795] 2003; Doyle 1986; Oneal and Russett 2001). The
task of regime change has also been adopted by international organizations under the guise of
peacebuilding. Following the end of the Cold War, the UN and other organizations such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and the Organization of American States (OAS) began playing a greater role in the reconstruction
of post-conflict states. The type of regime change implemented by international organizations
reflected a growing liberal consensus surrounding free markets and democratization as long-term
solutions to conflict and underdevelopment (Paris 2004).
Nation building is usually conducted in tandem with regime change, but reflects a distinct
cause of war. Nation building occupations reflects a deeper commitment problem in the occupied
state. Despite favorable leadership or regime type, occupied states cannot credibly commit to
respecting the outcome of the conflict if their institutional capacity is weak. The state needs to be
strong enough to resist internal and external challengers who may seek to reverse the policies or
leadership put in place by the occupier. The international context is also important. Occupiers
may undertake nation-building as a form of balancing against foreign powers or to prevent the
spillover of domestic conflicts.
The third image cause of war is the international system. The absence of a supranational au-
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thority creates a self-help system in which the resort to force is an ever present and sometimes
necessary option. Efforts a improving a state‘s security may inadvertently make other states less
secure. States view each other not according to their leaders or regimes, but by their relative ca-
pabilities. Tragically, war may occur although no state wishes it. According to the third image,
the relative distribution of capabilities and international anarchy are causes of war (Waltz 1979;
Mearsheimer 2001). The process of interstate war may destroy some of the industrial and military
capabilities of the opposing state. However, war often ends short of the total annihilation of op-
posing forces, leaving the defeated state in a position to potentially revise the outcome of the war
(Reiter 2009).
The occupier may therefore see the occupied state as a potential threat in and of itself. Efforts
at reforming leadership, regime type, or state capacity cannot eliminate the risk that the occupied
state will reemerge as a greater threat in the future. Intentions cannot be directly observed and
future capabilities are hard to predict. Under conditions of anarchy in the international system,
states have no recourse should the occupied state eventually turn against them. The occupying
state may therefore seek to use temporary domination over the occupied state to neutralize the
risk permanently (Morgenthau [1949] 1985, 24). States will seek to reduce the potential risk by re-
ducing the capability of the occupied state or by annexing it in whole or in part. Occupying enemy
territory also serves to deny the enemy the use of that territory for military purposes (Clausewitz
[1832] 2007, 181). For instance, following the First World War, France, Belgium, and to a lesser
extent, the UK, saw the industrial potential of Germany as a latent threat to their security. Since
industrial might forms the sinews of military power, they sought the demilitarization of the indus-
trial heart of Germany, the Rhineland, as well as the direct Allied administration of the coal-rich
Saar. France, for its part, sought unsuccessfully to separate the Saar permanently from Germany
(MacMillan 2003, 170-171).
When occupiers see enemy territory itself as a strategic liability against third-party threats,
degrading military capabilities may not be enough. Occupiers may feel compelled to annex or
permanently occupy the territory in an effort to address the security dilemma. For example, one
of the goals of the US occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934 was to prevent Germany from
establishing a naval base in the Western Hemisphere and threaten access to the Panama Canal
(Plummer 1988). States also annex occupied territory to form a buffer against rivals (Stirk 2009,
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Table 2.1: Occupation and the causes of war
Image Cause of War Response Timeframe Example
Individual Aggressive
leaders









Anarchy Annexation Indefinite Golan 1967
208). For instance, Israel occupied a so-called “security zone” in Southern Lebanon from 1985
until 2000 to prevent the territory from being used by Palestinian and Hezbollah forces to launch
attacks against Northern Israel. Similarly, Israel formally annexed the Golan Heights after the
1967 War to prevent Syria from using the high ground to shell Israeli towns. As Fazal (2007) has
demonstrated, buffer states are more likely to be occupied and annexed because rival powers fear
that if they do not do so their enemies will. Finally, at a broader level, an occupier may also seek
to annex a territory for its own enrichment or to help balance against other powers. A summary
of the link between the perceived causes of war and the types of occupation is provided in Table
2.1.
Of course, these objectives also reflect the balance of power between the occupying and the
occupied state. Relatively weak occupiers are less likely to undertake costly and long-term nation-
building than relatively strong ones. They are forced to balance the cost and probability of success
of occupations against the intensity and probability of future threats. As a result, they may set-
tle for temporary military administration or decapitation of leadership instead of comprehensive
regime change and nation-building.
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2.4 Defining Resistance
Resistance is the principal dependent variable in this study. Unlike the term occupation, resistance
is not defined in international law. For the purposes of this dissertation, I define resistance as: The
deliberate use of violence by members of the occupied population against occupying forces or officials.
First, this definition of resistance focuses on conflict between an occupier and an occupied pop-
ulation. It does not refer to resistance against indigenous governments, against domestic coercive
apparatus such as police, or against corporations. Nor does the term as it is used here refer to
resistance against ideologies or policies outside the context of occupation. Indeed, activists have
frequently sought to appropriate the romantic and righteous image of resistance to unrelated po-
litical agendas. Moreover, the term does not refer to strictly military resistance in the course of
interstate conflict outside of occupied territory. Second, this definition avoids making assump-
tions about the purpose of resistance. I simply assume that the act of resistance is directed by the
occupied against the occupier. As I will argue in the next chapter, objectives such as the restora-
tion of full sovereignty of the occupied state are only some of the potential objectives sought by
resistance groups.
Third, this definition consciously focuses on violent forms of resistance to occupation. I ac-
knowledge that resistance can take several forms and that non-violent resistance to occupation
can be significant and at times effective (see Chenoweth and Stephan 2008, 2011). As will be dis-
cussed further in the cross-national analysis of resistance to occupation, I focus on violent forms
of resistance to occupation for two reasons. First, violent resistance to occupation tends to be more
salient because it presents occupiers with both political and military challenges to achieving their
objectives.10 Second, from a methodological perspective, violent resistance to occupation can be
measured more reliably, therefore providing a better basis for cross-case comparison.
Fourth, this definition assumes that territory is occupied as defined above. The occupier need
not exercise absolute control of the territory and may in fact be invited by the occupied govern-
ment. However, this distinction is important since it helps separate cases of occupation from cases
of ongoing interstate war. Lastly, although I focus on resistance taking place in occupied territory,
10However, identifying what makes resistance successful is difficult to measure. Put simply, even if occupiers leave
a territory, it is difficult to assess the counterfactual of what an occupier would have done in the absence of resistance
and what role resistance played in the decision of the occupier.
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I do not assume that all acts of resistance take place in the occupied territory itself. Enhance-
ments in communication, transport, combined with the globalization of the state have increased
the range of potential targets for resistance. Whereas resistance groups were once limited to oc-
cupied territory, they increasingly target citizens and assets of the occupier at home or overseas,
wherever attacks will have the greatest effect and chance of success. For example, in July 2010,
the Somali insurgent group Shahab conducted terrorist attacks in Kampala to coerce Uganda to
withdraw African Union peacekeepers from Somalia (Kron and Ibrahim 2010).
2.5 Explaining Variation in Intensity of Resistance
The historical literature is replete with rich accounts of resistance against foreign occupation.However,
systematic explanations of resistance remain few. Moreover, historical accounts of resistance tend
to be biased since they focus on instances where resistance occurred rather than those instances
where it did not. Put simply, there is much less interest, and indeed some embarrassment, in
describing historical non-events. However, in so doing, such historical accounts overstate the
prevalence of resistance. Discussion of resistance in political science, sociology, and economics,
for their part, tend to be combined into assessments of either interstate or civil war. As discussed
previously, conflating the study of resistance with that of interstate or civil war tends to eclipse im-
portant causal mechanisms in the generation of resistance to occupation. As a result of insurgency
in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a growing, albeit still limited, literature on resistance to
occupation.
This section outlines the main theories for variation in resistance to occupation. Theories
fall under three broad categories: nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.
These categories do not refer to coherent theoretical schools, but rather to types of independent
variables. For each section I first outline the principal mechanisms proposed to explain resistance
to occupation, and then take note of the weaknesses and critiques.
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2.5.1 Nationalism
Mechanisms
Nationalism is the most conventional explanation of resistance to occupation. When I use the term
nationalism in this dissertation, I am referring to civic nationalism, a form of nationalism that is
based on loyalty primarily to the political institution of the state (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 52).
Nationalism affects resistance in four ways. First, nationalism provides the ideological basis of
political legitimacy. Second, the ideology of nationalism is perpetuated through mass schooling,
providing a deeply engrained sense of loyalty. Third, the violation of this ideology provokes a
potentially violent emotional response among the affected national group. Fourth, the existence
of pre-defined national groups and nationalist sentiment provide partial means for overcoming
collective action problems.
The basic premise of nationalism is that national and political units should be congruent (Gell-
ner 1983, 1). Rulers are more likely to reflect the interests of their constituents when they share
their distinct culture, values, and norms: in short their identity. When the principle of nation-
alism is violated, the feeling of anger produced is nationalist sentiment. In fact, for individuals
with strong convictions, there may be real psychic costs to inaction against foreign occupation.
The principle of nationalism is closely associated with that of self-determination and resistance
is considered a means by which this self-determination is achieved. Nationalism also commands
unique loyalty and self-sacrifice. The French writer Ernest Renan stated: “A nation is therefore
a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past
and of those that one is prepared to make in the future” ([1882] 1990, 19). As such, nationalism
provides a strong motivation to take up arms.
According to the modernist school, nationalism is a modern phenomenon that arose as a re-
sult of industrialization, democracy, and print capitalism (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Snyder
2000). Nationalism was not only an ideology, but also a military innovation that was harnessed
by the state. As Posen (1993b) argues, following the French Revolution nationalism allowed for
the “leve´e en masse” which vastly increased the mobilization potential of the state. Beyond sheer
numbers, nationalism increased the intensity of war through a sense of collective identity and
self-sacrifice. Warfare and the mass army exercised positive feedback on nationalism. National-
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ism allowed for the mass army, the fraternization and hardship experienced in mass army boosted
nationalism, and the glory of combat reinforced the nation. As a result, the wars at the beginning
of the nationalist era were of unprecedented severity. Fierce interstate competition in Europe en-
sured that all Western states adopted the military innovation of nationalism.
Varying degrees of “nationalization” can translate into different levels of resistance. A core
driver of nationalization is the national education system. Modernity and industrialization cre-
ated the need for a more mobile, skilled, and integrated workforce. In order to achieve this, generic
training such as literacy provided through a mass schooling system was required (Gellner 1983,
35). The advent of mass literacy as with other forms of mass communication fostered a shared
sense of nationhood (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1953). According to Darden (Forthcoming), this
mass schooling also provides a useful explanation for variation in resistance to occupation. Fixed
and durable national loyalties are instilled in a population during the first round of mass school-
ing. Mass schooling fosters nationalism in three ways. First mass schooling places children in a
bounded and controlled environment with peers over the course of several years. Second, school-
ing provides literacy in the national vernacular, which further tightens individuals’ connection
with a nation, its history, and its culture. Finally, schools infuse their pupils with nationalist ideol-
ogy through a managed curriculum. Once these nationalist principles are put in place, according
to Darden, they remain resilient across generations. Nationalized occupied populations will be
more likely to undertake resistance to occupation against those governments that did not initiate
the first round of mass schooling and less likely to undertake resistance against those that did. In
short, mass schooling cements loyalty and nationalism towards specific governments and fosters
resistance against others.
Nationalism also helps explain how individuals mobilize for collective action. It is important
to remember that states rarely prepare for civilian resistance once their armies have been defeated
in war. Resistance therefore requires individuals to organize absent the coercive authority of the
state. Collective action, particularly when it involves great personal risk, is notoriously difficult
to achieve (Olson 1965). Citizens may desire self-determination, but may be loath to assume the
costs, especially if others are ready to assume them. Moreover, individuals know that resistance
will be futile unless a critical mass is achieved to stand a chance of defeating the occupier (Gra-
novetter 1978; Schelling [1978] 2006; Kuran 1991; Petersen 2001, 22-23; Wood 2003). The concept
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of nationalism can help resolve these twin collective action problems. First, nationalism provides
the normative basis to impose social sanctions. If national self-determination is virtuous, then de-
fending the nation is heroic, just as failing to defend it is cowardly. These social sanctions provide
the selective incentives (praise, shame) necessary to spur collective action. Similarly, some of the
strongest norms and sanctions are reserved for those who betray their nation. Treason is punish-
able by death, so can collaboration with foreign occupiers (Hechter 2009, 290). Nationalism as an
ideology also reduces the moral, psychological, and social costs of killing (Darden Forthcoming).
Second, nationalism helps coordinate collective action. If the nation is a defined population, if
nationalist resistance is promoted through social sanction as described above, and if individuals
are aware of the previous two assumptions, then they will have greater confidence that sufficient
collective action will be achieved (Liberman 1996, 23). At a minimum, co-nationals may supply
the information, food, and shelter necessary to conduct guerrilla warfare. Overall, nationalism
provides both the necessary motivation and the coordination for resistance.
Nationalism provides a compelling explanation for resistance. First, nationalism figures promi-
nently in historical accounts of resistance and personal views of resisters. For example, in 1920:
“Resistance movements emerged in various parts of the Syrian countryside on the eve of the
French occupation. . . nationalist feelings and ideas were on the rise all over the country” (Provence
2005, 48). Over eighty years later in neighboring Iraq, an resister explained his participation in the
anti-American insurgency: “We do not want to see our country occupied by forces clearly pur-
suing their own interests, rather than being poised to return Iraq to the Iraqis” (Hashim 2005,
100). Second, nationalist themes permeate resistance messages. In Soviet occupied Latvia, re-
sistance leaders called upon former Latvian soldiers to “Uphold your holy obligations towards
the freedom and independence of our fatherland” (Swain 2007, 206). Third, the names of re-
sistance groups such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Anti-Japanese National
Salvation Army, the Luxembourgian Patriot League, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, and the Korean Patriot Legion, among many
others, provide some indication of nationalist aspirations. Fourth, resistance fighters are princi-
pally drawn from occupied national groups as opposed to non-occupied national groups, even in
conflicts that involve some foreign fighters.
According to nationalist theory, resistance is a predictable —if not inevitable— result of occu-
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pation. Resistance has been likened to an “antibody response” against foreign troops in the host
country (Kilcullen 2009, 285). The rise of nationalism in the modern world helps explain why
outright conquest has become increasingly rare.11 Nationalism bolstered the will of states to re-
sist foreign domination, and therefore increased the cost of occupation and annexation. As Knorr
(1975, 112) points out, “the French required only thirty thousand men to subdue Algeria in 1830.
In 1962, they could not subdue her with a force twenty times as large.” Obviously, the nationalist
rejection of foreign rule presents a dilemma for occupiers. According to Edelstein (2004, 50-51)
successful occupations can only succeed if they are lengthy. However, lengthier occupations tend
to provoke greater nationalist backlash, thereby reducing their likelihood of success. Furthermore,
efforts to quash resistance only inflame nationalist sentiment, drawing occupiers into a spiral of
repression and revenge. For these reasons, nationalist theory is generally pessimistic regarding
the likelihood of peaceful occupations.
Criticism of Nationalist Theories of Resistance
This section outlines some of the main criticisms of the nationalist account for resistance to occu-
pation. First, nationalist theory greatly over-predicts the intensity of resistance. According to the
theory, nationalist sentiment is enflamed when the national and the political are not congruent.
However, the vast majority of occupations generate little resistance. Resistance to occupation is
the exception, not the rule, presenting a major anomaly for nationalist theory. Even controlling
for the strength of occupying forces vis-a`-vis the local population, we tend to observe far less
resistance than nationalist theory would predict.12
Second, most occupations not only fail to generate resistance, but elicit the active —sometimes
enthusiastic— collaboration of some members of the local population. Occupied France provides
a number of examples. In July 1942, the nominally independent Vichy government planned and
11A number of factors aside from nationalism have also contributed to the decreasing appeal of conquest, such as
the declining value of land as a factor of production in modern society, the increase in economic interdependence
and global production which made conquest less appealing and more disruptive to normal trade patterns, the rise of
knowledge-based economies, the growing liberal norm against conquest, and globalization which has provided access
to technology that facilitates resistance (Van Evera 1990/1991; Liberman 1996; Brooks 1999; Fazal 2007). Posen (1993b)
argues to the contrary that through the mass army, nationalism has made conquest more likely.
12Conversely, the pre-nationalist era saw several groups resisting occupation, such as the Jews under the Zealots
against Roman rule, the Scots under William Wallace against British rule, the Shawnee Native Americans under Tecum-
seh against American rule, and the Dutch under William of Orange against Spanish occupation.
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executed the Ve´lodrome d’Hiver roundup by its own initiative, which arrested over 13,000 French
Jews, interned them in squalid conditions, and shipped many to concentration camps (Marrus and
Paxton 1995). In December 1942, French Prime Minister Pierre Laval stated: “Victory for Germany
will save our civilization from sinking into communism.” The French automotive magnate Louis
Renault regularly asked German occupiers for more orders: “My will is to give you material of the
best possible quality, given our metal supply. We will make everything that you want” (Liberman
1996, 59, 63). Nationalists may call inaction cowardice, and collaboration treachery, but nationalist
theory fails to provide an account for widespread collaboration in occupied societies.
Third, nationalist theories fail to predict the location of resistance. Indeed, there is much cross-
national variation in resistance to occupation. If resistance is a natural reflex to foreign occupa-
tion, why do we see so much cross-national variation? Why was the UN occupation of Somalia
so bloody and its occupation of Haiti so peaceful? Similarly, nationalist theories of resistance fail
to account for sub-national variation in resistance within countries. Why did the US face stiff re-
sistance in the so-called Sunni triangle but not in Iraqi Kurdistan? After all, even in considering
ethnic nationalism, both groups were being ruled by foreigners. Nationalism theory fails to ex-
plain temporal variation in resistance to the same occupation. If we consider nationalism to be a
constant, this variation in resistance is puzzling.
Fourth, the mobilizing and coordinating functions of nationalism are not unique and therefore
not necessary conditions for mobilization. Political ideology and religion can provide the impetus
for action and justifications for violence. As is clear in the civil war literature, they can construct
powerful peer groups that provide the selective incentives to overcome collective action problems.
Therefore, there is nothing unique to nationalism regarding the potential to overcome collective
action problems and to incite violence. Furthermore, nationalist explanations of resistance may be
confusing the cause of resistance with its effect. For instance, political entrepreneurs may drum
up nationalism in order to mobilize individuals to their cause. As Mansfield and Snyder (1995)
observe in the context of democratic transitions, elites sometimes use nationalist appeals in order
to compete for votes and mass support. Alternatively, non-nationalist resistance from segments of
the occupied population could generate indiscriminate retaliation from an occupier. The process
of violence may polarize and heighten nationalist sentiment, a process often seen in ethnic civil
wars (Kaufman 1996). While nationalism may be an instrument or an end result of mobilization
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and violence, it is not in and of itself the cause of resistance to occupation.
Lastly, the concepts of nation and nationalism remain ill-defined (for a review of the debate
see Smith 2001). Particularly problematic for nationalist theories of resistance is the distinction
between civic nationalism (loyalty to the state, often called patriotism) and ethnic nationalism
(loyalty to the ethnic group). Nationalist theories of resistance do not specify which conception of
the nation they refer to, and generally employ both. This distinction is important as it may lead
to contradictory predictions regarding resistance to occupation. Civic nationalism would predict
resistance to all foreign occupation, whereas ethnic nationalism (insofar as there is more than one
ethnic group in a state) would not necessarily predict resistance if occupation strengthens the
position of one ethnic group vis-a`-vis another within a state. Indeed, unitary nation-states are




A second type of explanation of resistance to occupation is what I term “opportunity structures.”
These explanations emerged principally in the civil war literature as a reaction to grievance-based
explanations of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Opportunity struc-
tures explanations follow a broadly rationalist approach: nationalism may provide an ideological
impetus to fight occupation, but those fighting are rational individuals who are sensitive to the
costs and benefits of resistance. Opportunity structures explains resistance by highlighting the
military, social, economic, and geographic factors that hinder or facilitate mobilization and com-
bat.
First, military factors can explain the likelihood of resistance. Occupiers may be able to de-
ter resistance by deploying a larger number of troops in occupied territory or undertaking other
shows of force.13 For example, after the surrender of Japan in 1945, there was a steady stream of
13Note that opportunity structure and nationalist theories of resistance to occupation reach contradictory predictions
regarding the effects of troops in occupied territory. Opportunity structure theory predicts that large deployments of
troops are more likely to deter resistance to occupation whereas nationalist theorist would predict large numbers of
troops to inflame nationalist sentiment.
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B-29 bombers flying over Japan. According to the Air Staff of the US Army Air Force (AAF): “A
major mission of the AAF is a display of force for the continued intimidation of the Japanese dur-
ing the interim from their capitulation until the actual arrival of the occupation forces” (Willard-
Foster 2009, 50). Similarly, facing Soviet occupation, a Latvian recalled: “Friends say come to the
forest, the British and Americans are coming; but I say: you know, dear friends, real friends, if
the German Army could not stand up to the Red Army, you with your rifles in the forests never
will” (Swain 2007, 195). Nationalists in the occupied populations may be ideologically opposed to
foreign occupation but they are usually not suicidal and will refrain from resistance when faced
with strong opposition. The general level of risk will be a function of the troop-to-population and
troop-to-area ratios. Assuming the local population is sympathetic to the resistance struggle, a
larger population provides the human cover for insurgency as well as a greater recruitment pool
for resistance (Mao [1937] 2000). The larger the population, the less likely it will be that a member
of a resistance group will be caught and punished by the occupier. Conversely large troop-to-
population ratios increase the ability of the occupying forces to deter and defeat resistance by
gathering intelligence, providing security to the local population, covering terrain, and respond-
ing to attacks in a timely fashion. Consequently some analysts have recommended a minimum
number of troops necessary to police occupied territory (Quinlivan 1996). While recognizing that
no force level guarantees victory for either side, the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual recom-
mends some 20 to 25 counterinsurgents per thousand civilians (US Army 2007, 23).14
In anticipation of defeat and occupation, some governments have sought to actively shape
opportunity structures to enable resistance.15 The most common method for ensuring resistance
is military service, which trains (usually male) citizens in warfare. For example, during the Cold
War, Singapore adopted a “poison shrimp” defense strategy: while it could easily be overrun,
the population would be trained to expel the occupier (Tan 1999). During the First World War, the
Serbian government trained “Komitadjis” or guerrilla fighters to continue the fight should they be
defeated by Austro-Hungarian forces (Gumz 2009, 21). Similarly, with impending defeat in March
2003, the government of Saddam Hussein opened its arms caches to equip insurgents (Ricks 2006,
14For a counterpoint see Friedman 2011.
15Interestingly, despite government-sponsored resistance, there is no case since 1900 of an individual leaders ousted
through occupation regaining power through resistance alone.
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190). Switzerland epitomizes this institutionalized approach to citizen resistance. Prior to the First
World War, US General George Wingate observed: “Switzerland has no regular army, but depends
for defense on her riflemen. Though poor, she spends annually large amounts in developing them,
both in and out of the schools. Out of a population of but three million —less than that of the City
of New York in 1904— she had 3,656 rifle clubs with a membership of 218,815.” When queried by
German Kaiser Wilhelm II what Switzerland‘s quarter-million man force would do when faced
with an invasion of half a million Germans, a Swiss militiaman replied “Shoot twice” (Halbrook
2003, 18). As late as the 1970s, Switzerland launched “Project 26,” which involved a stay-behind
army of 2,000 resistance fighters trained to wage guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion
(Grimes 2011).
Second, foreign sanctuary and support can facilitate resistance struggles. Foreign occupations
frequently affect the balance of power between states. Whether to dislodge rivals from occupied
strategic territory or to simply bleed them white, foreign states may retaliate by fomenting resis-
tance in occupied territory. Foreign support for self-determination serves as a shrewd cover for
the application of the balance of power, without assuming risk or courting full-blown retaliation.
This strategy is also commonly used in civil wars and insurgencies, sometimes as an alternative
to occupation itself (Salehyan 2007, 2008, 2009). Foreign support for resistance can range from di-
rect combat, to supplying and training local resisters, to providing cross-border sanctuary. Aside
from proxy warfare, outside support can serve to further other goals such as prestige, support for
coreligionists or co-ethnics, and regional influence, which are independent of foreign occupation
(Byman et al. 2001).
Examples of such outside support include Syrian and Iranian support for Hezbollah against
Israel in South Lebanon, US and Pakistani support for the Mujihadeen against the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan, Iranian support for the Mahdi Army against the US in Iraq, and Soviet deploy-
ment of partisans joining resistance groups against Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. The Special
Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War provides one of the most sophisti-
cated examples of proxy warfare through resistance. The SOE was created by Churchill to “set
Europe ablaze” by supporting local resistance movements and opening an internal front against
Germany, which would divert its resources from attacks against the UK (Hastings 2010, 364). The
efforts of the SOE went beyond harassment of the enemy, however. During Operation Gunnerside
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in the winter of 1942-1943, the SOE, in tandem with Norwegian resisters, successfully sabotaged
a heavy water plant, crucially setting back German efforts at manufacturing nuclear weapons
(Rhodes 1986; Gallagher 2002).
Third, geographic features of occupied territory such as configuration, terrain, and interna-
tional borders can enable resistance (Galula [1964] 2006, 23-24). Territory that is highly “com-
partmentalized” by barriers such as deserts and oceans makes it easier for occupiers to seal off
and defeat resistance. Several studies have found that “rough terrain” affects the likelihood of
insurgency (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), though
this effect is not consistent across studies (Lyall 2009a). Some of the most renowned resistance
groups such as the French Maquisard and the Baltic Forest Brothers are named after the terrain
that facilitated their struggles. In occupied Greece, Marxist resisters formed what was known as
the “Mountain Government,” named after the mountains where the resistance group was based
(DeRouen 2007, 370). Rough terrain, including mountains and forests, provide cover for irregu-
lar forces. Mountains can be defended more easily and with smaller forces (Guevara [1968] 1998).
Rough terrain also narrows the advantage of conventional militaries by making it more difficult to
maneuver and project force with heavy military equipment. Lastly, international land borders can
facilitate resistance by providing logistical supply routes and safe havens for resistance groups.
Fourth, economic conditions in the occupied state may also affect the propensity of resistance
to occupation. A number of studies have identified poverty as one of the most important pre-
dictors of insurgency and rebellion. However, the nature and direction of the causality remains
contested (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Levels of economic development and prosperity in the
occupied population can have a number of effects on their propensity to take up arms against
occupiers. Low levels of economic development reduce the opportunity cost of taking up arms.
Insurgency is generally considered to be a full-time occupation. Resistance activity requires in-
dividuals to take time away from other productive activities and the risk involved in resistance
may compromise future income. Income foregone will be higher in richer states, therefore in-
creasing the opportunity cost of fighting. The correlation between income and life expectancy
further magnifies the opportunity cost of taking up arms, as richer individuals are risking larger
income streams over a longer period of time. There may be convergence between geographic
and economic explanations of insurgencies, as poorer societies tend to be more rural, rural ar-
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eas tend to have rougher terrain, and insurgencies tend to be fought on rough terrain (Kalyvas
2006, 423). Recent scholarship has sought to test economic arguments of insurgency looking at
micro-level data. Hanson, Iyengar, and Monten (2009) found that labor-intensive reconstruction
projects in occupied Iraq reduced insurgent incidents by sapping the labor pool available to in-
surgent organizations and by improving outside options for potential recruits. However, Berman
et al. (2011) found that rising unemployment did not have a significant effect on insurgencies in
Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Philippines. Edelstein (2004, 60) argues that when occupied territory has
been devastated by interstate war, the occupied population is more likely to accept the occupation
as a necessary evil. Indeed, without the help of occupiers, those countries would not be able to
rebuild. Lastly, Liberman (1996) notes that the economic division of labor is greater in wealthier
industrialized societies. This division of labor makes society as a whole more productive, but in-
dividuals less self-sufficient. As a result individuals in modern industrialized societies are more
vulnerable to occupier pressure, and therefore less likely to resist occupation. In addition, because
economic modernization is strongly correlated with urbanization, and because density increases
the ability of the occupier to monitor and control populations, economic development can weaken
resistance.
Fourth, increasing scholarship has focused on the effects of social structure and social cohe-
sion on rebel mobilization. In an extensive study of resistance to occupation in Eastern Europe,
Petersen (2001) argues variation in the structure and cohesion of communities helps explain vari-
ation in rebellion. Petersen conceptualizes resistance on a spectrum ranging from collaboration to
neutrality to unorganized resistance to organized resistance and finally to violent rebellion. Most
individuals start off as neutral. Resentment against occupation, often triggered by changes in the
status of a group within occupied society, might push the group’s members towards resistance.
However, such resistance is fraught with risk. In addition, political parties, freedom of association,
and travel are frequently restricted during occupation, complicating mobilization. If mobilization
is detected by the occupier, occupiers may mete severe punishment on resisters and their commu-
nities. Potential resisters must invest an incredible amount of trust in co-conspirators they may
have never met. Lastly, the fewer the number of resisters, the greater the risk to those who choose
to resist, so achieving a critical mass is essential.
Drawing on the work of Taylor (1988), Petersen argues that tight-knit communities are essen-
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tial in moving individuals along the spectrum towards resistance, and – critically – to sustaining
them once they have committed to rebellion. Tight knit communities are better able to cope with
the risks of recruitment through trust built into long standing social interactions. Indeed, indi-
viduals are less likely to join an organization with people they don‘t know or haven’t met. Addi-
tionally, tight-knit communities are better able to administer status rewards in order to incentivize
individuals to undertake and sustain resistance to occupation. Simply put, the judgment of close
peers, with whom one has shared values and experiences, and is to have iterated interactions in
the future, weighs more than the judgment of strangers. Similarly, tight-knit communities are
better able to leverage norms of reciprocity. Individuals carry out sacrifices with the expectation
or reciprocal benefits in the future. The familiarity bred in close communities also helps over-
come threshold collective action problems. Individuals need assurances that they will not be the
only ones to rebel, especially when rebellion requires a minimum threshold to succeed. Intimate
knowledge of the community, and community-specific signaling mechanisms, help individuals
gauge the likelihood of community mobilization and to coordinate on collective action. Tight knit
communities are better able to threaten to retaliate against informants and collaborators with the
occupier. Aside from being more attached to the community, collaborators know they are being
watched. Petersen concludes by asserting that strong communities – those with direct relations
between members, many-sided social economic and cultural relations, reciprocity, rough equality
of material conditions, and a common set of values and beliefs – are better able to mobilize active
resistance to occupation. Weak communities, in contrast, will at best be able to mobilize passive
resistance to occupation.
Petersen‘s findings in Eastern Europe have been echoed in studies in Africa, the Middle East,
and Latin America. Examining the causes of large-scale violent Christian-Muslim riots in north-
ern Nigeria, Scacco (2008) discovered that economic grievances were not sufficient to trigger the
participation of individuals. Rather, she found that it is the interaction between grievances and
membership in certain types of neighborhood-level social networks that made rioting more likely.
In a survey of Palestinians in the West Bank, Argo (2009) noted that professed willingness to partic-
ipate in rebellion, especially violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation
and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. Moreover, some individuals were pri-
marily motivated by norms of reciprocity. In her study of insurgency in El Salvador, Wood (2003)
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found that community shaped individuals’ political culture. She stresses how the peasants who
joined the insurgency “came to interpret insurgency as justified by the injustice of existing social
relations and state violence, and to interpret its costs, even the highest of them, as meaningful
sacrifices” (Wood 2003, 225).
Petersen‘s argument on social structure also ties to a much larger literature that posits that
ethnic diversity inhibits collective action and the provision of public goods (Alesina et al. 1999;
Miguel and Gugerty 2005).16 Ethnic diversity undermines collective action through three broad
mechanisms: preferences, communication and coordination, and enforcement. Co-ethnics are
more likely to share preferences and to take each other‘s welfare into account. Co-ethnics are
also better able to communicate and work together, partly through common culture and partly
through a longer history of cooperation. Lastly, because of better monitoring and a long shadow
of the future, co-ethnics are better able to enforce cooperation amongst themselves (Habyarimana
et al. 2007, 2009; Fearon and Laitin 1996).
Criticism of Opportunity Structure Theories of Resistance
This section outlines some of the main criticisms of the opportunity structure explanations of re-
sistance to occupation. First, while opportunity structure explanations can better address spatial
variation in resistance to occupation, they provide weak explanations for temporal variation.17
Many of the factors highlighted in the literature change very slowly (general levels of income,
community structure) or not at all (geography). Without temporal variation in the independent
variable, such factors cannot explain the observed differences in the dependent variable of resis-
tance. Moreover, for the case of community structure, showing that actors mobilized through a
community network does not account for variation of resistance to occupation since networks are
ubiquitous. As Darden (2008, 12) jokes: “If the implicit null hypothesis is that those who unite in
an armed insurgency are friendless and without family or communal bonds, it is not surprising
that the network explanations outperform.”
Second, social structure explanations of resistance suffer from endogeneity and selection is-
16National liberation, it could be argued, is a public good insofar as it is nonrival and non-excludable. Once a foreign
occupier has left, all members of the occupied community are freed, regardless of their contribution to resistance.
17i.e. temporal variation in resistance within a single spell of occupation or variation in resistance across different
spells of occupations in the same country.
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sues. For example, there may be some self-selection in the formation of community organizations.
More nationalist individuals may be more likely to join community organizations, a reasonable as-
sumption given their ideological attachment to those communities, and therefore be more likely to
take up arms against foreign occupiers. It would therefore be nationalism, not community struc-
ture, which accounts for the intensity of resistance to occupation. The community organizations
often used to identify network density would be consequences, rather than causes, of nationalism
(Darden 2008, 26). Alternatively, as Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) note, some of the factors
commonly associated with insurgency, such as poverty, may simply indicate individual‘s propen-
sity to be manipulated by elites. Therefore it is difficult to ascertain whether these factors increase
grievances, enable resistance, or simply facilitate political manipulation.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, military, geographic, and economic factors do not cause
resistance directly. Occupied populations won’t initiate resistance simply because they are armed
or poor, or because they live around high mountains and thick vegetation. Opportunity structures
are at best enablers or facilitators, not motivators or drivers, of resistance. The same goes for social
structures. Without some motivation, whether greed, grievance, or something else entirely, it is
hard to see how such factors provide a direct impetus for resistance. Of course, it is possible that
these factors work in tandem: nationalism providing the ideological impetus for resistance and
opportunity structures moderating how much resistance is actually observed. Yet even this multi-




A third type of explanation of resistance to occupation falls under what can be termed interna-
tional context. According to Edelstein (2004, 2008a), occupations will be successful if there is
recognition by the occupying power and the occupied population of a common threat to the oc-
cupied territory. Under such circumstances, the occupier will have an incentive to offer protection
to a territory where it has invested significant resources and the occupied population will value
such protection. Occupied populations are pragmatic: they would prefer not to be ruled by for-
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eigners but they also consider the alternatives to occupation. If occupiers seem like the lesser evil,
they will accept occupation at least temporarily. Thus occupied states which face greater threats
from third states will be less likely to generate resistance whereas those that do not perceive such
threats are more likely to generate resistance. In this sense, Edelstein‘s theory draws much from
Realist International Relations theory, specifically Walt‘s (1987) balance of threat theory of alliance
formation. Following Edelstein‘s (restrictive) definition of occupation, six out of seven occupa-
tions facing a common external threat between 1815 and 2003 ended in success, compared with
one in 11 occupations that faced no such threat (Edelstein 2004, 66).
For example, East Timor accepted direct UN administration including the deployment of UN
troops on its territory between 1999 and 2002 as protection against reinvasion by Indonesia. As
Kilkullen writes: “Indeed, to the extent that there was a backlash against intervention in East
Timor, it was directed at the initial 1975 intervention by the Indonesian government, which most
East Timorese always had seen as a foreign external actor” (2009, 206). Likewise, the USSR en-
countered relatively little resistance after it invaded and annexed Armenia in 1920. Faced with
ongoing war with Azerbaijan and Georgia and the prospect of Turkish invasion (less than a decade
after the Armenian genocide), Soviet occupation provided Armenians with a protection of sorts.
According to Edelstein, a principal reason for why West Germany and Japan accepted large-scale
and long-term American occupation was the fear of Soviet invasion. In contrast, the US occu-
pation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934 failed because Haiti faced few commonly agreed external
threats.18
Criticism of International Context Theories of Resistance
Edelstein has made a valuable addition to the literature on resistance to occupation, by importing
key concepts from the International Relations literature. The external threat hypothesis is not
without some major drawbacks, however. First, external threats are rarely self-evident. Different
segments of the occupied population may perceive foreign threats differently. Moreover, different
segments of the occupied population may perceive internal threats to be graver than external
threats. Constructivists would argue that occupiers deliberately manipulate threat perception in
18Edelstein‘s focus is not on resistance, but on the success or failure of occupation. However, resistance is frequently
a cause of occupation failure.
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order to gain the support of the occupied (Desch 2008, 865). Edelstein himself notes:
“My book relies heavily on a structural notion of threat. . . Future research might in-
vestigate further how threat perceptions evolve within societies, how elite perceptions
might differ from the masses, and how occupying powers might manipulate those
threat perceptions and promote certain elites over others based on those perceptions”
(Edelstein 2008b).
Worse still, occupied territory may become more threatened precisely because of the presence of an
occupier that is a rival to a third party.
Second, there is an identification problem in examining the effect of external threat. Specif-
ically, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of external threats from the effect of deterrence in
occupied territory because occupiers are more likely to place troops in territory that is deemed
threatened by a third-party. Deployed troops serve double duty deterring internal and external
challengers to occupied territory. The finding that states facing large external threats are less likely
to resist may simply be picking up this deterrent effect.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter sought to frame the broad themes of resistance to occupation. I began by explaining
the puzzle of resistance and noting that resistance to occupation is a distinct form of political
violence from interstate and civil wars. I then laid out a definition and typology of occupation and
provided a basic theory to explain variation in types of occupation. Indeed, states will undertake
different types of occupation based on their perception of the root causes of their conflict with the
occupied state and the latter‘s ability to credibly commit to certain outcomes. Next, I outlined a
definition of resistance. I then took note of the varying schools of thought to explain variation
in resistance: nationalism, opportunity structure, and international context. While these theories
provides rich accounts of resistance, I noted that they fail to explain much cross and subnational
variation in resistance to occupation. Notably, mainstream nationalist theories of resistance to
occupation grossly over-predict the intensity of resistance. The next chapter seeks to improve
explanations of resistance by looking at key aspects of occupation policy, specifically political
dislocation and trust.
Chapter 3
Political Dislocation, Trust, and
Resistance to Occupation
”Taking initiative in introducing a new form of government is very difficult and dangerous, and
unlikely to succeed. The reason is that all those who profit from the old order will be opposed to
the innovator, whereas all the who might benefit from the new order are, at best, tepid supporters
of him”
-Machievelli, The Prince 1
3.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a theory to explain resistance to occupation. The underlying premise of
this theory is that resistance to occupation is irrational under most circumstances. Resistance is
risky and occupation is usually temporary. So why fight? I argue that two factors may incite seg-
ments of the occupied population to resist occupation, namely political dislocation and a breakdown
in trust.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I lay out three propositions to argue that resistance is
generally not a rational strategy against occupation. Second, I argue resistance may become ratio-
nal when some of these propositions are challenged. Specifically, I posit that resistance may occur
1Machievelli [1532] 2001, 20-21.
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when occupiers cause political dislocation, especially when it spurs competition among domestic
factions of the occupied population. Therefore strategies of indigenous rule and population secu-
rity are likely to mitigate the risk of resistance caused by political dislocation. Third, I argue that
resistance may occur when there is a breakdown in trust between the occupier and the occupied.
This breakdown in trust may be caused by the victimization of the occupied population or by
the failure of occupiers to credibly commit to treating the occupied population benignly and va-
cating occupied territory promptly. Democracies, international organizations, and occupiers with
religious affinities are less likely to face resistance because they are better able to overcome these
credible commitment issues.
3.2 Propositions
The theory starts with three propositions. First, resistance is a tremendously risky activity. In-
dividuals partaking in resistance can be arrested, abused, injured, or killed. Under the law of
occupation, attacks on occupiers are considered “war treason,” usually punishable by execution.
Resisters are not always afforded the protections allowed to belligerents under the laws of armed
conflict (Stirk 2009, 129, 131). To make things worse, most individuals are poorly disposed to com-
mitting acts of violence (such as resistance), even within the context of trained armies. As Collins
(2009) notes, cowardice and incompetence in acts of violence are more prevalent than is often ac-
knowledged. Worse still, resistance can endanger the family and community of resisters because
occupiers may resort to collective punishment. For instance, Israel closed borders, set up check-
points, and imposed curfews on towns in the West Bank in response to the Palestinian Intifadas,
causing tremendous economic hardship on the whole population. Far more brutally, Germany
implemented a policy whereby ten civilians were executed for every one German soldier killed
in attacks in occupied territory (Slim 2008, 145). As Hitler stated regarding the Partisan move-
ment: “I want to fight the terror of sabotage and attacks. . . with exactly the same weapons. . . ”
(Macksey 1975, 11). In Poland, sporadic resistance by Jews and Poles induced the SS to acceler-
ate “liquidation” programs. Resistance can also be counterproductive by spurring the occupier
to further restrict the sovereignty of the occupied state. Thus, resistance may weaken rather than
strengthen sovereignty. For example, following the German invasion of the Netherlands in 1940,
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former Prime Minister Henrij Colijn saw collaboration as the only way to maintain some sem-
blance of independence (Hirschfeld 1981, 472). Risk aside, resistance is also costly. In addition to
the opportunity cost of rebellion, resistance groups incur costs to mobilize, sustain, and arm com-
batants. If resistance is a risky activity that imposes costs on the resisters and their community,
why partake in resistance? At a minimum, if we consider national liberation to be a public good,
why do individuals not just free ride on the efforts of others?
Second, occupation is usually a temporary phenomenon. This is a crucial distinction between
occupation and other asymmetric conflict such as civil wars, where belligerents on both sides
remain in the same country in the aftermath of war. Occupation is considered temporary under
international law because sovereignty is merely suspended, not extinguished (Stirk 2009, 154).
Under Article 43 the 1907 Hague Convention, occupiers are required to adhere to the laws in
place in occupied territory “unless absolutely prevented” (ICRC 2010). In other words, occupiers
must respect the domestic status quo. Moreover, under Article 45 occupiers are prohibited from
forcing the occupied population to take an oath to the hostile power. Temporary occupation is not
merely a fiction of international law. As seen in Figure 3.1 (a), the median occupation between
1900 and 2010 lasted 51 months. More importantly, as seen in Figure 3.1 (b), resistance is not
associated with a decrease in occupation duration.2 Resistance can in fact have the opposite effect,
by pushing occupiers to steel their resolve and redouble efforts in order to save face and recoup
sunk costs (Edelstein 2004, 2008a). Indeed, occupiers may worry that conceding to resistance will
weaken their reputation, and the credibility of their commitments over the long term (Schelling
[1966] 2008; Walter 2009). Why then do individuals assume great risk to themselves and to their
communities in order to reach a goal that can usually be achieved without resistance?
Third, there is sometimes no difference in the quality of governance between occupiers and
the local governments that precede them. For all its faults, the US-run Coalition Provisional Au-
thority (CPA) in Iraq was far less bloody and far more transparent than the regime of Saddam
Hussein. Whether under the rule of the Serbian House of Karadjordjevic or the occupation of the
Austro-Hungarian House of Habsburg-Lorraine, Serbia was not a democracy between 1914 and
1918. If government is not run by the people why then should it matter who the people in govern-
2The positive correlation between resistance and occupation duration is, of course, complex and potentially endoge-
nous. Resistance may emerge in those cases where occupiers refuse to leave.
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Figure 3.1: Occupation survival
ment are, even temporarily? For most history, empires were run by rulers who were ethnically or
linguistically different from the majority of their subjects (Tilly 1992, 3; Hechter 2009a, 292). These
multinational empires are not simply vestiges of the pre-national era. Many modern states are
composites of different nationalities, with separatism being a common trait of contemporary In-
ternational Relations (Fearon 2004; Fazal and Griffiths 2008; Coggins 2011). A study of Acehnese
separatism reminds us: “Indonesia is seen as a purely artificial entity —no more than a Javanese
colonial empire enslaving the different peoples of the archipelago whose only common denomi-
nator was that they had all been colonized by the Dutch” (Schulze 2004, 7). According to Hechter
“this antipathy to alien rule is inconsistent with the logic of modern forms of social organization.
At least in principle, the office holders in modern states are supposed to be selected on the basis
of their competence rather than their identity” (2010, 402). Yet, resistance often emerges against
occupations that have no discernable effect on the quality of local governance. In fact, resistance
may emerge in occupations that replace repressive autocracies with democracies.
What these propositions suggest is that under most circumstances resistance is futile. If resis-
tance against occupation is a historical exception rather than the norm, it is because resistance is
not rational. Rather, strategies of passive neutrality such as fence-sitting or attentisme should be
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preferable. But occasionally, we do see resistance. Why is this the case? I argue that resistance is
more likely to emerge once these propositions fail due to political dislocation and a breakdown in
trust.
3.3 Political Dislocation
The first mechanism for resistance is what I call political dislocation. Recall that resistance to oc-
cupation is irrational when resistance is dangerous, occupations are temporary and benign, and
when occupiers are no worse than existing forms of government. However, occupation will not
be seen as temporary or benign when occupiers seek to alter the domestic balance of power in
occupied territory.
3.3.1 Dislocation
When occupiers enter states, they willingly or not wade into its domestic politics. The population
of occupied states is not single or unitary but potentially riven by tribal, ethnic, religious, political,
or ideological divisions. Such groups may perceive the occupation differently, depending on how
it affects their interests and their relative power. When occupied societies are highly polarized,
occupation may come to be seen in zero-sum terms. This is most obviously the case in foreign
interventions into civil wars. Edelstein points out that “some internal groups may value the occu-
pation as protection against other ethnic or religious groups, but others will view the occupation
as an impediment to the achievement of their goals” (2004, 64). Nationalist theories of resistance
assume that social groups will put disagreements aside in order to fight foreign occupiers, re-
gardless of the distributional consequences of occupation and resistance. Nationalist theories also
assume that the primary and most powerful form of attachment as well as the prime driver for ac-
tion is the nation, as opposed to sub- or transnational identities. However, individuals may come
to view the meaning of occupation through the prism of their primary social groups. In fact, when
domestic cleavages are salient, groups may fear each other as much as they fear occupiers.
The central argument of political dislocation is the following: occupiers are more likely to face
resistance the greater they disrupt the balance of political power in occupied societies. Political dislo-
cation can involve ousting local or national leaders, changing laws or constitutions, altering the
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mechanisms for selecting leaders, or undertaking economic reforms that affect the distribution
of wealth. There is also great variation in the scale of political dislocation, from the demilitariza-
tion of a region, to constitutional reform, all the way up to annexation. In some cases dislocation
is a deliberate strategy of occupiers. For example, the US occupied Grenada in 1983 to depose
Hudson Austin‘s military government. In other instances, political dislocation is incidental. For
example, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) intervened in the civil war in Sierra
Leone in 1997 and facilitated elections that brought new leaders to power. The initial purpose of
intervention was to end civil war rather than put in place specific leaders. In other cases still,
political dislocation is both deliberate and incidental. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, it de-
posed Saddam Hussein, who was seen as a threat to US security. In deposing Saddam, however,
the US also dislocated the clans, tribes, and religious groups which the US did not necessary op-
pose but whose power and status were derived from Saddam‘s leadership. According to Ricks
(2006), the Coalition Provisional Authority then carried out three catastrophic blunders. First, the
CPA ordered the de-Baathification of the Iraqi civil service, which put up to 85,000 individuals
out of work. Second, it dissolved the Iraqi armed forces, which created unemployment, anger,
and resentment among men with military training. Third, the US undertook rapid shock therapy
toward a market economy, which alienated Iraq‘s middle class. The result of the intentional and
accidental political dislocation was to create resentment against the occupation.
According to Petersen (2001, 33-35), political dislocation is provocative because it reorders the
political-social hierarchy of occupied societies. This reordering of hierarchies generates resent-
ment, with the specific type of reordering affecting the direction and intensity of this resentment.
Resentment will be produced when occupiers place themselves above the majority group in the
social hierarchy of occupied society. Resentment will be further exacerbated if the occupied places
a former minority in power in occupied society. The resentment caused by political dislocation
then causes anger, which according to Petersen makes individuals more risk accepting. Like-
wise, Galula ([1964] 2006, 14) argued that leaders of insurgents come from the “rejected elite.”
Such elites are better educated from the rest of the population and have aspirations to power that
remain unfulfilled through the existing political system (Byman 2007, 6). For instance, in US-
occupied Iraq a Sunni noted: “We were on top of the system. We had dreams. Now we are the
losers. We lost our positions, our status, the security of our families, stability. Curse the Ameri-
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cans” (Allawi 2007, 240).
When occupiers undertake political dislocation, particularly when they reform political in-
stitutions in a way that permanently marginalizes certain segments of the population, they also
create incentives for those groups to act rather than wait. Political dislocation creates a window
of opportunity for communities to act in order to avert future losses. Occupation may be tempo-
rary but reforms make its effects permanent. There are parallels to occupation, dislocation, and
resistance in the realm of economics. For example, racism and xenophobia are more likely among
those groups losing economic opportunities from perceived outsiders, particularly those outsiders
that are clearly identifiable (Wimmer 2002).
Implicit in dislocation theory is an assumption that domestic political orders can be resilient
to exogenous shock. Domestic political orders are maintained through a ruling coalition’s demo-
graphic weight, as well as its access to resources (to buy off opponents) and means of violence
(to suppress them). When political orders reflect the distribution of such resources, they tend to
be stable. When a disconnect emerges between resources available to the ruling coalition and the
policies being implemented, civil strife is likely until a new equilibrium is reached. The political
equilibrium in place within a state may not always suit the interests of the occupier. In fact, it is
often precisely because the equilibrium is at odds with the interests of the occupier that invasion
and political dislocation might be deemed necessary. When foreign occupiers undertake political
dislocation, they threaten or weaken a ruling coalition’s access to resources or capacity for vio-
lence. In the cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide, they may also affect the ruling coalition’s
demographic weight. However, unless the capabilities of the coalition are permanently weakened
(in other words, the political reforms implemented by occupiers accurately reflect the new polit-
ical equilibrium), greater political dislocation will increase the risk of resistance to occupation as
disenfranchised groups challenge the policies of the occupiers.3 The real challenge for occupiers
is to establish a domestic political equilibrium in occupied societies that both reflects the interests
of the occupier and is self-sustaining once occupiers and their capabilities are withdrawn.4
3I am grateful to Jack Snyder for this observation.
4Political dislocation theory is distinct from balance of power theory in International Relations theory. Political
dislocation theory posits that resistance is likely when there is a major disruption to the domestic balance of power. It
does not refer to the propensity of certain groups to challenge the hegemonic interests of other domestic groups, unless
of course, they do not reflect the domestic distribution of resources.
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Viewed from the perspective of political dislocation, the goal of resistance is not necessarily
to evict the occupier. Instead, resisters may seek to halt or reverse political reforms that are seen
as detrimental to the social group. In other words, political dislocation sees resistance groups as
much more pragmatic in their calculation. Violent resistance is simply a form of coercive bar-
gaining to protect interests. This provides a major difference between the prediction of nationalist
theory and political dislocation theory. According to nationalist theory resistance will not cease
until the occupier has left occupied territory. According to political dislocation theory, resistance
is more likely to cease once the desired change in occupier policy has been achieved.
Findings in the domain of psychology, microeconomics, and sociology help explain how polit-
ical dislocation increases the likelihood of resistance. Political dislocation is a perceived negative
shift in power compared to the status quo. Sociological theories of emotions explain that negative
emotions are likely to be aroused following loss of power and prestige. When leaders can point
to a specific group or individuals for the downgrading of their prestige, anger and resentment in-
crease and individuals become more willing to fight to reestablish the preexisting social hierarchy
(Petersen 2002; Turner and Strets 2005; Cederman et al. 2010). Similarly, according to framing
theory, different objectives and alternatives are evaluated based on a certain point of reference.
Prospect theory posits that individuals’ attitude toward risk depends upon whether the outcomes
are perceived as gains or losses, relative to the reference point (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 722).
People generally tend to be risk-averse preferring sure gains over gambles offering a higher ex-
pected payoff. People are more risk accepting when trying to fend off losses. What framing and
prospect theory tell us is that for people living through social or economic transformations, such
as those created by political dislocation in occupation, the status quo is not seen as neutral, but
instead as a loss. Individuals from communities suffering political dislocation, will therefore be
more risk accepting and more likely to undertake resistance. Indeed, leaders of revolutions and
rebellions frequently seek to frame the situation as a radical departure from an idyllic status quo
(Berejikian 1992, 653). Framing and prospect theory illustrate how structure and individual ac-
tions are intimately related. Structural factors such as political dislocation affect the environment
in which individuals undertake cost-benefit calculations, which in turn affect the likelihood of
resistance.
Political dislocation also explains why segments of the occupied population may choose to
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actively collaborate with occupiers. Political dislocation can have negative as well as positive
repercussions for social groups. In many instances, the occupied population may side with the
occupier because they genuinely support their objectives. Most Bangladeshis saw India‘s occupa-
tion of East Pakistan between 1971 and 1972 as liberation from the repression of West Pakistan.
Similarly many Turkish-speaking Cypriots welcomed the 1974 Turkish invasion as a blessing, not
a curse. The US occupation of Haiti following a catastrophic earthquake in 2010 was seen by most
as a well-intentioned gesture to help the devastated nation ensure security and get back on its
feet (Lacey 2010). The Armenian occupation of part of Nagorno-Karabagh was perceived differ-
ently whether one was of the Karabakh Armenian or of the Karabakh Azeri: “For one side, the
Armenian possession of Nagorny Karabakh. . . was an enemy occupation; for the other, it was a
fact of historical justice” (de Waal 2003, 3). One of the most infamous cases of collaboration was
the government of Vidkun Quisling, who ruled Norway on behalf of Nazi Germany between 1942
and 1945. Quisling, whose name has become synonymous with treasonous collaboration, was
not a purely opportunistic collaborator. Long before the occupation of Norway, he had founded
Nasjonal Samling (National Gathering), a far right national socialist party whose ideology was con-
sistent with Nazi Germany‘s. Overall, although collaboration is seen as pejorative, the strategy of
active or passive collaboration is the historical norm, not the exception. The necessary association
of occupation with aggression and collaboration with treason simply does not reflect the reality
faced by many occupied societies.
Not every occupation is welcomed, of course. When collaboration is not forthcoming, it can
be compelled through a strategy of carrots and sticks. Occupiers can extort collaboration through
sheer brutality. However, there are limits to what can be achieved through force alone, especially
when dealing the non-material —but equally vital— commodities such as information (Van Evera
1990/1991; Liberman 1996; Brooks 1999; Baldwin 1999). As Kalyvas notes (2006, 89), collaborators
are essential for solving identification problems in occupied societies, where foreign occupiers
may be unable to distinguish resisters in the civilian population. In other instances, occupied
populations are offered incentives to support occupation. Occupiers may favor certain groups in
occupied society because they share some ethnic, religious, or ideological affinity. They may also
incentivize collaboration as a way for individuals to gain power, accrue wealth, and to settle scores
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with rivals.5 Incentivizing collaborators may involve providing protection against domestic en-
emies. Occupiers must therefore provide anonymity, direct physical protection, or the resources
necessary to allow collaborators to entrench their position and defend themselves from reprisals.
The relative risk of collaboration is partly a function of the degree of political dislocation and the
occupier‘s control of territory. As Kalyvas (2006) has shown, the less contested the ground be-
tween occupier and resisters, the greater the likelihood of collaboration with the occupier. When
the occupier has strong control, locals are less likely to inform on collaborators and resisters are
less likely to be able to liquidate collaborators. Of course, the process of control and collabora-
tion are partially endogenous: occupiers are more likely to gain strong control with the help of
collaborators, which in turns increases the likelihood of collaboration.
Cunning occupiers frequently employ divide and rule tactics to break down political resistance
and rule occupied societies.6 They may also use proxy governments to reduce the perception of
occupation. According to Hechter (2008, 23), because the costs of social control are usually greater
for foreign rulers that are resented by the occupied population, using native intermediaries also
reduces the costs of foreign rule. By placing collaborators in power, occupiers may seek to anchor
their objectives over the longer term. In this sense, political dislocation can be a deliberate strategy
employed by occupiers to rule occupied societies.
Political dislocation can, of course, occur in the absence of occupation. Resistance to Soviet oc-
cupation in the Baltics during the 1940s and 1950s paralleled resistance to Sovietization during the
Russian Civil War. Moreover, ethnic groups excluded from state power are more likely to rebel
than their included counterparts, and more likely to rebel if their status has been downgraded
(Cederman et al. 2010). However, political dislocation in the context of occupations is partic-
ularly destabilizing because it is exogenous. Unlike endogenous dislocation, which may carry
greater legitimacy or reflect the domestic balance of power, exogenous dislocation is imposed by
the occupier with a temporary influx of capabilities. Such dislocation is more likely to lack both
legitimacy and support in the target state and fail to reflect domestic social, economic, and military
5 Collaborators may come to use the occupiers as much as the occupiers use collaborators. For example, Kalyvas
(2003) and Chayes (2006) describe the manifold ways Afghan leaders exploited American ignorance of local conditions
to extract economic benefits and have their rivals killed, claiming they were Taliban.
6Such divide and rule tactics are also used outside the context of occupation to dominate deeply divided societies.
See Lustick 1979.
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conditions. Were it to reflect the local distribution of power, it would probably not be necessary
to begin with. There is an increasing body of research demonstrating the destabilizing effects of
political dislocation. Enterline and Greig (2008) show that imposed polities are more likely to face
domestic challenges. Downes (2011) finds that Foreign Imposed Regime Change (FIRCs) signif-
icantly increases the likelihood that the target state will suffer a civil war in the subsequent ten
years. As further evidence of the effect of political dislocation, Downes finds that FIRCs that im-
pose new leaders increase the likelihood of experiencing civil wars whereas FIRCs that restore
former leaders decrease the likelihood of experiencing civil war. Finally Peic and Reiter (2010)
confirm that FIRCs increase the likelihood of civil war particularly when they are accompanied by
inter-state war that weakens state capacity, a phenomenon most commonly associated with occu-
pations. Such findings are consonant with a broader literature regarding the effects of structural
change and domestic instability (Huntington 1968). Wimmer and Min (2006) find that many wars
are fought to determine the state‘s governing structure, and are more likely to occur when the
institutions are in flux due to external geopolitical forces. This conclusion echoes Skocpol (1979),
who argued that international factors such as economic and security competition could precipitate
a crisis of the state and social revolution.
3.3.2 Factional Politics
An important corollary of political dislocation theory is that resistance is not simply a matter of
removing occupiers. With the state weakened and the incumbent overthrown, resistance may at
times be a method of attaining power itself, what I call the factional politics dimension of political
dislocation. The term “Partisan” defines both a member of an armed group formed to fight against
an occupying force and a strong supporter of a political party. When power is zero-sum and
leadership is indivisible, national liberation is not necessarily a public good (non-rivalrous, non-
excludable) but instead shares many of the characteristics of private goods (a summary of different
theoretical understandings of resistance and national liberation is provided in Table 3.1). Such
dynamics occur in both resistance struggles and in civil wars. Liberation is frequently tied to post-
occupation rule and power, which are private. Ousting foreign occupiers can be a means to bolster
domestic power (US Army 2007, 3). Post-colonial struggles are replete with examples of national
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liberation leaders turning into heads of state.7 The same can be said for resistance movements
such as Tito in Yugoslavia, Hoxha in Albania, or de Gaulle in France. Resistance not only builds
prestige but also provides social groups with tools of coercion through the mobilization, training,
and armament of its members. If resistance movements do not put their leaders into power, at
a minimum they provide them with greater political capital. Ironically, those who make war sit
at the peace table and get a say in the post-war political structure. As Almond (1947) found,
examining pre- and post-war electoral outcomes, the political composition of resistance groups
during the Second World War greatly influenced the relative strength of the post-war parties. Of
particular note were the communist parties of Western Europe, which had been active leaders
of resistance and who thrived in the early post-war period. Even when groups do not seek to
gain national leadership, they may seek to use occupation to increase their relative power. For
instance, McCoy notes that provincial and municipal leaders in the Western Visayas region of the
Philippines readily adapted to successive US and Japanese occupations, using the resources of the
occupiers to their own advantage and to the detriment of their rivals (McCoy 1980 cited in Kalyvas
2003). Similarly, in examining variation in nationalist violence against colonial rule, Lawrence
(2010) finds that competition amongst different nationalist actors explained much variation in
violence. Nationalist actors used violence to demonstrate their commitment to the nationalist
cause, consolidate control over particular localities, and eliminate rivals. Lastly, Cunningham et
al. (2012) find that in self-determination struggles, the greater the number of factions, the more
likely it is that each faction will resort to violence both against the state and against co-ethnics.
The theory of political dislocation and factional politics partly help explain the puzzle of why
we tend to observe different resistance groups emerge on the same territory when logic would dic-
tate such groups pool their efforts. For instance Belgium had twelve different resistance groups
whose factionalism led to squabbles over the allocation of provisions. There was also much misin-
formation and propaganda among different resistance groups. French communists, for instance,
claimed to kill 550 Germans a month, a clear exaggeration that served to boost its domestic pres-
tige (Macksey 1975, 112). In German-occupied Poland, resistance formed around three factions:
the Jewish resistance, the Home Army loyal to the government in exile, and the People‘s Guard
7 Although they share many similarities with resistance to occupation, national liberation struggles against colonial-
ism are not the focus of this dissertation.
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Table 3.1: Different theoretical understandings of resistance
Theory Purpose Type of Good Incentives
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formed by Soviet-backed communists (factions from the latter two would clash at the end of Ger-
man occupation). Palestinian resistance groups were heavily splintered, including groups such as
Fatah, the more Islamist Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the Syrian backed Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine, and the Maoist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among others
(Baracskay 2011). For many years, Namibia‘s struggle against South African occupation was car-
ried out by a multiplicity of groups such as the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), the
Namibia African People‘s Democratic Organization, and finally the South West African People‘s
Organization (SWAPO) (Katjavivi 1988). Were national liberation a pure public good, we would
expect groups to coordinate and seek economies of scale. However, because national liberation is
not an unalloyed public good, domestic political considerations counsel groups to pursue efforts
separately in order to defend factional interests and to maintain a coercive bargaining position
post-occupation.8 In Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, resistance fighters complained that the exiled rul-
ing Sabah family released information that endangered resistance operations, and, in an effort to
prevent political rivals emerging from the resistance, sought to ensure that those groups led by
members of the ruling Sabah family received the most assistance (Murphy 1991).
Factional competition among resistance groups provides a second mechanism to explain the
destabilizing effects of political dislocation during occupation. Political dislocation causes certain
social groups to mobilize against occupation. In order to protect themselves from the potential
political and military ascendency of these groups, other rival social groups mobilize (Byman 2009,
610). By the end of occupation a formerly occupied territory may find itself with different armed
factions, some expecting their sacrifices to translate into political power. As Posen (1993a) has
argued, the collapse of the state, which may occur as a result of occupation, creates a situation
of functional anarchy and a concomitant security dilemma that heightens the likelihood of eth-
nic conflict. While the interest of the state might be best served by a general demobilization of
resistance groups, none wishes to be suckered into unilateral disarmament. As Ikenberry notes:
the destruction caused by war and the breakdown of the old order provide opportunities to es-
tablish new basic rules and organizing arrangements. . . the stakes are high (Ikenberry 2001, 50).
8Social structure theorists of resistance would argue that factional resistance is, in fact, deliberate and superior to
broad based resistance. Precisely because resistance is so risky, only tight-knit networks, such as clans, ethnic groups, or
political parties can supply the level of trust necessary to mobilize in secret against occupation. Although this reasoning
is convincing, it grossly under-predicts which groups will band together against occupiers.
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Unless a third-party imposes a settlement on the various resistance groups, such groups cannot
credibly commit not using their coercive capacity to achieve political objectives beyond national
liberation. This is a well-documented phenomenon in civil wars, and one with many cases in post-
occupation conflict (Walter 2001). For example, Greek resistance to Nazi occupation involved a
number of resistance groups representing communists (EAM) and republicans (EDES, EKKA). As
early as 1943, before the withdrawal of Axis forces from Greece, EAM began clashing with other
resistance groups for power and control. Following the Second World War, Greece descended
into full-scale civil war between the Greek government backed by the UK and the US and Greek
communist forces. A similar dynamic was apparent in Albania, where Hoxha‘s resistance forces
assumed power after defeating the Ballis and Zogists in a brief civil war (Clodfelter 2002, 895).
Grandi (2011) shows that patterns of violence in early post-war Italy – which killed some 15,000
– were largely driven by former resisters seeking a greater share of political power. In Iraq, Sun-
nis organized the first resistance against the US-led occupation, but soon found themselves in a
vicious civil war against Shia militias. Often forgotten, in 1947 and 1948 France was seen to be
sliding towards civil war as the French Communist Party, strengthened through its role in the
resistance, became an increasingly vociferous critic of the coalition government (Judt 2005, 116).
When occupiers enter a country experiencing civil war, various factions frequently reengage in
conflict as soon as the occupier leaves, as seen during the Chinese Civil War which resumed fol-
lowing the end of Japanese occupation.
3.3.3 Mitigation
Political dislocation theory identifies a number of factors that increase the likelihood of resistance
to occupation. Understanding these factors also identifies policies that can mitigate resistance.
Specifically, occupiers can employ strategies of indigenous rule and population security to reduce
resistance.
Indigenous Rule
Political dislocation theory argues that occupiers that disrupt the balance of political power in
occupied societies are more likely to face resistance. What this suggests is that occupations that
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maintain indigenous rule or practice accommodation tend to face less resistance. This conclusion
is consistent with other studies of resistance. Petersen (2001, 35) argues that occupations that do
not drastically reorder the social hierarchy of occupied societies will generate less resentment and
therefore less resistance. Edelstein notes:
“Credible guarantees of independent, indigenous rule reduce the likelihood of costly
resistance from the occupied population and may minimize domestic opposition to the
occupation, and thereby make a long and successful occupation possible” (2004, 65).
Similarly, in their examination of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan and Korea, Hechter et al.
(2009b, 53) conclude: “the greater the opportunities afforded to native elites, the weaker the resis-
tance to alien rule.” The policy of indigenous rule was explicitly called for in the initial stages of
Israel‘s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 1967 and 1980. Rejecting calls for
a more direct and intrusive rule of occupied territories, Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan
called for an “invisible occupation,” which would encourage self-rule and “allow the population
of the areas to carry on their life and activities just as they had been used to until the 5th of June
1967.” Indeed, the first years of Israeli occupation resistance was relatively modest, with 49 Israeli
fatalities (military and civilian) in 1968, 59 in 1969, and 17 in 1970 (Sayigh 1997, 209). Crucially,
indigenous rule should reflect the domestic balance of power among relevant social groups in
occupied society. Regimes lacking domestic support and propped up by foreign occupiers are
more likely to be challenged once the occupiers leave (Sullivan and Karreth 2010). In fact, being
propped up by foreigners will erode the legitimacy of such regimes.
The strategy of indigenous rule or accommodation seems intuitive. Why then do occupiers
not employ this strategy more often? It is important to remember that occupiers are not only fo-
cused on avoiding resistance. Occupiers may rationally select an occupation strategy that causes
political dislocation and resistance in order to pursue other interests of greater value, when the an-
ticipated benefits of political dislocation outweigh the cost of resistance. For instance, South Africa
deployed troops to southern Angolan to support rebels from the National Union for the Total In-
dependence of Angola (UNITA) against the Angola government led by the People‘s Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Clearly, South Africa knew its occupation of southern Angola
would create political dislocation, but it saw the MPLA as the vanguard of a communist threat to
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its national security (George 2005). In fact, in some cases the very point of undertaking occupation
is to cement political dislocation on the territory of the defeated state.
Population Security
Political dislocation theory argues that factional resistance may emerge as different groups in oc-
cupied society vie for power and their place in the post-occupation political hierarchy. Notably
militias may emerge to counterbalance rival resistance factions that threaten their security. It is
therefore critical to prevent anarchy emerging during occupation from exacerbating inter-group
competition. If occupied populations cannot rely on the occupier to reestablish security, they will
be compelled to take security into their own hands. The failure to provide security may also gen-
erate additional resentment against the occupier. Central to the task, therefore, are the reestablish-
ment of law and order and the protection of civilian populations. This may involve, for example,
patrolling and policing duties and the physical separation of warring factions. As the occupation
of Iraq has gruesomely demonstrated, an occupier‘s failure to provide security to the local popu-
lation against factional insurgent groups encourages the development of other factional militias,
who could eventually turn against the occupiers in a bid to advance their political interests. The
focus on population security dovetails with more recent counterinsurgency doctrine. According
to Galula ([1964] 2006, 4) , “the battle for the population is the major characteristic of the revolu-
tionary war.” Likewise, the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual “directs
US forces to make securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy, their top priority” (US
Army 2007, XXV). Critically, population security serves to counter ongoing resistance, as well as
preventing resistance from occurring to begin with.
3.4 Trust
A second causal mechanism to explain resistance to occupation is trust. Recall that resistance
to occupation is not rational when resistance is dangerous, when occupation is temporary and
benign, and when occupiers are no worse than local government. This cost-benefit calculation
of resistance will be altered when there is a breakdown in trust with occupiers. Specifically, a
breakdown in trust will occur when occupiers victimize the occupied population or when they are
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incapable of credibly committing to treating the occupied population benignly or leaving occupied
territory. As such, a breakdown of trust occurs when the assumption of temporary and benign
occupation is eroded.
3.4.1 Vulnerability
Occupations can create tremendous vulnerability for occupied populations. Occupiers usually
enter the occupied state with military capabilities in order impose order and deter challengers.
Because occupation frequently occurs in the aftermath of war, the national armies of the occupied
stand defeated and many of their men of fighting age are dead, wounded, or captured. This creates
asymmetries of power that make occupied populations exceptionally vulnerable. This vulnerabil-
ity is exacerbated by post-conflict psychological factors. During war, individuals are primed with
nationalist rhetoric causing antagonisms between occupied and occupiers. Moreover, the trauma
of battle may lead occupying soldiers to thirst for revenge and consequently to engage in acts of
aggression against the occupied population. Rape, pillage, and murder are sadly common. The
large corpus of international humanitarian law regarding occupation emerged precisely to address
the acute vulnerability of occupied societies, and the risk of abuse and exploitation. Occupier and
occupied societies find themselves essentially in a state of anarchy in the sense that the occupied
have no higher recourse should the occupier abuse them. As Morgenthau writes in such situa-
tions “the imperialist policy may have no limits but those set by the power of resistance of the
prospective victims” (Morgenthau [1949] 1985, 69). Marines in Helmand Province, Afghanistan,
perceived how this power asymmetry could generate mistrust: ”Don’t they know we’re here to
help? No they don‘t know. They don‘t know if we are here to invade and take it over. We just
look like these guys that are from somewhere else. Somewhere else very very far away” (Scantling
2011).
3.4.2 Victimization
Because resistance is costly and occupation is generally temporary, individuals in occupied terri-
tory should rationally decide to wait rather than fight the occupier. Moreover, if national libera-
tion is a public good, then individuals should rationally choose to free ride on the efforts of others
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rather than assume the risk themselves. This cost-benefit calculation is reversed when occupiers
begin to victimize the occupied population (Mason and Krane 1989; Goodwin 2001). Victimiza-
tion can include arbitrary arrest, beating, torture, mass killing, and genocide. If individuals in
occupied territory run a high risk of being victimized regardless of their behavior, then attentisme
and fence-sitting may prove to be no safer than participation in resistance. This logic was summa-
rized by Hobbes ([1651] 1994, 87): “For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of
death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting.” In
German-occupied Belarus, a German report described the calculations of civilians as such:
“If I stay with the Germans, I shall be shot when the Bolsheviks come; if the Bolsheviks
don‘t come, I shall be shot sooner or later by the Germans. Thus, if I stay with the
Germans, it means certain death; if I join the partisans, I shall probably save myself”
(Statiev 2010, 75).
Further, reflecting on German occupation policy, the French historian Henri Michel (1972, 185)
stated: “The best recruiting agents for the Resistance were the savagery of the SS, the ineptitude
of the occupying regime and the severity of the economic exploitation.” Mao described a similar
phenomenon in Chinese resistance to brutal Japanese occupation: “This rage is engendered by
the reactionary and barbarous character of Japan‘s war —’there is no escape from fate,’ and hence
an absolute hostility has crystallized” (Tse-Tung [1938] 1967, 24). In Nazi occupied Greece mass
reprisals against civilians “did little to pacify Greece, fight communism, or control the population.
In general, the result was just the opposite. Burning villages left many male inhabitants with little
place to turn except guerilla bands. Killing women, children, and old men fed the growing hatred
of the Germans and the desire for vengeance” (Condit 1961, 268). The effect of victimization can
be seen in temporal variation in resistance. Resistance to Soviet rule in Latvia only truly took off
after 13 June 1941, when 16,000 Latvians were shipped to labor camps in Siberia (Ciganovs 1999,
127). More recently, a study of the effects of house demolitions by the Israeli Defense Forces in
occupied territories found demolitions of the homes of suicide bombers deterred future suicide
attacks against Israel whereas demolishing homes that did not produce bombers for “security”
reasons increased the production of suicide bombers (Benmelech et al. 2011).
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In some circumstances, victimization of occupied population makes it safer for individuals to
join resistance. By providing shelter, escape routes, safe houses, food, and weapons, resistance
groups may provide a degree of protection unavailable to those who do not resist. Because the
protection from the occupiers is nonrival but can be excluded to individuals, it is a club good.
As such, individuals are incentivized to participate in resistance in order to gain access to pro-
tection afforded by resistance groups. As Kalyvas and Kocher argue, individuals may partake in
rebellion “not in spite of risk but in order to better manage it” (2007, 183). The greater and the
more indiscriminate the abuses committed by occupying forces, the greater the likelihood that the
occupied population will be pushed into the arms of resisters. Deliberate victimization (such as
genocide, mass killing or ethnic cleansing) or accidental victimization as a result of discriminate
attacks (such as collateral damage) may have the same effect on the cost-benefit calculations of
civilians, albeit to different degrees. This point is significant since well-intentioned occupiers with
poor local knowledge and less ability to discriminate rebels from the civilian population may find
themselves aggravating resistance (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Indeed, a recent study of insur-
gency in Iraq found clear evidence that Coalition forces are punished with more insurgent attacks
for the collateral damage they inflict on civilians (Condra and Shapiro, 2012).
Victimization of civilian populations in occupied society may also trigger a powerful emotional
response against occupation. A desire for revenge clouds judgment and causes individuals to un-
derestimate the risk of taking up arms (Petersen 2002). In her study of rebellion in El Salvador,
Wood identified defiance as another emotional response to victimization. Activists joined rebels
because of feelings of moral outrage at the unwarranted persecution of their families or neigh-
bors (Wood 2003, 223). Victimization may also create a sense of “relative deprivation” among
victimized individuals, insofar as they perceive the occupier as responsible for a discrepancy be-
tween value expectations such as safety, welfare, and dignity and their actual value capabilities
(Gurr 1970). Revenge also figures prominently in many studies of insurgent motivations (Bloom
2005; Petersen 2001; Hashim 2005; Condra et al. 2010; US Army 2007). Precisely because occu-
pier and occupied interact under conditions of anarchy, occupiers cannot be held accountable for
their actions after they depart. Justice must therefore be met directly through armed resistance, or
not at all. At a minimum the emotional response to victimization reduces the desire of occupied
populations to collaborate with occupiers. In German-occupied Estonia:
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“Soon after midnight on July 1, (1941) thousands of residents of Kivioli awoke to shouts
and the rattle of gunfire. . . sporadic waves of machine gun fire and shouts and screams
filled the night. And yet the residents, aroused from their sleep, remained calm and
felt some satisfaction in knowing that something was finally happening” (Laar 1992,
11).
The victimization-resistance mechanism is self-reinforcing. As a result of victimization, mem-
bers of the occupied society may initiate resistance to occupation. This resistance, in turn, may lead
the occupier to retaliate against those communities deemed responsible for resistance. However,
because occupiers are by definition foreigners, they frequently have less information regarding
those responsible for resistance and therefore are less willing or able to discriminate in their retal-
iation and more likely to cause collateral damage. Precisely because of resistance, occupiers may
also lack sufficient control of territory to exercise selective violence, thereby resorting to less dis-
criminate violence (Kalyvas 2006). Moreover, as Lyall (2010b, 1). demonstrates in his analysis of
counterinsurgency in Chechnya, co-ethnics “enmeshed in dense intraethnic networks, are better
positioned to identify insurgents within the population and to issue credible threats against civil-
ians for noncooperation.” In many instances, occupiers deliberately employ collective punishment
of occupied communities in order to deter future attacks. Indeed, Valentino et al. (2004) find that
strategies of mass killing are most commonly employed during guerilla warfare out of frustration
with conventional tactics. By failing to discriminate those responsible from innocent bystanders,
occupiers thereby generate greater resentment, anger, fear, and often resistance, what Kilkullen
(2009) calls “accidental guerilla syndrome.” This escalation of violence exists in both civil wars
and occupations, but is aggravated in occupations where occupying troops have a shorter history
of interaction with locals, and suffer from cultural and linguistic differences.
Resistance groups can actively stoke the victimization-resistance cycle. A common tactic for
insurgent groups, especially those embedded among civilians, is to provoke their opponents with
the expectation that they will respond disproportionately, causing collateral damage. Cunning
insurgents may launch attacks from buildings with strong national or religious significance, such
as churches and mosques. They can also disguise themselves as protected members of their so-
ciety, such as women. Such attacks invite occupiers to respond by attacking sacrosanct spaces or
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violating cultural norms (Fair and Ganguly 2008). The occupier‘s disproportionate response, in
turn, shatters the legitimacy of the occupier, alienates the local population, and creates grievances.
Locals are then more likely to provide insurgents with men, material, and sanctuary in return
for protection. This insurgent provocation strategy leverages information asymmetries regarding
the type of the occupier. Since occupied populations are vulnerable and cannot directly observe
the intentions of occupiers, resisters will claim that such responses reveal the “true nature” of the
occupier.
Two counterpoints should be addressed regarding the effect of victimization and resistance,
namely endogeneity and effectiveness. The first point is that in the midst of insurgency it is diffi-
cult to understand whether victimization causes violence or whether violence causes victimization
(Lyall 2009a). Of course, the inability to identify the direction of causation does not preclude the
possibility that resistance causes greater victimization and that greater victimization causes greater
insurgency. In other words, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. More importantly, the
endogeneity question is more tractable in the context of foreign occupations. Unlike civil wars and
insurgencies, violence is not a necessary baseline condition in occupations. The majority of occu-
pations are fairly peaceful. Moreover, occupiers may enter a state with the ideological or religious
objective to victimize a certain population. It can therefore be considered to be an exogenous shock
on a given polity. Such characteristics give a better handle on whether occupier-initiated violence
in the midst of an otherwise peaceful occupation is a trigger of resistance. A second counterpoint
is indiscriminate violence helps defeat insurgencies by deterring attacks, depriving insurgents of
recruits, supplies, sanctuary, and intelligence, complicating logistics, creating a wedge between
locals and insurgents, and by underlining the insurgent‘s inability to protect the population (Lyall
2009a; Downes 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Indeed, if indiscriminate violence were so counterproductive,
it would be surprising that it would be used so frequently as a tactic of warfare. Adjudicating this
debate goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice to say that the effect of indiscriminate
violence on the generation of resistance is a distinct question from its effect on conflict outcomes.
There may be a non-linear effect whereby moderate levels of victimization provoke resistance
whereas large-scale victimization simply crushes it (see Greenhill, Forthcoming).9 Thus, victim-
9In a similar vein, Kydd and Walter (2006) argue that groups will only want to employ terrorist strategies of provo-
cation when a government is expected to respond with “middling levels of brutality.” In other words, low levels of
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ization can create resistance, although the same victimization may also defeat the resistance it
creates.
3.4.3 Credible Commitment
Occupations may generate resistance when occupiers cannot credibly commit to the wellbeing or
the eventual sovereignty of the occupied population. Not all occupiers are malevolent. Instead,
we can conceive of occupiers as existing on a spectrum from predatory to benign. At one extreme
are those occupiers who seek to use their temporary monopoly of force over occupied territory to
abuse and exploit the population or to extinguish the sovereignty of the state. At the other extreme
are those occupiers who intend to treat the occupied population well and restore sovereignty as
soon as possible and with minimal disruption. The Nazi occupation of Poland between 1939 and
1945 would be an illustration of the former whereas the multinational occupation of the Solomon
Islands since 2003 to foil a military coup and dampen ethnic conflict would be an example of the
latter. Because intentions cannot be directly observed, and because occupiers may have incentives
to misrepresent their true type, the occupied population can never be fully certain of the type of
the occupier.
Even if occupiers are well intentioned, they may have trouble credibly committing to the well-
being of the occupied population. First, because occupiers are foreign, there is generally a shorter
history of interaction, and therefore less familiarity, making it harder to gauge the intentions and
likely future actions of the occupiers (Kirschner 2010). This generates a baseline level of distrust.
Second, because occupation is temporary, it shortens the horizon of interactions between occu-
piers and occupied. With fewer future rounds of payoffs to be gained from cooperation, occupiers
have fewer incentives not to exploit occupied populations (Axelrod [1985] 2006). Occupiers are
therefore like Olson‘s “roving bandit,” whose short tenure creates incentives for excess taxation
(Olson 1993). Third, occupiers can simply return to their homelands to escape retribution, and ex-
tradition treaties are particularly unlikely in the case of states engaged in interstate war (Hechter
2009a, 291). Fourth, as noted above, the asymmetry of power in occupied territory decreases the
ability of the occupied to hold occupiers in check or to retaliate against the abuses of the occupier.
government brutality will fail to arouse further revolt and extreme levels of brutality may deter revolt entirely.
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Because occupiers and occupied effectively operate under conditions of anarchy, occupiers
may have trouble credibly committing to leaving occupied territory. For example, during the
British occupation of Mesopotamia (present day Iraq), “A further source of unease among groups
of urban notables was the Residency‘s failure to make an unambiguous declaration of policy. . . This
suspicion towards Britain‘s designs became important in 1919-20 as many of the collaborative el-
ements of Mesopotamian society, including the Jewish community and many Baghdadi notables,
toned down their support for the British” (Ulrichsen 2007, 372). Similarly, riots broke out in Gaza
on 10 March 1956 after the UN appointed Colonel Carl Engholm as Military Governor of Gaza,
with rioters taking the appointment as an indication of prolonged UN administration (Keesing‘s
1957, 15448).
Occupiers can still have trouble making credible commitments despite public promises. For
example during the US occupation of Beirut in 1958, American jets dropped one million leaflets all
over Lebanon with the following message in Arabic: “American troops have entered your country
in response to a request by your constitutional government. They are there to help you maintain
Lebanon‘s independence in the face of threats by those who wish to interfere in your affairs and
who have endangered the security of your country. American forces will leave your country as
soon as the UN takes measures to guarantee Lebanon‘s independence” (Attie´ 2004, 200). The
Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran between 1941 and 1946 provides another example. In 1941, the
UK and Russia occupied separate sections of neutral Iran over fears that the Shah could side with
Germany thereby depriving the Allies of critical reserves of oil. The Shah was forced to abdicate
in favor of his son. The new Shah was then pressured into signing a Treaty of Alliance with the
UK and the Soviet Union in January 1942. Through this treaty, the UK and the Soviet Union
sought to provide Iran assurances that occupation would be temporary. Specifically, Article Five
of the treaty committed the Allies to leaving Iran “not more than six months after the cessation
of hostilities.” When the deadline for withdrawal arrived on 2 March 1946, six months after the
end of the Second World War, the British began to withdraw, but Moscow balked, citing threats
to its security (Eshraghi 1984). Worse still, the Soviet Union had begun aiding Azeri and Kurdish
separatists to set up autonomous Soviet republics. The Soviet Union eventually left Iran, but only
under intense pressure from the US and the UK, and a rebuke from the UN Security Council (Blake
2009). Even when occupiers have no designs over the sovereignty of the occupied territory, their
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promises not to mistreat occupied civilians may ring hollow. When Soviet troops were deployed
to suppress the Prague Spring in 1968, Brezhnev declared: “We are not occupiers, we came to
Czechoslovakia as friends, as people worried about the fate of socialism in that country” (Navratil
2006, 508).
These examples illustrate that promises to leave occupied territory are cheap talk. Since they
are relatively costless and there are no automatic consequences if occupiers rescind on them,
promises do not constitute costly signals. Consequently, they do not reveal additional information
regarding the type of the occupier. Both well-intentioned occupiers and predatory annexationists
have incentives to portray their presence as temporary in order to avoid international censure and
resistance in occupied territory. Moreover, because the consequences of defection (in this case
abusing or annexing occupied territory) are so high, signals must be particularly costly in order to
be perceived as credible (Kydd 2000, 326). Occupiers can try to make their promises more credible
by making withdrawal contingent on behavior. However, this does not resolve the problem if oc-
cupiers are themselves the judge of compliant behavior (Edelstein 2004, 68). These difficulties are
compounded by the logic of counter-insurgency. On the one hand, in order to defeat resisters and
to recruit collaborators, occupiers must make a long-term commitment to defeating resistance. On
the other hand, in order to prevent resistance, occupiers must commit to leaving occupied ter-
ritory. Such reassurances obviously work at cross-purposes and the attendant hypocrisy creates
distrust among the occupied population. Lastly, resistance can generate self-fulfilling prophecies
regarding long-term occupation. Efforts by resisters to expel occupiers only encourage occupiers
to stay longer and redouble their efforts, thereby confirming the suspicion of resisters that occu-
piers never intended leaving in the first place (Edelstein 2004).
Can occupiers signal their benign type by sinking costs? For example, could contributions to-
wards humanitarian aid, reconstruction, infrastructure, and development separate the predatory
occupiers from the benign ones? Unfortunately, sinking costs may be insufficient. Such contribu-
tions may simply be seen as propaganda. Furthermore, if the occupied population is concerned
about being annexed by the occupying state, contributions towards development and infrastruc-
ture will be seen as investments rather than sunk costs. Finally, as the sabotaging of factories in
Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe and the torching of schools in modern day Afghanistan indicate,
such contributions can provide targets for resisters driven by political dislocation.
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3.4.4 Mitigation
So far, I have argued that resistance is not rational against short and benign occupations. How-
ever, occupiers may find it difficult to signal credibly their intentions to treat the populations be-
nignly and to leave occupied territory promptly. Trust between occupied and occupier is essential
since the occupied have no higher recourse should the occupier abuse the occupied. I argue three
mechanisms, regime type, international organizations, and religious affinity, help occupiers more
credibly signal benign intentions and help reduce the likelihood of resistance. Such mechanisms
reinforce trust by providing occupiers with legitimacy, transparency, and accountability.
Regime Type
Regime type is one mechanism to ascertain political intentions of occupiers. In particular, demo-
cratic occupiers are more likely to maintain trust with occupied populations for four reasons: they
are more likely to comply with the laws of war, less likely to victimize the occupied population,
better able to make credible commitments, and less likely to annex occupied territory.
First, democracies are less likely to victimize civilians. Liberal norms make democratic regimes
more likely to promote tolerance, nonviolence, and human rights (Valentino et al. 2004, 382). Such
human rights norms are more likely to be embedded in the domestic laws of occupiers, making
them harder to violate. Democracies are more likely to ratify human rights conventions, at least in
part because they are more likely to respect them to begin with (Landman 2005; Simmons 2010).
Democracies are more likely to include human rights NGOs that will monitor the government‘s
compliance with human rights at home and abroad. Democracies also worry that departure from
accepted standards of behavior in war would damage their international reputation, especially
with other democracies (Merom 2003, 25; Finnemore 2003). When occupiers are democracies,
members of occupied populations can more easily seek redress for human rights violations either
through international NGOs and media, or the political institutions of the occupying state, which
tend to be more open than in non-democratic states.
The claim that democratic occupiers tend to be more benign is borne out in a number of em-
pirical studies. Valentino et al. (2004, 398) find that highly democratic regimes are 32 percent
less likely to undertake mass killings than their highly autocratic counterparts. Similarly, Rummel
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(1995) found that democracies are less likely to kill foreign civilians. Part of the reason demo-
cratic occupiers are less likely to victimize occupied populations is that they are more likely to
comply with the laws of war. According to Morrow (2007), democracies are more likely than
non-democracies to comply with the laws of war pertaining to the treatment of civilians.10
Second, democratic occupiers are less likely to annex occupied territory. Because of their form
of government, democracies are more sensitive to the right to self-determination and less likely to
absorb populations against their will. When democracies occupy foreign territory, it creates cog-
nitive dissonance between the values that govern democratic administration at home and non-
democratic administration in occupied territory (Ratner 2005). Moreover, when annexing rela-
tively populous foreign territory, occupiers face the dilemma of either integrating an electorate
whose preferences may diverge from their own, or creating second class citizens within their so-
ciety in violation of their democratic ideals. This dilemma was illustrated most prominently in
regards to Israel‘s relations with occupied Palestinian territories. Israel could either be a demo-
cratic nation by affording Palestinians full citizenship, or a Jewish nation by excluding Palestinians
from certain rights as citizens, but never both fully democratic and Jewish (Friedman 1989, 254).
As Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was fond of saying, in 1967 Israel “got a lovely dowry. The
trouble is that the dowry comes with a wife” (Goremberg 2007, 130). Summary statistics indi-
cate that democracies are, in fact, less likely to annex foreign territory by force. Non-democratic
states were responsible for 84.05 percent of annexations since 1900 (based on data from Tir et
al. 1998).11 Similarly, Walter (2006, 2009) found that democracies were more likely to offer conces-
sions than to fight against separatist groups. Thus, democracies are less likely to suppress national
self-determination at any cost. The greater the confidence the occupier will not annex occupied
territory, the less likely they will be to undertake costly acts of resistance. This point is also signif-
icant because one of the main reasons Downes (2006, 2007a) found democracies to target civilians
was to depopulate annexed territory.
Third, democratic regimes are better able to make credible commitments to policies on which
they may otherwise have incentives to renege. Democracies are better able to credibly commit
10 In contrast, Downes (2007a, 2008) find that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to target civilians
when they are desperate to win interstate wars.
11Annexation is coded as 1 when the process of territorial change came about from conquest or annexation (Tir et al.
1998). Democracy is coded 1 when the country-year Polity IV score is above 7 (Gurr et. al. 2009).
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because when democratic leaders make promises, they not only send a signal of their intentions
to the occupied population, they also generate audience costs with their domestic population.
Because they are more transparent and meant to be domestically accountable, democratic leaders
find it more difficult to send one message to occupied populations and another contradictory mes-
sage to their own domestic audiences. Moreover, democratic leaders are punished domestically
for reneging on threats or promises made. According to Fearon (1994, 581), both democratic and
non-democratic leaders may incur audience costs, but democratic leaders pay added domestic
political costs for “engaging the national honor” and subsequently changing their position.12 The
same logic underpins democracies’ respect for international law pertaining to human rights and
the laws of war. As Morrow (2007) suggests, democracies are more likely to comply with treaty
obligations because the ratification of such treaties creates audience costs and therefore incentives
to follow through with commitments. Martin (2000) argues that because treaties are more costly
to ratify in democracies, for example because they may require the consent of the legislature, they
constitute more credible signals of states intentions. The very procedural inefficiencies that are
often seen to hobble democracies in their interactions with other states are precisely what enable
democracies to send costly signals of their commitment. As a result democratic occupiers are bet-
ter able to credibly commit to treating occupied populations benignly and to credibly commit to
vacating occupied territory. Such commitments, in turn, reduce occupied populations’ perceived
utility of undertaking resistance against occupation.
In sum, because they are less likely to victimize occupied populations or to annex occupied
territory, and because they are better able to make credible commitments, we should expect demo-
cratic occupiers to face less resistance than non-democratic occupiers.
International Organizations
Occupations undertaken under the aegis of regional or international organizations (IOs), what
I term multilateral occupations, are more likely to maintain trust with occupied populations for
four reasons: legitimacy, transparency, checks and balances, and non-annexation.
First, multilateral occupations are more likely to be pursued with the right intentions, and
12 For a rebuttal of audience cost theory, see Borghard and Snyder 2011.
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therefore to be seen as legitimate by the occupied population. States often proclaim altruistic
motives (e.g. human rights, self-determination) to pursue purely selfish interest in foreign inter-
ventions. It may be difficult to distinguish ex ante acts of aggression from benevolent intervention.
Because of their broad membership IOs are commonly perceived as gatekeepers of international
legitimacy (Coleman 2007). The deliberative process of IOs makes them better able to represent
the interests of the occupied society and of the international community. Of course, certain inci-
dents such as Libya‘s 2003 chairmanship of the UN Human Rights Commission or North Korea‘s
2011 chairmanship of the UN Conference on Disarmament question the legitimacy of multilat-
eral institutions. However, these examples highlight that if anything multilateral organizations
tend to be overly conservative, failing to act when (arguably) they should rather than acting when
(arguably) they shouldn’t. IOs are therefore less likely to undertake occupations that are consid-
ered illegitimate. Lastly, by conferring greater legitimacy to occupations, IOs increase the reputa-
tional costs of domestic and foreign actors to undertake resistance. As a result, the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) recommended that interventions be
conducted multilaterally to ensure that they are being pursued with the right intentions (ICISS
2001, XII). Similarly, Finnemore (2003) notes that multilateralism is increasingly seen as the only
legitimate way to carry out interventions. On a more conceptual level, by ensuring occupation is
being pursued for the right intentions, IOs provide a screening device for occupied populations
to determine the type of the occupier. 13
Second, IOs are better able to generate trust because they tend to be more transparent than
unilateral occupations. International organizations, while weak, possess one unique asset: legiti-
macy. They trade conditional legitimacy for oversight of state actions. Such oversight may deter
abuses or increase the likelihood that abuses will be detected should they occur. The dramatic
debate regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provides a case in point. The US saw UN authoriza-
tion to intervene in Iraq as valuable because it saw such authorization as conferring legitimacy
to US actions. However, in seeking UN authorization for action the US was forced to justify in-
tervention and share intelligence regarding Iraq‘s alleged weapons program. In short, the UN
provided a more transparent decision-making process for intervention. Transparency is enhanced
13 For a rebuttal of the effects of multilateralism on occupation, see Edelstein 2008a, 136-152.
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further when states depend on the IO to finance, or to coordinate the finance, of occupation. Fiscal
dependence on IOs opens the occupation to greater outside scrutiny, making it more transparent.
Third, IOs generate trust by providing checks and balances on the actions of occupiers. Con-
servative political theorists such as Burke and Fe´ne´lon argued that even with good values and
moderate domestic politics, states behave with moderation and decency only if checked by others
(Jervis 1993, 66). International organizations can therefore channel and constrain state actions. Be-
fore making major decisions, occupiers must consult with other partners in the multilateral coali-
tion as well as with the international organization itself. This multiplicity of actors creates veto
points, which reduce the likelihood of flagrant abuses against the occupied population (Tsebelis
1995, for a counterpoint see Ratner 2005). Powerful states themselves may have strong incentives
to bind themselves to international institutions (Ikenberry 2000). By establishing constraints and
clear rules of the game, they elicit voluntary cooperation from weaker actors that would otherwise
avoid cooperation out of fear of defection. Thus, what occupiers lose in efficiency and freedom of
action, they may gain in greater cooperation from the international community and the occupied
population (not to mention burden-sharing).
Interestingly, third-party states may prefer multilateral occupations because they provide guar-
antees that their rivals will not exploit occupations to their advantage. For example, warring states
may agree to multilateral occupation of contested territory, as was the case with the Free City
of Danzig (1920-1939) and Upper Silesia (1922), and was proposed for Fiume in Dalmatia (1919),
Meme (1921-1923), Alexandretta in Syria (1937), Jerusalem (since 1947), and Sarajevo (1994) (Wilde
2001, 587). Similarly, multilateral occupation may provide an important restraint on feuding al-
lies. For example, following the First World War, the UK insisted on a multilateral occupation of
Istanbul to check the presence of France (Criss 1999, 63).
Fourth, IOs can more credibly commit to vacating occupied territories. Because international
organizations are not states, they do not have the institutions to govern territories on a perma-
nent basis (with the possible exception of the defunct UN Trusteeship Council). The concept of
annexation simply has no parallel with regards to IOs. In addition, multilateral occupations must
retain the support of their members to persist. Multilateral occupations usually require periodic
renewals of their authorization. In other words, withdrawal of occupying forces is the default
policy. Because the actors undertaking occupation are different from those authorizing them, such
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“sunset” clauses help better ensure that occupations remain temporary. Ultimately, because multi-
lateral occupations tend to be perceived as more legitimate and transparent, because they provide
checks and balances to the occupiers, and because they are unable to annex territory, they are more
likely to maintain the trust of the occupied population and therefore elicit less resistance. States
may therefore have an interest in tying their hands through IOs in order to boost the credibility of
their commitments.
Religious Affinity
Occupations undertaken by coreligionists are less likely to face resistance than occupations un-
dertaken by groups of a different religion because of greater legitimacy, shared values, and moral
community. The 1555 Peace of Augsburg established the principle of cuius regio eius religio (to each
prince his own religion), meaning rulers had the right to determine the religion of their subjects
(Krasner 1999, 79). This principle, which would later be recognized in the Peace of Westphalia,
effectively called for non-intervention in the religious affairs of the state. According to Huntington
(1993), civilizations represented through the world‘s major religions, will take over from ideology
as the main sources of friction in International Relations. Religion provides an alternate basis of
identity and community from the nation. If shared identity and community are a basis for the
legitimacy of rulers, occupations undertaken by coreligionists will be seen as more legitimate. But
what are the specific mechanisms of religious affinity?
First, trust is a function of shared values. Religious affinity between occupier and occupied
boosts trust by increasing confidence that the occupiers will rule according to values and norms
acceptable to the occupied population. This is what makes it different than other forms of affinity
such as language or ethnicity, which does not necessarily entail shared values or norms. Con-
versely, religious difference heightens the perceived gap between “in-groups” and “out-groups”
(Wood 2003). Occupied populations may come to fear occupiers of different religions if they be-
lieve occupiers have come to change their way of life or govern them according to an incompat-
ible set of values. Such religious dissimilarity magnifies the perceived difference in governance
between native and foreign rule. The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Man-
ual recognizes such concerns and recommends: “U.S. forces must make clear that they do not
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intend to undermine or change the local religion or traditions” (US Army 2007, 219). Of course
such promises made by occupying forces will not be seen as credible by occupied populations,
especially if the occupier‘s religion is evangelical.
Second, religious affinity creates a shared moral community between occupiers and occupied.
This shared moral community reinforces trust because it increases the moral costs of abusing the
occupied population. Members of a common religion cannot as easily be demonized or labeled as
sub-human. Some religions possess theological institutions with clear hierarchies. Such overar-
ching institutions provide recourse to abused occupied populations and moral sanctions against
abusive occupiers. Additionally, the sanctions for killing coreligionists are usually greater than
those for killing members of other religions. Thus, on a moral level at least, religious affinities
help address the condition of anarchy between occupiers and occupied. Religious differences
also make it easier for resistance leaders to portray their struggle in zero-sum terms, as well as to
demonize their opponents (Pape 2005). However, if occupier and occupied are of the same com-
munity, political gains for one are not necessarily assumed to be political losses for the other. Thus
shared values and a sense of moral community help occupiers better credibly commit to treating
the occupied population benignly.
Third, religious affinity helps neutralize some of the most effective mobilizers of resistance:
religious leaders. Religious leaders benefit from a number of advantages in stoking resistance.
They possess moral legitimacy, which is important when instructing individuals to risk their lives
while claiming others. The power of religious leaders is not derived from political power, and
therefore can transcend occupation and regime change. Religious leaders can draw on a large
community of followers, with a strong sense of devotion. Religious ceremonies provide a focal
point and plausible deniability for large public gathering and protests. Religious leaders can draw
on a broader set of selective incentives than non-religious activists. Unlike nationalism, religion
can provide the promise of redemption in an afterlife, a potentially strong if unverifiable incentive
for action. However, when occupiers and occupied are of the same religion, these leaders are
less likely to mobilize against their coreligionists. Consequently, religious leaders are frequently
leaders of resistance. For example, during the First World War, Orthodox priests in Serbia called
for resistance against Austro-Hungarian occupations during sermons (Mitrovic 2007). Similarly,
the religious leader Muqtada al-Sadr was instrumental in launching the Shia insurgency against
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the US occupation of Iraq (Patel 2007).
The effect of religious affinity overlaps with the mechanisms of political dislocation and oppor-
tunity structure. For example religious differences may provoke fear of victimization or of even-
tual political dislocation. Furthermore, distinct religious communities may be uniquely suited to
resolving coordination problems (Petersen 2001). Because of the effect of religious affinity, occu-
piers try whenever practicable to deploy troops of the same religion as the occupied population
or to solicit coreligionist coalition partners. During the 1991 and 2003 invasions of Iraq, the US
went to extraordinary lengths to bring on board Muslim coalition members, despite their modest
military contributions. Such token forces serve mainly to vouch for the good intentions of the
occupiers to their coreligionists. Similarly in deploying UNIFIL troops in the wake of the 2006
Israeli-Lebanon War, UN Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown argued, “a European-
Muslim force (would be preferable) because of both groups interest in this situation” (Coleman
2007, 322). In a series of articles and books, Pape (2003, 2005, 2010) finds that democratic occu-
piers of different religion from the occupied population are more likely to suffer suicide attacks,
than coreligionist occupiers.
Through legitimacy, shared values, and moral community, religious affinity can increase trust
between occupiers and occupied. With greater confidence in benign treatment, religious affin-
ity thereby reduces incentives to take up arms against occupiers. We should therefore expect
coreligionist occupiers to experience less resistance than occupiers of different religion than the
occupied population.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter started with the proposition that resistance is irrational under most circumstances be-
cause resistance is dangerous, occupations are temporary, and the governance of occupying pow-
ers may be no worse than those of preceding governments. I then argued that two factors: political
dislocation and a breakdown in trust, increase the likelihood of resistance to occupation by alien-
ating powerful segments of the occupied population, stirring domestic competition for power,
victimizing the occupied population, and failing to credibly commit to treating the occupied pop-
ulation benignly or vacating occupied territory promptly. In short, political dislocation and a
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breakdown in trust erode the conditions under which resistance is not rational. I proposed that
indigenous rule and population security could mitigate the risks of political dislocation whereas
democracy, international organizations, and religious affinity could mitigate breakdowns in trust.
Understanding resistance as partly a domestic struggle for power in occupied territory, rather
than a simple reflex against foreign rule, can help explain otherwise puzzling characteristics of
resistance such as collaboration, fractionalized resistance groups, and post-occupation civil war.
Thus, political dislocation is what Lakatos terms a progressive research program: it can account
for novel facts without requiring auxiliary hypotheses (Lakatos 1970).
The mechanisms of political dislocation and trust can be interlinked. When an occupation
causes political dislocation, it may trigger resistance from the affected segment of the occupied
population. Lacking sufficiently fine-grained local knowledge to discriminate between resisters
and innocent civilians, the occupier may engage in accidental victimization of the occupied popu-
lation. Because the occupied population cannot adequately judge the type (predatory or benevo-
lent) of the occupier, they may be unable to discern whether the violence inflicted was accidental
or deliberate. Reassurances from the occupier that incidents of violence were unintended will not
necessarily be meaningful. This, in turn, may lead to a breakdown in trust between the occupier
and occupied, as individuals seek the protection of resistance groups. What was once factional
resistance against foreign occupation becomes a broader based reaction against perceived victim-
ization. A summary of the theoretical mechanisms of political dislocation and trust is provided in
Figure 3.2.
In contrast to existing theories of resistance to occupation, both political dislocation and trust
relate to the nature and policies of occupiers. This distinction is significant because it means that
occupiers may be able to take steps to mitigate resistance. It should also be noted that the mech-
anisms of political dislocation and trust are consonant with the international law of occupation.
Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention explicitly bans some forms of political dislocation, re-
quiring occupiers to obey the laws in force in the occupied territory. Article 43 also admonishes
occupiers to maintain “public order and safety,” which according to the mechanism of factional
resistance serves not only the needs of the occupied population, but also dampens anarchy, the
emergence of a security dilemma among domestic factions of occupied society, and the develop-
ment of militias that could eventually turn against occupiers. Lastly, the international law of oc-
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Figure 3.2: Summary of theoretical mechanisms of political dislocation and trust
cupation strictly bans the victimization of the occupied, with Article 46 of the Hague Convention
stating: “Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice, must be respected.” While international law has been seen at times as
a costly impediment to the successful conduct of warfare, in fact it highlights many of the factors
that prevent resistance.
The effects of political dislocation and trust may be plausible in theory, but how do they fare
against the empirical record? The next chapter tests these theories using a novel dataset of resis-
tance to occupation from 1900 until 2010.
Chapter 4
Cross-National Evidence on Resistance
to Occupation
But has the last word been said? Must hope disappear? Is defeat final? No!
-Charles de Gaulle, 18 June 1940
4.1 Introduction
Some of the greatest US foreign policy failures in the post-war period— as in Vietnam, Lebanon,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, have involved resistance to US occupation. Indeed, statesmen have gener-
ally been bad at predicting resistance, often with disastrous political, military, and human conse-
quences. With these failures in mind, this chapter presents a cross-national study of resistance to
occupation using an original dataset. First, I outline a research design that takes into account po-
tential selection bias in the onset of occupation. Second, using a probit model, I explore occupation
onset: where occupations occur and which countries are at risk for occupation. Third, I describe
a set of explanatory variables of resistance to occupation, their coding, and their hypothesized ef-
fects. Fourth, using a negative binomial count model, I examine why certain occupations generate
significant resistance while others do not. Fifth, I use a survival model to explore variation in the
duration of occupations. This chapter concludes by selecting case studies for further analysis.
To preview the results, I find that factors that increase trust between the occupied and the occu-
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pier, such as the level of democracy in the occupying state, international or regional organization
mandates for occupation, or shared religion, tend to reduce the number of occupier-force fatalities.
I also find evidence that political dislocation plays a strong role in stoking resistance. Occupations
that result in the overthrow of political leaders tend to generate greater fatalities among occupiers
than those that leave governing structures in place. Other factors such as poverty, mountainous
terrain, and the duration of occupation are also found to increase resistance to occupation. No-
tably, nationalism is found to be a poor predictor of resistance to occupation. All measures of
nationalism fail to register any statistically significant effect on resistance or have effects contrary
to predictions. Lastly, employing a survival model, I find that the predictors of resistance to occu-
pation do not predict the duration of occupations.
4.2 Research Design
The unit of analysis for this chapter is the occupation-year for the occupation onset models and
occupation for the resistance models.1 The universe of cases is determined using extensive sec-
ondary source research, as well as the definition of occupation outlined in the previous chapter:
“The stationing of armed forces by a state or an intergovernmental organization in all or part of a foreign
state‘s territory for at least one month, exercising coercive authority over the local population.”Using this
definition of occupation, I identify 163 occupations since 1900, listed in Appendix 4.8.3. This is the
first and only dataset of occupations of its kind.
The principle dependent variable in this chapter is resistance to military occupation, measured
by the number of occupier fatalities. A key methodological concern in such a non-experimental
study is selection bias. This occurs when the observed population reflects only part of a latent
distribution. Selection is problematic because failing to take into account non-events may lead
to biased estimates. However, in order for there to be a bias in the estimates, there must be a
endogenous, as opposed to exogenous, selection process. In other words, some of the factors
that determine whether a state is occupied also affect the level of resistance to occupation. An
endogenous selection effect will bias the coefficients, whereas an exogenous selection effect will
1Ideally, the unit of analysis would be the occupation-year. Unfortunately, there is insufficiently granular data on
occupier strength and occupier-force fatalities to break down the analysis at this level.
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simply lead to a loss of efficiency in the estimates.
There may be reason to believe that selection bias is at work in resistance to occupation. States
do not occupy foreign territories at random. Instead, they are cognizant of the balance of power
and its effects on the cost and outcome of war. According to rationalist theories of war, states will
refrain from starting wars they know they will lose; similarly, states may refrain from occupying
territories they know will generate bloody resistance. Thus, we would observe a disproportionate
number of occupations with low levels of resistance, which is indeed the case (see Figure 4.3). This
could lead to the erroneous view that occupations do not cause resistance, when, in fact, states are
simply prudent enough to avoid difficult occupations. For example, when the US National Secu-
rity Council debated the risks of a preventative war against the Soviet Union in 1954, it became
apparent that the US would need to occupy Soviet territory in the aftermath of the war. President
Eisenhower balked: “The colossal job of occupying the territories of the defeated enemy would be
far beyond the resources of the United States at the end of such a war” (Foreign Relations of the
US 1984, 636). Similarly, in their study of peacekeeping, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find that the
UN generally avoids sending missions to powerful countries.2
Despite these concerns, there are also several factors militating against selection bias. The pro-
cess determining occupation may also be extremely “noisy,” with a complex set of factors making
it difficult for states to estimate the cost of occupation a priori. Noise in the occupation selection
process emerges from three factors: imperfect information, cognitive biases, and issue tradeoffs.
First, would-be occupiers have incomplete information regarding the capabilities and intentions
of the local population; the ability and will of the local population to mobilize resistance; the
impact of novel technologies and tactics on resistance; and the possibility and impact of foreign
support for resistance. Incomplete information may, therefore, lead occupiers to miscalculate the
costs of occupation. Second, even if occupiers possessed perfect information, they might still be li-
able to underestimate the costs of occupation due to cognitive biases. Occupiers may overestimate
the perceived legitimacy of their mission due to cognitive dissonance, propaganda, or deliberate
misinformation from domestic or government actors. Militaries may ignore the risks of occupa-
2Edelstein (2008, 9-10) argues that there may actually be reverse selection effects in occupation. States are likely to
employ occupation as a tactic of last resort only when there are few other palatable options. Therefore, the universe of
observed occupations would be disproportionately hard, leading to failures in occupation.
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tion since they see such tasks as beyond their purview. Third, the selection process may be noisy
because occupiers undertake issue tradeoffs. Occupiers may be aware of the high costs of occu-
pation, but are willing to incur them in order to advance more important ideological or material
goals. Indeed, military casualties are, by their very nature, sacrifices made in the name of a na-
tional interest. Alternatively, when the balance of power among players is shifting, occupiers may
be willing to incur the high costs of occupation in time t in order to prevent even higher costs in
time t+ 1 (Powell 2006).
In order to address selection bias, I employ a two-stage process. In the first stage, using a pro-
bit model, I estimate the factors that put states more at risk for occupation. Importantly, I include
potentially endogenous variables that we may expect to affect both the probability of occupation
and the degree of resistance in occupied territory. In the second stage, using a negative binomial
count model, I estimate the factors that cause occupier fatalities. Third, I include the predicted
probabilities of occupation in the negative binomial model in order to test for selection. If the
predicted probability of occupation onset is not correlated with the error term in the resistance
model, this will allay concerns of selection bias in the estimate of occupier-force fatalities. Ap-
pendix 4.8.2 provides a formal proof of this method, as well as the full selection-bias test. As will
be demonstrated, the factors determining occupation are largely distinct from those determining
resistance.
4.3 Who Gets Occupied?
4.3.1 Unit of Analysis and Dependent Variable
First, I develop a basic model to estimate occupation onset. This model sets out to estimate the
probability that a state will experience occupation. The unit of analysis is state-years. I start with
a list of every state in the Polity IV dataset starting in 1900. To this list, I add a number of states
not in the Polity dataset that were occupied as soon as or very shortly after they were created or
achieved independence (Palestine, North Korea, South Korea, Western Sahara, East Timor, Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Namibia) (Gurr et. al. 2009). The dependent variable in the model is
occupation onset using an original dataset and drawing from the aforementioned definition of
occupation. The dataset was built from extensive research in primary and secondary sources and
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is the first and only one of its kind. The dataset starts in 1900, including occupations ongoing
during that year. The 1900 start date is arbitrary, driven principally by data availability. Each
occupation corresponds to one observation in the dataset, although the same country-year can
experience several occupations.
4.3.2 Independent Variables
The factors determining the propensity of a state to experience occupation fall under two broad
categories: capabilities and international context. I hypothesize that military capabilities, alliances,
population size, and mountainous terrain can play a role in determining occupation onset. Of
these factors, I expect only population and mountainous terrain to predict both occupation onset
and resistance to occupation. According to the Realist theory of International Relations, more-
powerful states are better able to deter attack and less likely to be defeated in war. As a con-
sequence, we should expect states with great military capabilities to be less likely to experience
occupation. Therefore, I include as a control the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)
drawn from the Correlates of War project (Singer et al. 1972). Smaller states can compensate for
the relative weakness by forging alliances with other states. In order to capture this effect, I include
a measure of alliance membership drawn from the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance
Dataset (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). This Alliance variable is coded as the highest level of alliance
commitment, where 0 indicates no alliance, 1 indicates a neutrality or non-aggression pact, 2 indi-
cates an entente, and 3 indicates a defensive alliance. Generally speaking, we should expect states
involved in defensive alliances to be less at risk for occupation than states engaged in a neutrality
pact.
Large population size will make occupations more costly, forcing occupiers to spread them-
selves thin to police the population. Indeed, force-to-population ratios play an important role
in military planning. I hypothesize that populous countries are less likely to be occupied than
sparsely-populated ones. I draw data on total population size from the Correlates of War project
(Singer et al. 1972). Mountainous terrain can also play a role in deterring occupation, either by
providing a natural bulwark against the passage of armored vehicles or by facilitating cover and
concealment of defensive forces (Clausewitz [1832] 2007). Therefore, I include a measure of the
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Table 4.1: Description of variables for occupation-onset models
Variable Definition Source
Post1945 Time period after 1945 NA
Interstate War Loser State lost an interstate war Ghosn et al. 2010





Log. Mountainous Log. percent mountainous terrain Fearon and Laitin 2003
Buffer State State is a buffer between great powers Fazal 2008
Civil War State experienced a civil war Sarkees and Wayman 2010
Military Capabilities CINC score Singer et al. 1972
Log. Population Log of total population of state Singer et al. 1972
Democracy Polity score of potential occupying state Gurr et. al. 2009
Religious Difference Coded 1 if main religion of dyads is different CIA 2010
Direct Contiguity Coded 1 if dyads share a direct land border Tir et al. 2006
percent of the state that is mountainous, drawn from Gerrard (2000). Because the defensive bene-
fits of mountainous terrain do not accrue in a linear fashion, consistent with other studies, I take
the log of the measure of mountainous terrain.
Naturally, we may expect the international context to play an important role in determining the
onset of occupation. Among other factors, war outcomes, civil war, the norm of state sovereignty,
and buffer-state status affect incentives for states to intervene and occupy other states. First, states
that lose wars are more likely to be occupied. They may be weakened by the process of war, and
their opponents may have incentives and capabilities to occupy the country in order to plunder
resources or decapitate the regime. As has been discussed, states may use occupation as a way to
prevent the reoccurrence of interstate war. To code states that have been defeated in an interstate
war, I use the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (Ghosn et al. 2010). Second,
states experiencing civil war may be more at risk for experiencing occupation. Such states will be
weakened and distracted by internal conflict, making them more vulnerable to foreign attack.
The international community may have stronger incentives to intervene in such states, to protect
domestic clients and allies, monitor and enforce ceasefires, or stem humanitarian disasters such as
genocide or mass migration (Fortna 2004; Walter 2001; Finnemore 2003). I code states experiencing
civil war according to the Correlates of War Intra-state War dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).
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Some International Relations theorist have posited that the probability of experiencing occupation
has declined since the middle of the 20th century as a result of strengthened norms regarding state
sovereignty, decolonization, and the crystallization of customary international law. In addition,
Article 4, Section 2 of the 1945 UN Charter states: “All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN
1945). This principle was reinforced in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law,
Friendly Relations, and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, which stated:
“Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or
use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United
Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues” (UN
1970).
The legal and normative innovations have raised the costs of undertaking occupation. Invasion
and occupation have not been abolished in International Relations, but they have clearly become
more controversial. In order to control for this effect, I create a dummy variable for state-years
after 1945. Lastly, recent scholarship has found that buffer states—that is, states geographically
located between two other states engaged in a rivalry—are more likely to experience occupation,
invasion, and state death. As Fazal notes, “Regional or great powers surrounding buffer states
face a strategic imperative to take over buffer states: if these powers fail to act against the buffer,
they fear that their opponent will take it over in their stead” (Fazal 2007, 312). I create a variable
for buffer states following the coding rules provided by Fazal. A summary of the definitions and
descriptive statistics are provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
4.3.3 Model Specification
The dependent variable in the onset model is binary, with 0 indicating that a state is not occupied
in a state-year and 1 indicating that the state is occupied in the state-year. I therefore employ a
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for onset models
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Monadic data
Occupied State 0.016 0.125 0 1 10374
Post 1945 0.731 0.444 0 1 10374
Interstate War Loser 0.007 0.082 0 1 10370
Log. Population 8.928 1.498 4.317 14.078 9906
Alliance 1.429 1.298 0 3 10370
Log. Mountains 0.728 0.647 -2.351 1.514 9750
Buffer State 0.209 0.406 0 1 10374
Civil War 0.063 0.242 0 1 10374
Military Capabilties -0.011 0.428 -9 0.384 9923
Dyadic data
Occupied State 0.013 0.111 0 1 1104218
Post 1945 0.858 0.349 0 1 1110858
Interstate War Loser 0.005 0.068 0 1 1110854
Log. Pop 8.960 1.52 2.651 14.078 1086010
Alliance 1.646 1.27 0 3 1110854
Log. Mountains 0.656 0.644 -2.351 4.311 1110858
Buffer State 0.2 0.4 0 1 1110858
Civil War 0.06 0.238 0 1 1110858
Military Capabilities 0.009 0.029 0 0.384 1085478
Democracy 0.516 7.365 -10 10 1093713
Religious Clash 0.599 0.49 0 1 1110858
Direct Contiguity 0.007 0.086 0 1 1110858
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probit model and cluster observations at the state level.
4.3.4 Findings of Occupation-Onset Model
The results of the occupation-onset model, shown in Table 4.3, provide some insight into the prob-
ability that states will be occupied. Consistent with rationalist theories of war, state capabilities
play some role in predicting the likelihood of being occupied. As predicted, the proxy for military
capabilities is found to have a negative effect on the probability of being occupied, but this effect is
not found to be statistically significant. Populous states are found to be less likely to be occupied,
but this effect is not found to be statistically significant. Mountainous terrain and alliance status
also do not have a statistically significant effect.
The international context is also seen as playing a key role in occupation. Predictably, states
that have lost an interstate war are more likely to be occupied. Holding all other variables con-
stant at their mean or mode, states that have lost inter-state wars are four-percent more likely to
experience occupation. States experiencing civil war are two-percent more likely to be occupied.
Changes in the international system after the Second World War also appear to have reduced the
risk of occupation. Indeed, post-1945 states are approximately one-percent less likely to be occu-
pied than those prior to 1945. Buffer-state status also increases the likelihood of being occupied,
consistent with Fazal’s findings.
As a robustness check, I rerun the models employing a rare events logit to account for the
possibility that the effect will be biased by the rarity of the incidence of occupation (King and
Zeng 2001). Employing a rare events logit does not change the direction or statistical significance
of the results.
4.3.5 Selection Bias?
The results of the occupation-onset model provide evidence against selection bias with regard
to resistance to occupation. While the process of occupation is not random (civil and interstate
war, buffer-state status, and the post-1945 time period all play a role), the factors determining the
onset of occupation are distinct from those that would predict the intensity of resistance. Among
the factors that states consider when occupying foreign countries, the probability of resistance
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Table 4.3: Risk of occupation
Probit RE Logit Dyadic Probit 1 Dyadic Probit 2
Post 1945 −0.34∗∗∗ −0.80∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.25) (0.05) (0.05)
Interstate War Loser 1.51∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.39) (0.09) (0.09)
Alliance −0.08 −0.17 −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗
(0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02)
Log. Mountains −0.05 −0.14 0.07 0.07
(0.08) (0.20) (0.05) (0.04)
Buffer State 0.34∗∗ 0.84∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.11) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05)
Civil War 0.79∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.31) (0.05) (0.05)
Military Capabilties −0.72 −3.19 −0.17 −0.35
(0.66) (5.81) (0.76) (0.77)
Log. Population −0.06 −0.12 −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗







Constant −1.52∗∗∗ −2.75∗∗ −2.56∗∗∗ −2.53∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.92) (0.14) (0.15)
Observations 9303 9303 1085424 1069004
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.082 0.094
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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does not appear to figure prominently. As such, we should expect the selection process to be
exogenous to resistance, and thus, not bias the estimates of the resistance model. Section 4.8.2 in
the appendix provides a further test for selection effects by employing the predicted probabilities
of the occupation-onset model as an independent variable for the resistance model described in
upcoming Section 4.4.
4.3.6 Modeling Occupation Onset Dyadically
As a last robustness check, I model occupation onset dyadically. The occupation-onset model de-
scribed in the last section uses the state-year as the unit of analysis. A drawback with this monadic
unit of analysis is that it cannot take into account characteristics of the occupier in determining
occupation onset, which trust theory suggests are relevant to resistance. Indeed, if potential oc-
cupiers are aware that democracy and religious affinity dampen the likelihood of resistance (as
trust theory suggests they do) then such factors may also affect the selection of occupations. In
order to account for the characteristics of the occupying state, I therefore create a directed dyadic
dataset for all state-dyads for every year in the international system between 1900 and 2010 (over
1,100,000 observations in total). Each dyad includes a potentially occupied state and a potentially
occupying state. This dataset is ”directed” insofar as the dyad “State A-State B” is different from
the dyad “State B-State A.”
Using a dyadic dataset allows me to employ of a number of new variables to model occupa-
tion onset. First, I measure the regime type of the potential occupying state, using the Polity IV
dataset (Gurr et. al. 2009). Regime type is measured on a scale from -10 to 10, with -10 being the
most autocratic and 10 being the most democratic. Polity scores are coded to the closest available
year. Second, I code whether the dyads are territorially contiguous using the Correlates of War
Project’s Direct Contiguity Dataset (Tir et al. 2006).3 Territorial continuity is expected to increase
the likelihood of occupation onset, as states need not overcome the stopping power of water or
third states to deploy military forces. Third, I code for religious differences in state dyads.4 Reli-
gious difference is a dummy variable representing a difference in the dominant religion of dyads
3I include colonies and dependencies in determining territorial contiguity for colonial powers.
4The religion of each state is coded as Buddhist, Christian, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Shinto,
Taoist, or other. Each state is coded as the largest religious group in the state, according to the US Central Intelligence
Agency .
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(CIA 2010).
As with the monadic occupation-onset models, the dependent variable codes whether occu-
pation occurs in a given directed state-dyad-year. I employ a probit regression and cluster obser-
vations at the state-dyad level. The results are included in Table 4.3. I run two models, one re-
stricted to those variables found in the monadic occupation-onset models and one adding dyadic
variables that measure religious difference, regime type ,and direct territorial contiguity. The re-
sults are largely consistent in direction, magnitude, and statistical significance, with the monadic
occupation-onset model, with one exception. I find that the population of the potentially occupied
state in negatively associated with the probability of occupation onset dyad. Unlike the monadic
models, this effect of population is statistically significant, though substantively quite small. In
other words, the dyadic model finds that more populous states are less likely to be occupied. This
is not surprising in and of itself, but could cause concern about selection bias. In order to account
for this possibility, Section 4.8.2 in the Appendix employs the predicted probabilities of the dyadic
occupation-onset model as independent variables for the resistance model (presented in the next
section). As is described in the Appendix, none of the predicted probabilities are found to be
statistically significant, thus assuaging concerns of selection bias.
4.4 Who Resists Occupation?
The previous section examined the factors that predict occupation. This section seeks to explain
why certain occupations generate resistance, measured in terms of occupier forces‘ fatalities.
4.4.1 Unit of Analysis and Dependent Variable
The unit of analysis is occupations, drawn from an original dataset. The dependent variable is
resistance to occupation. I operationalize resistance as the number of fatalities incurred by occu-
pying forces in occupied territory during the course of the occupation. This measure does not
include forces killed in the course of an inter-state war between the occupiers and the occupied
prior to occupation.5
5Occasionally, I found disagreement in the historical literature on the number of fatalities. When faced with conflict-
ing estimates, I used the figure most commonly cited in the literature. If there was no tendency in the literature towards
certain estimates, I took the average. For the cases of Serbia in 1918, Poland in 1939, and Latvia in 1940, estimates were
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The dependent variable of occupier-force fatalities poses some methodological issues. Given
the difficulties of obtaining data on fatalities in the midst of war, there is inevitably some mea-
surement error. However, it is important to note that this measurement error is non-systematic.
Reports of occupier-force fatalities are not drawn exclusively from occupiers or resistance forces.
Therefore, the error is noise that is not correlated with the independent variables. Although the
measurement reduces the efficiency of the statistical analysis, it does not bias the results (Keohane
et al. 1994).
Another methodological issue is the use of fatalities as the sole measure of resistance. Re-
sistance can take a variety of shapes and forms, from assistance to insurgents, to protests, strikes,
sabotage, and assassinations, all the way up to suicide attacks on occupying forces. Occupier-force
fatalities are, therefore, only the most extreme manifestation of resistance, and by ignoring other
forms of resistance we are seeing only part of the picture. While the other forms of resistance can
affect occupations, most face problems of measurability, systematic bias, and comparability. Most
forms of resistance are not serious enough to be systematically counted, though they may add up
to a sizeable effect over the long term. When acts of resistance are measured, they often suffer
from reporting bias. Take, for example, the use of membership in a resistance group as a measure
of resistance. Because resistance is a risky activity, individuals do not always openly identify with
resistance movements during the course of the conflict. If resistance succeeds, membership tends
to be over-reported; if it fails, membership tends to be under-reported, systematically biasing the
results. Moreover, even when acts of resistance can be counted reliably, many cannot easily be
compared. Cutting a local telephone line and blowing up a strategic bridge are both individual
acts of sabotage, but they are in no way comparable in their effect. Counting the members of a
resistance group is not very meaningful if some members are mere sympathizers while others are
hardened guerillas. Ultimately, occupier-force fatalities are the most reliable measure of resistance
to occupation. Moreover, fatalities are the most politically salient cost of occupation, particularly
in normally casualty-averse democracies.
imputed based on accounts of resistance. As a robustness check, I dropped these cases without significantly affecting
the results. References for all cases are available.
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4.4.2 Principal Independent Variables
I posit that two sets of factors play an important role in explaining resistance to occupation: polit-
ical dislocation and trust.
Political Dislocation
One of my key theoretical propositions is that resistance will be greater when occupiers undertake
policies that cause political dislocation. Occupiers may be reluctant to withdraw from occupied
territory unless they can obtain guarantees that the political outcome of the conflict will not be
reversed as soon as they withdraw (Reiter 2009; Downes 2009). This commitment problem gives
occupiers incentives to change the leadership or implement reform in the occupied states. Political
reform serves as an exit strategy that anchors political gains. In conducting reform, however,
occupiers may come to disrupt the domestic distribution of political power, what I term political
dislocation. Domestic groups that would have otherwise waited out the occupation may be driven
to resist. Groups weigh the immediate risk of resistance against the costs of a weakened political
position in the future. Understanding resistance partly as a domestic struggle for power in an
occupied territory, rather than as a simple reflex against invasion, can help explain why only
certain groups take up arms. Indeed, resistance movements frequently have ethnic or ideological
inclinations, and occupations often turn into civil wars, as factions turn against each other in the
aftermath of occupation.
Forced leadership change (overthrow). I measure political dislocation by looking at changes in
leadership and the context of occupation. Political dislocation theory predicts that resistance will
be greater when outsiders impose changes to the political balance of power. Changes of lead-
ership that are endogenous—i.e., that emerge from organic or domestic movements rather than
from foreign impositions—may be perceived as more legitimate and/or better reflect the domestic
balance of power. Conversely, forceful foreign-imposed leadership change may be seen as illegit-
imate. Domestic actors may see the foreign occupier as the cause of political dislocation and,
therefore, target foreign troops in order to prevent or reverse it before they become entrenched.
Therefore, I code cases for whether there was a forceful change in the leadership of the state: as-
sassination, coups, or forced exile. The coding for this variable draws in part from the Downes’
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dataset on foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs).6 Indeed, there is increasing evidence that
forceful regime overthrow is a determinant of civil war, when a weakening of the state following
interstate war and occupation, and the generation of resentment because of regime change lead
to greater political contestation (Downes 2011; Reiter 2010 ). It is important to remember that not
all foreign occupations result in leadership change. In fact, foreign occupation results in the over-
throw of the regime in only 44.17 percent of occupations. For instance, rulers may invite foreign
armies to help put down domestic insurgencies, as was often the case in France’s support of Chad.
The purpose of the occupation is, therefore, to maintain, rather than to overthrow, incumbents. In
other circumstances, occupiers may control only part of the occupied state and are, therefore, un-
able to carry out a more sweeping regime change. For example, Germany controlled vast swathes
of Western USSR during the Second World War but failed to overthrow Stalin.
Hypothesis 1 Occupations that forcefully remove the leader of the occupied state will experience more
resistance.
Trust
Another key proposition is that resistance emerges as a reaction to occupation policies. As with
other aspects of International Relations, the occupier and the occupied interact under conditions of
anarchy. Fear of future occupation and potential abuse act as a catalyst of resistance to occupation.
Resistance will be muted, however, if mechanisms are put into place to check the power of the
occupier and build trust with the occupied population.
Regime type. There are a number of variables that may affect the level of trust during occupa-
tions. The nature of the occupying state may have an impact on the level of trust. Specifically,
while authoritarian states may have few restrictions and inhibitions in repressing occupied pop-
ulations, democracies may be less likely to annex occupied states. Indeed, while democracies
have often engaged in colonialism, only three states deemed to be democracies (UK, Israel, and
Armenia) have annexed occupied territory since 1900. Thus, using the Polity IV dataset, I code
the political regime of the occupying state for the year prior to the occupation (Gurr et. al. 2009).
6There is not a complete overlap between my dataset and the Downes dataset since not all FIRCs involve occupa-
tions.
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In the cases of multinational occupations, the variable is coded as the average Polity score of the
three largest troop-contributing states.
International organizations. Multilateral occupations may affect trust and, thus, resistance to
military occupation. Regional or international institutions such as the UN, NATO, ECOWAS or
the AU can provide checks on the power of occupying forces. International institutions may also
increase transparency and oversight in occupation (for a contrary view, see Ratner 2005 and Edel-
stein 2008a). International organizations can serve as gatekeepers of international legitimacy and,
consequently, signal benign intent (Finnemore 2003). In addition, multilateral operations must
maintain the support of their members to persist. In other words, withdrawal of occupying forces
is the default policy. By providing additional veto points, multilateral occupations reduce the fear
of abuse, permanent occupation, and annexation. There are different levels of multilateral occu-
pation. An occupation may have an international mandate with international organization com-
mand and control of military forces and territorial administration. The international organization
can provide a mandate for an occupation but delegate autonomous operational responsibility to
states. Furthermore, an international organization may provide its blessing to a unilateral or mul-
tilateral occupation once it has already begun, such as the 2001 occupation of Afghanistan and the
2003 occupation of Iraq. Alternatively, an occupation can be multilateral—that is, carried out by
several states, but without the blessing of an international organization. Moreover, multilateral
occupations can have international organization mandate, from the UN or the League of Nations,
or can have regional organization mandates from organizations such as the African Union (AU),
the Organization for African Unity (OAU), NATO, the European Union (EU), the Arab League,
the OAS, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African De-
velopment Community (SADC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Regional organizations may also be
expected to provide legitimacy, though perhaps not beyond their area of membership.
In order to capture the effect of multilateralism on resistance to occupation, I create an interna-
tional organization dummy variable for occupations operating under the League of Nations or the
UN. The list of League of Nations and UN occupations is drawn from van Ginneken (2006) and the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). Because the effect of a regional organi-
zation mandate may differ from that of an international organization, I create a separate dummy
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variable for occupations operating under the mandate of a regional organization. The list of re-
gional organization occupations is drawn from Bellamy and Williams (2005) and complemented
by secondary sources for more-recent cases. Regional and international occupations are not mu-
tually exclusive. Clearly, not all multilateral peacekeeping operations are considered occupations
under the definition used here. Traditional peacekeeping operations, where UN troops are inter-
posed between opposing forces on an international boundary, are not considered occupations. In
order to qualify as an occupation, occupying forces must exercise some coercive authority, such as
patrolling or policing, over the local population. Importantly, an international mandate must be
obtained before the occupation to be coded as an international-organization-approved occupation.
Thus, the US occupation of Iraq since 2003, which acquired a UN mandate following the invasion,
does not meet this criterion.
Religious difference. Trust between the occupiers and the occupied may be a function of shared
values. Occupied populations may come to fear occupiers if they believe that the occupiers have
come to change their way of life or govern them according to a different set of values. Accord-
ing to Huntington (1993), civilizations represented through the world’s major religions will take
over from ideology as the main sources of friction in International Relations. Religion can affect
resistance by heightening the perceived differences between “in-groups” and “out-groups,” as
well as diminishing the perceived legitimacy of the occupier (Wood 2003). Religious differences
also make it easier for resistance leaders to portray their struggle in zero-sum terms, as well as
to demonize their opponents (Pape 2005). The religion of states is coded as Buddhist, Christian,
Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Shinto, Taoist, or other. Each state is coded as the
largest religious group in the state, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA 2010).
Religious difference is a dummy variable representing a difference in the dominant religion of the
occupied and the occupying state.
Mass killing. Finally, trust will break down when occupiers undertake policies of indiscrimi-
nate violence and mass killing. In such situations, the costs of passivity will outweigh those of
resistance (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Prospect theory also explains that individuals are more
likely to take risks when facing the prospects of loss rather than the chances of gain (Gurr 1970;
Scott 1985). Because violence is indiscriminate, it should also provoke resistance by a wide range
of groups within the occupied state. Mass killing is defined as the killing of more than 50,000 civil-
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE ON RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION 100
ians in a period of five years or less. Data on mass violence is drawn from Valentino et al. (2004)
and complemented by secondary sources for the 1900-1945 and 2000-2010 time periods. While
finer-grained data on occupier abuses would be useful, it faces strong endogeneity problems. It
is difficult to identify whether occupier abuses caused resistance, whether resistance triggered
occupier abuses, or, more likely, both.
The following is a summary of hypotheses regarding the effect of trust on resistance to occu-
pation:
Hypothesis 2 Occupations with a mandate from an international organization will experience less resis-
tance.
Hypothesis 3 Occupations with a mandate from a regional organization will experience less resistance.
Hypothesis 4 Occupations by autocratic states will experience more resistance than those by democratic
states.
Hypothesis 5 Occupations that implement policies of mass killing against the occupied state will experi-
ence greater resistance.
Hypothesis 6 Occupations in which the dominant religion is different between the occupier and the occu-
pied will experience more resistance.
4.4.3 Alternative Theories
I posit that trust and political dislocation play an important role in predicting resistance to occupa-
tion. However, there are a range of other factors and alternative theories that should also be taken
into account in modeling resistance to occupation. These factors fall under three broad categories:
nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.
Nationalism
Although many scholars argue that nationalism is a powerful force in International Relations,
there exists no single or ideal measure of nationalism. This is a major shortcoming of the liter-
ature on nationalism, one that cannot be addressed here. It should also be noted that because
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nationalism is generally thought to have arisen through the process of modernity, in a dataset that
begins in 1900, we can test only the intensity of nationalism rather than the existence of nationalism
(Gellner 1983). These complications aside, a number of variables are coded in order to capture the
potential effect of nationalism on resistance to occupation.
State age. Nationalist sentiment may be related to the age of the state. Older states may be
expected to draw greater loyalty from their citizens due to deep cultural heritage, traditions, sym-
bolism, and legitimacy. Older states may also cultivate a more defined sense of identity. The age of
the state is coded by the year that it entered the international system, according to the Correlates
of War State System Membership, with adjustments made for states not listed in the Correlates of
War (COW) dataset.
Literacy. Similarly, education can inculcate a strong sense of nationalism. The advent of mass
schooling in the 19th century served both to enhance economic growth and to consolidate nation-
states through cultural homogenization. Following Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006), I proxy
mass schooling by the adult literacy rate at the beginning of the occupation, using data from
UNESCO and the Cross-National Time Series dataset, as well as other secondary sources when
necessary (Banks 2011). When data are not available for the year of occupation, I code for the
closest available year.
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The effect of nationalism on resistance to occupation may be
contingent on the homogeneity of the occupied society. Ethnic fractionalization dilutes the ab-
solute commitment to the nation by creating competing loyalties. In so doing, it also reduces
individuals’ commitment and self-sacrifice in defending the nation. All other things being equal,
we would expect relatively homogeneous societies to exhibit greater levels of nationalist resistance
than relatively heterogeneous societies. I code ethnic fractionalization employing the widely-used
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) based on the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and
drawn from Collier et al. (2007).7
7It should be recognized that ELF is a blunt and imperfect measure of fractionalization. ELF is based on ascriptive
and primordialist categories and, therefore, often fails to capture relevant and evolving cleavages within a society (Ka-
lyvas 2006; Posner 2004). For our purposes, however, ELF is sufficient to measure the existence of some heterogeneity,
even if this heterogeneity does not capture the full complexity of occupied societies.
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Opportunity Structures
Groups and individuals that participate in resistance are sensitive to incentive structures. Factors
that affect the cost of taking up arms will, all other things being equal, affect the likelihood and
intensity of resistance. This is particularly the case in resistance movements, which are usually
irregular and relatively weak in comparison to occupying forces.
Terrain. Previous studies have found that “rough terrain” affects the likelihood of insurgency
(Buhaug and Gates 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), though this effect is
not consistent across studies (Lyall 2009a). Some of the most renowned resistance groups, such as
the French Maquisard and the Lithuanian Forest Brothers, are named after the terrain that facili-
tated their struggles. Rough terrain, including mountains and forests, provide cover for irregular
forces. Mountains can be defended more easily and with smaller forces (Guevara [1968] 1998).
Rough terrain also narrows the advantage of conventional militaries by making it more difficult
to maneuver and project force with heavy military equipment. Using data from Gerrard (2000), I
measure the percentage of a country‘s terrain that is mountainous.
Population. Second, I control for demographic factors that affect the costs and opportunities of
undertaking resistance. The most obvious factor is the size of the population in the occupied state.
Assuming that the local population is sympathetic to the resistance struggle, a larger population
provides the human cover for insurgency, as well as a greater recruitment pool for resistance (Mao
[1937] 2000). The larger the population, the less likely it will be that the occupier will capture and
punish a member of a resistance group. Larger populations make it costlier to search the popula-
tion or to inflict collective punishment for acts of resistance. Conversely, large troop-to-population
ratios increase the ability of the occupying forces to deter and defeat resistance by gathering intel-
ligence, providing security to the local population, covering terrain, and responding to attacks in
a timely fashion. 8
Per capita GDP. Economic conditions in the occupied state may also affect the propensity of
resistance to occupation. A wide range of studies have identified low per capita GDP as one of
the most important predictors of insurgency and rebellion. However, the nature and direction
8Some widely-cited studies have recommended minimum troop densities of 20 to 25 soldiers per 1,000 local in-
habitants in order to successfully conduct stabilization and nation-building operations (Quinlivan 1996; Dobbins et al.
2003). However, these studies have recently been questioned (Friedman 2011).
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of the causality remains contested (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Levels of economic development
and prosperity in the occupied population can have a number of effects on their propensity to
take up arms against occupiers. Low levels of economic development reduce the opportunity cost
of taking up arms. That is, resistance activity requires individuals to take time away from other
productive activities, and the risk involved in resistance may compromise future income. Income
forgone will be higher in richer states, therefore increasing the opportunity cost of fighting. The
correlation between income and life expectancy further magnifies the opportunity cost of taking
up arms, as richer individuals are risking larger income streams over a longer period of time.
Lastly, Liberman notes that the economic division of labor is greater in wealthier industrialized
societies. This division of labor makes individuals less self-sufficient, more vulnerable to occupier
pressure, and, therefore, less likely to resist occupation (Liberman 1998). Thus, I code the per
capita GDP of the target state at the beginning of the occupation in constant 1990 dollars, using
the closest available year (Maddison 2005). Because the marginal effect of per capita GDP is so
small, I also rescaled the variable by dividing per capita GDP by 100.
Perhaps the most salient demographic determinant of resistance to occupation is community
cohesion. Tight-knit communities can better monitor and mobilize individuals to resistance by
providing status rewards to those who fight and punishing those who do not (Petersen 2001; Wood
2003). Here again, I proxy community cohesion using the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index
(ELF) (Atlas Narodov Mira 1964; Collier et al. 2007).
Foreign Troops. Occupiers deploy troops in occupied territory to maintain order and prevent
instability. We should, therefore, expect the number of foreign troops to affect the likelihood of
resistance. I include a variable for the number of troops deployed in the occupied state. Measures
of the number of occupying troops are drawn from historical accounts in the secondary source
literature. Due to fluctuations in the numbers of troops deployed to an occupied state, I code
the highest number of troops deployed to the occupied state in the span of the occupation. The
number of occupying troops leads to conflicting predictions regarding occupier-troop fatalities.
On the one hand, more occupying troops will create more exposure and more targets for resistance
fighters. Moreover, more troops may be deployed precisely to those occupied states generating
the most resistance. Thus, we would expect more occupying troops to be associated with more
fatalities. On the other hand, large numbers of occupying forces may deter attacks from resistance
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fighters. In such cases, we should expect overwhelming shows of force to be associated with lower
levels of resistance.
Duration. Lastly, I include a control for the duration of an occupation. As with the number of
occupying troops, longer occupations will generate more exposure for occupiers and increase the
likelihood that they will experience fatalities. The duration of occupations is counted in months
from the beginning of occupation until the foreign forces are removed or until they cease exercising
coercive authority over the local population.9
International Context
In one of the more extensive studies on military occupation, Edelstein argues that the interna-
tional threat environment has an impact on the likelihood that an occupied population will rise
against its occupier. Edelstein does not provide a definition of foreign threat; nor does he test his
argument quantitatively. Threat is generically defined as the product of intention and capability.
Determining intentions is inherently idiosyncratic and subject to misperceptions and cognitive
biases that have long formed a staple of International Relations theory (Waltz 1959; Jervis 1978;
Wendt 1996; Walt 1987; Press 2005). Capabilities are also hard to define, for they include more
than simple “bean counting” of enemy forces and equipment, and can involve vague but critical
inputs such as doctrine and tactics (Biddle 2004). These present serious conceptual issues, but for
my limited purposes, I adapt Bennett’s (2007) formula to operationalize the aggregate amount of
foreign threat faced by an occupied state.
First, the enemies of occupied state X are identified based on past conflict with state X . Any
state with whom X has engaged in a reciprocated militarized dispute that lasted at least 30 days
in the five years prior to the occupation is listed as an enemy. History of conflict, therefore, serves
as a proxy for threatening intent. Reciprocated militarized disputes are drawn from Maoz (2005).
I dropped from this list the occupying state itself since it does not constitute a third-party threat
to the occupied state. Second, I identify supporters of X as those states that joined state X against
the particular enemy in the previously identified militarized dispute. I do the same for those
9Because the duration of occupation might be endogenous to the level of resistance, in the next section, I conduct a
survival analysis of occupation duration. As will be demonstrated, the level of resistance is not, in fact, systematically
related to occupation duration, allaying endogeneity concerns.
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supporters of enemies of state X . Third, I measure the military capability of state X , its enemies,
and the supporters ofX , based on the Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capabilities
(CINC, Singer et al. 1972). Fourth, I sum over all the enemies of X . Given n enemies, the threat






The values of the threat variable theoretically range from 0 when stateX is very secure to negative
infinity when state X has no capabilities or allies and faces strong enemies. All other things being
equal, we should expect occupied states facing greater foreign threats to generate less resistance
than occupied states facing lesser foreign threats. Table 4.4 provides descriptive statistics of the
main dependent and explanatory variables.
Table 4.4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Democratic Occupier 1.62 7.943 -10 10 163
International Mandate 0.264 0.442 0 1 163
Regional Mandate 0.245 0.432 0 1 163
ELF 0.196 0.196 0 0.88 163
Country Age 44.141 39.275 0 166 163
Log. Population 8.756 1.54 4.317 13.096 163
Duration 112.46 165.757 1 989 163
GDP 20.107 17.182 2.12 129.55 163
Religious Difference 0.558 0.498 0 1 163
Mass Killing 0.123 0.329 0 1 163
Foreign Threats -23.862 65.406 -425.424 0 162
Log. Foreign Troops 3.639 0.964 0 4.615 161
Overthrow 0.442 0.498 0 1 163
Log. Mountains 0.723 0.548 -0.634 1.484 157
GDP (Occupier) 6839.095 6656.265 550 29037 163
4.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 4.1 shows the number of military occupations ongoing since 1900. Consistent with the
occupation-onset model, the number of occupations is correlated with interstate war. The largest
spike in occupations occurred during the Second World War and its aftermath, as Germany sought
to expand its empire and the Allies counterattacked. Interestingly, although the norm against ter-
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Table 4.5: Description of variables for resistance models (1)
Variable Definition Source
Occupier Fatalities Fatalities incurred by occupying
forces in occupied territory during
period of occupation
Secondary sources
Democratic Occupier Polity score of occupying state Gurr et. al. 2009
International Mandate Occupier operating under
international mandate
Secondary sources
Regional Mandate Occupier operating under
mandate of regional organization
Secondary sources
Religious Difference Coded 1 if religion of occupier is
different from religion of majority
of occupied state
CIA 2010
Mass Killing Coded 1 if over 50,000 civilians in
occupied state were killed in
period of five years or less
Valentino et al. 2006









Fearon and Laitin 2003
Country Age Age of occupied state at time of
occupation onset
NA
Log. Population Log of total population of
occupied state
Singer et al. 1972
GDP Per capita GDP of occupied state
(divided by 100)
Maddison 2005
Duration Duration of occupation in months Secondary Sources
Log. Foreign Troops Log of number of occupier troops
in occupied state (high)
Secondary sources
Log. Mountainous Log of percent of occupied state
that is mountainous terrain
Fearon and Laitin 2003
Foreign Threats Sum of balance of power between
enemies and allies of occupied
state in five years prior to
occupation
Singer et al. 1972
Literacy Literacy rate of occupied state Secondary sources
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ritorial conquest has solidified over the course of the 20th century, the incidence of occupation has
remained between ten and 20 ongoing occupations per year. Thus, occupation remains a common
tool of statecraft. This fact is attributable to the increase in invited interventions and “robust peace-
keeping” missions, which are considered occupations under the definition used here. However,
it is also interesting to note that the number of occupations relative to the number of states in the
international system is generally declining. In other words, while occupation remains common, it














































Word War I Word War II End of Cold War
Figure 4.1: Evolution of occupations since 1900
There have been qualitative changes in the nature of occupations over the 20th century. The
percent of occupations with regional or international organization mandates has shifted: They had
been prevalent in the inter-war period and since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the
Cold War was widely seen as expanding the freedom of action of the UN and an increased need
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(a) Invasion vs. Invited Occupations
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(b) International Mandate
Figure 4.2: Qualitative shifts in nature of occupations
to contain ethnic conflict and civil wars. As Finnemore (2003) notes, to be perceived as legitimate
by the international community, even humanitarian interventions must be multilateral.
Of the 163 occupations that have occurred since 1900, 13 have taken place in Latin America, 23
in Asia, 23 in Western Europe, 29 in the Middle East, 35 in Subsaharan Africa, and 40 in Eastern
Europe. The relatively high rates of occupation in regions such as Eastern Europe and the Middle
East confirm the theory that “buffer states” between great powers are more likely to experience
occupation.
Nationalist theory predicts that violent resistance is a likely consequence of occupation. Figure
4.3, which displays the range of occupier fatalities, tells another story. Far from generating consis-
tently high levels of resistance, most occupations generate fairly few occupier fatalities. The vast
majority of occupations generate fewer than 1,000 occupier-troop fatalities. In fact, the majority
of occupations cause fewer than 200 fatalities per occupation. Take, for example, the US occupa-
tion of Nicaragua between 1909 and 1925. US Marines initially occupied Nicaragua to support
conservative forces against the liberal President of Nicaragua, Jose´ Santos Zelaya. Although the
US used the pretext of the killing of two American mercenaries by Zelaya’s forces, it was also
concerned about the potential construction of a rival to the Panama canal by Japan and Germany.




































(b) 0-1,000 Fatalities Range
Figure 4.3: Occupier-force fatalities per occupation
During the course of this occupation, the US suffered seven fatalities (Langley 1983; US Navy 2010
). Returning to the broader dataset, even when focusing on the ratio of occupier-force fatalities per
occupied person, resistance is fairly low. The results of the occupation-onset model provide ev-
idence that these relatively low levels of resistance are not simply a result of selection bias. As
was described, the process of occupation onset is largely exogenous to the hypothesized process
of resistance to occupation.
Even when controlling for selection effects in occupation onset, these figures may be deceptive.
Low fatality levels do not mean that occupations are costless or inevitably successful. Rationalist
theories of war would predict that occupations should generate few fatalities. Occupiers will seek
to minimize the risk of resistance by deploying sufficient troops to deter members of the occupied
population from taking up arms. Alternatively, occupations may generate low fatalities because
occupiers may choose to withdraw in anticipation of incurring high fatalities. As such, low fatality
figures do not mean that the occupations are necessarily successful or even achieve any of their
policy objectives.
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4.4.5 Model Specification
The dependent variable—the number of occupier-force fatalities—is a count variable that can take
only nonnegative integer values. In order to select the appropriate count model, I conduct a dis-
persion test, which clearly shows that occupier-force fatalities are over-dispersed, meaning that
the variance is larger than the mean (see Figure 4.8 in Appendix 4.8.4). Given the nature of the
data, I employ a negative binomial model.
4.4.6 Findings of Resistance Model
The principle dependent variable of interest is the occupier forces‘ fatalities. The negative bino-
mial model provides estimates on those predictor variables that affect the number of fatalities
suffered by occupying forces. Table 4.17 in Appendix 4.8.4 displays the correlation between ex-
planatory variables. There is a relatively strong correlation between key variables, such as re-
gional organization mandate and international organization mandate or between ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, country age, and per capita GDP. High correlation can lead to multicollinearity
in the model. Because of the number of explanatory variables and relatively few observations, I
run a set of different models.
The results of the negative binomial models are shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. For ease of un-
derstanding, I interpret the coefficients as: the percentage change in the number of occupier-force
fatalities as follows: %4fatalities = 100 × exp(βk × δ)− 1. Where %4fatalities is the percent
change in occupier fatalities, βk is the coefficient for the particular variable, and δ is the unit change
for the estimated effect.
4.4.7 Political Dislocation
The results provide support for the theory of political dislocation. Forced leadership change is
found to have a strong and statistically significant effect on the level of resistance to occupation
across all model specifications. Occupations that overthrow the incumbent regime experience a
475-percent increase in fatalities. Replacing forced overthrow with other measures of political dis-
location, such as constitutional revisions (dummy variable for occupiers undertaking revisions to
the constitution of the occupied country) or democratization (dummy variable for democratiza-
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Table 4.6: Determinants of resistance (baseline models)
1 2 3 4 5
Trust
Democratic Occupier −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
International Mandate −1.47∗∗∗ −1.31∗∗ −1.48∗∗∗ −1.56∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40)
Religious Difference 1.61∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.37) (0.35)
Mass Killing 0.71 0.78 0.73 0.87 0.84




Overthrow 1.56∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.46)
Controls
ELF 1.40 1.49 1.77 1.24
(1.40) (1.26) (1.23) (1.57)
Country Age −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Log. Population 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.27
(0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17)
GDP −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 0.33∗ 0.35∗ 0.33∗ 0.37∗ 0.33
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Log. Mountains 0.92∗∗ 0.91∗∗ 0.91∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 0.98∗∗
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.7: Determinants of resistance (alternative theories)
1 2
Trust
Democratic Occupier −0.22∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
International Mandate −1.02∗ −1.61∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.42)
Religious Difference 1.64∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.31)







Country Age 0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01)






Log. Foreign Troops 0.42∗∗ 0.33∗
(0.14) (0.15)








Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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tion of state under occupation), shows similar effects.10 This result dovetails with recent scholar-
ship that finds that Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) increases the likelihood of civil war
by undercutting the legitimacy of political institutions. Importantly, Goran and Reiter (2010, 16)
note that it is not the presence of foreign troops per se (as nationalist theory would predict), but,
rather, their effects on political institutions, that trigger violence.
4.4.8 Trust
Consistent with trust theory, the nature and behavior of occupiers is shown to be one of the
stronger predictors of resistance to occupation. Unsurprisingly, mass killing, that is the killing
of over 50,000 civilians under five years, has a strong effect on the propensity of resistance to
occupation. Skeptics may argue that this effect is endogenous: mass killing is more likely to be
undertaken to quash strong resistance and not the other way around. An examination of the cases
of mass killing, such as Germany’s invasion of Poland or Japan’s invasion of China shows that for
the most part, mass killings as defined here were undertaken as part of a deliberate and ideologi-
cal strategy to dominate occupied societies rather than reactions to resistance itself. However, the
effect of mass killing is not found to be statistically significant across all model specifications.
The most robust finding is the effect of regime type on resistance to occupations. More demo-
cratic occupiers face far less resistance than non-democratic occupiers. Every one-unit change in
the Polity IV score reduces the number of occupier-force fatalities by 82 percent, holding other
variables constant at their mean or mode. This effect is robust across all model specifications.11
International organizations are theorized to affect the likelihood of resistance both in their be-
nign treatment of the occupied and in the trust that they will not annex occupied territory. The
models show that international organizations have a strong substantive impact on the number
of fatalities suffered by occupiers. As predicted, international-mandate occupations generate less
resistance than occupations without an international mandate. Indeed, occupations with an in-
ternational mandate, decrease fatalities by 22 percent, holding other variables constant at their
10Other forms of political dislocation, such as massive economic reform or redistricting, also increase the likelihood
of resistance, although their effects are not found to be statistically significant (not shown).
11This effect may be even stronger than reported here. For example, it is possible that coverage of fatalities will be
greater in democratic occupations than in non-democratic occupations. If this is correct, then the underreporting of
fatalities in non-democracies should give us even greater confidence in the robustness of the results.
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mean.12 This effect remains even when controlling for the regime type of the occupier. Thus, the
dampening effect of international institutions on fatalities does not simply operate via the level
of democracy among the main contributors of multilateral occupations. I run a separate model
for occupations under regional organization mandates, dropping the international organization
mandate variable. I find that regional organizations also have a dampening effect on resistance to
occupation, reducing fatalities by 68 percent.
Lastly, I examine whether a difference of religion between the occupier and the occupied plays
a role in stoking resistance. Indeed, consistent with the theory, religious difference is a powerful
predictor of resistance to occupation. A clash of religion increases occupier-force fatalities by over
500 percent, and this effect is statistically significant across model specifications. In sum, trust
between occupiers and the occupied is found to play a strong role in reducing occupier fatalities.
4.4.9 Alternative Theories
The data show little support for nationalism as a predictor of resistance to occupation. As men-
tioned above, resistance is not a universal reaction to occupation. Approximately 58 percent of
occupations generate fewer than 50 occupier fatalities, while 53 percent generate fewer than 25. A
first measure of nationalism, country age, is not found to be statistically significant in any of the
models. The second measure of nationalism, literacy, has a highly statistically significant effect (I
run literacy and per capita GDP in separate models since they are highly correlated). However,
literacy is found to decrease the intensity of resistance, the opposite of Darden’s prediction. Be-
cause the effect of literacy may accrue over time, I add an interaction term between the literacy
rate and the age of the occupied state at the beginning of the occupation. This does not change
the results (not shown). Although Darden provides a compelling theory for why nationwide ed-
ucation can enhance nationalist sentiment, it is also the case that literacy rates are correlated with
per capita GDP. As a cause and consequence of economic growth, states invest more in their edu-
cation systems. Moreover, if modernization theorists of nationalism are correct, nationalism itself
is a result of economic growth and transformation (Smith 1998). Because the opportunity cost of
fighting will be higher for richer individuals than for poorer ones, this correlation between per
12The results refer to coefficients in baseline model 1 unless otherwise indicated.
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capita GDP may not show an effect in large cross-national studies. The third proxy for nation-
alism, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, does not exhibit any consistent or statistically significant
effect on resistance to occupation. In sum, the data show that the measures of nationalism are,
in fact, poor predictors of resistance to occupation. While the discipline of political science and
International Relations has so far failed to provide a measure of nationalism, what is clear is that
nationalism is not a constant with a determinate effect on resistance to occupation.
What role do international threats play in resistance to occupation? International threats, mea-
sured as the sum of the balance of power between enemies and allies of the occupied state in the
five years prior to occupation, show no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of resis-
tance. Therefore, I find no cross-national evidence to support Edelstein’s theory of resistance to
occupation.
One of the most significant findings of the recent civil war literature has been the effect of
opportunity structures on the propensity for rebellion. Factors such as mountainous terrain, levels
of poverty, and overall population size have been proven to be strong predictors of rebellion.
Only some of these findings from civil wars carry over to resistance to occupations. The principle
economic factor of opportunity structures—per capita GDP of the occupied territory—is shown to
have an effect on resistance. As expected, richer occupied states are less likely to resist occupation
than poorer ones. Every $1,000 increase in per capita GDP reduces fatalities by 62 percent. This
result supports existing findings in the civil war literature. It also makes a valuable addition
by helping to better clarify the causal mechanisms of economic factors. Traditionally, the civil
war literature has faced an identification problem in interpreting the effect of per capita GDP on
the likelihood of insurrection. It was not clear whether poverty created grievances that spurred
individuals to take up arms, or whether poverty reduced the opportunity cost of fighting or, more
complicated still, whether low per capita GDP also reflected government weakness. I am able
solve at least part of this identification problem by looking at occupations. Since occupations are,
by definition, foreign and exogenous, the per capita GDP of the occupied population does not
reflect the resources of the government. Additionally, per capita GDP at time t− 1 does not reflect
economic grievances against occupiers since occupiers are usually not responsible for pre-existing
economic conditions in the occupied state. The effect of per capita GDP would, therefore, be more
likely to reflect the opportunity costs of fighting.
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Consistent with the findings of Fearon and Laitin (2003), mountainous terrain is found to have
a positive effect on resistance to occupation. This effect is statistically significant in all but one
of the model specifications. Demographic factors, such as population size, are found to have a
positive effect on occupier fatalities, but the results are not consistently statistically significant.
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization, theorized to affect both nationalist sentiment and the costs of
mobilizing individuals to rebellion, also fails to register statistically significant effects.
For many policy makers, a key question is how many troops should be deployed to success-
fully manage an occupation. I find a positive effect of foreign troops on the number of fatalities
incurred, although this effect is not significant across all models. Are nationalism theorists there-
fore correct in arguing that more troops on foreign soil will only generate more resistance? The
interpretation of this finding is more problematic. First, the deployment of troops can simply in-
crease exposure: It is hard to generate fatalities when there are a limited number of occupying
troops to shoot at. Thus, more troops create more targets for resistance. Second, the number of
troops often reflects the intensity of preexisting resistance. States will send more troops to put
down insurrections in an occupied territory. Just as the correlation between firefighters and house
fires does not indicate that firefighters cause house fires, the correlation between troops and resis-
tance does not necessarily indicate that more troops cause more resistance. Without finer-grained
time-series data on troop levels and resistance, it is impossible to separate these effects.
As a robustness check, I rerun the baseline model using a quadratic transformation of the
measure of foreign troops. This is to account for the possibility of a hump-shaped effect of for-
eign troops on resistance. Low levels of troops could be less provocative to nationalist sentiment,
whereas high levels of troops would deter resistance. The measure of troops is no longer sig-
nificant, but the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicates a worse model fit. The standard
measure of foreign troops is, therefore, more appropriate for this model.
What effect does duration have on levels of resistance? The data generally support the hypoth-
esis that longer occupations will generate greater fatalities. Every additional year of occupation
increases occupier-force fatalities by 104 percent. What these data do not tell us is how occupier-
force fatalities are distributed over time. Do they steadily accrue? Do they rise exponentially as
the occupation drags on? Do they peter out after an initial burst of resistance? This could be a
fruitful avenue for future research.
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4.4.10 Robustness Checks
Occupations differ in a number of significant ways that may affect the main findings. In order to
address this concern, a battery of robustness checks are included in the tables in Appendix 4.8.3.
Second World War. As the descriptive statistics show, a significant percentage of the cases of
occupation since 1900 occurred during the Second World War, particularly under Nazi Germany.
Such a concentration of occupations could be driving the estimated effects. In order to control
for this, I create two dummy variables, Nazi and WWII, which represent occupations imposed
by Nazi Germany and occupations occurring during the Second World War, respectively. Since
there is substantive overlap between these two dummy variables, I run separate regressions for
each. Neither variable is found to be statistically significant, and the Second World War variable is
negatively signed, contrary to expectations. Lastly, I rerun the regressions dropping all cases from
the Second World War, but find that the main results remain statistically significant.
Post-1945. It is possible that the effects of occupation are different in the post-1945 timeframe.
In order to control for this effect, I rerun the baseline model dropping all cases of occupation
starting prior to 1945. Dropping these cases does not change the direction of the main findings.
However, with roughly half as many observations (83), the measures of religious difference, over-
throw, mountainous terrain and per capita are no longer statistically significant.
Context. Furthermore, although the occupation-onset model does not indicate selection effects,
perhaps democracies are simply better than non-democracies at selecting into successful military
occupations, as they are with interstate wars. As Reiter and Stam (2002) explain, elected leaders
will only embark on wars they think they can win because they understand that losing a war
would mean electoral defeat. For instance, democracies may be more likely to engage in occupa-
tion as the result of wars of liberation or invitation than of wars of conquest. Since occupations re-
sulting from conquest may be hypothesized to generate more resistance than those resulting from
liberation, this could potentially account for the results. I rerun the regression adding dummy
variables for conquest and liberation, but the results remain the same.
Force protection. One of the stronger findings of the baseline model is that democratic occu-
piers generate less resistance than do non-democratic occupiers. The effect of regime type may
be spurious, however, if this effect reflects greater defensive measures rather than lesser resis-
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tance. For example, democracies may be more casualty-averse and, therefore, undertake greater
force-protection measures. Force-protection measures can reduce the exposure, vulnerability, and,
therefore, the number of fatalities experienced by occupying forces. Force protection can involve,
among other things, body armor, blastproof vehicles, and medical evacuation and treatment.
These effects can be seen in the ratio of killed-to-wounded in conflict. During the Second World
War, the US army experienced one killed for every 2.4 wounded soldiers, a ratio of 41 percent.
During the Vietnam War, the US experienced one killed for every 3.12 wounded soldiers, a ra-
tio of 32 percent. In the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, only one soldier was dying for every
8.3 soldiers wounded, demonstrating a much-improved killed-to-wounded ratio of 12 percent.
There is no clean measure of force protection. The nature of strategy ensures that the reliable
force-protection measure of today becomes obsolete tomorrow. However, there is a very strong
correlation between levels of economic development and force-protection measures. Wealthier
states are better able to afford the added costs of force protection. For example, the approximate
uniform and equipment cost per US soldier was $170 during the Second World War, $1,112 during
the Vietnam War, and $17,472 during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Jelinek 2007). In order to
capture this effect, I proxy force protection with per capita GDP of the occupying force. I use the
per capita GDP of the occupying state at the beginning of the occupation in constant 1990 dol-
lars, using the closest available year (Maddison 2005). In the cases of multinational occupations,
the variable is coded as the average per capita GDP of the three largest troop-contributing states.
The per capita GDP of occupiers, which operates as proxy for the force-protection capacity of oc-
cupying forces, shows no significant effect on fatalities or on the significance of the regime-type
variable.
Peacekeeping and UN missions. It could be argued that including cases of peacekeeping in a
database on foreign occupations is like comparing apples to oranges, since peacekeeping troops
are deployed in a different political context. Therefore, I run two additional models, the first
dropping all cases coded as peacekeeping and the second dropping all occupations under the
aegis of the UN. The main results still hold.
Great power occupiers. As realists might expect, a large share of occupations were undertaken by
great powers such as the US (11 percent), Germany (11 percent), and the Soviet Union (11 percent).
There may be concerns that this concentration of occupations may be driving results. In order to
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test for this possibility, I run a set of regressions that drops the US, Germany, and the Soviet Union.
All the main findings remain robust.
Geographic area. The geographic area of the occupied state might have an impact on the likeli-
hood of resistance. For instance, in larger states, where occupying troops will be more spread out,
lower force-to-space ratios might make troops more vulnerable. I find no evidence for the role of
geographic area. Other main findings remain consistent.
Variations in democracy. Political regime type—in particular, democracy—has been seen as an
important variable in International Relations. However, recent literature on civil wars has shown
the existence of non-linear effects for democracy (Hegre et al. 2001). In order to account for
this possibility, I include a quadratic form of the Polity score. The transformed polity score does
not exhibit any statistically significant effect. As an added robustness check on the measure of
democracy, I run a model with a dummy democracy variable. The dummied democracy variable
retains a negative and statistically significant effect.
Outliers. As a robustness check, I run the regressions dropping outliers with fatality rates of
over 40,000. This does not affect the significance levels of the covariates. Even at 20,000 and 10,000,
the results are fairly stable. Furthermore, I run the regression with the dependent variable as the
ratio of fatalities to troop size (not shown) and again with the dependent variable as the ratio of
fatalities to the population size of the occupied country. Once again, the statistical significance of
all variables remains the same. Lastly, I run the regressions, including a variable for pre-existing
civil war in the occupied country, and I don’t find that it changes the statistical significance or
direction of the main results (not shown).
4.5 How Long Do Occupations Last?
The previous section provided insight into the causes of resistance to occupation. Do these same
factors help explain the duration of occupations? As the dataset shows, there is wide variation in
the duration of occupations: from a few weeks to 82 years. Many of those occupations slide into
permanent annexation. What explains this variation?
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4.5.1 Model Specification
In order to estimate the determinants of the duration of occupations, I use a survival model, also
known as a duration or hazard model. The purpose of survival analysis is to estimate the proba-
bility at time t that a given unit will disappear given that it survived until time t − 1, controlling
for a range of covariates. The survival function is defined as: S(t) = Pr(T > t) where t is some
time, T is a random variable denoting the time of death, and Pr is the probability.
Survival models can be parametric or non-parametric. Parametric survival models, such as
the exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, or log-lostic models, specify the theorized distribution of the
hazard rate. The hazard rate indicates at what rate a given unit will disappear. For example, the
Weibull model assumes that the hazard rate consistently increases or consistently decreases over
time. In other words, units become more likely or less likely to die off over time. The princi-
pal advantage of parametric models is that they provide more-precise estimates, especially with
smaller datasets. Non-parametric or semi-parametric models, such as the Cox proportional haz-
ards model, make no assumptions regarding the distribution of the hazard rate. These models
provide greater flexibility regarding the assumptions of the hazard rate, but at the cost of some
efficiency in the estimates. For the case of occupation duration, a semi-parametric model is most
appropriate. We cannot make assumptions regarding the hazard rate of the duration of occupa-
tions. On the one hand, occupations are more likely to end over time, as the occupiers may face
mounting resistance in occupied territory, as well as growing costs and impatience at home. On
the other hand, the likelihood that an occupation will end may decrease over time as the resis-
tance is defeated or exhausted or the occupying state consolidates its power. As Alexander the
Great stated following his conquests in the Middle East: “What we are dealing with is a pack of
wild animals; they are naturally intractable, and even captured and confined they will only be
tamed by the passage of time” (Rufus 1984). The Cox proportional hazards model is expressed
as: ht(t) = h0(t)exp(β′X) where h0 is the baseline hazard function and β′X are the covariates and
regression parameters (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).
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(a) Survival Probabilities of Occupations over Time























(b) Cox Snell Residuals
Figure 4.4: Occupation survival probabilities and Cox-Snell residuals
4.5.2 Findings of Duration Model
The results of the survival model provide only some indication of the determinants of occupation
duration. I begin by plotting the baseline hazard of termination of occupation through a Kaplan-
Meier estimator of occupation duration (Figure 4.4(a)). The Kaplan-Meier confirms some of the
findings from the descriptive statistics—namely, that the majority of military occupations die off
within two years, with only a minority of occupations turning into permanent annexations.
As noted above, there are strong theoretical reasons for assuming that parametric models are
not appropriate for estimating the duration of occupations. In order to decide whether the Cox
proportional hazards model is appropriate, however, I estimate the Cox-Snell residuals of a base-
line model of occupation duration. The Cox-Snell residuals are plotted in Figure 4.4(b). If the Cox
proportional hazard model holds, the estimated hazard rate of the Cox-Snell residuals plotted
against the Cox-Snell residuals should fall roughly on the 45-degree reference line. I find that the
Cox proportional hazards model does, in fact, fit the data closely. This provides some confidence
that the Cox-proportional hazard model provides an appropriate semi-parametric form.
The results of the Cox proportional hazards model are shown in Table 4.8. Coefficients in
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Table 4.8: Determinants of occupation duration (Cox PH)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Trust
Democratic Occupier 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
International Mandate 1.13 1.15 1.14 0.85 1.00 0.73
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.22) (0.25) (0.19)
Religious Difference 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.85 1.01 0.96
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19)
Mass Killing 1.42 1.40 1.40 1.21 1.87∗ 1.16
(0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.35) (0.57) (0.37)
Political Dislocation
Overthrow 0.65∗ 0.67 0.65∗ 0.74 0.69




Occupier Fatalities 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ELF 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.37 1.36 0.34
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.24) (0.83) (0.23)
Log. Population 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.99 0.87 1.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
GDP 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Country Age 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 1.16 1.14 1.16 1.19 1.05 1.19
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Log. Mountains 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.86














Observations 154 154 153 154 150 154
ll −562.17 −562.39 −557.15 −557.95 −541.77 −551.98
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Cox proportional hazards model indicate the effect of variables on the hazard of the occupation
terminating. The exp(coef) term indicates the hazard ratio. The interpretation of hazard ratios
differs from that of coefficients, which take negative and positive values. Hazard ratios are inter-
preted relative to a baseline of 1.0. Variables with hazard ratios greater than 1.0 increase the risk
of occupation termination; those with hazard ratios less than 1.0 decrease the risk of occupation
termination. Thus, a ratio of 0.50, for example, indicates that the hazard of the occupation termi-
nating is cut in half, while a ratio of 2.0 indicates a doubling of the risk of occupation termination.
I begin by running a baseline model with the main explanatory variables from the occupa-
tion resistance model. Perhaps the most important aspects of the survival models are the many
variables that are not significant. Virtually none of the predictors of resistance to occupation are
found to be determinants of the duration of occupations. Although variables denoting trust were
found to reduce occupier fatalities, such factors do not affect the duration of occupations. Inter-
estingly, the level of occupier-force fatalities does not show any consistent statistically significant
effect on occupation duration. Characteristics of the occupied state, such as mountainous terrain,
population, and per capita GDP, all show no statistically significant effect on the duration of oc-
cupations. Country age, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and literacy rate of the occupied state,
which are used as proxies for nationalism, do not exhibit any effect on occupation duration. This
is a surprising finding since we should expect greater nationalism to put an end to occupations
more quickly. The only factor that is found to have any statistically significant effect in the base-
line model on occupation duration is forceful regime change. The hazard ratio of forceful regime
change is 0.65 meaning that such occupations terminate more slowly than other occupations, on
average. However, this result is not statistically significant across models.
I then run two sets of models to test alternative theories of resistance to occupation put forth
by Edelstein and Darden, who look at foreign threats and mass schooling, respectively. As in the
resistance model, I find no statistically significant effect of either on the duration of occupation.
Because the duration of occupation may be a function of whether it occurred with the consent
of the occupied state, I run a separate model looking at whether occupying forces were invited
by the occupied state. As expected, invited occupations end much more quickly than non-invited
occupations—more than two and a half times faster, in fact. I then run a set of regressions look-
ing at whether the occupation was the result of aggression, retaliation, or liberation, using invited
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Table 4.9: Description of additional variables for duration models
Variable Definition Source
Invited State invited to occupy territory by
government of another state
Secondary sources
Annexation Occupier explicitly integrates all or
part of another state into its sovereign
territory
Secondary sources
Invasion State invades another state
unprovoked
Secondary sources
Retaliation State responds to aggression by
another state by occupying all or part
of its territory
Secondary sources
Liberation A first state invades a territory of a
second state to liberate it from
occupation by a third state
Secondary sources
occupations as the base category. The definitions employed for invited intervention, annexation,
invasion, retaliation, and liberation are provided in Table 4.9. I find that, on average, occupations
resulting from wars of retaliation and liberation end more slowly than invited occupations. I then
run a model to examine the effect of annexation. Naturally, we should expect a policy of annexa-
tion to increase the duration of occupations. The hazard ratio of annexation is 0.61, meaning that
such occupations end approximately 39 percent more slowly than other occupations on average.
This is not surprising in and of itself. Moreover, it is not clear if annexation is the cause or the con-
sequence of extended occupation. The effects of invited occupations and annexations are shown
quite clearly in the Kaplan Meier plots in Figures 4.5(b) and 4.5(c). An additional set of robust-
ness checks are provided in Appendix 4.8.5. As a last robustness check, I rerun the main duration
models using a parametric Weibull model. The results and statistical significance remain largely
the same.
To sum up, survival analysis indicates that the context of occupation is the best predictor of
occupation duration. Perhaps the most surprising finding of the survival analysis is just how little
the factors determining occupier-force fatalities determine occupation duration. This suggests
that the context of occupation is a better predictor of the duration of occupations than the costs
sustained in administering occupation. It should also alleviate concerns that the effect of duration
on occupier forces‘ fatalities is endogenous.
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(d) Fatalities
Figure 4.5: Kaplan Meier plots of key independent variables
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4.6 From Large-n to Case Studies
Large-n cross-national analysis allows us simultaneously to estimate the effects of rival explana-
tions and to control variables on resistance to occupation. However, it cannot provide the rich
historical account necessary to demonstrate the causal mechanisms at play. As Darden (Forthcom-
ing) notes, there are “significant losses in the quality of measurement, over-aggregation of units,
and the omission of critical variables that are too difficult to code across many countries and time
periods.” Therefore, following Lieberman (2005), I employ a nested approach with two stages.
The first stage, completed in this chapter, involves a large-n analysis to provide a general assess-
ment of the theory. Once the model is well specified and the results are robust, the second stage
employs model-testing small-n analysis. This second stage employs process tracing and historical
case studies in order to verify the hypotheses and their causal mechanisms.
Case selection methodology is an important aspect of the second stage of nested analysis as
poor case selection can bias results (Geddes 1990). According to Lieberman, cases that are well-
predicted in the model should be selected. Thus, I plot the predicted occupier-force fatalities from
the best-fitting model against the actual occupier fatalities. The results are shown in Figure 4.6
below. The 45-degree reference line represents the location of perfect model prediction. There are a
number of well-predicted cases that fall roughly along the line. In order to choose among the well-
predicted cases, I look for variation in key explanatory variables, as well as variation in time period
and geographic region, among the well-predicted subset of cases (Keohane et al. 1994; Gerring
2006). Some cases are also excellent candidates for case studies because they involve countries
that have been occupied by different kinds of actors at different times. This effectively allows us to
control for most variables, and better isolate the effect of key variables of interest. I therefore select
cases of Lithuania (1939-1991), Lebanon (1976-2005), and Cambodia (1979-1993). Also displayed
is the case of Afghanistan (2001-Present), which will be examined in the next chapter to explore
sub-national variation in resistance to occupation.



































































































Figure 4.6: Selection of case studies
4.7 Conclusion
Rather than demonstrating the universal effect of nationalism on resistance, the cross-national
data shows that resistance tends to be pragmatic in nature. Not every occupation generates re-
sistance. Indeed, the principal and counter-intuitive finding of this cross-national analysis is that
nationalism is a poor predictor of resistance to occupation. Instead, occupied societies appear to
be sensitive to the policies and nature of the occupier. Faced with occupation, populations are in-
fluenced by both the behavior of the occupiers and their effects on local political institutions. Who
the occupiers are and how they behave during the occupation both play a role in how the occu-
pied population reacts to their presence. Specifically, occupations carried out by democratic states,
with international or regional organization mandates, and involving shared religion between the
occupier and the occupied tend to incur fewer fatalities in the course of the occupation. Consis-
tently with the predictions, political dislocation is also a predictor of occupier fatalities. Lastly, I
found that most of the factors that predict the intensity of resistance to occupation fail to predict
the duration of occupations. Instead, the context in which the occupation emerged provides better
explanations of occupation duration.
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In a cross-national analysis with a relatively small sample size, some caveats should be noted.
First, cross-national studies necessarily employ blunt measures that fail to reflect the key indepen-
dent variables with sufficient granularity. In some cases, imperfect proxies must be used as mea-
sures of important explanatory variables. For instance, despite its centrality to political science,
there exists no good measure for nationalism. Conversely, some variables reflect several contra-
dictory factors simultaneously. I noted that per capita GDP is correlated with literacy. While the
former reduces the likelihood of resistance by increasing the opportunity cost of fighting, the latter
is expected to enhance it by cultivating nationalist sentiment. Such contradictory effects will at-
tenuate the coefficients of the explanatory variables. Second, aggregation of measures at the state
level obscures sub-national variation in resistance, which, in fact, can be as wide as cross-national
variation as the chapter on Afghanistan will demonstrate. Third, large-n quantitative analyses suf-
fer from what can be called “measurability bias.” By necessity, quantitative analysis elevates those
factors that can be measured easily and reliably while discounting those that cannot. However,
not all measureable factors are important, and not all important factors are measurable. Addition-
ally, not all important factors that can be measured can be measured well. This forces scholars to
rely on a pared-down explanatory toolkit for what is an extremely complex social phenomenon.
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4.8 Appendices
4.8.1 List of Occupations
Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)
Occupier Occupied Start End
UK Cyprus 1878 1960
US Philippines 1898 1942
UK Orange Free State and Transvaal 1900 1961
Japan Korea 1905 1945
US Nicaragua 1909 1925
Austria-Hungary Serbia 1914 1918
Bulgaria Serbia 1914 1918
Germany Luxembourg 1914 1918
Germany Belgium 1914 1918
Germany Russia 1914 1918
US Haiti 1915 1934
US Dominican Republic 1916 1924
UK Palestine 1917 1948
UK Iraq 1918 1932
UK, France, Italy Turkey 1918 1923
US Panama 1918 1920
Greece Turkey 1919 1922
Romania Hungary 1919 1920
France, UK Germany 1920 1935
France, UK, Italy Germany 1920 1921
League of Nations Germany 1920 1939
France Lebanon 1923 1946
France Syria 1923 1946
France, Belgium Germany 1923 1925
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Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)
Occupier Occupied Start End
US Nicaragua 1927 1933
Japan China 1931 1945
Italy Ethiopia 1936 1941
Germany Czechoslovakia 1938 1944
Germany Austria 1938 1945
Germany Poland 1939 1945
Italy, Germany Albania 1939 1944
USSR Poland 1939 1941
Germany France 1940 1944
Germany Netherlands 1940 1945
Germany Norway 1940 1945
Germany Luxembourg 1940 1944
Germany Belgium 1940 1945
Germany Denmark 1940 1945
UK Denmark 1940 1945
USSR Romania 1940 1941
USSR Latvia 1940 1941
USSR Estonia 1940 1941
USSR Lithuania 1940 1941
USSR Finland 1940 1945
Finland USSR 1941 1944
Germany Lithuania 1941 1945
Germany Latvia 1941 1945
Germany USSR 1941 1944
Germany Estonia 1941 1944
Germany, Italy, Bulgaria Greece 1941 1944
Germany, Italy, Hungary Serbia and Montenegro 1941 1944
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Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)
Occupier Occupied Start End
Japan Thailand 1941 1945
UK Iran 1941 1946
US Denmark 1941 1946
USSR Iran 1941 1946
Japan Philippines 1942 1945
Germany Italy 1943 1945
Germany Hungary 1944 1944
USSR Bulgaria 1944 1947
USSR Lithuania 1944 1991
USSR Romania 1944 1958
USSR Latvia 1944 1991
USSR Estonia 1944 1991
France Austria 1945 1955
UK Austria 1945 1955
US Austria 1945 1955
US Korea, Rep. 1945 1948
US Japan 1945 1952
US, UK, France German Federal Republic 1945 1955
USSR Austria 1945 1955
USSR German Democratic Republic 1945 1955
USSR Korea, Dem. Rep. 1945 1948
USSR Japan 1945 2010
USSR Hungary 1945 1991
France German Federal Republic 1947 1956
Egypt Palestine 1948 1956
Jordan Palestine 1948 1967
Israel Palestine 1956 1957
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Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)
Occupier Occupied Start End
Egypt Palestine 1957 1967
UK Jordan 1958 1958
US Lebanon 1958 1958
Belgium Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960 1960
UN (ONUC) Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960 1964
US Vietnam 1961 1973
China India 1962 Ongoing
Egypt North Yemen 1962 1967
UN (UNSF) Indonesia 1962 1963
OAS Dominican Republic 1965 1966
US Dominican Republic 1965 1966
South Africa Namibia 1966 1990
Israel Egypt 1967 1982
Israel Palestine 1967 Ongoing
Israel Syria 1967 Ongoing
France Chad 1968 1972
USSR Czechoslovakia 1968 1968
India Pakistan 1971 1972
Libya Chad 1973 1994
Turkey Cyprus 1974 1983
Cuba Angola 1975 1991
Indonesia East Timor 1975 1999
Morocco Western Sahara 1975 Ongoing
South Africa Angola 1975 1988
Syria Lebanon 1976 2005
France Chad 1978 1978
Israel Lebanon 1978 1978
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Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)
Occupier Occupied Start End
Tanzania Uganda 1978 1981
USSR Afghanistan 1979 1989
Vietnam Cambodia 1979 1989
Argentina UK 1982 1982
Israel Lebanon 1982 2000
US, France, Italy Lebanon 1982 1984
France, Zaire Chad 1983 1984
US Grenada 1983 1983
India Sri Lanka 1987 1990
UN (UNTAG) Namibia 1989 1990
US Panama 1989 1990
ECOWAS/ECOMOG Liberia 1990 1998
Iraq Kuwait 1990 1991
UN (ONUSAL) El Salvador 1991 1995
US Iraq 1991 1991
UN (UNTAC) Cambodia 1992 1993
UN (UNUSOM I) Somalia 1992 1993
UN (UNPROFOR) Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 1995
UN (UNUSOM II) Somalia 1993 1995
UN (UNAMIR) Rwanda 1993 1996
UN (UNMIH) Haiti 1993 1996
Armenia Azerbaijan 1994 Ongoing
US Haiti 1994 1995
NATO (IFOR) Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1996
NATO (SFOR) Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996 2005
UN (UNTAES) Croatia 1996 1998
ECOWAS/ECOMOG Sierra Leone 1997 2000
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Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)
Occupier Occupied Start End
South Africa Lesotho 1998 1999
Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, An-
gola, Namibia, Chad, Sudan
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1998 2002
UN (MINURCA) Chad 1998 2000
UN (MINURCA) Central African Republic 1998 2000
NATO (KFOR/UNMIK) Yugoslavia 1999 Ongoing
UN (UNAMSIL) Sierra Leone 1999 2005
UN (UNTAET) East Timor 1999 2002
UN (MONUC) Congo, Dem. Rep. 1999 2010
Ethiopia Eritrea 2000 2001
ISAF Afghanistan 2001 Ongoing
NATO (Allied Harmony) Macedonia, FYR 2002 2003
UN (UNMISET) East Timor 2002 2005
AU (AMIB) Burundi 2003 2004
EU (EUFOR Artemis) Congo, Dem. Rep. 2003 2003
EU (EUFOR Concordia) Macedonia, FYR 2003 2003
MNF-Iraq Iraq 2003 Ongoing
RAMSI Solomon Islands 2003 Ongoing
AU (AMIS) Sudan 2004 2007
EU (EUFOR Althea) Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 Ongoing
UN (UNMIS) Burundi 2004 2006
UN (ONUCI) Cote d’Ivoire 2004 Ongoing
EU Congo, Dem. Rep. 2005 2006
UN Sudan 2005 Ongoing
Australia, New Zeland, Malaysia,
Portugal
East Timor 2006 Ongoing
Ethiopia Somalia 2006 2009
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Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)
Occupier Occupied Start End
UN (UNIFIL II) Lebanon 2006 Ongoing
AU (AMISOM) Somalia 2007 Ongoing
EU (EUFOR Chad) Chad 2008 Ongoing
UN (MINURCAT) Chad 2009 Ongoing
UN (MINURCAT) Central African Republic 2009 Ongoing
US Haiti 2010 2010
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE ON RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION 136
4.8.2 Robustness Checks for Selection Effects
This section explains the method for testing for selection effects in occupier fatalities. It is impor-
tant to note that this section is simply a test and does not correct for potential selection bias.
In a latent model of resistance, F ? = Xβ + ε, F ? is the number of occupier fatalities; Xβ is a
set of explanatory variables; and ε is an error term with a distribution G(·). This model predicts
the number of fatalities in the absence of any selection.
A state is more likely to be occupied if fatalities are reckoned to be low. To formalize this model
of occupation, suppose that occupation y = 1 is determined by:
y = 1(F ? ≤ F¯ (Z) + η) (4.1)
If the expected level of occupier-force fatalities in a state exceeds this threshold F¯ , then poten-
tial occupiers will refrain from occupying the state and there will be 0 fatalities. Otherwise, there
will be occupation, with the resulting number of fatalities F ?. Thus, the actual observed model of
resistance (F = Xβ + ε˜) is determined by the following data-generating process:
F =
 F
? if F ? ≤ F¯ (Z) + η
0 if F ? ≥ F¯ (Z) + η
(4.2)
Selection bias occurs when explanatory variables of the selection model are correlated with the
error term in the resistance model because this will cause a truncation of the range of observed
fatalities. However, if expected fatalities fall below a specific threshold, then there will be no
truncation, and the error from the latent model and the observed model will be the same.
Specifically, define the regression done on the data as:
F = Xβ + ε˜ (4.3)
where the unobservable ε˜ ∼ G(·|ε˜ ≤ −Xβ + F¯ (Z) + η). Denote this conditional distribution as
G˜. Notice that the truncation above a certain fatality threshold of G(·) means that the higher is
F¯ (Z), the less truncated is G˜(·). This implies directly that the expectation of ε˜ conditional on X
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and F¯ (Z) denoted H(X, F¯ (Z)) and defined more formally as:
H(X, F¯ (Z)) = EηEε[ε˜|Xβ + ε ≤ F¯ (Z) + η] (4.4)
is increasing in F¯ (Z) and decreasing in Xβ. Put another way, if a Country A will be invaded
as long expected fatalities are below 10,000, and a Country B is invaded as long as the number
of fatalities are below 1,000,000, then the unobservable in Country B will be less selected than in
Country A. Thus, the bias due to selection will lead to a higher observed ε˜ in Country B than in
Country A.
Denote the propensity score yˆ as the predicted probability of invasion from the regression in
equation (4.1), i.e.:
yˆ = E[y|X,Z] (4.5)
Thus, I can rewrite equation (4.4) as
H(X, F¯ (Z)) = E[ε˜|yˆ(X,Z)] (4.6)
Thus, the higher the predicted probability of invasion, the less truncated will be ε˜ and, hence,
in the regression of fatalities:
F = Xβ + ayˆ + ν (4.7)
and we should expect the coefficient a to be positive and significant since a country with a pre-
dicted invasion probability will have a less truncated and, thus, higher distribution of unobserv-
ables.
Figure 4.7 provides an illustration of the selection effect. As discussed above, Country B is
invaded so long as fatalities remain below 1,000,000 (F (Z)B), whereas Country A is invaded only
if fatalities remain below 10,000 people (F (Z)A). We can see that the unobservable for Country A
is much greater than for Country B. Assume that the predicted probability yˆ of occupying Country
A is 25 percent, and the predicted probability of occupying Country B is 75 percent. Then, yˆ would
be correlated with the truncation of ε˜ leading to a positive and significant coefficient a.
In Table 4.11 Pr(occupied) represents the predicted probability of occupation (a) from the monadic
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selection models in Table 4.3. Tables 4.12 and 4.12 do the same employing the predicted probabili-
ties from the dyadic selection models in Table 4.3. As is shown, the predicted probabilities of both
monadic and dyadic occupation models have no statistically significant relation with the number








Occupation Prob B=0.75Occupation Prob A=0.25
Expected Fatalities A Expected Fatalities B
10,000 1,000,000
F(Z) BF(Z) A
Figure 4.7: Selection as a function of expected fatalities
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE ON RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION 139
Table 4.11: Determinants of resistance (testing for selection effects)
1 2 3 4 5
Trust
Democratic Occupier −0.18∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
International Mandate −1.46∗∗∗ −1.28∗∗ −1.46∗∗∗ −1.54∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41)
Religious Difference 1.62∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36)
Mass Killing 0.70 0.79 0.70 0.85 0.85




Overthrow 1.58∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗
(0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.47)
Controls
ELF 1.76 1.74 2.04 1.51
(1.40) (1.27) (1.24) (1.57)
Country Age 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Log. Population 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.24
(0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18)
GDP −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 0.33∗ 0.34∗ 0.33∗ 0.36∗ 0.32
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
Log. Mountains 0.93∗∗ 0.92∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 1.01∗∗
(0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34)
Pr(occupied) 0.38 0.25 0.38 0.17 0.14
(1.01) (1.00) (0.99) (0.97) (1.21)
Constant 1.86∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.12: Determinants of resistance (testing for dyadic selection effects 1)
1 2 3 4 5
Trust
Democratic Occupier −0.18∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
International Mandate −1.31∗∗ −1.14∗∗ −1.35∗∗ −1.43∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.44) (0.42) (0.43)
Religious Difference 1.55∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36)
Mass Killing 0.67 0.79 0.70 0.92 0.71




Overthrow 1.53∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗
(0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.39) (0.46)
Controls
ELF 2.06 2.22 2.36 1.83
(1.37) (1.18) (1.24) (1.61)
Country Age −0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log. Population 0.21 0.29 0.18 0.32
(0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17)
gdpsmaller −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 0.42∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Log. Mountains 0.82∗∗ 0.83∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.75∗ 0.90∗∗
(0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
Pr(dyadicoccupation1) 19.44 2.92 22.41 21.42 19.95
(56.41) (36.18) (59.27) (64.18) (58.99)
Constant 1.83∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Observations 144 144 144 144 144
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.13: Determinants of resistance (testing for dyadic selection effects 2)
1 2 3 4 5
Trust
Democratic Occupier −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
International Mandate −1.32∗∗ −1.13∗∗ −1.34∗∗ −1.42∗∗
(0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
Religious Difference 1.59∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36)
Mass Killing 0.59 0.73 0.62 0.84 0.62




Overthrow 1.52∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗
(0.39) (0.42) (0.39) (0.39) (0.46)
Controls
ELF 2.19 2.32∗ 2.50∗ 2.02
(1.36) (1.17) (1.23) (1.59)
Country Age −0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Log. Population 0.21 0.29 0.18 0.31
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17)
gdpsmaller −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 0.41∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.43∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Log. Mountains 0.83∗∗ 0.83∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.76∗ 0.91∗∗
(0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
Pr(dyadicoccupation2) 32.77 15.18 34.89 35.30 35.59
(47.07) (37.84) (47.14) (49.08) (50.22)
Constant 1.83∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Observations 144 144 144 144 144
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.8.3 Robustness Checks for Resistance Model
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Table 4.14: Determinants of resistance (robustness checks 1)
1 2 Drop WWII Post 1945 5 6
Trust
Democratic Occupier −0.20∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
International Mandate −1.34∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗ −1.70∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗ −1.46∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.40) (0.47) (0.51) (0.42) (0.42)
Religious Difference 1.53∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 0.67 1.60∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.33) (0.42) (0.54) (0.35) (0.36)
Mass Killing 0.99 1.02 1.77 3.24∗ 0.25 0.73
(0.66) (0.56) (1.13) (1.36) (0.50) (0.64)
Political Dislocation
Overthrow 1.57∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗ 1.06 1.87∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.40) (0.56) (0.55) (0.41) (0.42)
Controls
ELF 1.11 1.27 1.60 −0.30 −0.10 1.55
(1.44) (1.29) (1.51) (1.49) (1.41) (1.41)
Country Age −0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 −0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Log. Population 0.19 0.16 −0.04 0.30 0.28 0.13
(0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.29) (0.15) (0.16)
GDP −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 0.37∗ 0.34∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.33∗ 0.34∗
(0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.22) (0.14) (0.16)
Log. Mountains 0.90∗∗ 0.88∗∗ 0.60 0.03 0.90∗∗ 0.99∗∗
(0.31) (0.30) (0.39) (0.44) (0.31) (0.35)
Nazi Germany −0.87
(0.71)






Observations 154 154 129 83 154 154
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.15: Determinants of resistance (robustness checks 2)
-PK -UN -USSR -US -GER
Trust
Democratic Occupier −0.22∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
International Mandate −1.54∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗ −1.47∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.48) (0.42)
Religious Difference 1.40∗∗ 1.38∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.45) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36)
Mass Killing 0.39 0.54 0.54 −0.09 0.71
(0.66) (0.70) (0.69) (0.52) (0.63)
Political Dislocation
Overthrow 1.64∗∗ 1.69∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.55) (0.46) (0.41) (0.41)
Controls
ELF 1.06 0.03 1.67 0.50 1.40
(1.99) (1.70) (1.46) (1.36) (1.40)
Country Age −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log. Population 0.35 0.36 0.18 0.12 0.15
(0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
GDP −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration 0.00 0.00∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.36∗∗ 0.33∗
(0.27) (0.24) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16)
Log. Mountains 1.32∗ 1.45∗∗ 0.90∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.92∗∗
(0.52) (0.49) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Observations 114 132 137 136 154
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.16: Determinants of resistance (robustness checks 3)
1 2 3 ≤40K ≤20K ≤10K
Trust
Democratic Occupier −0.19∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
International Mandate −1.48∗∗∗ −1.98∗∗∗ −3.13∗∗∗ −1.17∗∗ −1.18∗∗ −1.21∗∗
(0.43) (0.48) (0.42) (0.44) (0.40) (0.39)
Religious Difference 1.63∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 0.89∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.39) (0.43) (0.34) (0.32) (0.37)
Mass Killing 0.79 0.97 1.53∗ −0.27 0.34 0.36
(0.67) (0.53) (0.62) (0.48) (0.42) (0.45)
Political Dislocation
Overthrow 1.41∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.40) (0.53) (0.43) (0.39) (0.48)
Controls
ELF 1.28 2.30 2.03 0.98 1.62 1.81
(1.48) (1.67) (1.68) (1.33) (1.21) (1.21)
Country Age −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log. Population 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.20 0.18
(0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
GDP −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 0.32∗ 0.25 0.08 0.37∗∗ 0.11 0.07
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
Log. Mountains 0.91∗∗ 0.73∗ 0.81∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.51 0.39
(0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29)




Quadratic Polity Score −0.02
(0.01)
Observations 150 154 154 153 147 143
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.8.4 Correlations and Model Specification
Table 4.17: Correlation among selected independent variables




ELF -0.2086 -0.2157 1
Country Age 0.2166 0.1708 -0.3256 1
Log. Pop. -0.1458 -0.0213 0.0592 0.4858 1
International Mandate -0.111 -0.0845 0.2073 0.0121 0.0671 1
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Figure 4.8: Dispersion test
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4.8.5 Robustness Checks for Duration Model
This section provides additional robustness checks on the results of the survival models. First,
I run the regressions, dropping outliers with fatality rates of over 40,000, over 20,000, and over
10,000. These do not affect the significance levels of the covariates. Second, some may argue
that comparing foreign occupations, traditionally understood, to UN peacekeeping is misleading
since they are politically distinct military activities. While I do not agree with this assessment, as a
robustness check I run two separate duration models, one excluding all cases of peacekeeping and
one excluding all cases of UN occupation. With the exception of the variable Country Age (which
is now statistically significant), there is no major difference in the direction or magnitude of the
variables. Third, I plot the deviance residuals of the different models against the observations,
adding a smoothed residuals lowess line (Figure 4.9). The purpose of the deviance residuals is
to assess whether there exist major outliers that are poorly predicted by the model. The deviance
residuals are generally distributed around 0, without major outliers, indicating a suitable fit for
the model. I also plot the deviance residuals over time for each of the models. The downward-
sloping lowess lines on these plots show that as an occupation continues, the predictions of the
model become less accurate. This is not uncommon and is more likely driven by very few outliers
in longer occupations.
To test whether any of these outliers could strongly bias the estimated coefficients, I plot the
score residuals for the first model (Figure 4.10). Score residuals indicate whether certain observa-
tions have disproportionate leverage on the estimated coefficients of the survival model. Consis-
tent with most small datasets, the plots indicate a wide range of score residuals. However, none
of the score residuals of certain observations have a strong effect on the statistically significant
variables.
Next, I use the estimates from the first model to plot the Martingale residuals against the differ-
ent variables. The purpose of the Martingale residuals is to show whether adjustments to the func-
tional form of certain variables are required. These plots are shown in Figure 4.11 with smoothed
residual lowess lines. These plots suggest that no adjustments are needed for the functional forms
of covariates; since there is no substantial deviation from linearity.
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Table 4.18: Determinants of occupation duration (robustness checks)
≤40K ≤20K ≤10K -PK -UN
Trust
Democratic Occupier 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
International Mandate 1.14 1.14 1.11
(0.28) (0.28) (0.27)
Religious Difference 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.79 0.85
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Mass Killing 1.40 1.41 1.38 1.55 1.51
(0.42) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.45)
Political Dislocation
Overthrow 0.65∗ 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.69
(0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15)
Controls
Occupier Fatalities 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ELF 0.83 0.88 0.91 1.24 1.22
(0.48) (0.53) (0.55) (0.96) (0.79)
Log. Population 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.86 0.90
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
GDP 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Country Age 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01∗∗ 1.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 1.16 1.11 1.11 1.14 1.11
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Log. Mountains 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.23 0.99
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.20)
Observations 153 147 143 114 132
ll −557.16 −526.40 −509.49 −408.70 −474.68
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE ON RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION 149
Table 4.19: Determinants of occupation duration (Weibull)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Trust
Democratic Occupier 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
International Mandate 1.18 1.19 1.18 0.87 0.97 0.73
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.23) (0.24) (0.19)
Religious Difference 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.80 1.00 0.93
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) (0.18)
Mass Killing 1.51 1.49 1.49 1.25 1.97∗ 1.17
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.36) (0.58) (0.37)
Political Dislocation
Overthrow 0.62∗ 0.63∗ 0.62∗ 0.71 0.65




Occupier Fatalities 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ELF 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.39 1.72 0.35
(0.54) (0.55) (0.55) (0.25) (1.04) (0.23)
Log. Population 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.97 0.84∗ 1.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
GDP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Country Age 1.01∗ 1.01∗ 1.01∗ 1.01 1.01∗ 1.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Foreign Troops 1.18 1.16 1.18 1.20 1.06 1.20
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Log. Mountains 1.03 1.05 1.04 1.02 0.92 0.87














Observations 154 154 153 154 150 154
ll −265.14 −265.30 −263.60 −260.16 −252.04 −252.66
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Deviance Residuals over Time
Figure 4.9: Deviance residuals
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Figure 4.10: Score residuals














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.11: Martingale residuals
Chapter 5
Resistance to Occupation in Afghanistan
(2001-2010)
All these races were accustomed to the rule and authority of another and they have no affinity
to us in religion, culture, or language. Do you really think that the battle that conquered them
subdued them as well?
-Alexander the Great 1
Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land
army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ’have his head examined,’ as General
MacArthur so delicately put it.
- US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
5.1 Introduction
Afghanistan has been described as the “Graveyard of Empires” (Bearden 2001). As a gateway
between the Occident and the Orient and a buffer state between the British and Russian empires,
it has a long history of occupation. Most of these occupations have generated fierce resistance. The
recent war in Afghanistan is no exception, as the US has become embroiled in the longest war in
1Cited in Rufus 1984, 122.
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its history. This chapter sets out to describe how resistance emerged in Afghanistan and to answer
the question of why it emerged the way it did. In so doing, it will shed light on which policies
could be effective at addressing insurgency.
This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, I provide a sketch of the war and occupation in
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Second, drawing on geocoded data of resistance events and
a range of social, economic, and geographic indicators, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis of vio-
lence at the district level. The results indicate that political dislocation is a strong predictor of re-
sistance, and provide only mixed support for alternative theories of nationalism and opportunity
structure. Resistance against Western occupation was not national, but instead concentrated in
Pashtun-dominated regions. Indeed, Pashtuns would have the greatest incentive to resist, accord-
ing to political dislocation theory: the Taliban were almost exclusively Pashtun, and the overthrow
of the Taliban shifted Afghanistan’s balance of political power away from the Pashtun community.
This chapter concludes by drawing the policy implications of the statistical findings.
5.2 Historical Context
5.2.1 Invasion
As with many other occupations, the Afghanistan War began in response to chaos in the periph-
ery. In the early 1990s, Afghanistan was engulfed in a vicious civil war. In 1996, the Taliban swept
through Afghanistan, defeated rival warlords, gained control of Kabul, and became the de facto
government. Following the attacks of 9/11, the US called on the Taliban government to hand over
al Qaeda leaders based on their territory and to shut down terrorist training camps. After the Tal-
iban rejected this ultimatum, the US launched military operations in Afghanistan in October 2001
with the stated purpose of disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations (Coll
2004). During the invasion, the US relied on a loose confederation of Tajik and Uzbek warlords
opposed to the Taliban regime known as the Northern Alliance, to conduct ground operations.
The combined efforts of US airpower and special forces and the Northern Alliance led to the swift
collapse of the Taliban regime. By early December 2001, senior Taliban leaders and as many as
10,000 Taliban fighters fled into Pakistan, effectively ending Taliban rule (Rashid 2008).
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5.2.2 Establishment of a New Government
As the US and the Northern Alliance fought the Taliban, diplomatic efforts sought to establish a
government to take its place. On 14 November 2001, the UN Security Council passed a resolu-
tion calling for a central role for the UN in establishing a transitional administration and inviting
member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and to help deliver aid. After the
fall of Kabul, the UN invited major Afghan factions —though not the Taliban— to an international
conference in Bonn to decide on a plan for governing Afghanistan (Katzman 2010, 10). The Bonn
Agreement, reached on 5 December 2001, set out a plan for the drafting of a new constitution and
the establishment of a representative and freely elected government. The UN Security Council
then passed a resolution creating the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF): “to assist
the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding ar-
eas” (UN 2001). On 22 December 2001, Hamid Karzai, a moderate Pashtun, took over the interim
administration of Afghanistan.
The US and Karzai faced the challenge of establishing a new government in the wake of a civil
war in an ethnically diverse country.2 Regime change in such a fragmented and polarized society
inevitably led to significant political dislocation. While the President was a Pashtun, ministries
were divvied up as spoils of war. Tajik and Uzbek leaders of the Northern Alliance took over key
ministries such as foreign affairs, intelligence, interior, and defense (Barfield 2010, 284). Pashtun
leader Haji Qadir left the Bonn conference claiming the Pashtuns were being underrepresented
(Jones 2009b, 137).
The selection of Karzai and his cabinet was only the beginning of an extended political process.
In June 2002 an emergency Loya Jirga accepted a provisional government for a period of two years
until a constitution could be agreed and elections held. In January 2004, a Loya Jirga approved
the constitution which created a strongly centralized government (Barfield 2010, 297). Gener-
ally peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections were held in October 2004 and September
2005 respectively. Karzai converted his initial appointment into a commanding electoral majority.
The Taliban were the only important political group to be excluded from the Bonn process (Jones
2The population of Afghanistan is composed of 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent Tajik, 9 percent Hazara, 9 percent
Uzbek, 4 percent Turkmen, and 2 percent Baloch, with a small number of other ethnic groups such as Nuristanis and
Aimak (CIA 2010).
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2009b, 145). The sweeping political reform of Afghanistan stood in stark contrast to the “light
footprint” approach adopted by the US military and its allies. The mandate of ISAF was initially
restricted to providing security in Kabul. In 2002, only 8,000 US soldiers, alongside a handful of
British, Australian, and Canadian troops, carried periodic operations on suspected al Qaeda sites
(Jones 2009b).
5.2.3 Resistance groups
As late as 2005, many in the US and the West were optimistic about ending the occupation of
Afghanistan. The Taliban appeared to have been routed. A new constitution had been approved
and presidential and parliamentary elections had been held. Foreign aid had led to breakneck
economic growth. Violence was relatively low by Afghan standards. The US did not even use the
word counterinsurgency in discussing its operations (Jones 2009b, 108, 142). Having accomplished
most of the objectives it had set for itself, the US began drawing down troops from Afghanistan,
transferred operational responsibility of ISAF to NATO (Barfield 2010, 318). US Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat”in Afghanistan in May 2003 (Katz-
man 2010, 9).
However, the pacification of Afghanistan proved to be an illusion. The political reforms ini-
tiated under ISAF occupation had alienated key segments of the Afghan population, while the
presence of ISAF forces attracted anti-Western Islamist insurgents. Resistance to ISAF occupation
is currently led by four groups: the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, and to a lesser
extent, al Qaeda (the conflict is ongoing at time of writing). There is evidence of coordination
among the different groups at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, though they do not
have a unified leadership (Bergen et al. 2010, 68). With the exception of al Qaeda, all the major
resistance groups are primarily Pashtun.
The Taliban is the principal insurgent group operating in Afghanistan. Following their over-
throw, surviving Taliban leadership headed by Mullah Omar resettled in Quetta, Pakistan (John-
son and Mason 2008, 57). Commanders operate in a hierarchical chain of command with the senior
leadership providing direction and guidance and operations being delegated to local commanders
(Giustozzi 2008). The Taliban’s financial infrastructure is based Karachi and derive profits from
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opium production (Jones 2009b, 107). As early as 2002, the Taliban began moving weapons, am-
munition, and food supplies back in Afghanistan in preparation for combat. By the summer of
2006, the Taliban were again controlling entire districts. More than any other insurgent group, the
Taliban have sought to set up a shadow government, and continue to refer to themselves as the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The stated objectives of the Taliban are to expel foreign forces
and overthrow the Karzai government in order to re-impose a fundamentalist regime based on
Deobandism (Jones 2009b, 230). The Taliban primarily consists of rural Pashtuns from the Ghilzai
confederation with some support from the Kakar tribe of the Ghurghusht confederation (Johnson
and Mason 2007). Kandahar province is the traditional home of the Taliban, who are also very
active in Helmand, Nimruz, Uruzgan, and Zabul. Although numbers are infamously unreliable,
Giustozzi estimates the total strength of the Taliban at 17,000, with 2,000 additional foreign volun-
teers (Giustozzi 2008, 35).
A secondary, yet potent, resistance group is Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). Led by Gullbud-
din Hekmatyar, a Mujahedeen leader and former Prime Minister, HIG’s stated objective have been
to eject foreign forces, which it considers to be infidels occupying Muslim lands and to establish an
Islamic government (Roy and Sfeir 2007, 131). HIG operates principally in the eastern provinces
of Kunar, Laghman, Paktia, and Kapisa and recruits mostly from the Pashtun community (Jones
2009b, 234; Johnson 2007, 108).
The third main resistance group is known as the Haqqani network, headed by Jalaluddin
Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin. In many regards, the Haqqani network is unified with the Tal-
iban, although this remains an issue of debate (Rutting 2009, 60). Haqqani himself had been Min-
ister of Borders and Tribal Affairs in the Taliban government. The Haqqani family is composed
of Pashtuns from the Zadran tribe in Paktia province. The group’s traditional base of power is
Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces, an area known as the Loya Paktia region (Dressler 2010).
As with HIG, the Haqqani network maintains a close association with al Qaeda and espouses a
radical Islamist ideology.
Lastly, al Qaeda has operated against ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Unlike other resistance
groups, which are based in Afghanistan’s Pashtun community, al Qaeda emerged out a network
of Arab Islamists who had joined the Mujahedeen in fighting Soviet occupation. al Qaeda’s objec-
tives are both local and transnational. In Afghanistan, it seeks to overthrow what it considers to be
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the apostate regime of Karzai. As with other insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, it seeks
to have the government replaced by a more orthodox regime, following a radical vision of Sharia.
Globally, al Qaeda has sought to weaken Western governments and expulse them from what it
considers to be Muslim land. Interestingly, though the US occupied Afghanistan principally to
neutralize al Qaeda, the terrorist network is not the main insurgent organization. It does not have
an indigenous basis of support, aside from its insurgent allies. al Qaeda has generally acted as a
force multiplier for other insurgent groups, helping manufacture and carry out IED attacks and
better execute suicide bombings and strategic communications (Jones 2009b, 291).
5.2.4 Insurgency
As resistance groups emerged, violence rose in Afghanistan. In April 2002 insurgent attacks were
orchestrated in Kandahar, Khost, and Nangarhar provinces. The next year, insurgents launched
attacks further into Helmand and Zabul provinces. In June 2003, the UN designated 31 districts in
Southern and Eastern Afghanistan as “high-risk.” By June 2004, the number of high-risk districts
rose to 78. By May 2007, the UN reported that approximately 41 percent of Afghanistan, or 163
districts, were inaccessible to the UN on a permanent or semi-permanent basis due to security
concerns. Tactics honed in Iraq, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks,
migrated to Afghanistan with devastating effect. In June 2003, the first suicide attack took place
using a car bomb against a bus carrying German ISAF soldiers. The same year, attacks against
Afghan officials, coalition forces, and aid workers became frequent enough that aid agencies be-
came concerned about their security in the South and East of the country (Tarzi 2008, 283).
In hindsight, the light footprint approach proved to be a strategic mistake because there were
still powerful elements in the society that continued to oppose reform (Biddle 2003, 31). The ap-
proach emboldened opponents of the regime, allowed criminal networks and warlords to reemerge,
and made it harder to control the porous border with Pakistan (Jones 2009b, 115). The inability of
the Afghan state or its foreign allies to effectively hold and police territory left civilians vulnera-
ble to insurgents. Without the guaranteed protection of the state, many Afghans were forced to
provide passive support to insurgents.
Afghanistan and its foreign partners eventually acknowledged their hard-earned gains were
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being eroded by the insurgency. In response, the US established regional command headquarters
for the more restive South and Eastern provinces of Afghanistan in 2003. In February 2004, NATO
Defense Ministers agreed to a plan for the phased expansion of ISAF throughout Afghanistan.
The expansion proceeded from the areas that experienced the least violence towards those that
experienced the most. Thus, ISAF established Regional Command (RC) North in October 2004,
RC West in September 2005, RC South in July 2006; and RC East in October 2006 (Jones 2009b,
142). In tandem with the spread of regional commands, ISAF expanded Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Teams (PRTs) to help promote the delivery of humanitarian aid and small-scale development
projects. The short-term effect of ISAF expansion in Afghanistan was a sharp increase in violence
and fatalities among civilians, insurgents, and Afghan and ISAF troops. The first six months of
2006 witnessed the greatest number of conflict related deaths since the fall of the Taliban (Rashid
2008, 364). As ISAF expanded, it found itself facing insurgent forces that had filled the power
vacuum after the fall of the Taliban.
5.2.5 Uncertain Future
In 2009, President Obama called for a short term surge of 30,000 American troops to help defeat
insurgent groups and solidify the security capacity of the Afghan government. By the end of 2010,
the future of the government remained precarious. The surge had not achieved its intended ef-
fects. While the Afghan government and its international backers still struggled to contain the
insurgency, it’s ability to survive fiscally and militarily was uncertain. Afghanistan remained al-
most completely dependent on foreign aid. Conversely, insurgent groups benefited from a boom-
ing drug economy. Even if insurgent groups could not hope to overthrow the government of
Afghanistan, they could erode Western military support for the regime leading Afghans to ques-
tion its legitimacy (Woodward 2010). By the end of 2012, the Afghanistan War had caused 3,249
ISAF fatalities (iCasualties 2013). Outright military victory and political settlement to the conflict
remained elusive. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010, Western forces finally announced their
intention to fold ISAF by 2014.
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5.3 Quantitative Analysis
The occupation of Afghanistan has led to an escalation of violence carried out by a number of
groups. However, there is widespread variation in patterns of violence. What then explains sub-
national variation in violent resistance? The Afghanistan War is extremely data-rich, with fine-
grained information being collected on the frequency and location of attacks, as well as the ethnic
and socio-economic composition of insurgents. As such, it provides a helpful case to explore vi-
olent resistance to occupation. Leveraging this data, this section uses a cross-sectional analysis of
district-level violence to help explain violent resistance, and evaluate competing theories of resis-
tance to occupation. This section proceeds as follows. First, I describe the unit of observation—
Afghan districts—and the two dependent variables pertaining to violence and fatalities. Second, I
introduce a number of independent variables meant to measure the effect of rival theories of resis-
tance to occupation, namely nationalism, opportunity structures, and political dislocation. Third,
I discuss the main results of the cross-sectional analysis. Last, I address a number of potential
counterpoints to the findings.
5.3.1 Unit of Observation
The unit of observation for this cross-sectional study is Afghan districts. Districts are the smallest
administrative boundary on which there is systematic collection of data on independent variables
of interest. Prior to 2004, there were 329 districts.3
5.3.2 Dependent Variables
The dependent variable, broadly defined, is violent resistance to occupation. A concern in the
collection of conflict data is that the availability of data will be correlated with key explanatory
variables, thereby biasing results. For instance, violence may prevent journalists from accessing
precisely those regions most affected by violent resistance, thereby leading to an underreporting
of violent events. It is epistemologically difficult to ascertain the completeness of any dataset, es-
pecially given a rare or unique phenomenon. While complete certainty is impossible, diversifying
3This number was subsequently increased to 397 districts in 2004. Since most district level data dates from 2003, I
use older district boundaries.
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Table 5.1: Summary of dependent variables
Dataset Time Period Observations Source
ACLED 2004-2010 3,384 Open source
SIGACTs 2004-2009 76,911 US Army
sources of information can help reduce this bias and increase confidence in estimates. In order to
capture the phenomenon of violent resistance in the context of Afghanistan, I employ two sources.
First, I examine the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010).
ACLED includes reported information on internal political conflict, disaggregated by date, loca-
tion, and actor. The unit of observation in ACLED is an individual event that occurred at a given
location. Events take place between conflict actors and are coded for a specific point location and
on a specific day. Conflict actors include governments, rebel groups, militaries, and organized
political groups who are involved in interactions over issues of political authority (i.e. territorial
control, government control, access to resources, etc.). ACLED data are based on a secondary
sources, such as articles and news reports. The ACLED dataset on Afghanistan includes 3,384
events between January 2004 and February 2010. The main drawback of ACLED is that it doesn’t
cover the period between 2001 and 2004 and has limited coverage for 2005 and 2006 (correspon-
dence with Raleigh 2011).4
Second, I employ fatality data drawn from 76,911 geocoded US Significant Action reports
(SIGACTs) between 2004 and January 2010. These reports were released by Wikileaks.org. The
reports cover most units from the US Army with the exception of most US Special Forces’ activ-
ities (Wikileaks 2010). The SIGACT dataset has the benefit of distinguishing ISAF from Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) fatalities. This helps confirm that variation in resistance events
does not simply reflect variation in targeting. As with the ACLED data, their main limitation is
that they do not cover the period between the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and 2004.
SIGACTS has the added limitation of being drawn exclusively from US military sources. Despite
drawing on different sources, the ACLED and SIGACT datasets are highly correlated (O’Loughlin
et al. 2010). For the ACLED and SIGACT datasets, I employ Arc GIS to sum incidents occurring
within each district. Figure 5.1 provides a summary of the dependent variables.
4ISAF reports relatively few fatalities prior to 2004 (iCasualties 2011). Moreover, qualitative accounts of violence
during this time period do not contradict findings from the 2004-2010 time period.













































(f) SIGACTs per capita
Figure 5.1: Geography of violence
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Examining temporal and spatial variation in these dependent variables provides some prelim-
inary insight into the causes of resistance. Resistance in Afghanistan exhibits clear temporal and
spatial trends. First, there is temporal variation in violence in Afghanistan, with violence increas-
ingly rapidly after 2005. Whether because of a weakened or deterred Taliban, a sense of gratitude
for expelling religious extremists, or massive foreign subsidies, resistance was muted in the first
three years of occupation (Sinno 2009, 266). These attenuating factors disappeared in 2005 and
2006 when the number of fatalities among foreign forces spiked (see Figure 5.2 (a) and Figure 5.3
(a)). Part of this spike in fatalities can be explained by a large increase in the number of foreign
troops. More troops, deployed to more areas of the country, simply generated more exposure. Yet
this can only be part of the answer. First, the number of troops deployed is endogenous to the
level of resistance encountered during the occupation. ISAF gradually expanded its presence to
the different provinces of Afghanistan precisely to counter what it saw as being a growing insur-
gency. Thus, while more troops created more exposure, the preexisting level of insurgency could
explain an increase in fatalities. Second, while increased exposure can increase the recorded level
of resistance, greater levels of troops could also plausibly deter more attacks. For example, while
initially causing a spike in violence, the “surge” in the Iraq War eventually led to a decline in vi-
olence (Ricks 2009).5 Therefore these figures do not give us reason to believe there is a necessary
linear or monotonic relation between troops and resistance.
Part of the answer may lie in the insurgents’ increased use of certain tactics. As seen in Fig-
ure 5.2 (b), suicide attacks were almost unknown in Afghanistan until 2003 and IEDs only be-
came a major tool of insurgency after 2004. While these tactics existed before the 2001 invasion
of Afghanistan, Iraqi insurgents perfected their employment. Transnational Jihadist movements,
such as al Qaeda, then transferred this tactical knowledge to their allies in Afghanistan (Horowitz
2010). These groups also helped Afghan insurgents more effectively adopt and employ such tac-
tics against hardened ISAF targets, which in turn explained the spike in coalition fatalities. As
the insurgent leader Jalaluddin Haqqani stated: “The American invasion of Iraq was very pos-
itive for us. It distracted the United States from Afghanistan. Until 2004 or so, we were using
traditional means of fighting like we used against the Soviets—AK-47s and RPGs. But then our
5The effect of the surge in Iraq remains a subject of debate. See Biddle et al. 2012.
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Figure 5.2: Evolution of resistance tactics
resistance became more lethal, with new weapons and techniques: bigger and better IEDs for
roadside bombings, and suicide attacks” (Yousafzai 2009).
Explaining temporal dimensions of resistance in Afghanistan is tricky. Many trends converged
simultaneously, creating an identification problem: the regrouping of Taliban, migration of insur-
gent technologies from Iraq, forward deployment of more Western forces which increased friction,
expansion of poppy cultivation, growing impatience with corruption and the pace of economic
growth, etc. . . Analysts have described this as the “perfect storm” that caused the spike in insur-
gency in 2005-2006 (Jones 2009b). Additionally many of these factors are endogenous, meaning it
can be difficult to ascertain whether resistance was the cause or the consequence of other trends.
For instance, did poppy cultivation generate funds for insurgent activity or did insurgent activity
create the legal vacuum for the cultivation of poppy (Lind 2010)? Did frustration with the pace
of economic growth build support for the insurgency or did the insurgency create instability that
undercut investment and economic growth?
Looking at the spatial variation of resistance can resolve some of these identification and en-
dogeneity problems. Indeed, by relying on crude geographic features, the field of International
Relations has tended to privilege temporal variation over spatial variation in its explanation of
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Figure 5.3: Temporal variation in violence
violence (Raleigh et al. 2010). As will be shown later, aggregated analysis of Afghanistan tends to
eclipse some of the most important regional patterns in insurgency. The spatial dimension in in-
surgency undermines simple explanations of variation in resistance based on coalition troop levels
or insurgent tactics. Although the insurgency has gradually spread since 2002, it remains region-
ally concentrated in the South and East of the country. Between 2004 and 2010, ACLED recorded
45.91 percent of events occurring in the South (The provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan,
Day Kundi, Nimroz, and Zabul) and 32.27 percent occurring in the East (the provinces of Bamyan,
Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktya, Paktika, Parwan,
and Wardak). Similarly, SIGACT data from the same time period shows 39 percent of events took
place in the South and 49 percent of events took place in the East.6 ISAF fatalities figures tell a
similar story: 56 percent of coalition fatalities were suffered in the South and 29 percent in the
East (iCasualties 2011). Taken on a per capita basis, these spatial patterns are starker: 78 percent
of ACLED events, 88 percent of SIGACTs, and 85 percent of fatalities were occurring in a part of
the country that represents only 46 percent of the population. Although suicide attacks and IEDs
6This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the US initially had a greater presence in the East than in the South of
Afghanistan and SIGACT reports are drawn from US sources.
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were becoming more lethal, their use remained geographically limited.
5.3.3 Independent Variables
This section describes a number of independent variables to explain this spatial variation in resis-
tance. The independent variables are grouped along rival explanations of resistance to occupation:
nationalism, opportunity structures, political dislocation, and trust.
Nationalism
Nationalism is perhaps the most common explanation for resistance to occupation in Afghanistan.7
Insurgent leaders frequently refer to nationalism in discussing their goals and objectives. In a
statement, the leader of Hezb-i-Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar demanded: “Withdrawal of for-
eign troops without any preconditions, allowing all Afghans and groups to set together and de-
cide their future and formation of a government to be acceptable to all are the prerequisites for the
peace talks in the country.” Later, in an interview, he said:
“The presence of foreign troops is the fundamental reason for the continued fighting.
Foreign troops should leave Afghanistan. . . Right now I just want the freedom of my
country. I am not thinking about other issues. I don‘t want anything for myself, nor
have we asked for anything for me or Hizb-e-Islami” (Gopal 2010).
Al Qaeda has called for the removal of foreign troops from all Muslim countries, including Afghanistan.
In 2010, bin Laden stated: “How can it be right that you participate in the occupation of our lands,
support the Americans in the killing of our women and children and yet want to live in peace
and security?” (Associated Press 2010). Mullah Omar, the leader of the Quetta Shura Taliban said:
“The current Jihad and resistance in Afghanistan against the foreign invaders and their puppets,
is a legitimate Jihad, being waged for the defense of the sovereignty of the Islamic country and
Islam” (Middle East Media Research Institute 2010). Elsewhere Omar said:
“The Islamic Emirate believes peace and stability will not return to Afghanistan unless
and until all foreign forces pull out of the country. The unremitting continuation of
7In the context of resistance to occupation, nationalism refers to an attachment to the Afghan nation. Sub-national
or ethnic nationalism, while relevant, is considered conceptually distinct since it overlaps with political dislocation.
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foreign interference will pave the way for more casualties and destructions” (Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan 2010).
Reports from discussions with lower-level insurgents also indicate nationalist motives: A former
Taliban ambassador said: “The Taliban have no problem with the Afghan government. We have
no problem with Karzai or the Afghans. The problem lies with the Americans” (Ghaith 2010). In-
terviews of Taliban foot soldiers in Kandahar also revealed nationalist motives among insurgents:
“He fervently believes that expelling the foreigners will set things right in his troubled coun-
try. . . They use the language of radical Islam, but their message often consists of nothing more
than xenophobia and a desire to protect their way of life” (Smith 2008, A16).
To measure the effect of nationalism I use two variables: the presence of foreign troops and the
degree of ethnic fractionalization.
Foreign troops. Because nationalist sentiment may be inflamed by the presence of foreigners,
I include a variable to measure the effect of foreign forces. Although this variable is an essential
component to estimating the causes of resistance, it is also highly problematic. As noted ear-
lier, the presence of foreign troops may be endogenous to the prevalence of resistance. However,
failing to account for the presence of foreign troops can create omitted variable bias. In order
to address these problems I use an instrumental variable approach. To be valid, the instrument
should be correlated with an endogenous independent variable (the presence of foreign troops),
but not correlated with the dependent variable (occurrence of resistance) other than through the
endogenous independent variable. A promising instrument is the location of military airbases.
Because they act as logistical hubs for ISAF forces, airbases tend to be correlated with the presence
of foreign troops. Indeed, because Afghanistan is land-locked, virtually all Coalition troops arrive
in Afghanistan through airbases and airbases play a role in certain military operations within the
country. However, because all airbases in Afghanistan were built prior to 2001, their location is
not correlated with the current occurrence of resistance.8 Data on the location of 13 airbases in
Afghanistan is drawn from the Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS). I then em-
ploy Arc GIS to calculate the average distance of a district to the closest airbase. Data on foreign
troop strength is drawn from the Institute for the Study of War (New York Times 2009).
8Dube and Naidu employ a similar instrumental variable approach in examining the effect of military assistance on
political conflict in Colombia (Dube and Naidu 2009).
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A critical factor in considering airbases as instruments for troop presence is whether patterns of
violence during the Soviet occupation differ from those in the Coalition occupation of Afghanistan
since 2001. Indeed, seven air bases (Herat, Shindand, Farah, Kandahar, Kabul International Air-
port, Bagram, and Jalalabad) were built or improved by the Soviet Union (Nelson 1985). If the
location of airbases reflects patterns of violence faced by both Soviet and Coalition forces, then
the instrument will suffer from the same endogeneity problems as a measure of the distribution
of troops. However, the historical record indicates that patterns of violence differed considerably
between the Soviet and ISAF occupations of Afghanistan. Unlike ISAF —which faces resistance
mainly in Pashtun community in the South and East of Afghanistan— the Soviet Union faced re-
sistance from all regions and all ethnic and linguistic groups. Figure 5.4 displays the location of
anti-Soviet insurgent groups. By 1981, Mujihadeen were active in 325 districts in all 29 provinces
of Afghanistan (Rasanayagam 2005, 111). The US government estimated that 75 percent of the ter-
ritory and two thirds of the population were under effective insurgent control (Amstutz 1986 132
). Unlike the Taliban insurgency which is led almost exclusively by Pashtuns, the anti-Soviet re-
sistance was also led by Tajiks in the North East and West such as Shah Masood and Ismael Khan
(Tomsen 2011, 215). Thus, the USSR faced major uprisings in the cities of Herat and Mazar-e-
Sharif, as well as the Panjshir valley and the Hazarajat, areas that have been particularly quiescent
during the ISAF occupation. Differing patterns of violence led to differing patterns of troop de-
ployment. Among the 85,000 troops deployed by the USSR, approximately half were based in
and around Kabul and the remainder focused on Jalalabad, Asadabad, Gardez and Ghazni in the
East, and Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, and Faizabad in the North (Rasanayagam 2005, 112-113). In
contrast, the bulk of ISAF troops are deployed in the South and East of Afghanistan. Because
the geographic distributions of violence during the Soviet occupation and subsequent civil war
differ from the current occupation of Afghanistan, this alleviates concerns that the placement of
previously constructed airbases reflects ongoing patterns of conflict.
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Community cohesion has been theorized to affect the probabil-
ity of resistance to occupation. First more ethnically or linguistically homogeneous communities
may have a stronger sense of identity. Second, ethno-linguistically homogeneous communities
may be better suited at administering selective incentives and sanctions to mobilize resistance
to occupation (see Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). I therefore calculate a measure of ethno-
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Figure 5.4: Location of resistance groups under soviet occupation (source: CIA)
linguistic fractionalization (ELF) by looking at different linguistic groups in Afghanistan. It re-
flects the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. ELF is
calculated using the Herfindahl concentration formula: ELF = 1−∑ni=1 s2i where s2 indicates the
share of the population of group i (Posner 2004, 849). Province-level data on the share of different
linguistic groups is drawn from the CSO Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile (CSO 2007).
ELF ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 represents a perfectly homogenous society and 1 represents
a perfectly heterogeneous society.
The following hypotheses summarize the effect of the nationalism variables on resistance to
occupation:
Hypothesis 7 Districts closer to airbases will experience greater levels of resistance.
Hypothesis 8 Districts with less ethno-linguistic fractionalization will experience greater levels of resis-
tance.
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Opportunity Structures
A second explanation for resistance in Afghanistan centers on opportunity structures provided by
economic and geographic conditions as well as weak institutions. To examine the effect of oppor-
tunity structures, I include measures of poverty, mountainous terrain, corruption, and distance to
Pakistan.
Poverty. Poverty has been offered as a cause of resistance and insurgency in the context of
Afghanistan. In a 2009 Oxfam survey of Afghans, 70 percent of respondents said that poverty
and unemployment were the principal causes of violence in the country (Oxfam 2009). Surveys
conducted by the Asia Foundation have consistently identified poverty, poor economic condi-
tions, and unemployment as some of the more pressing concerns of Afghans (Asia Foundation
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). During a press conference, the chief ISAF intelligence officer noted: “Who
is ’the enemy’ in Afghanistan?. . . The enemy is illiteracy, it’s poverty, it’s unemployment” (Lob-
jakas 2007). Coalition forces have observed local declines in insurgent activity during the harvest
months, as potential fighters are taken out of the insurgency “labor market.” Coalition officials
have argued that small-scale make-work projects, such as cleaning drainage ditches could be suf-
ficient to sap the insurgency of potential recruits. Not only are young males gainfully employed,
but they are also too tired to pick up a gun after they put down their shovel (Correspondence with
Canadian PRT official 2007).
In order to measure poverty, I employ province-level poverty rates. The level of poverty is
coded on a 5-point scale: 1 (9-20 percent), 2 (21-30 percent), 3 (31-43 percent), 4 (44-54 percent),
5 (55-76 percent). This data is drawn from the CSO’s 2007-2008 National Risk and Vulnerabil-
ity Assessment (CSO 2008). Once district-level unemployment data collected by ISAF becomes
declassified, it will be possible to gain a more precise understanding of the effect of economic
conditions on resistance.
Mountainous terrain. Geographic conditions such as mountainous terrain have often been seen
as facilitators of insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The Panjshir valley northeast of Kabul was
a deadly trap for Soviet troops and the Korengal valley in Kunar Province has proven to be an ex-
tremely difficult for coalition forces to hold (Rubin 2008). On several occasions, armored vehicles
could not navigate winding mountain trails forcing troops to dismount and making them more
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vulnerable to attacks. Coalition data shows some of the effects of geography on resistance. For
example, there is a seasonal dip in fatalities during winter months when cold weather and snow
in mountain passes reduce the mobility of insurgents. Conversely, insurgent “spring offensives”
occur when these impediments literally melt away.
Many spatial analyses of conflict employ altitude as a proxy for mountainous terrain (e.g.
Kalyvas 2006; Lyall 2009a). This is problematic since altitude does not adequately describe the
suitability of terrain for insurgency. For instance, high altitude plateaus provide little or no cover
for insurgents whereas low-altitude valleys and canyons can provide ideal terrain for ambushes.
Fearon and Laitin employ a variable for mountainous terrain, but it is not available at the Afghanistan
district level (Fearon and Laitin 2003). I therefore estimate terrain roughness by changes in eleva-
tion at a micro-level. I begin with a digital elevation map taken from the GTOPO30 dataset (US
Geological Survey 2007). For every cell in an Afghanistan GIS elevation grid, I measure the stan-
dard deviation in altitude between that cell and the 8 neighboring cells. I then measure the mean
standard deviation of all cells within a district. Note that greater average standard deviation does
not necessarily indicate higher altitude. It indicates greater variation in altitude within the dis-
trict. Because the incremental advantages of mountainous terrain may be expected to decline, I
then take the log of the mean standard deviation.
Corruption. Many policy analysts have traced the origin of the Afghan insurgency in whole
or in part to widespread corruption and poor governance (Chayes 2006; Jones 2009b; Rubin 2007;
International Crisis Group 2006). According to this view, resistance to occupation is in fact resis-
tance to a corrupt regime that is seen as supported by foreigners. Financial and military support
from abroad reduces the Afghan government’s incentives to be responsive to complaints at home.
Afghanistan regularly ranks among the five most corrupt countries according to Transparency
International (Transparency International 2010). The Taliban came to prominence in the 1990s
precisely by restoring law and order and combatting warlords and brigands. Corruption would
therefore increase the pool of aggrieved individuals to draw from. In order to estimate this effect,
I measure the percentage of individuals who report to have bribed a policeman in 2009, drawn
from Integrity Watch’s National Corruption Survey (Integrity Watch 2010).
Pakistan border. Foreign support and sanctuary has been shown to play a critical role in sus-
taining insurgencies (Salehyan 2007). Afghanistan has generally weak control of its borders, but
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its border with Pakistan is considered especially vulnerable. Insurgents have used sanctuaries
in Pakistan to regroup, plan, and launch attacks against ISAF and the Afghan government. All
major insurgent groups have their headquarters in Pakistan. There is considerable evidence that
Afghan insurgents also received intelligence and material support from Pakistan’s ISI (Rashid
2008, Johnson and Mason 2008). In order to estimate the effect of Pakistani sanctuary on resis-
tance in Afghanistan, I measure the average distance of each district to the border with Pakistan
using Arc GIS. Although this is an incomplete measure —terrain and roads are also critical—
we should generally expect higher levels of insurgencies in districts near or bordering Pakistan.
Although Afghanistan also borders Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China, only
Pakistan has been known to provide sanctuary for resistance forces (Rashid 2008).9
Population. Last, I control for the population size of each district. We should expect that the
larger the population, the greater the number of individuals to be recruited for resistance. District
level population data in 2003 is drawn from the Central Statistical Organization (CSO 2003). The
mean district has a population of 62,662.
The following hypotheses summarize the effect of opportunity structure variables on resis-
tance to occupation:
Hypothesis 9 Districts with higher poverty rates will experience greater levels of resistance.
Hypothesis 10 Districts with more mountainous terrain will experience greater levels of resistance.
Hypothesis 11 Districts with greater levels of corruption will experience greater levels of resistance.
Hypothesis 12 Districts closer to the border with Pakistan will experience greater levels of resistance.
Hypothesis 13 Districts with larger populations will experience greater levels of resistance.
Political Dislocation
The theory of political dislocation posits that resistance to occupation will be strongest among
those groups that stand most to lose from political reform under foreign occupation. Conversely,
groups that stand to gain from changes implemented by occupiers will be less likely to undertake
9US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates mentioned that Iran provided limited material support for the Tal-
iban(Associated Press 2010a)
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resistance to occupation. In the case of Afghanistan, reforms initiated under ISAF occupation
led to political dislocation. This political dislocation affected two groups: 1) the Taliban who
lost power and were hunted down and exiled, and to a lesser degree, 2) the broader Pashtun
community who saw a weakening of their relative domestic position.
First, members and supporters of the Taliban were immediately dislocated. Mullah Omar was
removed as the leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and replaced with Hamid Karzai. Re-
forms led to the Taliban losing monopolistic control over the military. Through the Bonn process,
a new democratic constitution replaced the theocratic Taliban regime. No member of the Taliban
was invited to the Bonn peace talks. The conflation of al Qaeda and the Taliban in the minds of
American policy-makers made it all but impossible for moderate Taliban to join the post-2001 po-
litical transition. Discussion regarding the possibility of rejoining the political process in 2002 and
2004 came to little. Moreover, Afghan officials could not provide credible assurances to Taliban
who wanted to rejoin the process that they would be protected from detention by the US (Rashid
and Rubin 2008, 39; Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2011). UN Special Representative for the
Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi lamented: “The Taliban should have been at Bonn. This was
our original sin” (Rashid 2008, 104).
Second, members of the broader Pashtun population were dislocated. During Afghanistan’s
civil war in the 1990s regional militias and political parties appealed directly to ethnolinguistic
affiliation. As a consequence, Afghan politics became particularly “ethnicized” (Dorronsoro 2005).
Competition between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks made groups sensitive to any change
in the ethnic balance of power. A 2001 CIA assessment noted: “Afghanistan truly is a zero sum
game. Anytime anyone advances all others consider this to be at their expense” (Berntsen and
Pezzullo 2005, 219). As former CIA Pakistan station chief Milton Bearden ominously wrote in
Foreign Affairs in November 2001:
“Strident calls to add the overthrow of the Taliban regime to the list of American ob-
jectives may be attractive in terms of human rights, but that objective, too, must be
weighed against the goal of making certain that the events of September 11 are not
repeated. . . Some have called for arming and forming an alliance with Afghanistan’s
now-leaderless Northern Alliance. . . the more likely consequences of a U.S. alliance
CHAPTER 5. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN AFGHANISTAN (2001-2010) 174
with the late Masoud’s fighters would be the coalescing of Afghanistan’s majority
Pashtun tribes around their Taliban leaders and the rekindling of a brutal, general civil
war that would continue until the United States simply gave up. The dominant tribe in
Afghanistan, which also happens to be the largest, will dominate; replacing the Pash-
tun Taliban with the largely Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance is close to impossible”
(Bearden 2001, 28-29).
Although not all Pashtuns supported the Taliban, the Taliban were undoubtedly the most pow-
erful group to advance Pashtun interests. Moreover, during their conquest of Afghanistan the
Taliban had effectively eliminated rival Pashtun groups. Therefore, when the Taliban were over-
thrown in 2001, a political vacuum emerged. Non-Taliban Pashtuns were poorly organized, and
thus the Pashtun community —the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan— was politically weak-
ened.
This weakness led to political marginalization. According to Dorronsoro (2005, 342-343): The
fall of the Taliban led to a new imbalance in representation in the national institutions. The Uzbeks
are able to a point to regard themselves as represented by Dostum, while the Hazaras are repre-
sented by Hezb-i Wahdat and the Persian speakers of the northeast by Jamiyat-i Islami. However,
the Pushtuns, the most numerous ethnic community, have unquestionably been marginalised by
the new regime.” Though efforts were made to incorporate some Pashtun groups, the Bonn pro-
cess was a victor’s peace with ministries distributed as spoils of war. During the Bonn talks, the
United Front obtained 17 of the 20 seats it demanded in cabinet. More importantly, the United
Front controlled the key ministries of defense, intelligence, foreign affairs, and interior (Rashid
2008, 129). A consequence of the light footprint approach initially adopted by the US was a re-
liance on Tajik-dominated warlords from the Northern Alliance as local proxies. Pashtuns were
also marginalized from the military: although Pashtuns made up 40 percent of the population of
Afghanistan and accounted for more than 52 percent of the troops in the Afghan National Army,
only about 36 percent of the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and 32 percent of officers were
Pashtun. In comparison, the Tajiks, who constituted roughly 25 percent of the Afghan population
and 37 percent of troops, made up 53 percent of NCOs and almost 56 percent of officers (Tarzi
2008, 287).
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For ethnic minorities such as the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara communities, who had been marginal-
ized or persecuted under the Taliban regime, the occupation of Afghanistan provided net benefits.
Ethnic minorities and their languages were given official status and Shias were given legal parity
with Sunnis. Many of the political gains acquired by ethnic minorities were mirrored by losses by
the Taliban and for Pashtuns more generally (Dorronsoro 2005, 343). The political marginalization
of the Pashtun community was historically unprecedented. There were only two brief periods
in recent Afghan history when Pashtuns haven’t been in power: once in 1929 when Habibullah
Kalkani (a Tajik), seized power for a few months and the second when Burhanuddin Rabbani (an-
other Tajik) became president, a position during the civil war that accorded virtually no power.
According to longtime Afghan observer Gilles Dorronsoro (2010):
“since 2001, perceptions of Pashtuns and other groups are diverging due to the role of
the Afghan state and the international community. Most Pashtuns regard the central
government as being in the hands of non-Pashtun leaders. (although Karzai is from an
aristocratic family from Kandahar, he is often seen as being under the influence of the
United States.)”
Political power aside, the political dislocation of Pashtuns led directly to insecurity. After the
fall of the Taliban, there were reports of extortion, looting, killing, rape, and other forms of per-
secution against Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan. In 2002, some 20,000 Pashtuns fled Northern
Afghanistan because of ethnic persecution (Dorronsoro 2005, 343). Some Pashtuns felt they were
unfairly targeted by coalition forces that did not distinguish between Pashtuns and Taliban. As
one elder stated: “The Taliban did the crimes, but the punishment was for us” (Human Rights
Watch 2002, 1).
The theory of political dislocation would predict that those groups marginalized in the course
of occupation are more likely to take up arms against occupiers. Resistance will be more acute
when occupiers take steps to institutionalize changes in political structures. In the case of Afghanistan,
dislocation was institutionalized through constitutional reform, a process undertaken in the ab-
sence of Taliban or full Pashtun representation.
Pashto speakers. I have argued that political dislocation in Afghanistan affected the Pashtun
community generally and within this Pashtun community, the Taliban specifically. To measure
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political dislocation, I therefore measure the percentage of each province that is Pashto speaking.
The ethnic characteristics of Afghanistan facilitate the identification of the effects of political dislo-
cation. The Pashtun ethnic group speaks primarily Pashto, and Pashto speakers (as most linguistic
groups in Afghanistan) tend to be regionally concentrated.10 Data on Pashto speakers is drawn
from the CSO Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile (CSO 2007). Once again, it is important
to be clear about the meaning of this measure. It does not indicate that all Pastho speakers oppose
foreign occupation of Afghanistan or support the Taliban. Being a Pashto speaker is considered a
necessary but not sufficient condition for support for political dislocation.
Hypothesis 14 Districts with higher percentages of Pashto speakers will experience greater levels of resis-
tance.
Table 5.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ACLED Events 10.311 24.716 0 219
ISAF + ANSF Fatalities 14.921 30.358 0 275
Average Distance to Airbase 81247.3 54807.185 3747.136 358210.75
Average Distance to Pakistan/10000 18.386 15.562 0.4 58.992
District Population/10000 6.266 14.431 0.162 230.613
Pashto Speakers 51.65 34.998 0.9 99.400
Dari Speakers 33.109 29.769 0.1 97.900
Poverty 2.966 1.478 1 5
ELF 0.361 0.212 0.012 0.709
Mountainous Terrain (log) 3.994 1.071 0.481 5.508
Number of ISAF Battalions in Province 1.454 2.44 0 11
N 328
5.3.4 Model Specification
The dependent variables (number of resistance events, coalition fatalities) are count variables. In
order to determine the appropriate count model, I conduct a dispersion test. With a large number
of zeros, the test clearly shows that a negative binomial model is most appropriate (see Figure 5.7).
Moreover, because one of the key explanatory variables, the number of foreign forces in the area of
a district, is endogenous to the dependent variables, the number of resistance events or fatalities,
10There are also significant pockets of Pashto-speakers in Faryab, Balkh, Kunduz and Baghlan in northern
Afghanistan.
















































Figure 5.5: Independent variables 1
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Figure 5.6: Independent variables 2
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Table 5.3: Coding of variables
Variable Definition Source






Corruption Percent of individuals in
province who report paying
bribes in 2009
Integrity Watch 2010
Foreign Troops Number of ISAF/OEF
battalions in province (high)
Institute for the Study of War
2010
Average Distance to Pakistan Average distance to Pakistan
divided by 10,000
Arc GIS
District Population District population divided by
10,000
CSO 2007







Mountainous Terrain (log) Log. of average standard
deviation in altitude
USGS 2007, Arc GIS
Average Distance to Airbase Average distance to airbase Arc GIS
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Figure 5.7: Dispersion tests
I employ an instrumental variable approach. As discussed above, I employ distance to an airfield
as an instrument of the presence of foreign troops. The instrumental variable approach involves
a two-stage regression. In the first stage of this model I regress the endogenous variable on the
other explanatory variables including the instrumental variable and save the predicted values. In
the second stage, I regress the dependent variable on the explanatory variables and the predicted
values of the endogenous variable from the first stage regression. While this approach does not
bias the coefficients, its principal disadvantage is that it may lead to inflated standard errors.
5.4 Discussion of Results
In this section I discuss the results of the quantitative analysis of resistance in Afghanistan. The
results are displayed in Table 5.4. The dependent variable in the first three models is SIGACTs and
the dependent variable for the subsequent three models is ACLED events. To preview the main
results: I find evidence of political dislocation as a driver of resistance. Factors such as poverty
and mountainous terrain are also significant in certain models, but in the opposite direction than
predicted.
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Table 5.4: Determinants of resistance in Afghanistan
S1 S2 S3 A1 A2 A3
Pashto Speakers 0.07∗ 0.09∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
ELF -10.54∗ -10.39∗
(4.80) (4.87)
Corruption 0.30∗ 0.30 0.25∗ 0.24
(0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17)
Foreign Troops -1.05 -1.69 -3.05 -1.66∗ -2.20∗ -3.30
(0.76) (0.95) (1.92) (0.76) (0.94) (1.97)
Average Distance to Pakistan/10000 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.03∗ 0.04∗ -0.08
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
District Population/10000 0.02 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Poverty -0.48 -0.64∗ -1.19 -0.67∗ -0.79∗ -1.22
(0.28) (0.32) (0.68) (0.28) (0.32) (0.69)
Mountainous Terrain (log) -0.22 -0.31∗ -1.16∗ -0.36∗∗ -0.42∗∗ -1.32∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.54) (0.13) (0.14) (0.54)
Constant -0.76 -0.42 14.84∗ -1.38 -1.21 15.12∗
(1.30) (1.26) (6.21) (1.36) (1.30) (6.29)
lnalpha 0.85∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 328 328 328 328 328 328
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.4.1 Nationalism
The results of the quantitative analysis provide only weak support for the nationalist theory of
resistance. First, the effect of foreign troops, proxied through distance to airbases, is inconclusive.
There is no consistently significant effect. Once again, it is important to be careful in interpreting
this result. In some circumstances, it may indicate that greater number of foreign troops may be
deterring attacks, while in other cases it may be indicating that troops increase exposure to attack.
It may also indicate that resentment against foreigners in conditional on ethnicity. For example,
Germany has over time been the second or third largest troop contributor to the ISAF mission
but has suffered relatively few fatalities since they are principally deployed to ethnically Tajik
Provinces of Regional Command-North.
Second, ethno-linguistic fractionalization exhibits a statistically significant effect on resistance.
As expected greater fractionalization predicts lower levels of resistance. For every 0.1 change in
ELF (with 0 representing a perfectly homogenous society and 1 representing a perfectly heteroge-
nous society), there is a 65.15 percent decrease in the number of ACLED events or 64.6 percent
decrease in the number of coalition fatalities in the SIGACT data. This finding is consistent with
the argument put forth by Humphreys and Weinstein and by Petersen that ethnic fractionaliza-
tion impedes mobilization (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Petersen 2001). What is not clear
from these findings is whether ethno-linguistic fractionalization lessens resistance by diluting na-
tionalist sentiment, by impeding collective action, or both.
Quantitative findings aside, a number of additional factors undermine the nationalist expla-
nation of resistance in Afghanistan. First, the spatial distribution of attacks is not consistent with
population size, but is lopsided towards populous Pashtun districts. According to Barfied: “that
insurgency was far from nationwide, and Afghanistans receptivity to a returned Taliban was de-
cidedly local” (Barfield 2010, 322). Indeed, when rerunning the models substituting the Pashto
variable with a Dari variable, I find a negative but not statistically significant relation with the
number of attacks (not shown). Indeed, Dari is the language spoken mainly by non-Pashtun
groups in Afghanistan, and those groups most commonly opposed to the Taliban. Second, just as
some explain the resistance as anti-foreign, others have claimed that the problem was precisely
that international forces were not deployed soon enough to restore law and order and help ensure
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better governance in the South of Afghanistan. According to Ahmed Rashid many Afghans “were
literally on their knees begging for a greater international presence” (Rashid 2008, 196). The lack
of a Western presence meant more power for warlords and less security and economic develop-
ment. Similarly the International Crisis Group noted: “The Taliban never decisively defeated and
expectations running high among the population, however, the Pashtun belt was largely left to
fester without the troops who would have then been welcomed with open arms” (International
Crisis Group 2006, 4). Therefore, far from rejecting foreign troops as nationalism would predict,
many were welcoming more.
Third, despite calling for the expulsion of foreign forces, some insurgent groups were foreign-
financed or employed foreign fighters. For example, the Haqqani network received funding and
support from al Qaeda and employed Arabs, Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Chechens, and Turks. This
would seem to indicate that a least some of their fighters could not have been motivated by
nationalism as it is traditionally understood. Fourth, an examination of the Global Terrorism
Database shows of the 862 incidents between 2001 and 2008 committed by the Taliban and Hizb-
al-Islami, 138 were committed against military targets and 19 were committed against diplomatic
targets. Thus 81 percent of attacks listed between 2001 and 2008 were directed against Afghan—
not foreign—targets as nationalism would predict (Global Terrorism Database 2010). Sixth, if
foreign occupation were the sole driver of resistance in Afghanistan, then we would expect in-
surgency to cease once occupation ended. We cannot directly evaluate this claim as long as the
foreign occupation of Afghanistan persists. However, counterfactuals can provide important in-
sight into the causal mechanisms of resistance (Fearon 1991). Most importantly the expectation
that violence would cease if the foreign presence would end seems profoundly unrealistic given
historical precedent. All the main insurgent groups, except for the Quetta Shura Taliban, fought
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and all insurgent groups including the Taliban continued to
fight the government once the occupation ceased.
It is also worth noting that if nationalism were a key driver of resistance to occupation we
would expect to see more support for groups such as the Taliban and less support for the estab-
lished government of Afghanistan. Instead, polling has tended to show strong opposition to the
Taliban and relatively stronger support for the government of Afghanistan (see for instance ABC
News/BBC/ARD Poll, February 2009). Naturally we should be skeptical about such polls since
CHAPTER 5. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN AFGHANISTAN (2001-2010) 184
the incentives for preference falsification in conflict zones are great. For instance, villagers may
not trust unknown pollsters, especially when expressing support for an insurgent group. Many
pollsters were unable to conduct polls in provinces such as Zabul or Uruzgan, which are Taliban
strongholds. Pashtuns also tend to be under-sampled in most polls (Giustozzi 2008, 35-36). Sup-
port for government is probably inflated in such polls, but the fact that polling still shows regional
variation despite these polling biases confirms the regional character of the resistance.
5.4.2 Opportunity Structures
A quantitative analysis of violence in Afghanistan also contradicts many common assumptions
regarding the effect of opportunity structure on resistance to occupation. Insofar as they are found
to be statistically significant, factors such as poverty and terrain roughness have an unexpectedly
negative effect on resistance.
First, I find poverty has a negative impact on resistance, although this effect is not statistically
significant across models or with the SIGACT data. In the ACLED data every one-unit change in
the five-point poverty classification, resistance events decrease by 48.6 percent. Thus, contrary to
the common assumption that insurgency is a product of economic desperation; areas with higher
levels of poverty are less likely to experience resistance than their richer counterparts. Indeed,
examining the geography of poverty, we find that some of the poorest regions of Afghanistan are
found in the northeast of the country as well as the Hazarjat in central Afghanistan. The South,
where much of the resistance is located, experiences lower poverty rates than the country aver-
age. It is important to note that poverty was measured in 2003, that is, prior to the intensification
of insurgency in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 and the rise in poppy cultivation in insurgent-affected
areas. This measure also averts endogeneity concerns whereby economic conditions could be af-
fected by the insurgency itself (Miguel et al. 2004). This measure is therefore not contaminated by
the effect of subsequent insurgency. This findings runs counter to much of the findings of “greed”
literature in civil wars (notably Collier and Hoeffler 2004) which claims among other things that
poverty may lower the opportunity costs to fighting. The finding is consistent with other micro-
level empirical studies of insurgency in Afghanistan. For instance, in examining district-level
changes in unemployment in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2009 Berman et al. “emphatically
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reject a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied
forces” (Berman et al. 2011, 496). In fact, consistent with my findings, Berman et al. note there
is a negative effect of unemployment and insurgency. Although they do not provide conclusive
explanations for the unexpected negative relation between unemployment and insurgency, they
note that economic effects may be swamped by other factors. Additionally, since cross-national
studies of insurgency and of resistance to occupation show that poverty is a significant variable, it
may simply be the case that economic condition can predict the general propensity of conflict but
not its precise location.
Second, I find that terrain roughness is negatively associated with resistance to occupation.
Although this effect is consistently negative, the effect is not statistically significant in most mod-
els. In the ACLED data, each increase in the standard deviation of altitude leads to a 32.3 percent
decrease in resistance events. Indeed, looking at the distribution of mountainous terrain and in-
surgency, it is notable that some of the hotspots of resistance activity are in the agricultural plains
surrounding Kandahar City and Lashkar Gah. The most rugged terrain in Afghanistan in the
Hindu Kush northeast of Kabul is simply inaccessible by insurgents and government forces alike
making it unlikely to be the setting of insurgent activity. Notably, rugged terrain of the central
Hazarajat is nearly absent of insurgent activity. This finding is at odds with previous findings that
mountainous terrain is a predictor of civil war and insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
However, some caution is warranted in interpreting this result. Mountainous terrain can pro-
vide shelter for insurgent groups even if mountainous terrain itself is not the site of confrontation
between insurgents and occupation forces. Indeed, because it is inaccessible to occupation forces,
such terrain will not be a predictor of resistance activity. Alternatively, stronger insurgent groups
may choose to fight in flat terrain, whereas weaker groups might be able to fight only in the moun-
tains.11 Moreover, mountainous terrain may be able to predict the onset of insurgency—the object
of Fearon and Laitin’s study—rather than the location of fighting. Additionally, in the context
of Afghanistan the effect of terrain might be highly contingent on other factors such as political
alignment of the population inhabiting the terrain. Regardless, this finding should lead scholars
to be more cautious in the use of terrain as an explanatory variable for insurgency. Specifically
11Thanks to Jack Snyder for suggesting these strategic effects.
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scholars should be careful about: 1) the level of aggregation in the measure of terrain (i.e. national
vs. sub-national measures of terrain), 2) measuring actual terrain roughness rather than proxies
such as altitude, 3) distinguishing onset, occurrence, and intensity of insurgency as a product of
terrain, 4) evaluating the effect of terrain in the context of political alignments, and 5) taking into
account selection and strategic interaction effects of terrain on insurgency.
Third, corruption is found to have a positive effect on insurgency, with attacks and fatalities
more likely in areas where reports of corruption are greater. However the effect of this variable
is not statistically significant across models. Fourth, I find no statistically significant effect of
proximity to Pakistan on resistance to occupation. Because distance to Pakistan and percentage of
Pashto speakers are correlated at the−0.56 level, I run two separate models. Furthermore, because
the effect of proximity to Pakistan may not be monotonic, I run the models with a squared term for
distance to Pakistan. The null finding remains regardless of model specifications. Thus, although
there is extensive evidence that Pakistani sanctuaries provide critical support for the insurgency,
there is no direct relation of proximity to Pakistan and the location of resistance to occupation.
This may also indicate that cross-border insurgents do not necessarily target close to the border,
but instead actively seek higher value targets inland, using safe-house and other logistical hubs.
Alternatively, it might simply be indicating that distance is a poor predictor of insurgency because
it is so dependent on terrain and infrastructure.
Fourth, district population positively predicts resistance in Afghanistan. More populous dis-
tricts are more likely to experience resistance than less populous districts. This finding is robust
and statistically significant in the ACLED data but is not robust using the SIGACT data. More-
over, the substantive effect is relatively weak. Every 1,000-person increase in district population
leads to a 0.73 percent increase in ACLED events. What this quantitative evidence cannot tell us,
however, is whether population centers provide deeper pools of recruitment, a form of safety in
numbers, or some combination of the two.
5.4.3 Political Dislocation
Consistent with political dislocation theory, I find the proxy for political dislocation—the percent-
age of Pashto speakers—is a robust predictor of resistance incidents across both dependent vari-
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ables. For every 1 percent increase in Pashto speakers, the number of ACLED incidents increases
by 9.1 percent and the number of coalition fatalities increases 7.2 percent (effects refer to models 1
and 4 unless otherwise noted). This finding is robust across model specification and significant at
the 0.05 level.
Groups such as the Taliban, being politically dislocated in the aftermath of the US invasion,
mobilized resistance against coalition forces. Process tracing the decision to undertake resistance
against occupation is difficult in this case, particularly since the subjects go to great lengths not
to be traced at all. Yet, all the main insurgent groups are almost exclusively led and composed
of Pashtuns. The majority of Taliban Shuras were composed of former members of the Taliban
government. For example, the four commanders appointed by Mullah Omar to organize the Tal-
iban in southern Afghanistan were former deputy Defense Minister Mullah Baradir, former army
chief Akhtar Muhammad Uthmani, former corps commander Mullah Dadullah, and former In-
terior Minister Adbul Razzaq (Stenersen 2010, 42). Being almost entirely Pashtun, groups such
as the Taliban, Hizb-al-Islami, and the Haqqani Network were principally able to recruit from
the Pashto speaking community and operate within Pashtun-inhabited areas. Not all Pashtuns
supported the Taliban, and many were forcefully recruited, but the Taliban and other insurgent
groups were drawn almost entirely from the Pashtun community. According to Giustozzi, the Tal-
iban recruited: “all those who had supported the Taliban regime and who had been marginalized
afterwards” (Giustozzi 2008, 48). Gen. David Petraeus stated:
“the rank and file of the insurgency is, indeed, local Afghans. It is Pashtun brothers.
It is largely a Pashtun insurgency. There are some other ethnic groups involved in
it, certainly, and some transnational elements as well, but essentially it is a Pashtun
insurgency” (2010).
All the commanders who have been named by the Taliban are of Pashtun origin. Aside from
Pashtun pockets in Faryab, Balkh, Kunduz and Baghlan, the Taliban have had much more trouble
recruiting in the non-Pashtun north of Afghanistan (Giustozzi and Reuter 2010). Indeed, accord-
ing to Dorronsoro, the Taliban faced a dilemma: “how can the Taliban use the Pashtun resentment
in the South and simultaneously broaden the insurgency and include other ethnic groups in the
North?” (2009, 14 ). Reflecting the narrow political base of the resistance, insurgent groups do not
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use the traditional name or flag of Afghanistan but use the symbols imposed by the Taliban during
their rule from 1996 to 2001 (Stenersen 2010, 55-57). Virtually all regionally-disaggregated polls in
Afghanistan show sympathy or support for the Taliban is greatest in more Pashto-speaking areas
(e.g. ABC 2009, Asia Foundation 2004-2009). As a result the number and frequency of attacks
on coalition forces is highly correlated with Pashto-speaking regions. Indeed, observing the fre-
quency of attacks matches the distribution of ethnic groups in the country, with attacks being far
more likely in the Pashtun belt.
The effect of political dislocation can also be seen in decisions of certain insurgent comman-
ders. For instance, in 2002 Hekmatyar declared a jihad to liberate Afghanistan from foreign dom-
ination and claimed he had formed an alliance with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Again in 2006,
Hekmatyar denounced what he considered the puppet government of Karzai and pledged alle-
giance to al-Qaeda leadership (International Crisis Group 2006, 10). However later on, Hekmatyar
expressed a willingness to cooperate if Karzai ceded enough power to him (Barfield 2010, 326). In
2007, Hekmatyar said he was willing to discuss a ceasefire with the government of Karzai, con-
ditional on the withdrawal of foreign forces and elections under a neutral caretaker government.
However in 2008 Hekmatyar decided he could gain more leverage on a weak government through
insurgency (Katzman 2010, 23).
These findings show that political dislocation can provide an explanation for why some groups
take up arms against occupying forces, whereas other groups do not. Importantly, these findings
question the assumption that nationalism is what drives resistance to occupation. Although it is
frequently noted that the Taliban sought the removal of coalition forces from Afghanistan, what
is less often noted is that the Taliban wish to reestablish control of Afghanistan and impose their
political agenda. In other words, the Taliban is a political faction as much as it is a resistance
movement. The war in Afghanistan is better understood as a civil war with a foreign-backed
government, rather than a resistance struggle.
5.4.4 Trust
One of the principal findings of the cross-national study of resistance to occupation was the role of
trust. Specifically, resistance was found to be less likely in instances where occupier and occupied
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shared a common religion, when occupations operated under an international mandate, and when
occupations were carried out by democracies.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to evaluate the effects of all these critical variables in a cross-
sectional analysis of the Afghanistan War because there is no sub-national variation in the treat-
ment. For instance, although insurgents frequently employ fiery religious rhetoric, the effect of
religious dissimilarity cannot be estimated because Afghanistan is almost entirely Muslim (with
meaningful distinctions between Shia and Sunnis). Similarly, it is impossible to estimate the effect
of an international organization mandate since ISAF has always operated under a mandate from
the UN. US-lead Operation Enduring Freedom does not operate under the same mandate, but it is
unclear whether Afghans perceived this distinction. Lastly, although the main troop contributors
to ISAF vary over time and space in Afghanistan, they have always been established democracies
(with the exception of Turkey).
One aspect of trust that can be more precisely measured in the context of occupation of Afghanistan
is the abuse of civilians. In the cross-national study, abuse of civilians was theorized to be a pre-
dictor of resistance. While cases of civilian abuse are not systematically tracked, there are records
of civilians casualties. In a study of insurgency in Afghanistan, Condra et al. find strong evi-
dence that local exposure to civilian casualties lead to a long-term increase in insurgent violence,
what they term a “revenge effect” (Condra et al. 2010). Specifically, by matching districts on pre-
existing levels of violence, Condra et al. find that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties
from a typical incident are responsible for 1 additional violent incident in an average sized dis-
trict in the following 6 weeks and lead to increased violence over the next 6 months. Indeed, the
Pashtun social code (Pashtunwali) places a high value on personal revenge. If a Pashtun man
is dishonored, he must avenge that dishonor or he will lose face and social status to the point of
becoming an outcast (Johnson and Mason 2008, 63). A 2008 poll found that among those who sym-
pathized with the Taliban, 40 percent were motivated by resentment caused by civilian casualties
in ISAF airstrikes (Charney Associates 2008). Another poll conducted by ABC News, the BBC, and
ARD found that among those who believed it was acceptable to target coalition forces, between
8 and 11 percent believed such attacks were justified as retaliation for abuses (ABC/BBC/ARD
2007). Another poll indicated that 80 percent of Afghans viewed airstrikes, which are responsible
for much collateral damage, as unacceptable (Cohen and Agiesta 2009).
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Of course, foreign forces are not the only belligerents to kill civilians. The Taliban and other
insurgents have been involved in extensive abuses themselves (Human Rights Watch 2007). Why
should foreign victimization alone cause a breakdown in trust? Recent research provides some
insights. A recent survey experiment by Lyall et al. (2011) from 204 randomly selected villages
across 21 districts in Pashtun-dominated provinces found that Afghan attitudes towards combat-
ants is affected by exposure to violence. However, attitudes towards combatants depend in large
part on the identity of the perpetrators of violence. Harm inflicted by ISAF forces results in de-
creased support for ISAF and increased Taliban support, while harm inflicted by Taliban forces
reduces support for the Taliban but does not translate into greater support for ISAF. This differ-
ence is partly explained by “hedonistic” bias, which predisposes individuals to perceive in-group
behavior as conditioned by circumstance and out-group behavior to be conditioned by predis-
position. Regardless, this survey data —although deliberately restricted to Pashtun-dominated
provinces and focused on levels of support rather than violence committed— indicates that vic-
timization plays an important role in supporting resistance. Thus, while claims regarding victim-
ization in resistance to occupation cannot be directly tested here, existing studies examining the
same country in roughly the same period confirm their effect.
5.4.5 Robustness Checks
In order to verify the validity of the findings, I conduct a number of robustness checks. First,
certain influential outliers may be biasing the coefficients. I therefore rerun the models dropping
observations from Helmand province, a highly Pashto speaking province that accounts for a dis-
proportionate amount of violent incidents and fatalities. In fact, 20 percent of ACLED events and
16 percent of SIGACTS occurred in Helmand, a province that represents 2 percent of Afghanistan’s
population. Dropping Helmand reduces the substantive effect of Pashto and ELF, but increases
their statistical significance. Other results remain the same.
Second, I check for interaction effects. Although variables such as mountainous terrain, poverty,
or proximity to Pakistan may not be triggers of resistance they may be facilitators of resistance. In
other words, they may increase the effect of other factors by decreasing the cost of taking action.
After all, mountainous terrain only helps sustain insurgency: slope and elevation are not direct
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causes of resistance. I therefore run all the models with interaction effects between political dislo-
cation and poverty and distance to Pakistan and mountainous terrain. These checks do not alter
the direction or the statistical significance of the findings.
5.4.6 Counterpoints
The results of the sub-national quantitative analysis support the hypothesis that political dislo-
cation is an important driver of resistance to occupation. This section addresses six important
counterpoints to these findings. First, as noted by certain Afghan area experts, Pashtuns may sim-
ply be a particularly pugnacious ethnic group, regardless of political dislocation. As far back as
1809, an elder Pashtun tribesman in Afghanistan told the British Envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone:
“We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood. . . we will
never be content with a master” (Tanner 2009, 134 ). As a character in Rudyard Kipling’s novel
Kim noted: “Trust a Brahmin before a snake, and a snake before an harlot, and an harlot before a
Pathan (Pashtun)” (Kipling 1914, 174). Indeed, British forces suffered a crushing defeat during the
First Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-1842 and suffered major setbacks in the Third Anglo-Afghan war
of 1919. Describing the Pashtun belt on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region Winston Churchill
noted:
“The inhabitants of these wild but wealthy valleys are of many tribes, but of similar
character and condition. The abundant crops, which a warm sun and copious rains
raise from a fertile soil, support a numerous population in a state of warlike leisure.
Except at the times of sowing and of harvest, a continual state of feud and strife pre-
vails throughout the land. Tribe wars with tribe. The people of one valley fight with
those of the next. To the quarrels of communities are added the combats of individuals.
Khan assails khan, each supported by his retainers. Every tribesman has a blood feud
with his neighbor. Every man’s hand is against the other, and all against the stranger”
(Churchill 1901, 15).
According to Johnson and Mason “Historically, the rural Pashtuns have dominated their neigh-
bors and have avoided subjugation or integration by a larger nation. . . This characteristic makes
Pashtuns the perfect insurgents” (Johnson and Mason 2008, 50). Indeed, the Pashtun-populated
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areas of neighboring Pakistan are also afflicted by insurgency, despite the absence of foreign occu-
pation. Thus resistance may be a product of culture rather than political dislocation.
While widespread, this belief is questionable. Much of the warlike depiction of the Pashtun is
drawn from colonial-era England and its bitter encounters with the Pashtuns of South Asia (John-
son and Mason 2008, 52). Yet because British occupation was limited to the Pashtun belt in the
South and East of Afghanistan, it shouldn’t be a surprise that resistance was encountered where
British troops were actually present. Greater insight can be gained by contrasting the British and
current occupations of Afghanistan with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and
1989. In contrast to the British occupation, the Soviet occupation covered the entire country and
helped implement radical social and economic reforms that affected all social and ethnic groups.
And indeed the Soviet occupation provoked resistance from all segments of the Afghan popula-
tion. Resistance emerged from a cross-section of Afghan society: Hizb-i-Islmai, Jam’iyyat-i-Islami,
Harakat-I inqilab-i Islami, Jabha-yi nejat-I milli, Mahaz-i Islami among the Sunnis, and Shura-yi
ittifagh-i Islami, Harakat-i Islami and Seph-i Pasdaran among the Shia (Roy 1990, 235-236). Lastly
it is instructive to examine the civil war period in Afghanistan between 1993 and 2001. Upon
gaining power in 1996, the Taliban continued to face fierce opposition not from the Pashtun belt
in the South and the East, but from Tajik and Uzbek warlords such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and
Abdul Rashid Dostum in North and West. Up until his death, the former was considered one
of Afghanistan’s most successful Mujahedeen leaders. There is therefore no strong evidence that
Pashtuns are the only group to take up arms.
A second counterpoint is that that the effect of political dislocation is spurious. Because the
Pashtun belt straddles the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the proportion of Pashtun speakers is
highly correlated with proximity to Pakistan. Perhaps it is Pakistani support for insurgents, rather
than Pashtun political dislocation, that is responsible for resistance to occupation. In order to con-
trol for a possible spurious effect, I run all the models dropping the Pashto speaker variable. I find
that proximity to the Pakistani border alone does not robustly predict the likelihood of resistance.
In those models where there is a statistically significant effect, it runs contrary to predictions.
A third counterpoint is that Pashtuns were not politically dislocated at all. President Karzai
was Pashtun and the allocation of cabinet positions reflected the demographic weight of the Pash-
tun community. Yet, while the cabinet reflected their demographic weight, it still represented a
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sweeping change from the status quo ante with a loss of the Pashtun monopoly of power. Ac-
cording to prospect theory, individuals will be more sensitive and risk accepting when facing the
prospect of loss rather than the prospect of gain (Kahnenman and Tversky 1979). Additionally,
no southern Pashtuns—a significant community that previously held power—were represented
in the initial cabinet, except for Karzai himself (Rashid 2008, 105). Furthermore, Karzai came to
be seen as a front man for the Northern Alliance, a belief only further confirmed by his cabinet
appointments. According to a Pashtun delegate to the Loya Jirga peace process: “The perception
that Karzai had betrayed his ethnic Pashtuns is now firmly in the minds of the Pashtuns” (Inter-
national Crisis Group 2003, 9; Tarzi 2008, 285). Insurgent groups have consistently argued that
Karzai does not represent Afghans since he is an agent of foreigners. For example, the Taliban
have stated:
“Karzai is a tool for the foreigners who appointed him, he has no competent authority,
and he failed in his promises to the Afghan people. . . If he was free he should stop
the killing of Afghans, and stop the occupation of the country” (Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, 2007).
A fourth, and related, counterpoint is that it was Islamist Pashtuns specifically, not Pashtuns as
a whole, that opposed occupation. Although the Taliban and other resistance groups drew from
the Pasho speaking population, Pashtuns themselves were not necessarily politically dislocated.
Aside from some violent incidents, Pashtuns have been integrated in Afghanistan’s political sys-
tem. Employing Pashto speakers as a variable is therefore too blunt a measure. It reinforces the
same stereotypes about Pashtun support for insurgents that erronously caused them to be targeted
in the first place. This line of criticism is largely valid, but it points to the fact that resistance, far
from being nationalistic, is in fact highly concentrated among certain ethno-linguistic groups. The
question becomes how, rather than if, political dislocation causes resistance, and how narrowly we
seek to define political dislocation.
A fifth counterpoint is evidence that the insurgency in Afghanistan was not motivated by eth-
nic concerns. Ethnicity did not figure prominently in the vote for President Karzai in 2004 and
2010. Only 2 percent of Afghans said they voted for candidates based on ethnic concerns. Opin-
ion polls conducted by the State Department showed that most Afghans did not view ethnicity as
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divisive. Afghans rarely use the terms Pashtun or Tajik within the country (Jones 2009b, 160). In
fact, divisions within ethnic groups may be as salient as divisions between them. These are serious
criticisms, but they fail to account for how resistance was almost exclusively centered on a single
ethno-linguistic group. Table 5.5 shows a positive correlation between the percentage of Pashtun
per district and incidents of violence while exhibiting a negative correlation between the percent-
age of Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Turkmen, and violence.12 Moreover, these criticisms fail to
account for preference falsification. In Afghanistan, as in other cases of resistance, insurgents of-
ten sought to conceal their narrow parochial objectives under the pretense of broad nationalism.
As Barfield notes, there has been a shift in the message of insurgent groups. They downplayed
their ideological calls opting instead to argue for the expelling of foreign infidels from the country
(Barfield 2010, 327). Similarly, the Taliban have been careful to avoid ethnic or tribal appeals. It
has also consistently dismissed any rumors of splits in the “resistance” movement, even denying
the very existence of separate movements (Stenersen 2010, 54). By framing their struggle as one of
self-determination, rather than the imposition of a radical Islamist regime or ethnic nationalism,
these groups have sought to broaden their base of support in Afghan society.
Table 5.5: Correlation of ethnic groups and resistance






A sixth counterpoint is that insurgents themselves have refused to negotiate with the gov-
ernment and coalition forces. If political dislocation caused resistance, then we would expect
reconciliation to be welcomed, not refused. For example the Taliban leadership has often stated
that it would not engage in negotiations so long as Afghanistan remained occupied: “There is
nothing to discuss with the Kabul government until all aggressing forces pull out from all areas
of Afghanistan, and until Islamic rule is established in Afghanistan” (Saeed, 2009). Alternatively,
it has stated that it does not seek political power, but merely the departure of foreign forces and
12Data ethnic groups drawn from Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Report (ANQAR).
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the restoration of Afghan sovereignty. This logic is misleading for two reasons. First, negotiations
are aimed at moderates who may be willing to compromise while insurgent statements are issued
by hardliners who prefer to fight for more concessions. Second, having launched an insurgency,
resistance groups may feel there is more to be gained by fighting than by talking. Third, insur-
gents know that the bargaining position of the government is bolstered by the presence of foreign
troops. Insurgents therefore have strong incentives to insist on the removal of foreign forces as a
precondition for negotiations.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to test rival theories of resistance to foreign occupation in the context of
Afghanistan. I began by outlining the history of the occupation of Afghanistan and the composi-
tion and objectives of the principle resistance groups. I then carried out a cross-sectional analysis
of attacks and coalition fatalities in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2010 at the district level. Politi-
cal dislocation, in this case the marginalization of Pashtuns and the Taliban specifically, was found
to be a robust predictor of insurgency. Although the hypothesis could not be tested directly using
cross-sectional data, I also found support for the contention that trust plays a role in explaining
variation in resistance. Importantly, political dislocation theory outperformed other theories of re-
sistance to occupation. Although population size and ethnic fractionalization were found to affect
the intensity of resistance, the main predictions of nationalism did not bear out in a careful anal-
ysis of attacks on coalition and Afghan forces. Similarly factors related to opportunity structure
such as poverty, terrain, and proximity to Pakistan were found to have no statistically significant
effect or effects contrary to predictions.
What are the implications of these findings in the context of Afghanistan? First, if nationalism
is not a principal driver of violence then we should not expect violence to cease once foreigners
withdraw. For insurgents the desired end-state is not the departure of foreign troops, but the in-
stallment of an Islamic regime in Kabul (Stenersen 2010, 51). In fact, rather than predicting an
tapering of violence with the end of occupation, political dislocation theory predicts the exact op-
posite: the departure of foreign forces may lead to an escalation in violence as political institutions
are suddenly misaligned with the domestic balance of power. In this regard, efforts to strengthen
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Afghan National Security Forces may help reduce the risk of civil war, given sufficient resources
and training. Second, political dislocation may be a trigger for resistance, but collateral damage
incurred in countering resistance can stimulate insurgent recruitment. These two factors are there-
fore interlinked. Third, if economic factors are not essential drivers of conflict, then reconstruction
and economic development alone will not tackle the causes of resistance and insurgency. There
may be strong normative and humanitarian reasons for fostering economic development, but they
should not be seen as a panacea to an insurgency driven by political grievances. Fourth, the find-
ings reinforce the argument that democratization can be profoundly destabilizing when it leads to
political dislocation and the generation of powerful spoilers (Stedman 1997).
Lastly, if the insurgency in Afghanistan is being driven in part by political dislocation, might
negotiations and political accommodation lessen resistance? A number of scholars and practition-
ers have in fact advocated direct negotiations with the Taliban (Christia and Semple 2009; Rashid
and Rubin 2008; Chandrasekaran 2012). This position was also adopted by the Afghan and US
governments, among others (Rondeaux 2008; Dreazon et al. 2008). While political accommo-
dation can in theory help address violence stemming from political dislocation, the prospects of
a negotiated outcome are complicated by the splintering of Taliban factions, remaining incom-
patibilities of interests with the Afghan government and Western forces and shifting bargaining
leverage. As noted above, both the Taliban and the Pashtun community were dislocated. Insofar
as negotiations may help address the grievances of the Pashtun community for greater represen-
tation, they may be effective at sapping some of the power of the insurgency. However, such
accommodation may be insufficient for more radical Islamist insurgents whose demands go be-
yond the expulsion of foreign forces and greater Pashtun representation. Critically, most Western
powers would view accommodation with extremist demands as anathema to their values and in-
terests.13 Political accommodation must also be understood in the context of the military balance
of power. Resistance forces may believe they can eventually achieve their preferred objectives
through violence, and if the costs of carrying out such violence is lesser than costs of accommo-
dation (that is, the difference between their ideal preference and the negotiated outcome), then
13Withdrawal of forces would lead to a similar outcome but without the political cost of explicitly acknowledging
or accepting extremist demands. Alternatively, the Taliban could provide Western forces a face-saving exit by pub-
licly committing to a democratic Afghanistan and simply resume insurgency once foreign forces leave after a “decent
interval” as Kissinger termed it (Gardner 2011, 229).
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political accommodation is unlikely to succeed. Given the US’s public commitment to withdraw-
ing of the bulk of its forces by 2014, resistance groups may loath to negotiate away what they
believe they can achieve through violence after the withdrawal. Comparing negotiations with the
US to the holy month of Ramadan, some Taliban ask: “Why abandon the fast five minutes before
sunrise?” In sum, the combination of extremist demands and shrinking horizon of Western forces
make negotiating an end to resistance in Afghanistan harder to achieve. Negotiations have yet to
achieve tangible results. In November 2010, a man claiming to be Taliban official Mullah Akhtar
Muhammad Mansour was revealed to be an impostor (Filkins and Gall 2010). In September 2011,
men claiming to be Taliban representatives killed chief interlocutor and the head of the country‘s
High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani in a suicide attack (Rubin 2011). In March 2012, the
Taliban suspended talks, accusing the US of being too “shaky, erratic, and vague” (Doucet 2013).
By early 2013, negotiations had yet to resume.
Chapter 6
Resistance to Occupation in Lithuania
(1940-1953)
You must take a good look at reality and understand that in the future small nations will have
to disappear.
-Soviet Foreign Secretary Vyacheslav Molotov, 2 July 19401
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a case study of resistance to foreign occupation in Lithuania between 1940
and 1953. Lithuania‘s identity is tightly coupled with the experience of occupation. A buffer
state of three million squeezed between Germany and Russia, it has long lived under foreign
rule. Independent Lithuania only re-emerged in the 20th century through a favorable confluence
of events: the Bolshevik revolution and civil war in Russia and the defeat of Germany following
the First World War. However, Lithuanian independence was short-lived. It was occupied and
annexed by the Soviet Union in June 1940, followed by Germany in 1941, and again by the Soviet
Union in 1944 until the USSR‘s collapse in 1991.
Why study Lithuania? Lithuania is a useful case study of resistance to occupation for four
reasons. First, it exhibits variation in the treatment of occupation. Regrettably for Lithuania,
1Cited in Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 25
198
CHAPTER 6. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN LITHUANIA (1940-1953) 199
the country experienced several consecutive occupations, and these occupations provide varying
treatments of political dislocation and trust. By holding socio-economic and geographic factors
constant, Lithuania became an unwilling laboratory of occupation and resistance. Second, Lithua-
nian resistance to occupation, as with all the cases studies in this dissertation, is well predicted by
the cross-national model presented in Chapter 4. In order to ensure that the model’s findings are
not spurious, case studies are necessary to trace the theoretical mechanisms outlined in Chapter
3. Third, a significant percentage of occupations since 1900 occurred during the Second World
War. The Lithuania case study helps ensure that the theoretical mechanisms apply to this critical
juncture in history. Lastly, Petersen (2001) and Darden (forthcoming) study the case of Lithuania in
other prominent works on resistance to occupation. Examining Lithuania, therefore, allows us to
compare the predictions of competing theories of resistance on common ground.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the sequence of events during the
Soviet and German occupations. For each occupation, I also describe the occupier policies, resis-
tance events, and the composition of resistance groups. The second section assesses the theories
of political dislocation and trust. The third section compares the predictions of political dislo-
cation and trust to the prediction of alternative theories of resistance to occupation, namely —
nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.
To preview the results, the case study demonstrates the role of trust and political dislocation in
triggering resistance. Contrary to nationalism theory, there was no automatic or unified response
to occupation. In fact, many Lithuanians collaborated with the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany for
financial or political gain. Moreover, different groups undertook resistance against different occu-
piers. Soviet policies were opposed by disenfranchised wealthier landowners, industrialists, and
traditional political parties, whereas German occupation was principally opposed by Jews and
communists fearing persecution. Lastly, as predicted by the political fractionalization corollary,
resistance groups often fought against each other in order to secure a better post-war outcome for
themselves.
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6.2 Historical Context
6.2.1 First Soviet Occupation (1940-1941)
Invasion
On 23 August 1939, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to sign a
non-aggression pact with his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov. The Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact, as it came to be known, called on each state to remain neutral in the event of an attack by
a third party. However, a secret additional protocol to the Pact assigned Estonia and Latvia to a
Soviet sphere of influence, Lithuania to a German sphere, and parts of Poland to both. Germany
invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, triggering the Second World War, and the Soviet Union
followed on 17 September 1939 (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 15).
Following the invasion of Poland, Stalin sought to tighten his control over the Baltics. On 10
October 1939, he proposed a Pact of Defense and Mutual Assistance with Lithuania. The pact
guaranteed Lithuanian independence and re-iterated Soviet non-interference in domestic affairs.
To sweeten the deal, Stalin offered Vilnius, the historic capital of Lithuania which had been lost
to Poland in 1921 (Snyder 2003). Lithuania signed the Pact and, on 28 October 1939, Vilnius was
restored as its capital (see Figure 6.1). Despite the concession of Vilnius, Lithuania had little reason
to trust Soviet guarantees: Lithuania had been ruled by Imperial Russia and had just witnessed
the Soviet invasion of neighboring Poland. However, it had little choice but to acquiesce to Soviet
demands. It could not turn to Germany, which was allied with the USSR, and both nations vastly
outgunned Lithuania (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 47). Moreover, there were now 20,000 Soviet
troops on its territory. Stationed in bases, these troops did not formally constitute an occupation,
but, nonetheless restricted Lithuanian autonomy. The New York Times referred to it as a ”virtual
sacrifice of independence” (Gedye 1939, 6).
Having restricted Lithuanian autonomy, the USSR then moved to extinguish its sovereignty.
Unbeknownst to Lithuania, a modification to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had assigned Lithua-
nia to the Soviet sphere, and by February 1940, the USSR had made the decision to annex Lithua-
nia altogether. Under Soviet guidance, activities by the outlawed Lithuanian Communist Party
increased sharply (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 15, 18). On 25 May 1940, the Soviet Union men-
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daciously accused Lithuania of kidnapping two Soviet soldiers garrisoned on Lithuanian territory.
Lithuanian Prime Minister Antanas Merkys was then summoned to Moscow, where Molotov cas-
tigated him for violating of the Defense and Mutual Assistance Pact. At midnight on 14 June 1940,
Molotov handed Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbasˇys an ultimatum to settle the disagree-
ment. The ultimatum called for the formation of a Lithuanian government “capable of assuring
the proper fulfillment” of the Pact and the stationing of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil. The
Lithuanian government was given six hours to reply (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 47).
In a late-night meeting to respond to the ultimatum, President Smetona called for military
resistance against the Soviet Union. The military balked, arguing that such resistance would be
suicidal. Rather than preside over the fall of his country, Smetona chose to flee Lithuania. Prime
Minister Merkys resigned to comply with the ultimatum. Soviet deputy commissar for Foreign
Affairs Vladimir Dekanozov was then sent to Lithuania to directly supervise the formation of a
new government. On 15 June 1940, 300,000 Soviet troops crossed the border, initiating the First
Soviet occupation of Lithuania (Petersen 2001, 90).
In the first stages of the occupation, there was great uncertainty among both elites and the pub-
lic about Soviet intentions. Lithuanians continued to hope for some nominal independence, and
Foreign Minister Vincas Kre˙ve˙-Mickevicˇius traveled to Moscow to request a loosening of Soviet
control over Lithuania. In a meeting reminiscent of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, Soviet Foreign
Secretary Molotov replied bluntly: ”You must take a good look at reality and understand that in
the future small nations will have to disappear. Your Lithuania along with the other Baltic na-
tions, including Finland, will have to join the glorious family of the Soviet Union. Therefore you
should begin now to initiate your people into the Soviet system, which in the future shall reign
everywhere” (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 25).
Reforms
With the Red Army in firm control, the Soviet Union began to transform Lithuania into a Soviet
republic, what Vardys and Sedaitis (1997, 50) called the ”synthetic revolution.” Parliament was
disbanded on 1 July 1940. In June and July 1940, leading Lithuanian statesmen were arrested and
deported. Communist parties, which had been illegal prior to the occupation, were made the only










Figure 6.1: Borders of Lithuania 1939-1991
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legal parties in the country. The leadership of the Lithuanian national guard was eliminated on
13 July. By 14 July 1940, merely one month after the Soviet invasion, Lithuania held elections for
”People‘s Assemblies” (Petersen 2001, 90). Among the alleged 95.5 percent voter turnout recorded
by the Soviets, 99.2 percent of votes were for communist candidates.2 Indeed, only communist-
party candidates were allowed to run, and Soviet officials were present in voting booths (Misiunas
and Taagepera 1983, 27). At its first meeting, the People‘s Assembly called for the nationalization
of most rural and urban property, as well as all factories and banks. The Assembly formed a
delegation to be sent to Moscow to request the formal incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet
Union. Despite some protests in Lithuania, the Soviet Union ”granted” the request for annexation.
Most Western states never recognized the annexation (Brandisˇauskas 1999, 10).
Dramatic political and economic reforms followed the formal annexation of Lithuania. In July
1940, 11 of the 12 mayors of Lithuania‘s principal cities, 19 of the 23 mayors of towns and 175 of
the 261 county heads were dismissed (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 24). All factories with 20 or
more workers were nationalized. All businesses over specified sizes were expropriated. Thus, in
1940, some 1,597 stores and warehouses, 43 hotels, and 2,555 buildings were taken over by the
state. The ruble was made the official currency at a highly unfavorable exchange rate. Limits
were placed on how much individuals could withdraw from bank accounts (the rest seized by the
state). About 385,000 hectares were confiscated from 27,000 landowners (Kaszeta 1988; Misiunas
and Taagepera 1983, 31-32).
As political and economic reforms started to sink in, preparations for resistance emerged. On
19 September 1940, Lithuanian diplomats met in Rome to form the Lithuanian National Commit-
tee (LTK), with the purpose of coordinating the efforts of Lithuanian partisans opposed to Soviet
occupation (Brandisˇauskas 1999, 10). On 9 October 1940, the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) was
founded by Kasys Sˇkirpa, a former Lithuanian military attache´ to Germany. The LAF was orga-
nized around two centers, in Vilnius and Kaunas, supplemented by hundreds of three-man cells
across the country (Kaszeta 1988). Concurrently, the LAF sought to unify emerging resistance
groups such as Lithuania‘s Defense League, Iron Wolf, and the Lithuanian Freedom Army (In-
viskis 1965, 65-66). The LTK and the LAF lay dormant for most of the first Soviet occupation.
2 Real turnout was estimated at 20 percent (Petersen 2001, 91).
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Resistance was mainly passive, consisting of anti-Soviet graffiti, jokes, and pamphlets calling for
sabotage and the boycotting of elections (Petersen 2001, 94-96). The LTK waited for a propitious
moment to revolt (Brandisˇauskas 1999, 12; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 43).
Resistance
In June 1941, three events triggered an upheaval against Soviet occupation. First, the Soviet regime
began massive purges against what it described as ”counter-revolutionary” segments of the pop-
ulation. Counter-revolutionaries were defined very broadly, and included members of all non-
communist parties, elites of patriotic, religious, and youth organizations, former officers of the
Lithuanian military, former law-enforcement officials, and priests and ministers, among others
(Vardys 1963, 506). Between 10 and 17 July 1940, some 500 members of former political parties
were arrested (Brandisˇauskas 1999, 13). Second, from 13 to 18 June 1941, the USSR deported some
35,000 Lithuanians to remote labor camps in Siberia and Kazakhstan. The purpose of the depor-
tations was literally to remove potential opponents of reforms and their families (Snyder 2010).
Lastly, on 21 June 1941, Hitler launched a surprise attack against the Soviet Union, known as
Operation Barbarossa.
Operation Barbarossa shifted the balance of power between Lithuania and Soviet Union. Alone,
Lithuania stood no chance at liberating itself from Soviet control. However, with Soviet forces tied
up in battle with Germany, resistance groups saw an opportunity for liberation. Thus, as news of
the German offensive reached Lithuania in June 1941, a massive LAF-led revolt erupted. On 22
June, the LAF seized the radio tower in Kaunas and announced the re-establishment of the state of
Lithuania and the composition of a new government. Revolt spread to Vilnius on 23 June, where
the post office, the radio tower, and other buildings were taken. Amidst the revolt, membership
in the LAF swelled to 20,000 (Brandisˇauskas 1999, 16-18).3 The revolts in Kaunas and Vilnius were
catalysts to broader resistance across the country, which continued until 27 June 1941 (Stasˇaitis
2000, 115). Approximately 2,000 Lithuanian civilians and partisans died in the 1941 uprising, and
the Soviets executed a further 1,500 prisoners (Mackevicˇius 1986; Kaszeta 1988). By some accounts,
the Soviet soldiers and activists suffered 5,000 fatalities in June 1941 (Brandisˇauskas 1999).
3 Both Soviets and Lithuanian sources tended to inflate the number of partisans during the first Soviet occupation:
the former to justify brutal repression, the latter to promote nationalism.
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6.2.2 German Occupation (1941-1944)
Invasion and Transitional Government
German forces entered Lithuania on 22 June 1941, finding much of the country already under the
control of Lithuanian partisans. Partisan control of Lithuania did not mean peace, however. Fol-
lowing the departure of the Soviets, pogroms spontaneously arose in Vilnius and Kaunas, where
1,200 to 4,000 Jews were killed, often by forces of the LAF (Greenbaum 1995, 306; Levin 1995, 64).
To many Lithuanians, Jews needed to be punished for their collaboration, real or perceived, with
the Soviet Union. Anticipating the occupation of Germany and local reprisals, many Jews fled to
the Soviet Union (Levin 1995, 279).
The LAF set up a provisional government on 24 June 1941. It immediately started rolling back
Soviet reforms by de-nationalizing land, enterprises, and real estate, and by restoring local admin-
istrative units and police. At the same time, the provisional government worked with German
occupation authorities. Unaware of Germany‘s plans for the eventual colonization of Eastern Eu-
rope, the provisional government hoped that collaboration would provide the goodwill to secure
political independence (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 45).
Along with Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia, Lithuania was placed under the administration of
the Reichkomissariat Ostland. On 17 July 1941, Alfred Rosenberg was appointed Reich Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Unlike other countries under Germany’s control in Eastern
Europe, Lithuania was initially provided a degree of self-government, with local directorates led
by sympathetic Lithuanians. Such directorates helped channel demands through local authorities,
which helped mask the reality of occupation (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 50). On 28 July 1941,
Reichkomissar Heinrich Lohse announced the establishment of a civilian government in Lithuania.
Soon thereafter, Petras Kubiliu¯nas, a Lithuanian extreme nationalist, who had attempted a coup
in 1934, was appointed First General Counselor in the civilian government.
Many aspects of Lithuanian life, such as culture, education, and the Church, were left un-
touched. This contrasted with Soviet rule, which had strongly persecuted the Lithuanian Church.
(Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 52). Over the course of WWII, Lithuania developed the reputation
of being one of the closer collaborators of Nazi Germany. For instance, at any given time, there
were approximately 8,000 Lithuanians serving in ”Defense Battalions” under German command
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(Petersen 2001, 153-155).
Mobilization, Repression, and the Holocaust
The goodwill established between Germany and the provisional government was short-lived.
German administrative efforts effectively sidelined the LAF and the provisional government. Ger-
many initially ordered LAF not to establish a government, and refused to coordinate with the
provisional government that was established. Hitler ignored an LAF memorandum calling for
Lithuanian independence and, instead, ordered the LAF to disarm. On 5 August 1941, the provi-
sional government disbanded because restrictions imposed by the German civilian administration
made it impossible to perform its duties. On 22 September, the German government banned the
LAF altogether (Inviskis 1965, 71, 76).
As time wore on, dissatisfaction with German occupation grew. Germany failed to return
property and land expropriated by the Soviets to their rightful owners (Alexiev 1982, 19). Worse
still, Germany began settling colonists on Lithuanian land. By the fall of 1942, 16,300 German
colonists had been settled on Lithuanian farms (Inviskis 1965, 74). Additionally, economic con-
ditions worsened as the Second World War dragged on, with food shortages becoming more fre-
quent. Pressure on the front led Germany to squeeze Lithuania for more resources and manpower.
On 19 December 1941, Rosenberg issued a decree announcing a general work obligation and in
1942 called for 100,000 laborers. After only five percent of this quota was filled, Germany started
resorting to harsher conscription methods. Villages were destroyed and youths deported when
Lithuanian officials failed to provide the requisite quota (Statiev 2010, 63). By 1944, Germany had
sent some 75,000 Lithuanians to Germany (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 54; Kaszeta 1988).
On 6 March 1943, following defeat at the battle of Stalingrad, Germany also sought to con-
script Lithuanians into military units. At first, Germany experienced difficulties recruiting sol-
diers, as Lithuanians already resented German occupation and had even fewer incentives to join
the Wehrmacht now that it was losing the war. In order to hasten recruitment, Germany began
arresting and deporting members of the Lithuanian elite and closing down schools (Mackevicˇius
1986). In 1944, facing both manpower shortages and an intensifying Soviet partisan campaign,
Germany acquiesced to the formation of a ”territorial force” or ”local detachments” composed
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of Lithuanians, commanded by Lithuanians, and designed to operate solely in the Baltics as a
rear guard to tackle Soviet partisans. This was appealing to many Lithuanians, who saw the So-
viet Union as a grave threat. Military units under Lithuanian command would also assure that
they would defend Lithuania against Soviet occupation rather than become cannon fodder for a
collapsing German front. Thus, recruitment of a territorial force under Lithuanian control was
tremendously popular (Kaszeta 1988). But, Germany rescinded its promises, and the force was or-
dered to take an oath to Hitler, to serve in Germany and other theaters of operation, and to come
under the control of the SS. When Lithuanian General Plechavicˇius refused to carry out these
orders and thousands of soldiers quit, he and 40 other officers were arrested and sent to concen-
tration camps. Lithuanian soldiers then were executed at random (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983,
55; Mackevicˇius 1986).
The greatest victims of the German occupation were the Jews of Lithuania. At the beginning
of the occupation, Lithuania was home to approximately 200,000 Jews. Vilnius, with 70,000 Jewish
inhabitants, was known as the Jerusalem of the North and was a major center of Jewish culture
and scholarship (Greenbaum 1995). Within a month of the occupation, the German administration
began to issue anti-Semitic decrees. At the same time, the German SS paramilitary death squads,
known as the Einsatzgruppen, killed 5,000 Jewish men in Ponary forest, 11 kilometers outside Vil-
nius. In September 1941, Jews were corralled into two ghettos. The first ghetto was destroyed in
October 1941. By the end of 1941, some 40,000 Jews had been killed in Ponary (Laqueur 2001).
During the occupation, some ten Lithuanian police battalions took part in the Holocaust, killing
some 78,000 Jews inside and outside Lithuania (Bubnys 2002, 32). The Vilnius Ghetto was de-
stroyed on 23 September 1943. By the end of the Second World War, roughly 195,000 Lithuanian
Jews had been killed.
Resistance
Following the battle of Stalingrad, the tide of the Second World War began to turn against Ger-
many. As the front collapsed, repression of occupied Lithuania intensified. And as repression
intensified, so did preparations for resistance. Organized resistance started in the fall of 1941, fol-
lowing the disbanding of the provisional government and the suppression of the LAF (Misiunas
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and Taagepera 1983, 63).
Four distinct categories of resistance movements emerged: anti-communist, Polish, Jewish,
and Soviet. First was the anti-communist, anti-German underground, often considered the “na-
tionalist” resistance. This movement was itself divided between the Lithuanian Front (LF), which
grew out of the LAF, and the Union of Lithuanian Freedom Fighters (LLKS). The LF was more
Catholic, whereas the LLKS was more secular and militantly anti-German. Both groups engaged
in passive resistance but avoided armed confrontation with German troops, fearing it would only
help the USSR. Second, the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) operated in Eastern Lithuania.
Since Vilnius and its surrounding regions were part of Poland prior to 1939, the vast majority of
the population of Vilnius was Polish or Jewish, not Lithuanian.
Third, some 5,000 Soviet partisans operated in Eastern Lithuania. These partisans were com-
posed of communist Lithuanians, as well as Red Army soldiers who were either left behind during
the German invasion or subsequently infiltrated behind enemy lines. In many cases, knowledge
of the inhumane conditions in German POW camps pushed Soviet soldiers to go underground
as partisans rather than surrender to the Wehrmacht. In July 1941, Stalin called on loyal commu-
nists to organize partisan units in territory occupied by Germany. In May 1942, the Soviet Union
established a Central Staff of the Partisan Movement in Moscow (Snyder 2010, 233). On 26 Novem-
ber 1942, a Lithuanian Partisan Movement command, headed by Lithuanian communist Antanas
Sniecˇkus, was created with the Central Staff. Unlike the Special Operation Executive (SOE) set up
by Churchill to provide support and coordination to resistance movements in continental Europe,
the Soviet Union directly provided the majority of the manpower and political directives to the
partisans.
Fourth, some Jewish Lithuanians undertook organized resistance under the United Partisan
Organization (Fareynegte Partizaner Organizatsye) or FPO, founded on 1 January 1942 by the Zionist
party youth branch (Arad 2010, 207). In the beginning, the FPO undertook mainly in passive
resistance, securing hideouts and weapons in the Vilnius Ghetto while preparing for more active
resistance. In early September 1943, realizing that Germany intended the wholesale destruction of
the Ghetto, the FPO clashed with German forces that had entered the Ghetto to begin deporting
Jews (Eckman and Lazar 1977, 24, 29). According to some sources, the total number of Lithuanian
Jewish partisans reached 1,650, including those partisans fighting in Belarus and Jews operating
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in non-Jewish partisan movements (Kowalski 1984, 275).
6.2.3 Second Soviet Occupation (1944-1991)
Re-invasion and Re-imposition of Reforms
Although resistance in Lithuania was relatively limited, it nevertheless tied down German troops
as they fought a losing war against the Soviet Union. Ultimately, it was the Soviet invasion, rather
than resistance, that ended the German occupation. In early July 1944, Soviet forces entered east-
ern Lithuania, capturing Vilnius by 13 July and Kaunas by 1 August 1944. Immediately upon their
arrival, Soviet troops began reintroducing sweeping social reforms, and, just as quickly, resistance
to Soviet occupation re-emerged. Unlike the first Soviet occupation, the Soviet Union made no
effort to win hearts and minds (Petersen 2001, 170).
Lithuania was again incorporated into the Soviet Union. A Soviet government was reestab-
lished, led by First Party Secretary Antanas Sniecˇkus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Mecˇislovas
Gedvilas, and Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of the Supreme Soviet Justas Paleckis
(Vardys and Sedaidis 1997, 60). The USSR also assigned Russian Soviets to oversee Lithuanian
Soviet leaders (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 81). Much of the administration of Soviet Lithuania
was now conducted in Russian.
In 1949, the Soviets introduced a new land-reform law that imposed collectivization of farms.
The collectivization led to a steep drop in agricultural production, which took a decade to recover
(Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 65). In order to facilitate collectivization and weaken the opposition,
the Soviet regime began mass deportations. Based on its experience in Russia, the Soviet Union
had expected resistance to collectivization and explicitly sought to ”drain the sea” by depriving
opponents of Soviet policies sources of food, shelter, and supplies (Statiev 2005). The Soviets
deported an estimated 60,000 Lithuanians between August and September 1944, some 70,000 in
1947, and another 70,000 in May 1948 (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 70, 96). Ultimately, the
Soviet Union would deport 12 percent of Lithuania‘s pre-war population (Stasˇaitis 2000, 115).
Predictably, the deportations had a mixed effect. On the one hand, it pushed some to flee to the
forests and join the resistance rather than risk death in the Siberian steppe. On the other hand, the
sheer scale of deportations incapacitated resistance to collectivization.
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The Soviet crackdown on Lithuania was both physical and spiritual.4 During the first Soviet
occupation, church property had been nationalized and the clergy had been deported or assas-
sinated, the separation of Church and state codified, and the concordat with the Holy See dis-
continued. These policies were reinstated in the second Soviet occupation. On 9 July 1948, the
government passed a decree on the nationalization of houses of prayer and other church property.
It also sought to obstruct the training of new clerics, thereby threatening the viability of the clergy
(Streikus 1999, 93, 99). From 1946 to 1949, 180 priests were deported to labor camps. Between
1940 and 1965, the number of parish churches and chapels declined from 708 and 314 to 575 and
0, respectively (Vignieri 1965, 221).
Resistance
Violent resistance to Soviet occupation started with the arrival of Soviet troops in 1944 and lasted
until 1953. Unlike the first Soviet occupation, resistance was protracted and mostly rural. Ad-
ditionally, unlike the June 1941 revolt, Lithuanian resistance groups were far better organized.
Some, though not all, had gained experience during the first Soviet and subsequent German oc-
cupations. But, Lithuanians were no longer under any illusions regarding the intentions of the
Soviet Union. They had gained a clear understanding of the type of occupier they were facing,
and the brutal experience of nationalization, collectivization, and deportation in 1940-1941 had
a galvanizing effect on resistance. Between 1944 and 1950, a total of 100,000 Lithuanians partic-
ipated in resistance activities (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 86). At its height in the mid 1940s,
approximately one percent of the entire population was fighting with the partisans (Vardys and
Sedaitis 1997, 82). By way of comparison, this is the equivalent of peak Vietcong strength during
the Vietnam War. Resistance included three different types: active partisans who fought and hid
in bunkers or farms; passive partisans who continued about their lives, but occasionally fought
with the resistance; and supporters who provided intelligence, shelter, and supplies (Vardys and
Sedaitis 1997, 82). Partisans ranged from groups of 800 men and women down to individuals
simply seeking to escape Soviet rule (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 81, 83).
Faced with mounting resistance, in September 1944, the Soviet Union sent General Sergei
4 As Jewish leaders understood it, both Soviets and Germans were a threat. The former killed Jewish souls through
atheism, while the latter killed Jewish bodies through massacres (Levin 1995, 36).
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Kruglov to direct counterinsurgency in Lithuania (Vardys 1963, 518). Soviet counterinsurgency
forces were composed of units from the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence agency known
as the Ministry of State Security (MGB), the Soviet secret police agency known as the People‘s
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). These gov-
ernment units were supported by a network of approximately 7,000 local militias called Istrebiteli
(”destroyers”) (Statiev 2010; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 88). Government forces operated a
network of informants, and carried out periodic sweeps of forests where partisans were suspected
of hiding.
The history of post-war resistance to Soviet occupation can be divided into three phases. In
the first phase, between July 1944 and May 1946, the resistance operated throughout Lithuania
and effectively controlled much of the countryside. Partisans numbering up to 30,000 launched
pitched battles against Soviet troops. As Figure 6.2 (b) shows, this tactic proved to be disastrous
given the disparity of power between Soviet and partisan forces, and partisans suffered heavy
losses (Vardys 1963, 500). Resistance groups also conducted raids and ambushes against Soviet
MVD units, assassinated collaborators, warned civilians of deportations, and liberated prisoners
and deportees. Resistance groups also published a number of anti-Soviet pamphlets. Despite
major military setbacks, the resistance made it much harder for the Soviet regime to recruit local
government officials or to enforce government policies, especially the collectivization of farms and
land reform (Vardys 1963, 513).
During the second phase of resistance, between May 1946 and November 1948, partisans re-
sponded to heavy losses by making organizational and tactical changes. Instead of pitched battles,
decentralized units employed guerrilla warfare. During this phase of the war, partisans split into
smaller groups and went into hiding. By this time, the Soviet Union had deployed some 100,000
troops to Lithuania (Stasaitis 2000, 117).
The third phase of resistance, between November 1948 and May 1953, saw the steady decline
of resistance as a result of relentless Soviet attacks and deportations. Rather than focus on at-
tacking Soviet forces, partisans went underground, sometimes literally hiding in bunkers built
under homes, farms, and roads. Resistance shifted from confrontation to survival. As the move-
ment weakened, it became increasingly difficult to communicate and coordinate actions. The last
known leader of the Lithuanian resistance, Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas was arrested and killed
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by the NKVD in 1956 (Kaszeta 1988).
Both Soviets and partisans attacked civilians throughout the war. Lithuanian partisans sen-
tenced to death some 1,977 alleged collaborators (Anusˇauskas 1999, 67). On 20 October 1944, the
USSR instituted an official policy of collective punishment, allowing the arrest, imprisonment and
deportation of families of partisans. Starting in 1945, Soviet authorities would also publicly dis-
play dead partisans in public squares in order to intimidate the Lithuanian population and to ob-
serve the reaction of villagers to identify those associated with the resistance (Gasˇkaite˙-Zˇemaitiene˙
1999, 30-31).
From the beginning, lack of partisan supplies, particularly weapons and ammunition, were a
major problem. Unlike many other resistance groups during the Second World War, Lithuanian
partisans during the second Soviet occupation sustained themselves almost completely without
foreign support. Lithuania was also boxed in by Soviet-dominated states and, thus, could expect
no support from its neighbors (Vardys 1963, 515; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 84). By the time the
resistance was wiped out in 1953, partisans had suffered an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 fatalities,
and Soviet losses totaled some 20,000 (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 84, 88). Figure 6.2 shows
the distribution of troops and fatalities as estimated by the Soviet Union (Misiunas and Taagepera
1983, 277).
As with other periods of occupation, resistance was fractured into different groups. At first,
many uncoordinated groups emerged spontaneously (Vardys 1963, 500). Eventually, though, re-
sistance consolidated around four main groups: the Liberation Committee of Lithuania, the Par-
tisan Union of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Freedom Army, and the National Council of Lithuania.
Although the Polish Armija Krajowa continued to be active around Vilnius, by 1946, most Polish
partisans had surrendered (Gasˇkaite˙-Zˇemaitiene˙ 1999, 41). In February 1949, the various Lithua-
nian partisan groups merged into the Movement for Lithuania‘s Struggle (LLKS) (Vardys 1963,
500). At that point, however, the movement was so weak that the merger had no military effect.
On the contrary, the USSR actively encouraged the centralization of resistance groups in order to
simplify their decapitation (Petersen 2001, 172).
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Figure 6.2: Troops and fatalities 1944-1953
6.3 Theoretical Explanations
The case of Lithuania presents of number of puzzles. Why did individuals resist occupation? Why
was there mainly passive resistance to German occupation, but bloody decade-long resistance to
Soviet occupation? Why did different groups in different parts of the country undertake resis-
tance at different times? This section seeks to evaluate the predictions of the theories of political
dislocation and trust in the context of Lithuania.
6.3.1 Political Dislocation
Political dislocation theory posits that occupiers are more likely to face resistance the more they
disrupt the balance of political power in occupied societies. Moreover, the specific type of political
dislocation will determine the direction and intensity of resistance. The Soviet and German occu-
pations each caused considerable political dislocation. Governments were toppled, political par-
ties were banned, and massive social and economic reforms fundamentally challenged the bases
of domestic political order. Additionally, the political dislocation of Soviet and German occupa-
tions affected different groups: large landowners, industrialists, and traditional political parties
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in the case of the Soviet occupation; and Jews and communists in the case of German occupation.
The differential impact of each occupier’s policy, as well as the sequence of political dislocation
and resistance and the composition of resistance groups, helps us identify the effect of political
dislocation.
First Soviet Occupation
Contrary to nationalist assumptions, not all segments of Lithuanian society were equally opposed
to the first Soviet occupation. At first, the Soviet Union did not make its intentions clear: After oc-
cupying the country, Soviet troops quickly withdrew from posts and government buildings. Most
Lithuanians were also unaware of the Soviet ultimatum or the secret protocols of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact. Resistance was muted. In addition, prior to occupation, Lithuania had been
ruled by Antanas Smetona, an autocrat who came to power in a coup in 1926. Observers who
compared the occupation of Lithuania with the concurrent occupations of neighboring Estonia
and Latvia thought that the Lithuanians showed more enthusiasm for the new order imposed
by the Soviets than the Latvians or Estonians did. One possible factor, in their opinion, was that
Soviet occupation had led to the flight of the broadly despised President Smetona (Senn 2007, 119).
Another Lithuanian group that was more likely to welcome the arrival of Soviet troops was
Lithuania‘s Jewish community, representing some ten percent of the population. True, the pro-
portion of communists and leftists was much greater among the Jewish Lithuanian population
than among the non-Jewish population. Yet even to those non-communist Jews, the Soviet Union
was seen as a bulwark against the threat of Nazi Germany. As Red Army columns approached
Lithuanian cities, Jews greeted them with cheers and flowers, thanking God and saying ”better
Stalin than Hitler” (Levin 1995, 36). Self-preservation aside, some Jews also had political rea-
sons for supporting the Soviet regime. Political reforms implemented by the Soviet government
initially empowered the Jewish population. Like many other states in Eastern Europe at the time,
Lithuanian law and widespread anti-Semitism imposed strong restrictions on Jewish political par-
ticipation. Under Soviet rule, Jews could be appointed to government positions, elected office, and
academic institutions. The Jewish press in Lithuania, therefore, encouraged its readers to take part
in the elections of the Soviet People‘s Assemblies: ”The present elections are doubly significant for
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us Jews. For us, the new regime not only signals the socialist liberation of oppressed social strata,
but also the national liberation of all Jews in Lithuania, with no exception whatsoever” (Levin
1995, 51). As a result of Soviet rule, Jews were able to join the cabinet as well as the internal
security services.5
The reaction of the Jewish community contrasted with pamphlets being circulated by the
emerging anti-Soviet resistance: ”Son of the enslaved Fatherland! Today the hour has struck for
you to show that you are a Lithuanian. A real Lithuanian prefers death, rather than raise his hand
for Lithuania‘s traitors. Do not go into the voting hall, because there you will be forced to betray
brothers, freedom, and faith” (Budreckis 1968, 24). To many Lithuanians, the Soviet emancipa-
tion of Jews was a double treachery. First, Jews became inextricably bound in the minds of many
with Bolshevism, and the excesses of its internal security services. Second, the rise of Jews to
administrative and security roles, reversed the traditional— and to some, natural —hierarchy in
Lithuanian society. This role-reversal generated strong resentment against the Soviet Union and
Jews more generally (Petersen 2001). A Sˇiauliai police report from 24 June 1940 noted that the ”ir-
responsible Jewish element, especially the youth. . . do not even allow Lithuanians to pass on the
sidewalk Lithuanians complain that the Jews are bragging: ‘we are now the masters’ ” (Suzˇuede˙lis
2004, 322).
As Soviet policy towards Lithuania became more repressive, it began to face more resistance.
The purges and deportations initiated in 1941 were a shock to the Lithuanian population. What-
ever illusions Lithuanians may have held regarding the Soviet regime were swiftly dispelled.
These policies also alienated virtually every relevant political group in Lithuania. Indeed, these
deportations targeted potential opponents of Soviet policies. Precisely because the Soviet regime
had so greatly alienated diverse strata of the Lithuanian population, a broad-based anti-Soviet
underground rose in armed revolt (Vardys 1963, 502). As one Lithuanian recalled:
Our entire family was deported in the early morning of June 13, 1941. Seven soldiers
came, forced us from our sleep; they seated father on a stool, ordered him to raise his
hands and pointed a pistol at him. They seated us, four children, at the table; we were
crying and screaming, afraid for father. . . After they finished the search, they piled all
5 The first Soviet occupation was not necessarily kind to Jews. The Soviet regime banned Zionist organizations,
abolished Hebrew education, and deported some 12,000 Jews (Levin 2001, 52).
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our books in the yard and set them on fire telling us that they were bourgeois literature.
My youngest sister was only two years old (Balkelis 2005).
This indiscriminate violence pushed Lithuanians to revolt. As Petersen notes (2001, 118) the vil-
lage Svainikai saw no resistance prior to June 1941. Despite resentment against the Soviet Union,
villagers waited for German liberation. However, deportations between 14 and 21 June triggered
a violent response and the first violent resistance to Soviet rule. Similarly, skirmishes between
Lithuanian partisans and Soviet forces occurred in Rokisˇhis, Marijampole˙, and Utena counties on
16 and 17 July as the Soviet Union organized mass deportations (Budreckis 1968, 44). Thus, the
sequence of repression and rebellion is instructive in identifying some of the causes of resistance.
Despite its strengths, political dislocation as an explanation of resistance in the case of first
Soviet occupation has two lacunae. First, the theory over-predicts resistance in the first phases
of the Soviet occupation. With the government overthrown, politicians jailed and exiled, and the
economic system overturned, we should expect violent resistance from dislocated elites in 1940.
Instead, it took the German invasion of the Soviet Union for Lithuanians to rise up against Soviet
occupation. Second, why did Lithuanians fight the Soviet Union rather than wait to be liberated by
Germany? By many accounts, Lithuanian resistance leaders hoped to establish some provisional
government before Germany entered Lithuania in order to maintain bargaining leverage for self-
rule.
German Occupation
The effect of political dislocation becomes clearer when comparing anti-Soviet and anti-German
resistance. Rather than fight German occupiers, as they had just done against the Soviets, national-
ist groups actively collaborated with them. Moreover, collaboration with Germany served the spe-
cific aim of destroying nationalists’ domestic enemies. For example, during the first week of Ger-
man occupation, the provisional Lithuanian government signed an agreement ”to assist with all
their might the German nation in its fight with Europe‘s mortal enemy – Bolshevism”; to abstain
from raising any political issues during the war; and not to accept and carry out any instructions
without prior coordination with the respective authorities of the German army (Brandisˇauskas
1999, 20). Far-right nationalist groups also actively sought to collaborate with Germany, seeing oc-
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cupation as an instrument to achieving their own domestic political agenda (Suzˇiede˙lis 2011, 136).
The banned Lithuanian fascist party Gelezˇinis Vilkas (Iron Wolf) stated: ”. . . The Wolves should
not forget the Lithuanian struggle for liberation from Jewish economic slavery” (Nikzˇentaitis,
Schreiner, and Staliu¯nas 2004, 131). Notably, “Partisan Liberators of Lithuania” under the LAF
carried out pogroms against the Jewish population well before the arrival of German troops (Fai-
telson 1996, 21 )
A Lithuanian newspaper at the time captured the logic of political dislocation:
”It is an unusually beautiful sight when the German soldiers and tanks are decked
with flowers, the soldiers are fed, while they give sweets to children and cigarettes to
adults. Lithuanian citizens! Assist the German army further in all possible ways, so
that our woods and bushes are soon as possible cleared of Jews, Bolsheviks, and other
elements alien to our country, as well as Lithuanian traitors” (Brandisˇauskas 1999, 18).
Notably, far more Lithuanians volunteered in the police against Soviet partisans than in the par-
tisans against German occupiers (Statiev 2010, 76). Some poorer farmers favored the land reform
implemented by the Soviet regime, but not enthusiastically enough to join the Soviet partisans.
Conversely, many Lithuanians hated the Soviets enough to collaborate with Germany against So-
viet partisans.
Lithuanian nationalists initially collaborated with the Germans, but stopped once it became
clear that Germany intended to sideline them and impose their own government. In February
1942, Josef Wutz of the Einsatzstab reported that “the mood of the [Lithuanian] population vis-a`-
vis the Germans has noticeably worsened in the last quarter,” noting that “the national demands
for the regaining of independence or, at least, a recognition of cultural autonomy, are equally
strong among all strata” (Suzˇuede˙lis 2004, 352). The theory of political dislocation can explain
why nationalist and right-wing groups refrained from undertaking resistance even once they were
sidelined and Germany started repressing the Lithuanian population. Most Lithuanians saw the
Soviet Union as a greater threat than Germany, since Soviet occupation policy involved not only
brutality, but also wide-ranging social and economic dislocation. In the midst of the German-
Soviet war, Lithuanian resistance leaders were concerned that by fighting German occupation,
they would only facilitate the return of the Red Army. Therefore, resistance to Germany was
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mainly passive, seeking to restrain the excesses of Nazi occupation by sabotaging German plans
for economic and military mobilization rather than overthrowing it altogether. (Vardys 1963, 505).
Second Soviet Occupation
Political dislocation during the second Soviet occupation also shaped the nature of resistance.
According to Statiev:
the guerrilla units consisted of ideological enemies of communism, such as national-
ists, Nazi collaborators fearing Soviet reprisals, including national guards, deserters
from SS units, auxiliary police, and civilians involved in the extermination of Jews,
communists, and Soviet prisoners of war (POWs); those attacked by the communists
as class enemies; and most of all, farmers hurt by the Soviet agrarian policy (Statiev
2010, 98).
In fact, radical agrarian reforms were intended to attract supporters and neutralize resistance
through class confrontation between the winners and losers of such reforms. In other words,
Soviet occupiers employed political dislocation as a strategy of divide and rule. According to Mi-
siunas and Taagepera (1983, 89): ”Redistribution pitted those who lost against those who received
land. The latter had an apparent economic stake in the continuation of the Soviet regime. . . in
conflict with their national and, in Lithuania, their religious feeling.” This strategy fed onto itself,
with Soviets confiscating the land of suspected partisans (often richer peasants) and giving it to
poorer peasants, many of whom were recruited into Soviet auxiliary battalions (Lieven 1994, 88).
More than any other occupation policy, fear of collectivization fueled anti-Soviet sentiments, and
prosperous farmers such as kulaks and sereniaks stood more to lose than any other social group. As
the chair of the presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Justas Paleckis, stated:
“After the taxation scale based on land quality was abolished, the peasants who live in
infertile regions found themselves in an extremely hard situation. . . Some complained
that they had to sell their last horse in order to pay the taxes. Naturally, the political
situation in such areas is the gravest and banditry is widespread” (Statiev 2010, 155).
Evidence of political dislocation can be seen in both the agents and the targets of anti-Soviet
resistance. According to the NKVD, farmers represented 79.7 percent of all (apprehended) par-
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tisans, not surprising given that Lithuania was primarily agricultural and that insurgencies tend
to be rural. However, among farmers, those with larger land holdings were better represented
among the anti-Soviet resistance (Statiev 2010, 100). Lastly, even in its dying days, when resources
became scarce, the anti-Soviet resistance directed its efforts at preventing a specific policy: the
collectivization of farms (Vardys 1963, 521).6
6.3.2 Factional Politics
A corollary of political dislocation theory is that resistance is not simply a matter of removing oc-
cupiers, but also a method of attaining power itself. Resistance, from this point of view, is a private
good. The history of resistance to occupation during the German and second Soviet occupations of
Lithuania provides extensive evidence in support of this corollary. Resistance movements fought
over goals and strategies, seldom pooled their resources, and often fought against each other.
German Occupation
Anti-German resistance was not monolithic. Instead, it was divided into bitterly antagonistic anti-
communist, Polish, Jewish, and Soviet partisan movements. Relations between Polish and Lithua-
nian resistance groups were fraught with tensions. Poland and Lithuania had gone to war over
Vilnius between 1919 and 1921, and Lithuanian (re)possession of the city in 1939 was followed by
a policy of discrimination and ethnic cleansing against ethnic Poles (Zubek 1993; Balkelis 2007).
Polish resistance leaders envisioned a return to the borders of pre-war Poland, including Polish
Vilnius. Indeed, in July 1944, right before the defeat of Germany and reoccupation by the Soviet
Union, the Home Army launched Operation Ostra Brama to recapture Vilnius (Ciechanowski 2002,
207). Fundamental disagreement over the final status of Vilnius made it difficult for Polish and
Lithuanian resistance groups to cooperate. Worse still, unlike other resistance groups operating
in Lithuania, the Polish Home Army fought both the Nazi occupation and local Lithuanian police
and administration. The result was a low-level irredentist civil war nested within a broader anti-
occupation struggle (Snyder 2003, 84). At a broader level, Polish and Lithuanian resistance groups
did not share threat assessments. To the Lithuanian resistance, the Soviet Union was the prime
6It should be noted that non-occupied Soviet Russia also saw acts of resistance – though less violent – against
collectivization.
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enemy, whereas Germany was the secondary enemy. The reverse was true for Polish partisans. Al-
though both occupations had been catastrophic, the Soviet Union at least officially recognized the
right to Polish statehood, whereas Lithuania had been annexed by the Soviets altogether (Bubnys
2004).
The case of the Polish resistance is by no means unique. Soviet partisans often clashed with
both the Polish Home Army and anti-communist Lithuanian partisans operating in Eastern Lithua-
nia. Poland had never accepted the Soviet dismemberment of Polish-majority Eastern Lithuania
following the 1939 Soviet invasion. Soviet partisans also clashed with Lithuanian anti-communist
partisans, who saw the Soviet Union as a threat and the behavior of Soviet partisans as reckless. In
addition to killing German collaborators, Soviet partisans killed German troops in the knowledge
that they would retaliate indiscriminately against the civilian population, thereby encouraging
Lithuanians to take up arms against German occupiers (Sheppart 2010; Snyder 2010, 238). Be-
cause of these provocations, in the view of many Lithuanians, the partisans were as much of a
threat as the German occupiers themselves.
Divisions persisted within the anti-communist Lithuanian groups. Discussions regarding the
structure of the resistance movement were complicated by the presence of different political par-
ties. According to Lusˇys (1963):
The question inevitably arose as to which parties and resistance groupings would be
qualified and authorized to participate in the new resistance center. We agreed on the
following formula: the groups would include all political parties that had been repre-
sented in the last parliament of democratic Lithuania and all resistance organizations
that had made a tangible contribution in the fight against the occupant.
Every political party wanted to be represented, but including representatives from so many dif-
ferent parties could compromise the clandestine operations of the resistance. Talks held in 1943
failed to get different political parties to agree to combine representatives because ”the group-
ings. . . differed on matters of principle and could therefore not merge to such an extent that one
person could properly represent two or three groupings” (Lusˇys 1963).
Relations between the Jewish FPO and anti-communist Lithuanian and Polish partisan groups
were minimal and, in some cases, confrontational. Many partisans considered the Jewish com-
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munity to be a Soviet fifth column. In Lithuania and across Eastern Europe, armed Jewish men
were often rejected by other partisan groups and sometimes killed for their weapons. When the
FPO contacted the Polish Home Army to obtain weapons in their fight against Germany, the latter
declined, unconvinced that the group was not communist and wouldn’t favor Soviet or Lithua-
nian control of Vilnius after German defeat (Arad 2010, 209). Lacking support from local partisans
for weapons and supplies, the FPO contacted Polish, Lithuanian, and Soviet communists instead
(Eckman and Lazar 1977, 27; Suzˇiede˙lis 2011, 252). Incredibly, there were also tensions within
the Jewish resistance itself, between the communists and the Zionist resistance in Kaunas (Porat
1997).
Second Soviet Occupation
Several resistance groups also emerged during the second Soviet occupation starting in 1944. Pol-
ish Home Army partisans continued to fight Soviet occupation until 1946, all the while opposing
Lithuanian nationalists. Notably, Polish and Lithuanians continued to clash, despite the fact that
they were hopelessly outnumbered by a common enemy: the Soviet Union. Competition and po-
litical disagreements, driven in part by party membership, persisted among Lithuanian groups.
According to Mykolas Krupavicˇius, the chairman of the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of
Lithuania (VLIK):
The left were the first to organize themselves, and the [National] Front are keeping
up with them. The Party of Freedom Fighters is very active and aggressive, and the
National Party are following in their footsteps. The Christian Democrats have not yet
started organizational work, but, in the light of these facts, they will have to keep up
with the others” (Kuodyte˙ 1999, 75).
Disagreements also emerged among different political factions of the resistance over who could
speak on the resistance‘s behalf overseas (Streikus 1999, 79). On 12 January 1947, the national
conference of partisan leaders rejected the strategy proposed by the United Movement for Demo-
cratic Resistance. Many partisans ”refused to assume the role of a mere home army without a
direct influence on the future self-government of the country” (Vardys 1963, 517).
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6.3.3 Trust
First Soviet Occupation
According to trust theory, resistance will emerge when there is a fundamental breakdown in trust
between occupiers and the occupied. This breakdown in trust can be triggered by the occupier‘s
inability to credibly commit to leaving the territory or to treating the occupied population be-
nignly. If individuals in occupied territory run a high risk of being victimized regardless of their
behavior, then resistance will be seen as a practical survival strategy. Resistance, from this point
of view, is a club good, whereby individuals contribute to resistance in return for protection from
predatory occupiers.
The history of Lithuania provides strong evidence for trust theory. Despite nationalist rhetoric,
Lithuanians waited rather than revolting immediately upon the arrival of Soviet troops in 1940.
After all, at the beginning of the occupation, Soviet authorities deliberately concealed their inten-
tions. Most Lithuanians were unaware of the ultimatum delivered by the USSR or the annexa-
tion, mass deportation, and colonization that lay ahead. Soviet intentions were painfully revealed
through a sweeping set of political reforms initiated in 1940. Yet it was the deportation of tens of
thousands of Lithuanians in mid-June 1941 that was the principal trigger for action at the end of
June 1941. The deportations, estimated at 35,000, were unprecedented in their scope. In theory,
the deportations were aimed at specified ”class enemies,” but in practice, they were so broad as to
appear arbitrary. In such circumstances, attentisme became a less viable strategy. After all, depor-
tation was an effective death sentence, with forced labor, starvation, and diseases accounting for
the death of approximately 25 percent of deportees (International Commission on Crimes of Nazi
and Soviet Occupation 2005). Moreover, the deportations meant that Lithuanians could not sim-
ply wait out the occupation since they would not be in their own country if and when it was freed.
In sum, it was only once Soviet policies altered individuals’ calculus of survival that support for
active resistance emerged.
German Occupation
For most Lithuanians, German occupation was more benign than Soviet rule. Political parties
sought to collaborate with the Nazi regime, hoping to maintain a semblance of sovereignty, whereas
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the majority of the population simply avoided confrontation and waited for the storm to pass. At-
tentisme was a rational strategy for most Lithuanians but became impossible for Jews. Unlike the
non-Jewish Lithuanian population, Jews were confined to ghettos, massacred in forests, and sent
to concentration camps. The Soviet Union, it was hoped, would liberate them from German rule,
but there were no guarantees that the Soviet Union would arrive on time. Consequently, resistance
became necessary for survival. The statement issued by FPO leader Abba Kovner in January 1942,
illustrates this logic:
Before our eyes they took away our parents, our brothers and sisters. . . Of those taken
out through the gates of the Ghetto not a single one has returned. . . You who hesi-
tate, cast aside all illusions. Your children, your wives and husbands are no longer
alive. . . Hitler plans to destroy all the Jews of Europe, and the Jews of Lithuania have
been chosen as the first in line. We will not be led like sheep to the slaughter! True, we
are weak and defenseless, but the only reply to the murderer is revolt! Brothers! Better
to fall as free fighters than to live by the mercy of the murderers. Resist! Resist with
your last breath! (Bauer and Rotenstreich 1981, 81).
Similarly, Jewish partisan Samuel Lato recounted his calculation of risk in joining the Partisans:
”I was terrified. If caught smuggling bullets into the ghetto I would be shot on the spot. . . The
stakes were terribly high, but I was convinced I was going to die anyways. We all were.” (Lato
2006, 76). ”There was no question that we would be next. . . I wasn’t going to wait around. I
decided to take action” (Lato 2006, 74).
If Jews faced such an existential threat under German occupation, why, then, was there not
more Jewish resistance? To understand relative Jewish inaction, it is important to understand the
role of information and the strategic environment faced by Jews. During much of the Second
World War, the Jewish population was unaware of the extent of the unfolding genocide, including
the whereabouts of those who had been deported from the ghettos and the Final Solution. Ger-
many had an evolving policy towards the ”Jewish Problem,” and German administrators had de-
liberately given the impression that Jews who had been deported were being sent to labor camps,
not to gas chambers. Conditions in the Vilnius Ghetto were difficult, but stable for almost two
years. Under such conditions, leaders of the Judenrat (Jewish administrative council)—those most
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likely to mobilize the population—opposed resistance. Instead, they argued that Jews should save
their lives by working in Ghetto factories, thereby demonstrating their value to Germany. It was
appeasement on a small scale, and it too would be catastrophic (Einwohner 2009, 416-417; Tushnet
1972; Arad 1982).
Moreover, ghettos allowed Germany to hold entire Jewish communities hostage. This captivity
presented an agonizing dilemma for would-be resisters. If the Jews undertook resistance, retalia-
tion against their community would be swift and certain. The case of Yitzak Wittenberg provides
an illustration of the hostage problem. After the Gestapo captured Jewish members of the com-
munist underground operating outside the confines of the Vilnius Ghetto, Germany threatened
to destroy the Ghetto unless FPO leader Yitzak Wittenberg surrendered himself (Einwohner 2007,
1314). Faced with this ultimatum, Ghetto police ran through the courtyards shouting ”The Ghetto
will soon be reduced to ruins! We shall all die! Help find Wittenberg!. . . Save the Ghetto!” (Eckman
and Lazar 1977, 32). Jewish newspapers also stated: ”It is the duty of every Jew in his behalf as
well as in the behalf of the Ghetto to inform of any activity which might endanger the existence of
the Ghetto” (Eckman and Lazar 1977, 34). Faced with such pressure, Wittenberg surrendered and
was killed the next day. In essence, so long as the Judenrat saw collaboration as a viable alternative,
resistance was considered reckless.
The only way to make resistance attractive was to convince the population that genocide was
certain. Only when death was certain did the risk of resistance seem relatively appealing. It is
precisely this tension between attentisme and resistance that the FPO sought to overcome. Un-
fortunately, as the discussion of opportunity structures will show, circumstances made resistance
particularly challenging for the Jewish population. Thus, by the time the Gestapo came to destroy
the Vilnius Ghetto in 1943, the population was cornered and mostly unarmed.
The Jewish community was the principal victim of German occupation, but not the only one.
Over time, German rule became more heavy-handed, due to military exigencies and hardening
ideology. For instance, counterinsurgency against Soviet partisans led Germany to undertake
collective punishment against civilians. Although Lithuanians were not sympathetic to Soviet
partisans, Germany‘s retaliatory policy alienated the population. Germany‘s forced labor and
conscription campaigns also swelled the ranks of the resistance. Throughout the Baltics, many
partisans were individuals escaping German conscription. By 1944, Lithuanians were aware that
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the war was turning against Germany and reckoned that they had a better chance of surviving as
partisans than as SS conscripts (Swain 2004, 139).
Second Soviet Occupation
The second Soviet occupation was marred by a lack of trust from the very beginning. The first
Soviet occupation, particularly the wave of deportations in 1941, had provided Lithuanians with
a clear signal of occupier type. Soviet promises to treat Lithuanians benignly would simply not be
credible, and, in fact, the USSR did not even attempt to win hearts in minds after 1944.
As with the first Soviet occupation, the mechanism of trust and victimization can be observed
in both the correlation and sequence of indiscriminate repression and resistance activity. The
Soviets organized a brutal campaign of liquidation of farm households through massacres, depor-
tations, and forced collectivization (Kuodyte and Tracevskis 2006, 36). Violent resistance tended to
spike immediately after repressive Soviet actions such as deportations and massacres and would
tend to shrink once the dangers had tapered off (Vardys 1963, 510). As one partisan recalled: ”Le-
gal life was becoming more and more dangerous for me. I began working on establishing ties with
the partisans operating in my native region, so that in a critical situation I would have somewhere
to run” (Luksˇa 2009, 131). Another partisan explained his motives thus:
“I found myself under the flag of anti-Soviet underground, the Movement for the Free-
dom Struggle of Lithuania, not because I did not like the idea of socialism—I was then
too young to orient myself sufficiently in theory—but because the Soviet government,
brought to Lithuania by the Red Army, dealt with the people who did not accept the
incomprehensible new order with excessive and criminal cruelty” (Remeikis 1980, 53).
We can observe the effect of political dislocation and breakdowns in trust by the temporal se-
quence of resistance. As the Soviet Union initiated its deportation campaign in 1944, going from
8,711 to 19,973 in 1945, resistance intensified. What the Soviet MVD described as “terrorist acts”
increased from 854 to 3,324, and its estimated number of “armed nationalists” jumped from 4,515
to 17,524 (Stasˇaitis 2000, 122). The effect of Soviet policies was so dramatic that the Lithuanian
communist party itself eventually admitted that its policies were, at least in part, responsible for
the resistance. At the 22nd Communist Party Congress, Antanas Sniecˇkus stated that its policies
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had made it quite difficult for the communists to win popular support (Vardys 1963, 508).
The evolution of partisan tactics further indicates the role of trust in resistance. For instance,
there are several accounts of individuals joining the partisans to evade occupiers rather than to
confront them. According to Statiev (2010, 112): “The immediate goal [of resistance groups] was
not independence but to avoid conscription, arrests, and deportations.” A Stefanija Kucˇinskiene˙
recounts: “When the Russians came, that was terrible. Real hardship began. All of my three
brothers were to be recruited by the Soviet army but they all took to the forest” (Leinarte 2010, 54).
Resistance groups played an important role in warning civilians of impending attacks and de-
portations. Indeed, a 1947 top-secret directive from the United Democratic Resistance Movement
stated:
“Since we do not foresee new possibilities in our struggle, our suggestions of new
forms of warfare are based on. . . the need to help the greatest number of Lithuanians to
stay in their motherland, to avoid the hardships of exile, and not to drag needlessly
hundreds of our peaceful countrymen into suffering and ruin” (Remeikis 1980, 217,
emphasis in original).
As Vardys (1969) notes:
Another important task of the freedom fighters was the protection of the civilian pop-
ulation. This was necessary for the morale of their civilian supporters and and for self-
preservation. The partisans frequently assumed police functions and tracked down
thieves and robbers, very numerous in the immediate postwar period. They restrained
Soviet military and civilian officials from ”confiscating” food and valuables.
During the later stages of the second Soviet occupation, the resistance focused on survival rather
than on combat (Misiunas and Taagepera, 1983, 84). This behavior is consonant with the idea of
resistance groups as providers of club goods such as protection.
6.3.4 Credible Commitment
The trust theory of resistance to occupation posits that factors such as regime type, international
mandate, and religious affinity strengthen credible commitment and maintain trust, thereby mit-
igating resistance. Since Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were totalitarian states operating
CHAPTER 6. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN LITHUANIA (1940-1953) 227
without an international mandate, within-case comparison provides limited insight into regime
type or international mandates. Moreover, the scope of political dislocation and the sheer scale of
victimization would have probably drowned out such factors. That being said, the international
community clearly entered into Lithuanians’ calculation of resistance. Specifically, resisters looked
to the USSR‘s Anglo-American allies as sources of constraint on Soviet behavior. They expected
the Atlantic Charter to force the Soviet Union to restore sovereignty and self-determination. Al-
though the Soviets did not operate under an international mandate, it is clear that such a mandate
would have precluded annexation and political deportations.
Similarly, the Catholic Church played a role in resistance. Lithuania was deeply religious in
1940: Some 85 percent of the population (94 percent of all ethnic Lithuanians) was Roman Catholic
and the Church played a central role in everyday life (Vignieri 1965, 215). For the most part, the
Lithuanian Church tried to avoid politicization. However, it could not remain indifferent to an
atheist Soviet regime that actively vowed to destroy it. Religious grievances were the earliest and
loudest form of dissent, and Catholic parishes represented a grassroots institution that helped
recruit resistance members (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 85; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 82). Reli-
gious figures, such as Bishop Ramanauskas, firmly rejected collaboration with the Soviet regime.
The majority of priests were sympathetic to the resistance struggle, but often avoided direct con-
tact since they feared it would provide the Soviet government with the pretext to further repress
the Church (Streikus 1999, 85-88; Vardys 1978). A few priests contributed more directly to the
resistance against the USSR. Resistance members usually held prayer meetings and frequented
sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church, to which the majority of the partisans belonged (Vardys
1965, 96). When armed resistance was crushed in the early 1950s, the Church remained one of the
few sources of symbolic and spiritual resistance. It went on to play a crucial role as a focal point
for protest leading up to the end of Soviet rule in 1991.
This case study helps address two counterpoints to the trust theory of resistance, namely en-
dogeneity and the effectiveness of repression. First, the endogeneity critique posits that resistance
may trigger victimization, rather than victimization triggering resistance (Lyall 2009a). Analyzing
the origins of occupier policies and the temporal sequence of resistance helps isolate the causal
effect of victimization. During the Soviet and German occupations, attentisme and collaboration
were the initial responses, with resistance following mass deportation, forced conscription, and
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the Holocaust. Soviet and German motives for victimization were exogenous, driven by ideology
(deportation, Holocaust) or the military necessities of interstate war (forced conscription and la-
bor). Once resistance emerged, however, there was, indeed, an endogenous spiral of resistance
and repression. For instance, the Soviet Union made it a policy to deport the families of suspected
resistance fighters. Second, it can be argued that the breakdown in trust was irrelevant to the out-
come of occupation. It was precisely Soviet and German brutality that subdued Lithuania. While
there is no doubt that sheer brutality eventually wiped out resistance, our principal concern here
is the level of resistance, not the outcome of occupation. The outcome of occupation and the level
of resistance diverged substantially, especially in the initial stages of the occupation.7
But could one go further and argue that a breakdown in trust was not only a necessary, but
also a sufficient, condition for resistance? Indeed, repression deterred Lithuanians from undertak-
ing resistance by raising the threshold for collective action. Eventually, repression and victimiza-
tion triggered resistance by equalizing the costs of action (resistance) and inaction (victimization).
Finally, repression defeated resistance groups. In sum, it was brutality that triggered resistance
and it was brutality that suppressed it. Yet, Lithuanian resistance cannot be attributed solely to
repression and victimization; repression was not the sole trigger of resistance in Lithuania. Re-
sistance was also motivated by political and economic dislocation caused by collectivization and
the imposition of communist rule. Consequently, resistance was not undertaken by all groups
in Lithuanian society equally, but by those most affected by political dislocation. Moreover, the
timing of resistance followed the occurrence of political dislocation. For example, resistance units
began to form against Nazi occupation only once it became clear that political autonomy was not
forthcoming. Lastly, trust theory cannot explain the degree not only of resistance, but also of col-
laboration in occupied Lithuania. In all these respects, political dislocation provides part of the
explanation of resistance to occupation in Lithuania.
7 We should be wary of drawing practical lessons from the Soviet or German ”successes” in Lithuania. The sec-
ond Soviet occupation, for example, defeated the resistance at a cost of 13,000 to 20,000 Soviet fatalities and 30,000
partisan and civilian fatalities. These casualty figures are high, especially considering that Lithuania was a country
of approximately three million at the time. These resistance to population/year ratios would be equivalent to 134,000
occupier fatalities in a conflict like the NATO/ISAF occupation of Afghanistan. Such losses, not to mention the morally
and politically unconscionable brutality that accompanied them, would hardly be considered a success in modern-day
democracies.
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6.4 Alternative Theories
The theories of political dislocation and trust provide a useful framework for understanding resis-
tance to occupation in Lithuania. But how do these theories stand up to competing explanations
of resistance? This section briefly assesses the validity and drawbacks of alternative theories.
6.4.1 Nationalism
Nationalism was the most common narrative of resistance in Lithuania, but ultimately provides
little explanatory leverage. Nationalism undoubtedly played some role in stoking resistance to
Soviet occupation: Lithuania‘s declaration of independence was still within the living memory of
many Lithuanians‘ and most resistance to foreign rule was framed in reference to the Lithuanian
nation. Many Lithuanian nationalists claim that resistance was inevitable because Lithuania was a
”rebel nation,” that had fought for its independence and would not so easily give it up.8 Member-
ship to many resistance groups was restricted to those of Lithuanian origin, although exceptions
were made for Latvians. Members of the resistance wore Lithuanian uniforms with Lithuanian
flags and symbols such as the cross of Vytis (Vardys 1963, 510-511). Nationalism figures promi-
nently in memoirs of partisans and in the statements of partisan groups.
However, nationalist explanations of resistance have two serious flaws. They fail to explain
collaboration with the occupiers and the splintering of resistance groups. First nationalist groups
in Lithuania collaborated with Germans more than they resisted them (Statiev 2010, 90). Far-
right nationalists—precisely those groups which nationalism theory would expect to resist most
forcefully—actively sought collaboration with Nazi occupiers. They only turned against their
occupiers once they were politically marginalized by the occupation government. Moreover, if
nationalism is considered to be a constant, it also fails to explain why different groups took up
arms to different degrees against different occupiers in Lithuania.
Second, nationalist explanations tend to overstate the unity of Lithuanian resistance. Indeed,
8Interestingly, a study of the Soviet Union, prepared for the Wehrmacht High Command before the German inva-
sion, concluded precisely the opposite. Of Soviet nationalities, Lithuanians were described as timid, insecure, and of
”characteristic Eastern subservience.” Furthermore, the study claimed that Lithuanians were incapable of independent
initiative and totally lacking in organizational talent (Alexiev 1983, 5). Lithuanian boasts were overstated, and Ger-
man assessments were fundamentally racist, but both highlight the futility of sweeping nationalist claims in predicting
resistance.
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two contradictory forms of nationalism co-existed in Lithuania: one civic and one ethnic. These
contradictions are important because they lead to opposite predictions regarding resistance. Civic
nationalism predicts a unified response to foreigners whereas ethnic nationalism predicts faction-
alized resistance. Nationalist resistance was not unified because Lithuania itself was comprised
of different and sometimes conflicting nations: (ethnic) Lithuanians, Poles, and Jews. Even within
ethnically Lithuanian groups, nationalism was only the lowest common denominator among dif-
ferent political factions. In historical accounts of resistance, the term nationalist is used variously
to describe members of the far-right, ethnic Lithuanians, and Lithuanian citizens more broadly. As
a priest recalled in 1943: ”Life was complicated. The [Polish] Home Army fought the Germans,
the Lithuanians and the Soviet partisans simultaneously. . . They burned the houses of German in-
formers and killed their families. Later, in the same villages, Lithuanian partisans did the same to
Soviet informers” (Lieven 1994, 87). When resistance groups involve Poles fighting Lithuanians,
Germans, and Soviets, Lithuanians fighting Jews and Soviets and collaborating with Germans,
and Jews collaborating with Soviets, nationalist theories provide little theoretical leverage on such
splintering and fratricide.
According to Darden (forthcoming) these anomalies can be addressed by recognizing that na-
tionalism is not a constant but a variable. Nations that develop mass literacy (which Darden
identifies as over 50 percent literacy) under the rule of a state will be more like to maintain politi-
cal loyalty to that state, even after they attain independence. Darden assesses this claim directly in
Lithuania. Lithuania crossed the 50 percent literacy threshold around 1897. Because the Catholic
Church ran Lithuanian schools at the end of the 19th century, and because the Lithuanian Church
had an antagonistic relation with Orthodox Russia, Darden argues that Lithuanians developed
a distinct Catholic-Lithuanian form of nationalism. Further evidence in favor of Darden‘s theory
can be found in the demographic composition of partisans. For example, the first partisans against
Soviet occupation in 1941 were students at Kaunas and Vilnius Universities, the first generation
of Lithuanians to have been raised in an independent Lithuania and schooled completely in a
Lithuanian curriculum (Inviskis 1965, 63).
However, a closer examination of patterns of resistance undercuts Darden‘s theory. When
Lithuania crossed the 50 percent literacy threshold, it was not independent, but part of impe-
rial Russia. Lithuania should therefore have generated greater resistance to German occupation
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than Soviet/Russian occupation. In fact, the opposite occurred. Additionally, while individu-
als schooled under the Lithuanian curriculum were the first to take up arms against the Soviets,
young males generally have a higher propensity to partake in warfare. Therefore, any causal
explanation is marred by an identification problem. Moreover, Vilnius was part of Poland, not
Lithuania until 1939, meaning it would not have been exposed to the same Lithuanian nationalist
curriculum. Lastly, although Darden argues that schooling by the Catholic Church created a hy-
brid Catholic-Lithuanian form of nationalism, this explanation fails to explain why more Lithua-
nians resisted Soviet occupation than German occupation. In sum, nationalism may have been
one of the many forces animating Lithuanian resistance, and not necessarily the most potent one.
6.4.2 Opportunity Structures
According to opportunity structure explanations of resistance, potential resisters are rational in-
dividuals who are sensitive to the costs and benefits of resistance. Variation in resistance can
be explained by military, social, economic, and geographic factors that hinder or facilitate mo-
bilization and combat. First, military factors can be seen playing a role in resistance. Both the
Soviet Union and Germany flooded Lithuania with troops, making resistance particularly daunt-
ing. When individuals took up arms, they were likely to have some military training. Of the
known guerrilla commanders among the Lithuanian partisans, 37 percent were former military
officers and another ten percent were former police officers (Statiev 2010, 97). Martial training
reduced the risk of taking up arms, and, therefore, increased propensity for resistance. Moreover,
the timeline of resistance to occupation shows a general correlation between shocks to the military
capacity of occupiers and the onset of resistance. Upticks in resistance occurred during Operation
Barbarossa in 1941 and during the Soviet counterattack in 1944, which severely weakened Soviet
and German military capacity, respectively. Instructions drafted by the LAF in 1941 stated: “When
to begin the uprising: The sign for starting the uprising should be considered as the moment when
the German Army crosses the border and attacks the Russians” (Budreckis 1968, 35). Moreover,
Lithuanian partisans expected a war between the Soviet Union and the US and the UK to break out
following the Second World War. Lithuanians saw such military shocks as windows of opportu-
nity for resistance. Ultimately, the resistance movement during the second anti-Soviet occupation
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fizzled not because nationalism weakened, or because political dislocation ended, or because trust
was reestablished. Rather, as Figure 6.2 (a) shows, the resistance was crushed through the over-
whelming military strength of the Soviet Union and its willingness to sustain staggeringly high
casualties.
One concern in examining the role of military capability is endogeneity; that is, we cannot de-
termine the role of military forces on the course of resistance since the number of troops deployed,
and their attrition might be a function of the very strength of the resistance movement under
study. In the case of Lithuania, shocks to the balance of power can be considered exogenous,
insofar as they were a product of interstate war between Germany and the Soviet Union, rather
than preexisting Lithuanian resentment of Soviet rule and armed resistance. Hitler and Stalin had
strategic, logistical, and ideological reasons for waging war on the Eastern Front, and Lithuanian
resistance, however heroic, played little role in the course of this titanic struggle (Snyder 2010).
At the other extreme, it could be argued that military factors were not only a relevant factor,
but the sole relevant factor in determining resistance to occupation. What determines whether in-
dividuals collaborate or resist occupation is the degree of territorial control exercised by opposing
forces, irrelevant of occupier policies (Kalyvas 2003, 2006). Civilians caught in war between Nazi
Germany, the Soviet Union, and various partisan groups decide to collaborate or resist based on
their assessment of relative risk. Individuals prioritize personal safety over political preferences.
Indeed, when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, Lithuanians revolted against Soviet rule.
When the tide of war turned against Germany following the battle of Stalingrad, many collabo-
rating police officers abandoned their uniforms, some to join the Soviet partisans. Individuals are
opportunists, rather than ideologues according to this point of view (Snyder 2010). This approach
undoubtedly has it merits, but fails to explain why patterns of opportunism did not translate
evenly across different social and economic groups. Presumably, political preferences played an
intervening role. Moreover, we should have greater confidence in the causal mechanisms of polit-
ical dislocation and trust if they can be observed despite the effects of rival territorial control.
Second, opportunity structures would predict an effect of geography and terrain. The tradi-
tional measure of terrain—mountains—played no role in Lithuanian resistance since the coun-
try is essentially flat. Instead, forests, covering 20.7 percent of Lithuania‘s territory, were crucial
in sustaining resistance, providing cover and concealment (see Figure 8.2). When Soviet troops
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Figure 6.3: Forest cover in Lithuania
conducted periodic sweeps of the forests, they proceeded on foot and, therefore, were more vul-
nerable to ambushes by small groups armed with light weapons. Indeed, the NKVD eliminated
post-war partisans in neighboring but unforested western Ukraine more quickly than in forested
Lithuania (Statiev 2010, 109). Forests were so critical, in fact, that anti-Soviet partisans came to
be known as the Forest Brothers. Speaking more broadly, resistance was clustered in rural, rather
than urban, areas. Partisans could more easily sustain themselves in the countryside, and low
force-to-space ratios made it difficult for occupying troops to police the population. Geographic
factors clearly played a role in explaining resistance, but, ultimately, the basic geographic com-
position of Lithuania did not change across the Soviet and German occupations. While some
geographic factors may have facilitated resistance, they cannot explain the variation between oc-
cupations.
Third, economic factors can be seen to play a role in resistance. Lower opportunity costs help
explain why the majority of partisans were under the age of thirty, and declining economic con-
ditions may have also lowered certain individuals’ aversion to risk (Vardys 1963, 509; Petersen
2001). Variation in economic modernization also led to differing patterns in resistance. As soci-
eties modernize, they generally become more urban, making it easier for occupiers to monitor and
control. Indeed, urban resistance to the second Soviet occupation was curbed by frequent MGB
checks led by a denser network of agents and informants (Gasˇkaite˙-Zˇemaitiene˙ 1999, 42). Addi-
tionally, economic modernization is associated with a division of labor, which makes societies as
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a whole wealthier, but individuals less self-sufficient (Liberman 1996). This dynamic was most
evident in Jewish resistance to German rule. Due to centuries-old property laws, Jews tended not
own rural property, concentrating instead in towns and cities where they prospered as craftsmen
and professionals. The concentration of Jews in cities made it easier for Germany to create ghettos,
where the entire Jewish community was essentially held hostage. Moreover, while the country-
side provided the most propitious terrain for resistance, economic specialization meant that urban
Jews did not have the skill set necessary to survive. Anti-Semitism, more prevalent in rural areas,
also prevented Jews from blending in with the population or relying on them for support (Levin
2001, 548; Eckman and Lazar 1977, 14).
Fourth, according to Petersen (2001), tight-knit communities are more likely to resist occupa-
tion. Such communities provide the monitoring and status rewards to trigger collective action and
deter collaboration. In an extensive study of Lithuania, Petersen shows that resistance occurred
in a two-stage process. During the first stage, small acts of resistance were committed, such as
jokes, pamphlets, and songs. These acts were meant to communicate opposition to the occupy-
ing regime, without triggering repression. Importantly, the signals were perceptible only to the
members of the community. At the same time, these acts served as signals of the latent number
of individuals willing to revolt, therefore helping to coordinate expectations. Petersen shows that
an individual‘s set of closest connections, his community, became the key source of information
and influence. Moving from protest to insurgency, especially in face of Soviet and German occu-
pation required organization and discipline. Therefore, as Petersen argues, Lithuanian resistance
groups therefore grew out of pre-existing social groups that could provide the secrecy and mon-
itoring necessary to deter collaboration, as well as the supplies needed to sustain resistance. For
this reason, resistance to occupation often originated in groups such as unions, political parties,
nationalist groups such as Union of Sˇiauliai or the Union of Young Lithuania, and Ateitis during
the first Soviet occupation; and the Zionist party during the German occupation (Petersen 2001
110). While these social groups were not themselves resistance groups, they mobilized their mem-
bers to join the resistance. Petersen‘s social structure argument provides a compelling micro-level
explanation of resistance. However, as Petersen acknowledges, the causal mechanisms of political
dislocation precede the mechanism of social structure. Resistance is motivated by resentment, and
resentment is formed through changes in status hierarchy (Petersen 2001, 34).
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6.4.3 International Context
International context theory posits that occupiers are less likely to face resistance when they are
seen as protection from greater third-party threats (Edelstein 2008a). This theory performs well
in explaining resistance to occupation in Lithuania, a country that faced multiple occupations
in the midst of an interstate conflict. Lithuanians made decisions on whether or not to resist
occupation, and to what extent to resist, partly on what they perceived to be the lesser evil between
two potential occupiers. As mentioned earlier, for example, Jewish Lithuanian preferences were
summarized in the slogan ”better Stalin than Hitler.” The former entailed economic dislocation,
whereas the latter entailed genocide (Levin 1995). For non-Jewish Lithuanians, the lesser evil was
Nazi Germany since its occupation entailed lesser political and economic dislocation. As a result,
most non-Jewish Lithuanians undertook passive resistance to German rule and active resistance
to Soviet rule, whereas Jewish Lithuanians did the reverse.
The case of Lithuania also demonstrates the limits of international context theory, which tends
to aggregate the preferences of occupied societies, whereas political dislocation theory argues that
differing domestic preferences matter in interpreting foreign threats. Not only did Lithuanians
perceive the threat of the Soviet Union and Germany differently, but different segments of the
Lithuanian population also perceived the effect of each occupation differently. In other words,
the effect of the international context is contingent on the perception of political dislocation by
different segments of the occupied population. This, in turn, helps explain why different segments
of the population cooperated or resisted occupation.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the effects of political dislocation and trust in the context of the Soviet and
German occupations of Lithuania. First, I described the sequence of events and policies during
the three occupations between 1940 and 1953. I noted that rather than generating a unified nation-
alist response, varying foreign occupations generated distinct reactions from different groups at
different times. Second, examining the sequence and timing of resistance, I illustrated that resis-
tance was triggered by political dislocation and victimization rather than by nationalism. Specif-
ically, Soviet policies were opposed by disenfranchised wealthier landowners, industrialists, and
CHAPTER 6. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN LITHUANIA (1940-1953) 236
traditional political parties, whereas German occupation was principally opposed by Jews and
communists fearing persecution. Resistance tended to emerge after occupiers implemented poli-
cies that sidelined or victimized specific groups. Just as important, Soviet occupation was initially
supported by certain segments of the Jewish population, whereas German occupation received the
strong initial support of Lithuanian nationalists. Soviet leaders went so far as to employ political
dislocation to engineer class war between segments of the Lithuanian population. Third, I noted
the contributions of alternative theories of resistance: nationalism, opportunity structures, and in-
ternational context. While partisans were often motivated by nationalist ideals, the theory fails to
explain such wide variation in reactions to occupation, not to mention collaboration and fratricide.
Theories relating to opportunity structures fare somewhat better, explaining some of the tempo-
ral variation in resistance, although geographic and economic constants cannot predict observed
swings in resistance activity. International context theory provides good theoretical leverage to
differing reactions to Soviet and German occupation. However, I argued that this theory was
essentially contingent on varying domestic assessment of the effects of political dislocation.
Chapter 7
Resistance to Occupation in Cambodia
(1979-1993)
”Before the major issue was to liberate the country from the Vietnamese. Now...We must make
preparations for the second stage where it is necessary to protect the rank and file.”
-Khmer Rouge1
7.1 Introduction
Between 1970 and 1993, Cambodia was afflicted by civil war, genocide, and foreign occupation.2
The twin occupations of Cambodia by Vietnam and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC) provide a good opportunity to examine theories of resistance to occupation, in particu-
lar theories of political dislocation and trust. Indeed, the challenge in cross-national studies is to
draw valid causal inference from strongly heterogeneous units. States can be different in a number
of ways, some that can be measured and accounted for, others not, and such unobservables could
explain some of the theorized variation in outcome. Within-case studies can help overcome such
1Cited in Chandra 1999, 40-41.
2The state currently known as Cambodia has been referred to by different names in the last 30 years. Democratic
Kampuchea (DK) refers to Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, the People’s Republic of Kam-
puchea (PRK) refers to Cambodia under the Kampuchean Communist Party between 1979 and 1989, the State of Cam-
bodia (SOC) refers to Cambodia under the Cambodian People’s Party (Kampuchean Communist Party under a new
name) between 1989 and 1993, and Cambodia after 1993. I refer to Cambodia throughout when referring to the geo-
graphic area of Cambodia rather than any specific government.
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pitfalls by holding constant many factors and unobservables while allowing variation on variables
of interest.
Cambodia provides an almost ideal within-case study of occupation. Cambodia was occupied
twice and quasi-sequentially in a 14-year period. Many of the main structural characteristics of
the occupied country thus remained constant. However, Vietnam and UNTAC undertook dra-
matically different occupation policies. This variation is shown in Table 7.1. First, Vietnam un-
dertook extensive political dislocation, whereas the UN did not. Vietnam entered Cambodia and
installed a Soviet client regime, while the UN implemented an agreed plan for democratic reform
that gave all parties a stake in the process and potential access to power. By ousting the Khmer
Rouge and effectively shutting out royalists and republicans, Vietnam triggered resistance from a
broader range of the political spectrum. In contrast, the UN did not face royalist or republican re-
sistance, though it continued to face resistance from the Khmer Rouge who saw little to gain from
democracy. Second, while not undertaking the large-scale victimization of Cambodia, Vietnamese
rule was noticeably more brutal than UNTAC occupation. Real or feared atrocities committed by
Vietnamese soldiers, as well as arbitrary forced-labor practices pushed many Cambodian to flee
to the Thai border, where many joined resistance groups. This within-case comparison provides
some support for trust theory as well. Many Cambodians feared that Vietnam had not come to
save them from the Khmer Rouge, but rather to colonize and annex Cambodia. The UN, in con-
trast, never faced such fears since it was formed by a constellation of states and accountable to
the UN Security Council (where most political factions had allies). In fact, the UN may have had
the opposite problem of Vietnam, by which it could not credibly commit to staying in Cambodia
long enough to ensure stability. Relatedly, the UN went to great lengths to ensure transparency,
launching radio stations and releasing yearly reports. Vietnam, an authoritarian single party state
had no credible lines of communication or oversight. The twin occupations of Cambodia do not
demonstrate a strong role for religion. Vietnam, a communist state, was nominally Buddhist in
cultural heritage, and it’s reopening of religious practices in Cambodia generated goodwill. UN-
TAC was an amalgam of different cultures, and religions, though this did not generate mistrust.
Therefore, the trust generated by common religion did not appear to play a central role across
both occupations.
With less political dislocation and victimization, and greater trust generated by democratic
CHAPTER 7. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN CAMBODIA (1979-1993) 239
institutions, backed by an international organization, UNTAC experienced far less resistance than
did Vietnam. UNTAC lost 59 soldiers in an 18-month period, whereas Vietnam is estimated to
have lost 25,300 troops against a strong resistance movement over 128 months of occupation. Even
when accounting for Vietnam’s greater exposure due to longer occupation and more troops, this
case study illustrates significant differences in resistance.







Troops (peak) 200,000 15,547†
Timeframe 1979-1989 1991-1993
Fatalities 25,300 59
† This figure does not include the 893 military observers and 3,500 civilian police that were part of UNTAC.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a historical narrative of the Viet-
namese and UN occupations of Cambodia, with particular attention to the causes of occupation,
the policies undertaken by occupiers, and the composition and intensity of resistance. The sec-
ond section evaluates the explanatory power of political dislocation and trust in the Cambodian
context. The last section compares those theories to alternative explanations of resistance to occu-
pation, namely, nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.
7.2 Historical Context
7.2.1 Vietnamese Occupation (1979-1989)
Invasion
The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was the culmination of years of cross-border tensions.
Upon gaining power in 1975, Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, became convinced that
Vietnam was expansionist. In order to counter this perceived threat, Pol Pot ousted Vietnamese
advisors as well as party members that were friendly to Vietnam. Soon thereafter, he began order-
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ing the systematic killing of Vietnamese in Cambodia. Purges within Cambodia were combined
with raids in Vietnam over disputed land borders and islands, killing hundreds of civilians and
laying waste to large tracks of farmland (Kroef 1979, 747; Chanda 1989, 27-28; Slocomb 2003, 43).
Internationally, the Khmer Rouge allied itself with Maoist China in opposition to pro-Soviet Viet-
nam. In 1977, Cambodia severed diplomatic ties with Vietnam. In 1978, Pol Pot began an extensive
purge of the political and military leadership in the Eastern Zone of the country, causing experi-
enced cadres to be killed or flee to Vietnam (Morris 1999, 232). Purges, cross-border raids, and
alignment with China were intended by Pol Pot to thwart Vietnamese expansion. Ultimately, they
only precipitated it.
Vietnam saw Cambodia’s behavior as more than a nuisance. It was concerned that to do noth-
ing would be interpreted as a sign of weakness that would invite further incursions. In order
to solve its “Cambodia problem,” in February 1978, Vietnam decided to overthrow the Khmer
Rouge and install a friendlier regime (Slocomb 2003, 44). The decision to invade and occupy was
calculated and deliberate. There were many indicators that the Vietnamese would be welcomed
as liberators by much of the Cambodian population that was suffering under the Khmer Rouge
(Quinn-Judge 2006, 212). The People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) also assured Vietnam’s political
leadership that the matter could be resolved in a maximum of six months (Ross 1990).
On 3 December 1978, former Khmer Rouge cadres in Vietnam formed the Kampuchean United
Front for National Salvation (KUFNS). On 21 December 1978, Vietnam launched an attack on the
mountainous northeast of Cambodia near Stung Treng (Becker 1986, 437). The invasion of Cam-
bodia began officially at midnight on 24 December 1978, when tank-led columns spearheading
some 150,000 Vietnamese troops and members of the KUFNS struck into Kratie´ province (Becker
1986, 437-438). A week later, Vietnam invaded from Laos, seizing Stung Tren province (Gottesman
2003, 11). Vietnamese forces drove quickly towards Phnom Penh. By 4 January 1979, Vietnam con-
trolled all provinces east of the Mekong. By 7 January, Vietnam controlled the capital (Slocomb
2003, 47).
Numerically stronger and better equipped, Vietnamese forces decimated the army of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, as Cambodia was then known. The wounded Khmer Rouge was not com-
pletely neutralized, however. Remnants of the regime dispersed to the Thai and Laotian border
areas in the Northwest of Cambodia taking with them as many Cambodian civilians as possible
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(Morris 1999, 221; Gottesman 2003, 4). Pol Pot fled to Thailand by helicopter (Chandler 1997, 47).
Ultimately, the invasion cost the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese army some 30,000 and 25,300
fatalities, respectively (Clodfelter 2002, 692-693).
Despite overthrowing a genocidal regime, the invasion of Cambodia was generally condemned
by the international community. In January 1979, China chastised Vietnam’s invasion at the UN
Security Council and on 17 February 1979, it launched a two-week “punitive war” led by 250,000
troops against Vietnam (Morris 1999, 221; Becker 1986, 349). The international community refused
to recognize the Vietnam-installed government and Europe cut off food aid to Vietnam (Morris
1999, 222).
Regime Change and State Building
Vietnam acted quickly to establish a new regime. On 8 January 1979, a provisional government
was announced under an eight-person Kampuchean Revolutionary Council. The Council, which
was to govern Cambodia until elections, was headed by Heng Samrin, a purged Khmer Rouge
commander who had fled to Vietnam in September 1978 and joined the KNUFNS (Becker 1986,
438; Slocomb 2003, 48). On 10 January, Democratic Kampuchea was renamed the People’s Repub-
lic of Kampuchea (PRK). In February 1979, Cambodia and Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship
and cooperation (Gottesman 2003, 11; Martin 1994, 216).
The political transition following the invasion was relatively peaceful (Chanda 1989, 30). To
most Cambodians, traumatized by the Khmer Rouge, the arrival of Vietnam meant a return to
peace. The Vietnamese were therefore welcomed by many as liberators, and grateful Khmer
helped occupying troops uncover arms caches and to arrest Khmer Rouge officials (Martin 1994,
215). The Vietnamese found a country decimated by war and misrule. There was no currency,
no financial institutions, no public transport, and no telephones. Difficulties in reestablishing a
new government were compounded by a lack of educated Cambodians, many of whom had been
killed under Pol Pot (Quinn-Judge 2006, 215).
Guided by Vietnamese advisors, the PRK was established along communist lines: a single
party state led by the Khmer People’s Party (Gottesman 2003, 48). Vietnam retained responsibility
for Cambodia’s defense, internal security, and foreign affairs, leaving other domestic issues under
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nominal Cambodian control (Keller 2005, 136). Yet even domestic issues were decided with sig-
nificant oversight by Vietnamese advisors. Every decision was cleared by advisors, if not dictated
entirely by them. Vietnam set up three advisory organizations to keep a tight rein on the new gov-
ernments policies (Quinn-Judge 2006, 216). Vietnamese advisors were deployed to each ministry,
where they reviewed policies enacted by the fledging Cambodian bureaucracy. All Cambodian
leaders were guarded —and therefore monitored— by Vietnamese soldiers. Cambodian officials
who contradicted Vietnamese directives were promptly removed (Gottesman 2003, 106, 131).
The PRK claimed that it united ”all nationalities of the country and rallies all patriotic forces,
regardless of political and religious tendencies —workers, peasants, petty bourgeois, intellectuals,
Buddhist monks, and nuns” (Gottesman 2003, 8). It invited educated Cambodians to return to the
civil service. Thousands of Cambodians flocked to the bureaucracy, though mainly as a means of
survival amidst poverty. Among them were past leaders from the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes.
However, interested individuals were still subject to political vetting and Vietnamese advisors
made sure officials from previous regimes did not dominate the administration (Gottesman 2003,
50-56). Because the Khmer Rouge had so decimated the educated class, the PRK continued to staff
many positions with Vietnamese advisors (Slocomb 2003, 60).
In 1981, a new constitution was drafted by the Cambodian government and then substantively
revised by Vietnamese advisors to make it more in line with Vietnam’s constitution (Gottesman
2003, 109-113). Tightly controlled single party elections were held in 1981. The outcome of the
election was preordained and largely irrelevant. The Cambodian National Assembly had no real
power and never stood for reelection (Gottesman 2003, 216; Keller 2005, 137). The PRK promised
to respect human rights, but was quite severe in dealing with its political opponents (Chandler
2008, 277-278).
The new regime pursued technocratic socialist policies, based on the Vietnamese model, and
sustained by substantial Vietnamese and Soviet aid. At first, these policies involved reestablishing
the bureaucracy, economy, and education system, all of which had been virtually wiped out under
the Khmer Rouge. The PRK reestablished markets and currency. Collective farms were initially
broken up and family farming was reintroduced. Individuals were allowed to move around the
country, leading to a swelling of the population of Phnom Penh (Chandler 1997, 48). The govern-
ment made a point of stressing freedom of religion and to rebuilding temples and religious schools
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destroyed by the Khmer Rouge (Kroef 1979, 737; Chandler 2008, 278). Vietnam’s embrace of Bud-
dhism in Cambodia was not purely altruistic. In Cambodia, as in Vietnam, it closely monitored
religious practices in order to prevent challenges to the state. For most Cambodians, the attitude
and policies of the Vietnamese PRK contrasted favorably with the experience of the Khmer Rouge.
Despite welcome reforms, other policies remained controversial. For instance, it is estimated that
between 100,000 and 250,000 Vietnamese civilians settled in Cambodia between 1979 and 1989
(Quinn Judge 2006, 217-218).
Resistance
Backed by approximately 150,000 Vietnamese troops, the PRK controlled 80 percent of Cambodia’s
territory (Keller 2005, 137). By 1982, the Vietnamese government declared the war to be over
(Ross 1990). However, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia did not completely extinguish
the Khmer Rouge. From the ashes of Democratic Kampuchea, three resistance groups emerged
to challenge the PRK and its Vietnamese patrons: the Khmer Rouge, the National Union Front
for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (known by its French acronym
FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (known by its French acronym
FNLPK).
The Maoist Khmer Rouge was led by Khieu Samphan and to a lesser degree, Pol Pot. In
February 1979, the Khmer Rouge asserted its refusal to accept the administration of ”Vietnamese
aggressors” and that its “proletarian state administration. . . still remains intact” (Kroef 1979, 733).
Militarily, the Khmer Rouge was the strongest of Cambodia’s resistance groups, with forces num-
bering between 20,000 and 30,000 (Doyle 1995 17). It controlled territory near the Thai border and
several of the refugee camps in Thailand itself (see Figure 7.1).
The royalist FUNCINPEC was created in March 1981 by the exiled King Norodom Sihanouk.
FUNCINPEC drew on the forces that had been loyal to the Sihanouk government between 1954
and 1970 as well as the Mouvement pour la libe´ration nationale du Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) and
two other monarchist resistance groups. FUNCINPEC created an armed wing called the Arme´e
nationaliste Sihanoukiste (ANS) (Martin 1994, 244). At its peak, the ANS had between 7,000 and
11,000 fighters. In 1987, Sihanouk claimed ANS combatants were deployed in five Cambodian
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Table 7.2: Main actors in Cambodian resistance (1979-1989)
International National Subnational
Soviet Union Vietnam PRK/SOC
China Cambodia Khmer Rouge
US FUNCINPEC
ASEAN FNLPK
provinces, including Batdambang, Siem Reap, and Otdar Meanchey on the western border with
Thailand and as far east as Kampong Thum (Ross 1990).
The third resistance group was the republican FNLPK. It originated in 1975, prior to the Viet-
namese invasion of Cambodia, by loyalists of the republican government of Son Sann which ruled
Cambodia between 1970 and 1975. However, Sann and his allies did not have the supplies and the
manpower to take on the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979. When Vietnam invaded
in 1979, Sann called for armed resistance. In 1981, the FNLPK had approximately 7,000 fighters,
which it used to protect refugee camps and launch periodic raids into Cambodia. Although it
was militarily insignificant, it presented another non-communist alternative to the Khmer Rouge
resistance (Gottesman 2003, 57). Combat elements were reportedly operating in three provinces
of western Cambodia: Batdambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey, and Pouthisat (Ross 1990).
The three factions worked to unify their efforts. In early 1981, Sihanouk met with the Samphan
of the Khmer Rouge to discuss the formation of a coalition. Sann of the FNLPK was originally re-
luctant to join the talks, but eventually relented. On 4 September 1981, under heavy pressure from
their Chinese, Thai, and American patrons, the three factions met in Singapore to create the Coali-
tion Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) (Morris 1999, 226). Announced on 22 June
1982, the CGDK was to be the official government in exile, recognized by the international com-
munity and claiming Cambodia’s seat the UN. As a precondition for the agreement, the Khmer
Rouge officially renounced socialism. Although not credible, this rhetorical shift provided the
cover necessary for the US to support the CGDK (Chandler 2008, 284).
Resistance groups benefited from the sanctuary provided by Thailand. The presence of hun-
dreds of thousands of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia alarmed Thailand and other members
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thailand therefore allowed resistance
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groups to operate in the refugee camps across the border. It also provided clothing, weapons,
and food to Khmer Rouge. Supplies from other foreign sponsors of the resistance were ferried
through Thai ports (Chandler 2008, 281). As such, the resistance struggle was embedded within
a regional and global power struggle (see Table 7.2). Resistance groups used the refugee camps
along the Thai-Cambodia border to rest, resupply, regroup, and recruit (see Figure 7.1). Thanks
to its foreign sanctuary, the Cambodian resistance could not be eliminated. At the same time,
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Figure 7.1: Terrain and refugee camps of Cambodia 1979-1993
Vietnam had borne the brunt of the resistance while being heavily engaged in defending its
northern border against China (Mahbubani 1983, 407). In order to reduce its defense burden, Viet-
nam and the PRK developed a two-pronged strategy. First, Vietnam undertook a massive offen-
sive during the 1984-1985 dry season to dislodge resistance from its strongholds within Cambodia
(Slocomb 2003, 228; Gottesman 2003, 223; Martin 1994, 240). Second, Vietnam and the PRK be-
gan developing a vast fortification program along the Thai border intended to prevent infiltration
























Figure 7.2: Provinces of cambodia
and supply of insurgents. The program, known as K5 or the ”bamboo curtain,” involved clearing
forests, laying mines, and constructing roads and walls from Laos to the maritime border with
Thailand (Slocomb 2001, 198). The PRK resorted to mass conscription to complete K5, involving
upwards of 150,000 Cambodians. Conditions on the K5 sites were deplorable with hard labor,
little shelter, insufficient food, malaria, and the ever-present danger of land mines (Gottesman
2003, 231-236; Chandler 2008, 284). The K5 plan was a gamble for the PRK. It could weaken re-
sistance movements and limit their access to Cambodian territory. At the same time, conscription
and the horrendous conditions of conscripts were hugely unpopular. Following the institution
of conscription, there was a large uptick in the number of refugees arriving in Thailand, where
undoubtedly some joined resistance groups (Slocomb 2003, 240-241).
The dry season offensive and the K5 barriers partly succeeded in stemming the insurgency.
More importantly, they fundamentally changed the nature of the conflict from border confronta-
tion to infiltration. No longer able to control territory inside Cambodia, the resistance sent smaller
armed groups to infiltrate deeper into Cambodian territory to attack civilians and the adminis-
tration. According to the PRK, there were 15,300 such insurgents operating within Cambodia in
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1984 and 21,000 in 1987 (Gottesman 2003, 224, Slocomb 2003, 227). Highways and roads were
occasionally interdicted by resistance activity (Ross 1990). In short, stalemate persisted, albeit in
a different form. Clashes between resistance and PRK and Vietnamese forces resulted in 48,800
deaths between 1979 and 1986 (Brogan 1998, 155).
Vietnamese Withdrawal and Civil War
The standoff between the PRK and the Cambodian resistance became increasingly unsustainable
as the Cold War drew to a close. For Vietnam, the occupation was tremendously costly and perpet-
uated a dangerous confrontation with China. Economic and diplomatic isolation barred Vietnam’s
access to world markets and forced it into an embarrassing level of dependence on the Soviet
Union (Doyle 1999, 192). The festering conflict between Soviet-backed Vietnam and Chinese-
backed Khmer Rouge was also costly to Moscow and prevented a desired rapprochement with
China (Quinn-Judge 2006, 224). Therefore, as the Soviet Union began to collapse, so did aid to
Vietnam and the PRK. Infusions of Soviet aid, which propped up the PRK, dropped from $200
million a year by the mid 1980s to $18 million by the end of the Cold War (Chandler 1997, 50).
Ultimately, it was the contraction in Soviet aid, rather than the insurgency itself, that forced Viet-
nam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia (Morris 1999, 226). In 1985, Vietnam expressed its
willingness to negotiate a solution for Cambodia. The same year, the Foreign Minister of Vietnam
announced the complete withdrawal from Cambodia by 1990 (Quinn-Judge 2006, 219).
As Vietnamese aid dwindled, the PRK sought to negotiate a settlement with resistance groups.
However, the presence of Vietnamese troops and concerns over a return of the Khmer Rouge grid-
locked negotiations. Highlighting the issue of credible commitment in conflict outcomes, Vietnam
was reluctant to withdraw from Cambodia if it would mean a return of the Khmer Rouge. Af-
ter all, what would have been the purpose of its sacrifices in Cambodia if it were again to face
a belligerent neighbor? Hanoi had concluded a set of defense agreements with the PRK in June
1981 to anchor its position, but would the agreements be observed should the PRK be overthrown
(Gottesman 2003, 115)? Conversely, for resistance groups, especially the Khmer Rouge, peace ne-
gotiations with the PRK were unacceptable so long as Vietnamese forces were on Cambodian soil.
The presence of such forces gave the incumbent an unacceptable bargaining advantage.
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Vietnam sought to break the deadlock by gradually withdrawing its forces while training in-
digenous Cambodian forces to contain the insurgency. The PRK’s army grew from 30,000 in 1982
to 100,000 regular troops and 200,000 militia in 1989 (Quinn-Judge 2006, 219). In May 1988, Viet-
nam announced it would withdraw 50,000 troops from Cambodia by the end of the year. On 6
January 1979, Vietnam declared it would withdraw all of the remaining 26,000 troops by Septem-
ber 1989 (Martin 1994, 281). Vietnam completed the withdrawal of its forces and advisors on 26
September 1989 (Slocomb 2003, 248).
At the same time the PRK built up forces to confront the insurgency, it also altered policies in
order to accommodate the more moderate factions of the resistance. In 1987 and early 1988, PRK
Prime Minister Hun Sen held discussions with Sihanouk. In 1989, Cambodia undertook a num-
ber of liberalizing measures, including greater freedom of commerce and the return of privately-
owned land. On 29 April 1989 the constitution of Cambodia was reformed. As a result of the
change, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea was renamed the State of Cambodia (SOC), with a
new flag and coat of arms. Buddhism was also restored as the state religion (Gottesman 2003, 303).
Neither the withdrawal of the Vietnamese, nor the liberalizing policies of the SOC, succeeded
in mollifying the resistance. Instead, as Vietnamese troops withdrew, Cambodia descended into
civil war. A resigned Hun Sen stated: ”We knew that when the Vietnamese army left, we wouldn’t
be able to hold onto 100 percent of the territory” (Gottesman 2003, 309). Indeed, the CGDK tested
the SOC’s staying power in the absence of Vietnamese support (Doyle 1995, 23). In the fall of 1989,
resistance groups scored important victories in Western Cambodia and by 1990, they controlled
approximately a quarter of Cambodia (Chandler 1997, 50-51).
7.2.2 UNTAC Occupation (1991-1993)
Peace Process
The international community undertook a number of initiatives to halt Cambodia’s slide toward
civil war. In 1988 and 1989, ASEAN held a series of informal gatherings with members of the resis-
tance, the Cambodian government, and other neighboring countries, in what came to be known
as the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) (Martin 1994, 280-281). Timing worked in ASEAN’s fa-
vor: Sihanouk was getting older, Hun Sen craved international recognition, and Sann experienced
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internal dissent that further weakened the military strength of the FNLPK. All parties were also
militarily exhausted (Doyle 1995, 21). During the July 1988 meeting, the PRK government called
for the formation of a national reconciliation council that would include itself and all three re-
sistance groups with Sihanouk as chairman (Chanda 1989, 30). This quadripartite government
would then organize elections that would put an end to the civil war. In parallel, France initiated
a Paris Peace Conference between July and August 1989. At the conference, the parties agreed to
the withdrawal of any remaining foreign forces, the neutralization of Cambodia, and the return
of refugees (Keller 2005, 144). However, the parties to the conflict did not trust each other enough
to form a temporary coalition government. The SOC could not credibly commit to abiding by
the agreement once factions put down their arms. Needed was an international mechanism to
supervise the implementation of the peace agreement (Doyle 1995, 22).
It became clear that for any peace agreement to hold, the international community would need
to directly intervene among the factions. In October 1989, US Congressman Stephen Solarz pro-
posed a temporary UN administration of Cambodia to help in the implementation of a peace
agreement. On 27 August 1990, the P5 agreed (without the presence of Cambodia) on a consen-
sus framework for Cambodia, which would involve a transitional UN-run administration (Doyle
1995, 24; Gottesman 2003, 337).
Once a mechanism for ensuring the implementation of a peace agreement was established,
peace negotiations proceeded more smoothly. On 10 January 1990, the Cambodian factions formed
the Supreme National Council (SNC), which included all the factions of the conflict and was
chaired by Sihanouk. In June 1991, this SNC agreed to an indefinite ceasefire (Doyle 1995, 20).
Finally, on 23 October 1991, the factions signed the Paris Peace Agreements. The agreements com-
mitted the factions to a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodian territory, the
cessation of external military assistance, the cantonment and demobilization of a least 70 percent
of resistance forces prior to electoral registration, the demobilization of the remaining 30 percent
or their incorporation into a new national army immediately after the elections, and the release of
all POWs and civilian political prisoners. Each faction would retain control of their territory until
the election (Findlay 1994, 5). The Paris Agreements also identified of the SNC as the unique legit-
imating body and source of authority in which the sovereignty of Cambodia would be enshrined
throughout the transitional period (Doyle 1995, 25). Importantly, the Paris Agreements called for
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UNTAC, which was established on 28 February 1992 under UN Security Council resolution 745.
King Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh on 14 November 1991 and on 2 March 1992, the first
UNTAC military contingents deployed to Cambodia.
UNTAC Mandate
UNTAC was tasked with ambitious objectives and a limited timeframe. Luckily for backers of the
mandate, the Paris Agreement gave the UN extraordinary power. As Doyle (1995, 1) notes: ”Not
since the colonial era and the post —World War II Allied occupations of Germany and Japan had
a foreign presence held so much formal administrative jurisdiction over the civilian functions of
an independent country.”
UNTAC was divided between a civilian and military mandate. UNTAC’s civil component
of 7,000 civilians was headed by Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) Yasushi
Akashi of Japan. Akashi controlled the aspects of civil administration that could directly affect the
elections (defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information) and monitored others
that could otherwise influence such elections. Furthermore, UNTAC was to monitor and promote
human rights, repatriate refugees, restore and rehabilitate aspects of Cambodia’s infrastructure,
and oversee the drafting of a new constitution (Findlay 1994, 6). In order to achieve these ob-
jectives, UNTAC could issue binding directives to the Cambodian bureaucracy, as well as review
and change policies put forth by the bureaucracy. The civil administration of UNTAC established
offices in all of Cambodia’s 21 provinces (Doyle 1995, 35-38). UNTAC personnel controlled the
armed forces, trained Cambodian officers of the judiciary in penal law and human rights, and
verified public revenue and expenditures (Keller 2005, 162). Lastly, UNTAC allowed for the for-
mation of political parties, so long as their platforms were consistent with the Paris Agreements.
Under the Paris Agreements, the SNC could overrule a decision of UNTAC so long as the decision
was reach by consensus and consistent with the Paris Agreements.
The military component of UNTAC was headed by Australian Lt. Gen. John Sanderson and
included the largest peacekeeping mission up to that time: 12 infantry battalions from 11 countries
for a total of 16,000 military personnel. It’s mandate was to monitor the ceasefire and disengage-
ment of forces, monitor withdrawal of foreign forces, monitor demobilization and disarmament,
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and clear land mines (Doyle 1995, 27; Lindley 2007, 161). The Paris Agreements put the police
forces of the different factions under the supervision or control of a 3,6000 strong UNTAC police
force to ensure law and order were maintained with impartiality (Sanderson 1995, 31). Although
UNTAC was originally deployed to monitor the ceasefire and cantonment, it later redeployed to
support the national election (Doyle 1995, 30-31). In sum, UNTAC had wide-ranging powers,
but for very specific and limited objectives: organizing national elections and assuring a neutral
political environment for such elections.
Resistance
UNTAC faced relatively minor resistance during its 18-month mandate. Unlike resistance to Viet-
namese occupation, which was led by FUNCINPEC, the Khmer Rouge, and FNLPK, resistance
to UNTAC was undertaken almost exclusively by the Khmer Rouge. Starting in January 1992,
politically-motivated assassinations occurred in Phnom Penh. In February 1992, the Khmer Rouge
fired on a UN helicopter, wounding a peacekeeper. In May 1992, the Khmer Rouge expanded the
territory under its control and refused to be monitored by the UN or to disarm its forces (Chandler
2008, 287). On 13 October 1992, it announced it was boycotting the elections altogether. The Khmer
Rouge’s pullout from the Paris Agreements triggered a series of tit-for-tat retaliations by UNTAC
and the SOC. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the Khmer Rouge on 30 November
1992. On December 13 and 14 1992, the Khmer Rouge attacked UN barracks. On 24 and 25 De-
cember, Khmer Rouge artillery shells landed near UNTAC troops in Siem Reap province. The area
came under shelling again on 31 December (UN 2003). On 13 January 1993, the SOC launched a
series of attacks against the Khmer Rouge. Starting in March 1993, the Khmer Rouge resorted to
the killing of ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia. In April and May 1993, it carried out attacks
in an attempt to sabotage the elections, including bombing an UNTAC base on 4-5 May 1993.
Although a formal objective of the Paris Agreements, democratization and elections created
problems of their own: opposition political offices were attacked, ransacked, and burned and
party members were beaten, kidnapped, and killed (Doyle 1995, 56). The Khmer Rouge’s unwill-
ingness to allow UNTAC to enter territory under its control and to supervise the disarmament
of its members fundamentally undermined the Paris Agreements. None of the parties could be
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expected to disarm if one of the most powerful among them refused to do so. Faced with Khmer
Rouge recalcitrance, UNTAC shifted from supervising the ceasefire and disarmament process to
providing security for the elections (Sanderson 1995, 34).
By the time of the elections in May 1993, the Khmer Rouge had killed some 104 Vietnamese
and assassinated 37 political opponents. They were not the only ones to commit violence. UNTAC
assigned SOC responsibility for 46 political assassinations (Doyle 1995, 47). Total casualties, mili-
tary and civilian, during the UNTAC period were about 225 (UCDP 2011). UNTAC itself suffered
59 military fatalities (UN 2003).
Withdrawal of UNTAC
National elections took place between 23 and 28 May 1993. Despite the Khmer Rouge boycott, they
were considered a success. More than 4.6 million people voted (a turnout of 90 percent), there was
little violence on election day, and the elections were declared free and fair (Findlay 1994, 6; Akashi
1994). The constituent assembly was then able to draft and approve a constitution on schedule on
21 September 1993. The mandate entrusted to UNTAC was concluded on 24 September 1993
when Sihanouk formally promulgated the new constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia and on
4 November 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 880, terminating UNTAC. The last
peacekeepers left Cambodia on 14 November 1993 (UN 2003).
The UN mission did not completely end the Cambodian civil war. It simply deescalated and
de-internationalized it, while politically isolating the Khmer Rouge (Findlay 1994, 5). The Khmer
Rouge was banned from Cambodia in 1994. By the mid 1990s, it still had some 5,000 armed men,
but was struggling with defections (Chandler 2008, 289). The Khmer Rouge was not the only post-
election challenge facing Cambodia. FUNCINPEC won the election with 45.47 percent of the vote
followed by the CPP with 38.23 percent. The SOC/CPP was shocked by its electoral loss, and Hun
Sen (the former head of the SOC) refused to accept defeat. In the two weeks after the election, his
CPP party resorted to violence to blackmail FUNCINPEC and UNTAC into reversing the election
results (Shawcross 1994, 26). Eventually Sihanouk and Hun Sen agreed to form a coalition govern-
ment with a shared Prime Minister position and cabinet positions divided between their parties
(Lindley 2007, 168; Chandler 2008, 288).
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7.3 Theoretical Explanations
Resistance, first against Vietnamese occupation and then against UNTAC occupation, defined
Cambodian politics for over a decade. Yet the occupations could not be more different. The Viet-
namese occupation generated tremendous resistance, leaving thousands dead on both sides. The
UNTAC occupation of Cambodia was far more peaceful. This section applies the theories of po-
litical dislocation and trust to the case of Cambodia. How do these theories help us understand
resistance?
7.3.1 Political Dislocation
Political dislocation theory argues that resistance is caused by a disruption of the domestic balance
of political power. Those groups that stand to lose politically from occupation will be more likely
to take up arms. Conversely, those who stand to gain from occupation will be more likely to
collaborate.
Vietnamese Occupation
To this day, there remains strong disagreement in Cambodia whether Cambodia was liberated
or invaded in December 1978. Opponents of Vietnam and the Hun Sen regime highlight the op-
pressive nature of Vietnamese rule whereas his supporters highlight their role in nation-building
after the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge (Gottesman 2003, x-xi). As this section shows, views on
Vietnamese occupation map broadly on preexisting political preferences.
Vietnam did not simply invade Cambodia. It overthrew the regime, dramatically reshaped the
government in its image, and marginalized opposition groups. The biggest losers of Vietnamese
occupation were Pol Pot and his inner circle. They were removed from power, tried in absentia,
and spent 15 years exiled in a literal wilderness in the jungles of Western Cambodia and Thailand
(Morris 1999, 219). Thus, as political dislocation theory would predict, the largest resistance group
was the Khmer Rouge.
The Khmer Rouge was the principal, but by no means the sole, target of political dislocation
in occupied Cambodia. Vietnam imposed a single party socialist state. Opposition parties were
prevented from partaking in elections and critics of PRK rule were barred from positions in gov-
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ernment. Television and movie theaters played only censored news and political films. Only
books dealing favorably with Vietnam and communism were permitted (Martin 1994, 235). Even
opportunities in higher education were reserved for the family members of political apparatchiks.
Also marginalized were royalists and republicans, the other ideological contenders to rule in Cam-
bodia.
Understanding resistance as a product of political dislocation helps explain certain features of
the Cambodian resistance. Resistance groups were organized ideologically rather than function-
ally or regionally. Each resistance group represented former rulers of Cambodia. King Sihanouk,
who ruled Cambodia from 1954 until he was overthrown in a republican-backed coup in 1970,
headed FUNCINPEC. The republican FDNLK was headed by Sann, a former Prime Minister, and
members of the Cambodian military who had overthrown Sihanouk in 1970. The Khmer Rouge,
represented the regime that seized power in 1975 and was overthrown by Vietnam in 1979. Viewed
from this angle, resistance was simply a continuation of the violent contest for political power in
Cambodia beginning in 1970 (Chanda 1989, 27).
Both the PRK and their Vietnamese patrons grasped the effect of political dislocation on resis-
tance. They understood that purging all members of the Khmer Rouge would needlessly exacer-
bate resistance, and consequently were willing to integrate mid-to-low-level cadres. Integrating
such cadres would deprive the Khmer Rouge of recruits, without posing a challenge to the PRK
(Chanda 1999, 33; Gottesman 2003, 68). Vietnam believed it would be easier to integrate these
cadres than the nationalists or the upper echelons of the Khmer Rouge (Martin 1999, 218). Be-
sides, if it was to rule effectively, the PRK needed manpower to staff the bureaucracy, much of
which had been wiped out by the Khmer Rouge.
As is often the case, high profile acts of violent resistance overshadow the extent of collabo-
ration in occupied Cambodia. The majority of Cambodia saw little resistance. Most Cambodians
saw the arrival of Vietnamese troops as liberation from a genocidal regime. The PRK focused
on reestablishing the state, and purposely avoided the more disruptive elements of socialism. For
instance, it never fully implemented the collectivization of agriculture. By the late 1980s, anticipat-
ing the withdrawal of Vietnam, it undertook a number of liberalizing measures. As it reformed
the economy, the PRK looked to the prerevolutionary past as a model. By the time of the Paris
Agreements Cambodia had a functioning economy, and semi-free markets. Poverty was down
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and school enrollment was up (Slocomb 2003, xii). The limits of the reforms, and the return to the
status quo ante, preempted broader resistance (Gottesman 2003, 19). The PRK’s achievements in
rebuilding Cambodia may also explain why its successor, the CPP, received 35 percent of the vote
in the 1993 election.3
UNTAC Occupation
The effects of political dislocation become clearer when comparing the Vietnamese and UNTAC
occupations. Vietnamese occupation caused significant dislocation by overthrowing the Khmer
Rouge and permanently marginalizing other political opposition. In contrast, UNTAC went to
extraordinary lengths to include all factions in the political process leading to a general election.
UNTAC was the outcome of years of negotiations. Consequently, it benefitted from the con-
sent of all the parties (albeit with significant pressure from the international community). For the
first time in Cambodian history all factions were allowed to ”flourish simultaneously, under UN
protection” (Chandler 1997, 51). This consent was buttressed by the institution of the SNC. UN-
TAC had the authority to govern Cambodia, but the SNC served to legitimate its actions. The
SNC remained the locus of Cambodian sovereignty and the shared power relationship provided
some accountability to the transitional authority (Keller 2005, 169). In January 1992, the SNC an-
nounced that any Cambodian could form a political party and in September 1993, Sihanouk once
again became the constitutional monarch (Gottesman 2003, 347; Chandler 1997, 25).
By definition, the election ensured that the political outcome reflected some latent distribution
of support for government. However, as the literature on spoilers conveys, elections alone do not
ensure peace (Stedman 1997). Thus, beyond the desirability of elections, it is important to note
that most factions also saw the UNTAC mandate as politically expedient. FUNCINPEC and the
FNLPK were relatively weak militarily and could not expect to seize power through force. Be-
cause they did not believe their military capacity reflected their political support, the elections
process promised opportunities for political gain. The incumbent SOC saw benefits from the elec-
toral process as well. Even if it would lose its political monopoly, the SOC (and its political party
the CPP) recognized that its power was waning due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
3Since the 1993 election was undertaken and monitored by the UN, and because the CPP did not actually win the
election, we can assume that this level of support was not simply the product of fraud.
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withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Its pariah status prevented it from benefitting from the fruits of
international trade. The SOC saw the cantonment mandated by the Paris Agreements as a way to
cripple the Khmer Rouge militarily, knowing the Khmer Rouge had little domestic political sup-
port otherwise (Doyle 1995, 69). Critically, the CPP wrongly assumed it would win the elections
(Ratner 1995, 178). Based on this flawed assumption, elections promised significant gains for rel-
atively small concessions. Finally, the Khmer Rouge initially accepted UNTAC’s mandate only
because it never intended to fully comply with it. It hoped UNTAC would dismantle the SOC’s
control over government without forcing the Khmer Rouge to disarm.
Beyond the initial mandate and cooperation with the SNC, UNTAC’s leadership was extremely
cautious —some would say much too cautious— in maintaining the support of the parties and
limiting the use of force. The purpose of UNTAC was stabilization and the creation of a neutral
political environment (Sanderson 1995, 30). In one famous incident, SRSG Akashi and Lt. Gen.
Sanderson were refused entry, as allowed by the Paris Agreements, into Khmer Rouge-controlled
territory. The Khmer Rouge had erected a road block composed only of a thin bamboo pole.
Yet, Akashi and Sanderson refused to breach this symbolic barrier. The UNTAC mandate did not
include for enforcement by UN peacekeepers. To do so would have risked escalation and required
a much larger military force structured and equipped for protracted conflict. Moreover, according
to Sanderson (1995, 32): ”such a mission would have been doomed for disaster even if it had been
given wide international support, since it would have required a UN force to take sides in an
internal conflict.”
Ultimately, the Khmer Rouge did come to see UNTAC as a political threat. Publicly, the Khmer
Rouge also accused UNTAC of favoring Vietnam and their Cambodian clients over the Khmer
Rouge (Morris 1999, 226). This may have been a red herring, however. The Khmer Rouge had little
to gain from elections since it had little popular support. Moreover, the elections would unify the
other factions against it. Unable to win the election or to accept electoral defeat, the Khmer Rouge
sought to derail the peace process altogether. It withdrew its consent from the UN mission and
subsequently rejected the ceasefire (Roberts 2006, 29; Sanderson 1995, 33). To recapitulate, UNTAC
entered a highly polarized political environment in Cambodia. Political dislocation helps explain
why it was the Khmer Rouge, and not other factions that had fought Vietnamese occupation,
which were responsible for the lion’s share of resistance to UNTAC.
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7.3.2 Factional Politics
A corollary of political dislocation theory is the mechanism of factional politics. Occupiers may
disrupt the domestic balance of power in occupied society. This can trigger not only resistance
against the occupier, but also clashes between different groups. Indeed, groups may use resistance
not only as a means to evict the occupier, but also to seize power for themselves.
Vietnamese Occupation
Cambodian resistance provides an excellent illustration of factional politics. Resistance was di-
vided along political and ideological lines. There are two potential explanations for such divisions.
The first is that pre-existing political organizations, with their membership, social networks, and
funds, were better suited than random individuals to mobilize resistance (Petersen 2001). Yet,
if political organizations could better mobilize initially, over time we would expect to see such
groups merge. Indeed, logic would dictate that different groups pool their efforts to capitalize on
comparative advantages and economies of scale. An alternative explanation is that such groups
saw resistance as a way to maximize relative power.
Resistance groups espoused competing visions for the future of Cambodia: royalism for FUNC-
INPEC, Maoism for the Khmer Rouge, and republican parliamentarism for FNLPK (Chandler
1997, 25). These ideologies were deemed incompatible. The royalists had been overthrown by
the republicans in 1970, who in turn had been overthrown by the Khmer Rouge in 1975. Al-
though they shared a common enemy, they also deeply distrusted each other. Both the FNLPK
and FUNCINPEC stated in their founding declarations their opposition to a return of the Khmer
Rouge (Corfield 1991, 15, 21). This distrust manifested itself in the failure of resistance groups
to unify but also in fratricidal clashes. According to Martin: “In practice, each movement repro-
duces traditional Cambodian society in microcosm: each faction is inspired by the feudal scheme
of things” (1994, 246).
Outgunned and outmanned, the resistance factions had every reason to join forces, but such
efforts repeatedly failed. Following the invasion of Cambodia, the UN General Assembly called
on the UN Security Council to organize an international conference on Cambodia. This conference
did not take place because of dissent among resistance groups over its objectives (Keller 2005, 142).
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Even the non-communist resistance, with narrower ideological disagreements, failed to unify. For
instance, throughout 1981 and 1982, FNLPK proposed a merger with the FUNCINPEC, even of-
fering Sihanouk its presidency, and offer he refused (Martin 1994, 242; Corfield 1991, 16). Within
the FNLPK itself, struggles for power emerged as the main issue of contention being Sann’s family
monopoly over top positions (Martin 1994, 247).
The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), formed in 1982 under tremen-
dous international pressure, was as Kiernan notes: “neither a coalition, nor a government, nor
democratic” (1985, 37). The CGDK was designed to preserve the power of each faction, with
Sihanouk as President, Sann as Prime Minister, and Samphan as Vice President for Foreign Af-
fairs (Etcheson 1987, 187). Foreign sponsors pressured Cambodian factions to form a unified front
in order to increase the effectiveness of the resistance and to provide a fig leaf for funding the
Khmer Rouge. According to Martin: “The CGKD. . . can be considered a sham alliance that al-
lowed foreign powers to keep their consciences clean while they refused to accept the Vietnamese
occupation of Cambodia” (1994, 246). Ultimately, the structure of the CGDK was insufficient to
overcome mistrust and competition.
All the factions were deeply wary of each other’s relative power. By 1982, the Khmer Rouge
was becoming an increasingly effective fighting force (Chandler 2008, 281). This was a cause of
great concern for the non-communist resistance. The ANS and the FNLPK were, according to CIA
assessments, fragile and no match militarily for the Khmer Rouge or the PRK (CIA 1989, 2). On
the one hand, they could not wage an effective insurgency against the PRK and Vietnam without
the help of the Khmer Rouge. As Sihanouk stated in an interview: ”without the Khmer Rouge,
we have no credibility on the battlefield.” On the other hand an alliance with the Khmer Rouge
presented dangers over the long term. Sann, the leader of the FNLPK was extremely reticent to
join forces with the Khmer Rouge. He noted: ”Choosing between the Vietnamese and the Khmer
Rouge is like choosing between plague and cholera” (Etcheson 1987, 200). The non-communist re-
sistance feared that following the end of occupation the Khmer Rouge would then turn its sights
on them (Pao-min 1987, 758; Mahbubani 1983, 416). Sihanouk stated: ”Personally, I have no sym-
pathy for the Khmer Rouge. They killed several members of my family. I want the whole truth to
be told of them. That is why I require guarantees. If I do not obtain them, I will not cooperate”
(Etcheson 1987, 198). Indeed, the Khmer Rouge regularly fought against FNLPK and the ANS
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forces (Martin 1994, 246; Ross 1990). If the non-communist resistance was going to survive in
post-occupation Cambodia, it needed the means to defend itself. Throughout the 1980s, the three
resistance forces therefore remained non-integrated, each maintaining separate bases, command
structures, and operational planning, and controlling separate refugee camps in Thailand (Ross
1990; Etchesen 1987).
UNTAC Occupation
Factional politics plays a lesser role in explaining resistance to UNTAC occupation since the
Khmer Rouge was the only group contesting the UN presence. However, the frame of factional
politics is critical to understanding why the UN was called to occupy Cambodia to begin with.
As political dislocation and factional politics theories would expect, the end of Vietnamese occu-
pation did not end violence. Instead, resistance simply turned into civil war. The Khmer Rouge
built up arms caches and actively prevented its cadres from reintegrating into Cambodian society.
As a Khmer Rouge document put it: ”Before the major issue was to liberate the country from the
Vietnamese. Now national defense is the major issue. We must make preparation for the second
stage where it is necessary to protect the rank and file” (Chanda 1989, 40-41). With the Vietnamese
now out of Cambodia, the fundamental question of ”who rules?” remained.
The international community tried to bring the resistance groups and SOC government to-
gether through the Jakarta Informal Meetings and the Paris peace talks. During international ne-
gotiations, the two non-communist resistance groups showed a lack of organization and ongoing
incompatibility of interests, as they negotiated the future of Cambodia. The Cambodian factions
eventually agreed to form a SNC composed of six delegates from the GCKD and six from the SOC,
which would represent Cambodia at the UN. However, during its first meeting, the SNC could
not agree on a President or a vice-President, leading to a vacant seat at the UN for a year. The Paris
peace talks constantly broke down over the question of power sharing in the interim period before
elections (Martin 1994, 284-285). Mistrust among the factions, many of which had allied to fight
Vietnamese occupation, remained a fundamental barrier to any negotiated settlement. Ironically,
because resistance groups could not reach a consensus, they required another foreign occupation,
this time by the UN, to oversee the ceasefire and the implementation of elections.
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Once UNTAC was in place, each resistance group registered a separate political party in order
to contest the election. Each group used its history of fighting Vietnamese occupation to build
public support in the elections (Heder and Ledgerwood 1996). As factional politics theory would
predict, resistance was directly tied to future political rule. Moreover, each party opposed different
aspects of the UNTAC mandate, seeking to manipulate the peace process to enhance their electoral
prospects (Doyle 1995, 13; Findlay 1995). UNTAC was sensitive as to how the implementation of
the peace plan would affect the relative power of the different factions and sought to provide, as
best possible, a neutral political environment. After the Khmer Rouge refused to canton its forces,
UNTAC forces commander Lt. Gen. Sanderson became concerned it would trigger a renewal of
fighting among the factions: “in early 1992 I could feel the ground moving from under myself and
those moderates of all military factions who were committed to the peace process” (Sanderson
1995, 31). In sum, factional politics helps explain why Cambodia’s resistance groups failed to
disband upon the departure of Vietnamese troops, why these groups transformed into political
parties, and why Cambodia descended into a civil war between 1989 and 1991.
7.3.3 Trust
According to trust theory, occupiers will have difficulty credibly committing to treating the occu-
pied population benignly and to vacating occupied territory promptly, creating the potential for a
breakdown in trust. This breakdown in trust will be most acute when the behavior of occupiers
makes resistance less risky than inaction and attentisme.
Vietnamese Occupation
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia was by no means peaceful. Tens of thousands of fatalities
were sustained on both sides and political opponents to the communist regime were persecuted
and jailed. However, Vietnam generally did not undertake a systematic campaign of civilian vic-
timization. When Vietnamese troops first invaded Cambodia, they did not mistreat the population
(Martin 1994, 215). Officially, Vietnamese troops were ordered to protect all Cambodians, though
many stood aside as Cambodians took revenge on Khmer Rouge cadres (Gottesman 2003, 37-38).
Interviews with Cambodian refugees in 1979 found:
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The Vietnamese appear anxious to win the hearts and minds of the people and seem
to behave well toward them. They distribute rice and cooking utensils so that families
can once again eat en famille instead of en masse. They also either appoint or supervise
the election of new village officials. Refugees give the impression that these changes
are widely welcomed, despite the fact that they are imposed by the ancient enemy of
the Khmers (Kiernan 1979).
In many ways, Vietnamese occupation benefitted directly from Khmer Rouge atrocities. Whereas
victimization theory predicts that indiscriminate violence by occupiers encourages individuals to
seek protection among resistance forces, during the initial stages of the Vietnamese occupation
it was indiscriminate violence by the Khmer Rouge that sent Cambodians into the arms of their
Vietnamese occupiers.
However, abuses against the Cambodian population did occur under Vietnamese occupation
and those instances of abuse highlight the trust mechanism of resistance. For example, Cambodian
soldiers working alongside Vietnamese soldiers defected to the resistance in 1985 after witnessing
abuses committed by their counterparts (Martin 1994, 240). Far more damaging to trust between
Cambodian civilians and Vietnamese troops was the forced conscription starting in 1982 and in-
tensified in 1983 as part of the K5 program. According to Slocomb:
”it panicked the people and turned whatever goodwill the regime had earned between
1979 and 1984 into bitter and long-lasting resentment, particularly over the methods
used to recruit labor and conscript troops. In this way, the PRK played easily into
the hands of its detractors. The combined resistance forces successfully employed K5
against the PRK regime by using it in their political propaganda to win over the peo-
ple’s sympathy and turn them against what they could claim, with obvious justifica-
tion but no apparent irony, was an oppressive regime” (2001, 209).
Ultimately, as Gottesman notes: “the resentment that Cambodians felt toward the Vietnamese was
not constant; it was intensified and diminished in response to specific actions taken by Vietnamese
officials, the PRK leadership, and the resistance” (2003, 138).
Cambodian reaction to Vietnamese abuses was mitigated by two factors: fear of the Khmer
Rouge and territorial control. As trust theory emphasizes, resistance can be motivated by self-
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protection as much as nationalism. Many Cambodians feared that a withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops would mean the return of the far more brutal Khmer Rouge. A refugee was quoted as
saying: ”We do not want to return to the country as long as the Vietnamese are there; we are afraid
of them and even more of the Khmer Rouge” (Martin 1994, 241). At first, most Cambodians were
simply relieved that the Khmer Rouge were out of power and they sought to recover a normal life
(Martin 1994, 239). Moreover, the successful quarantine of resistance to the periphery of Cambodia
played an important role in reducing civilian victimization. For most of the occupation, resistance
and government forces faced off along a front in remote and sparsely populated territory. The
separation of forces reduced the identification problem that so often leads to the deliberate or
accidental killing of civilians (Kalyvas 2006). Because the forces of Vietnam and the PRK did not
systematically target civilians, civilians had few incentives to turn to resistance forces in order to
gain protection.
UNTAC Occupation
UNTAC did not undertake a program of civilian victimization. On the contrary, a pillar of its
mission was the promotion of human rights (Findlay 1995). UNTAC undertook a countrywide
human rights education campaign and overhauled the judicial system to better address human
rights cases (Lindley 2007, 167). UNTAC pushed the SNC to adopt all major human rights conven-
tions, freed political prisoners, sought to reform prisons, lifted restrictions on personal freedom of
movement, allowed for the expansion of human rights groups and the free press (Doyle 1995, 33,
45-46; Chandler 2008, 288).
The presence of UN troops did generate some frictions and animosity. There were some re-
ported incidents of civilian abuse, particularly by the Bulgarian police contingent (Ratner 1995,
195-196; Cumming-Bruce 1993, 10). Moreover, the deployment of UNTAC led to skyrocketing in-
flation and prostitution (And attendant increases in HIV/AIDS infections) (Whitworth 2004, 72).
However serious, these did not amount to widespread abuse, let alone systematic victimization.
Moreover, the UN went to great lengths to address allegations of mistreatment of Cambodians.
When the Khmer Rouge accused UNTAC of collaborating with the Vietnamese to colonize Cam-
bodia or of raping Cambodian women, UNTAC set up community relations offices to handle
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the allegations (Ledgerwood 1994). Consequently, there is no evidence of Cambodians forming
resistance groups to protect against victimization by UNTAC. There is also no evidence of individ-
uals joining the Khmer Rouge to avoid victimization, unsurprising given the Khmer Rouge’s own
record of genocide. As the next section explains, the UN was also uniquely capable of making
credible commitments towards the sovereignty and wellbeing of the Cambodian population.
7.3.4 Credible Commitment
The trust theory of resistance posits that factors such as regime type, international mandate, and
religious affinity help mitigate resistance. They do so by increasing the ability of occupiers to
credibly commit to the wellbeing of the occupied population. I find evidence that credible com-
mitment played a role in resistance to occupation. UNTAC, an occupation under the aegis of an
international organization, faced less resistance than the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The
UN was better able to credibly commit to the independence of Cambodia.
Vietnamese Occupation
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia illustrates the difficulties of credibly committing to occupied
populations. Despite earning the gratitude of many Cambodians for overthrowing the Khmer
Rouge, distrust remained. When the Vietnamese arrived, many wondered whether they were
there to protect them from the Khmer Rouge or to annex and exploit the country? In other words,
what type of occupier was Vietnam? Cambodia and Vietnam had a long history of ethnic animos-
ity dating as far back as Vietnam’s occupation of the 1830s (Corfield 2009, 17-18; Gottesman 2003,
ix, 15). Moreover, some feared Vietnam would try to colonize Cambodia. Vietnam was 71 million
in population against Cambodia’s nine million and needed to expand agricultural areas, poten-
tially in sparsely populated Cambodia (Abuza 1995, 441). During the rule of the Khmer Rouge,
Samphan declared: ”the number one enemy is not U.S. imperialism, but Vietnam, ready to swal-
low up Cambodia” (Pouvatchy 1986, 447). Vietnam’s enemies stoked fears of annexation, with
China accusing Vietnam of trying to force Cambodia into an Indochinese Federation (Gottesman
2003, 43). Added to the difficulties in establishing trust was the fact that Vietnam did seek revi-
sions to its borders with Cambodia. These changes confirmed through treaties, the first pertaining
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to maritime boundaries in 12 November 1982 and the second pertaining to land borders on 27
December 1985 (Martin 1994, 229). The treaties were harshly criticized by all resistance groups.
FUNCINPEC and the KPLNF both rejected these treaties. The Khmer Rouge stated “All of this
is a device to allow Vietnam to occupy Kampuchea’s territorial waters and plunder Kampuchea’s
natural resources in the sea and on the seabed” (BBC Monitoring 1982). King Sihanouk accused
Vietnam of “nibbling away” Cambodian territory (Thayer 2012, 68)
Absent the transparency and oversight provided by democracies or international organiza-
tions, Vietnam could not signal its type. Vietnam and the PRK were closed regimes with limited
lines of communication with the Cambodian population. There were almost no Westerners in
Cambodia to provide information, aside from a few humanitarian workers. What news of the
regime did transpire came from refugees, usually political exiles opposed to the regime to begin
with. Moreover, there were few or no checks on Vietnamese power. The Vietnamese army oper-
ating in Cambodia did not answer to Cambodia’s council of ministers, but to the Party’s military
committee, which effectively responded to the wishes of Vietnam. Neither Vietnam nor the PRK
was a democracy, but instead single party communist regimes (Gottesman 2003, 57, 206, 229).
In the absence of credible commitment mechanisms, revisions to Cambodia’s laws and borders
were more problematic. Were the demands in fact limited, or the first step in a broader annexion-
ist agenda? Absent oversight, how could Cambodians tell the difference, and absent checks and
balances, how could they prevent it? The lack of checks and balances on Vietnamese occupation
helps explain why Vietnamese immigration became such an issue of contention. Vietnam had
sought to repatriate ethnically Vietnamese Cambodians. To Vietnam, repatriation was repairing
the wrongs committed by the Khmer Rouge. To many in Cambodia, it was imposed demographic
colonization aimed at erasing Khmer independence (Gottesman 2003, 124; Martin 1994, 227).
Two factors helped counteract the complete breakdown in trust in Vietnamese-occupied Cam-
bodia: the liberalization of religion and relatively low civilian victimization, as discussed pre-
viously. First, common religion bolstered trust between Cambodia and Vietnam. Both Vietnam
and Cambodia are overwhelmingly Buddhist and Buddhism had traditionally been an important
source of social authority in Cambodia.4 Organized religion had been decimated by the Khmer
4Note that Cambodia is Theravada Buddhist whereas Vietnam is predominantly Mahayana Buddhist.
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Rouge, which had killed Buddhist monks and destroyed temples and religious texts. Vietnam’s
occupation of Cambodia saw a revival of Buddhism. Through a measure of respect for Buddhism
—something that had been completely absent under the rule of Khmer Rouge— Vietnam was able
to restore a badly needed sense of normalcy and allay fears that it sought to completely reorder
Cambodia’s way of life. The regime put in place by Vietnam pledged to guarantee the people’s
freedom of religion” and that temples, pagodas, and historical relics” said to have been destroyed
by the Pol Pot regime will be repaired and maintained ”according to the people’s needs” and the
”practical conditions” prevailing in local areas (van der Kroef 1979, 737). Buddhist schools were
reopened and monks were once again allowed to receive offerings from the population (Quinn-
Judge 2006, 216).5 As the PRK sought to broaden its basis of social support, further religious
restrictions were lifted and Buddhism itself was restored as the state religion in 1989 (Gyallay-Pap
2007, 91). The restoration of Buddhism was a popular policy in Cambodia. According to Prince Si-
hanouk (Kamm 1998, 194), Cambodians preferred a “Vietnamese protectorate” to a Khmer Rouge
“genocide”, “Many people enjoy family life again, no longer slave at forced labor, and observe
Buddhism. The Vietnamese have brought relative peace.” Similarly, peasants interviewed in 1979
noted that the decision by the Vietnamese-backed government to encourage the practice of Bud-
dhism was a popular move (Kiernan 1979). At the same time, Vietnam and the PRK understood
that religion could be a potent source of dissent, particularly due to its association with King Si-
hanouk. Therefore the regime did make sure to retain some control over the religious hierarchy,
so that monks not ”take advantage and use Buddhism and the beliefs of the people to go and con-
duct activities to destroy the principles of the pure revolution or to propagate and divide national
solidarity” (Gottesman 2003, 71). The policy was successful, as religious leaders did not side with
the resistance movement.
UNTAC Occupation
In contrast to Vietnamese occupation, UNTAC used its international mandate to better credibly
commit to the sovereignty and wellbeing of Cambodia. Specifically, it was able to maintain trust
with a clear and limited mandate with multilateral oversight. UNTAC was established by UN
5For a description of ongoing restrictions on Buddhism under the PRK, see Martin 1994, 237.
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Security Council resolution 745 with a period not to exceed 18 months. Elections, mandated in the
Paris Agreements, provided a focal point for the end of UNTAC. As one observer noted: ”It’s very
jarring physically when you see foreigners running your country. . . if they are not taking UNTAC
to task, it’s because they know that UNTAC was going to leave anyway. There was a calendar,
there was a clear statement that UNTAC was not going to be there forever” (Carney 1993, 42).
Trust was further maintained through overlapping oversight of UNTAC. Under the Paris
Agreements, the SNC enshrined Cambodian sovereignty and would act as an advisory body to
UNTAC and UNTAC had to abide by any unanimous decision by the SNC. As such, all four
factions to the conflict maintained sovereignty and oversight of UNTAC. UN Security Council
resolution 745 also called the UN Secretary General to report on the implementation of the man-
date publicly and by a specific set of dates. The UN Security Council maintained further oversight
of UNTAC’s operations, condemning violence (Resolution 823), endorsing election results (Reso-
lution 840), and terminating UNTAC (Resolution 860). Importantly, the Security Council included
the patrons of the major factions of the conflict, which could act to intervene on their client’s be-
half. Indeed, China abstained from Resolution 792, which called upon UNTAC to proceed with
elections despite Khmer Rouge recalcitrance, arguing elections without Khmer Rouge participa-
tion would be harmful to the peace process (Sorpong 2000, 263). Additionally, the core group
of major powers and regional actors that supported UNTAC and the SNC needed to coordinate,
and thereby provided a degree of transparency to the UNTAC mission. Beyond the need to build
trust in the UN, transparency was hardwired in UNTAC’s mandate in order build and maintain
trust between the factions in Cambodia and to ensure that UNTAC maintain a neutral political
environment.
Lastly, the multinational nature of UNTAC prevented occupation from turning into permanent
annexation. UNTAC was created out of the Paris Agreements with the support of the UN Security
Council and funding from UN member states. The UN had historically been a major proponent of
Cambodian independence, passing yearly resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces
from Cambodia (Morris 1999, 223). If UNTAC was established with the support of all the factions,
the UN had no way of maintaining indefinite rule of Cambodia. In fact, a key legal question in
establishing UNTAC was whether the UN had the authority to administer territory, even tem-
porarily, at all. Article 78 of the Charter states that the trusteeship did not apply to territories such
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as Cambodia that had become members of the UN (Keller 2005, 157).
Lastly, some of the factors that undermined UNTAC’s effectiveness were the same that guar-
anteed its limited mandate. Put simply, UNTAC did not have the political or military unity to
maintain an occupation beyond its mandate. As Lt. Gen. Sanderson reported: “Generating cohe-
sion among 16,000 troops, representing 34 member states of the UN, was not an easy task” (1995,
33). Moreover, no single troop contributor could have maintained the mission absent support
from the international community.
Although this case study shows the effect of credible commitment, it is also important to rec-
ognize that other factors also played a role. First, UNTAC was able to neutralize political opposi-
tion though collective decision-making encompassing the main parties of the conflict. By placing
emphasis on mitigating political dislocation, UNTAC avoided stoking resistance. Second, and
relatedly, UNTAC was able to minimize fatalities because it was excessively cautious, and thus
avoided placing its soldiers in harm’s way.
7.4 Alternative Theories
This section examines the explanatory power of alternative theories of resistance to foreign occu-
pation, namely nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context. As will be demon-
strated, nationalism provides limited insight to variation in resistance patterns, opportunity struc-
ture helps explain some of the location of resistance, and international context is either irrelevant
or makes predictions contrary to observed patterns of resistance.
7.4.1 Nationalism
Superficially, the resistance seemed motivated by nationalism. Nationalist and independence
themes peppered the rhetoric of resistance groups. Sihanouk declared: ”We fought against the
Viet Minh in 1953/54 as we fought against the Siamese [Thai] and Annamese [Vietnamese] who
were invading our country in the past centuries and because they wanted to colonize us in place
of the French colonists” (Pouvatchy 1986, 441). Similarly, the Khmer Rouge argued they had
prevented ”the Vietnamese from annexing Cambodia and. . . from turning present-day Cambodia
into the second Kampuchean Krom [Vietnamese province]” (Abuza 1995, 436, 438). During the
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UNTAC period, all of the opposition parties sought to boost their political legitimacy by mak-
ing reference to their resistance against Vietnam (Friesen 1996, 184). Conversely, Vietnam went
to great lengths to depict the 1979 invasion as Cambodian-led, going so far as to initially deny
they were fighting the war at all. Instead the KUFNS was credited for leading the fighting and
capturing the capital (Becker 1986, 438).
Concretely, nationalist rhetoric was translated in xenophobia against Vietnamese soldiers and
ethnically Vietnamese Cambodians (Doyle 1999, 198). The Khmer had a profound sense of infe-
riority and deep resentment against Vietnam and Vietnamese culture (Morris 1999, 17; Pao-min
1987, 750). Relations between ethnically Khmer and ethnically Vietnamese Cambodians —many
who had lived in Cambodia for generations— could be tense. As one Khmer put it: ”we talk to one
another, but we are not friendly. Everyone would be happy to see them leave” (Martin 1994, 261).
Resistance groups argued that Khmer should not fight Khmer, in other words that Cambodians
should not collaborate with the PRK in order to fight Cambodian resistance groups (Gottesman
2003, 228). Similarly, Cambodians saw the teaching of Vietnamese under PRK rule as a funda-
mental threat to Cambodian independence. Both when in power and when resisting Vietnam, the
Khmer Rouge considered any foreigner as a potential threat. It banned foreign languages and cul-
tures, including those of minorities living in Cambodia (Gottesman 2003, 29). During the UNTAC
period, the Khmer Rouge massacred ethnic Vietnamese, claiming that Vietnam was still secretly
running the country (Chandler 2008, 288). When UNTAC drafted electoral laws that allowed any
person born in Cambodia with one parent born in Cambodia with the right to vote, resistance
factions demanded that ethnic Khmer living in Vietnam, as well as Cambodians living overseas,
also be granted the right to vote in the elections. In contrast, resistance factions insisted that any
ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia, regardless of how long they lived in Cambodia, be barred
from voting (Ratner 1995, 178).
The role of royalist resistance factions can also be seen as evidence of nationalism. The royalist
FUNCINPEC was one of three main resistance groups. At some point, every resistance faction
swore fealty to King Sihanouk, a leader and symbol of the Cambodian nation (Keller 2005, 129).
Moreover, both the Khmer Rouge and the republican FNLPK sought to boost their legitimacy by
trying to recruit Sihanouk. Lastly, during the Paris peace talks and UNTAC occupation, Sihanouk
played a role as the focal point of negotiations.
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Upon closer examination, nationalist explanations provide limited insight into the dynamics
of resistance. Nationalism may have characterized resistance rhetoric under Vietnamese occupa-
tions, but factions turned against each other once the occupation ended, an anomaly for nation-
alism. Furthermore, two of the three major resistance groups that fought Vietnamese occupation
did not fight UN rule. The Khmer Rouge and the republican FNPLK may have sought Sihanouk’s
support, but in power they had overthrown Sihanouk himself. Royalist factions were among the
weakest resistance groups. In short, it is hard to argue that royalist nationalism was a major factor
since groups that had previously opposed the King were using him in a cynical bid to mobilize
precisely those who were not fighting. Lastly, it bears repeating that the vast majority of Cambo-
dian did not resist or actively collaborate with Vietnamese and UN occupation. Most Cambodians
saw the Vietnamese as protection from the return of the Khmer Rouge and government jobs as a
precious opportunity to escape poverty.
What about the role of mass schooling in stoking nationalism? As Darden (Forthcoming) argues,
durable political loyalties are forged in the first round of mass schooling. This theory provides
limited purchase in explaining resistance in Cambodia. The first round of schooling was set up in
1917 during the colonial period, when both Cambodia and Vietnam were part of French Indochina
(Ross 1990). Even if one dates the beginning of mass schooling to 1953 when Cambodia achieved
independence, the education hypothesis fails to explain why Cambodia generated more resistance
to Vietnam than to UNTAC, since neither state initiated the first round of schooling in Cambodia.
7.4.2 Opportunity Structures
Opportunity structure theories argue that resistance will be more likely when barriers to mobiliza-
tion and combat are lowered. Factors that affect the ease of undertaking resistance include terrain,
economic conditions, community structures, and military capacity. Unlike nationalist theories of
resistance, opportunity structures provide partial explanation for resistance in Cambodia.
Terrain and foreign sanctuary were critical components of resistance to Vietnamese rule and
help explain the location of resistance to Vietnamese occupation. Following the Vietnamese in-
vasion in 1979, the Khmer Rouge executed a strategic retreat to the mountains and dense jungle
of Western Cambodia (Slocomb 2001, 195). These mountains provided cover for resistance while
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slowing the advance of mechanized Vietnamese forces. Subsequently, most resistance took place
in the countryside. The memoirs of a Chinese diplomat traveling with the Khmer Rouge in the
Cardamom Mountains provide a vivid account of the terrain:
”High on the mountain the forest was dense. The grass was deep and the way slippery.
It was tough going. Forty degree temperatures and 40-plus-kilogram packs made the
level of difficulty unimaginable. Sweat flowed and clothes soaked through. It took an
entire day to climb one mountain” (Shui 2006, 16).
”In the forest. . . Twisted roots and gnarled branches connected the trees. The vines had long thorns
and were twisted into a bramble. It might as well have been ’hell’s gate’ ” (Shui 2006, 18). Through-
out the Vietnamese occupation, many resistance camps were set up along the Daˆngreˆk mountain-
ous range on the Thai border.
Terrain was also influenced by weather patterns. Cambodia alternates between a wet season
of monsoons from May to October and a dry season from November to April. Monsoon patterns
and attendant flooding and road damage, affected the ability of parties to deploy heavy weapons.
Vietnam planned its invasion of Cambodia for December 1978, when the terrain would be dry
and therefore more suitable for armored vehicles and when the rice harvest would be available
to its army (Gottesman 2003, 31). Towards the end of each year, the rain stopped and the roads
dried off. This played in favor of incumbent forces, which used the opportunity to move in heavy
weapons and destroy rebel bases. Large counterinsurgency operations, including the 1984/1985
offensive that drove much of the resistance out of Cambodia, were generally conducted during the
dry season. The same patterns characterized resistance during the UNTAC period where ceasefire
violations typically increased with the onset of the dry season (UN 2003).
The single most important facilitator of resistance to Vietnamese occupation was the foreign
sanctuary provided by Thailand. There were as many as one million Cambodian refugees on the
Thai border, providing a deep recruitment pool for resistance groups (Corfield 1991, 18). Un-
doubtedly, Thai sanctuary prevented the collapse of resistance groups following the 1984/1985
dry season offensive.
Resistance to Vietnamese occupation demonstrates the role of military capacity. During the in-
vasion and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaign, Vietnam flooded Cambodia with troops.
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At the height of the occupation in 1985, there were approximately 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers
backed by 30,000 Cambodian troops. However, as the Cold War drew to a close, funding and
supplies from Moscow dried up. This had secondary effects for Vietnamese and PRK military
capacity. Importantly, the end of the Cold War can be seen as an exogenous shock to the mil-
itary capacity of Vietnam and the PRK. It affected the military capacity of both but it was not
the Cambodian resistance itself that determined the end of the Cold War. As such, it provides a
useful angle to observe the impact of military capabilities. Indeed, the departure of Vietnamese
troops created a security vacuum in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge and resistance groups were
able to reestablish control over a quarter of the country. Ultimately, as its military capacity dimin-
ished, Cambodia was forced to look for diplomatic ways of resolving the conflict. Military factors
were also crucial in UNTAC occupation. The late deployment of the UNTAC military contingent
emboldened the Cambodian factions to violate the Paris Agreements and jeopardized UNTAC’s
mission (Findlay 1994, 7). Once deployed, the mere presence of UNTAC decreased the number of
attacks in Cambodia (Doyle 1995, 33).
Resistance in Cambodia illustrates the role of certain economic factors. General poverty rates
by province do not correlate with presence of resistance (Ministry of Planning 2006). The greatest
determinant of resistance was proximity to sanctuaries in Thailand, rather than the opportunity
cost of fighting. Recruits in the resistance did not come from any specific socio-economic groups,
although resistance occurred predominantly in rural areas. Poverty and dim economic prospects
appear to have pushed more to collaborate with the PRK regime to secure jobs rather than resist
it to secure independence. Certain collaborators “were above all concerned with ensuring a bare
minimum for their family cell and denounced their neighbors if that could win them a promotion”
(Martin 1994, 240). According to Herder, working with the Vietnamese “usually meant a more
secure standard of living: for those working in committees, in militias, or in factories there was
more rice than for those working in the fields” (Heder 1980, 58). One economic factor that did play
a role was access to timber and gems. Timber, exported through Thailand, helped fund resistance
groups during Vietnamese occupation. The UN Security Council asked that UNTAC impose a
timber export ban to starve resistance groups (Collier 2003, 145).
Lastly, resistance in Cambodia does not follow the role of community structures in sustain-
ing resistance. Resistance groups recruited mainly from refugee camps, not territory under Viet-
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namese or UNTAC control. This fact is significant because potential resisters did not face the
risks and restrictions that make tight-knit communities necessary for recruitment into resistance
groups. On the contrary it was precisely their control of various refugee camps that allowed re-
sistance groups to sustain their forces. Patterns of resistance did partially map on ethno-linguistic
diversity. Cambodia is 90 percent ethnic Khmer and 5 percent Vietnamese. Ethnically Vietnamese
Cambodian live in urban centers such as Phnom Penh, a substantial number lived in the South
and Southeast along the lower Mekong and Basak rivers as well as on the shores of the Tonle Sap
(Ross 1990). It is unclear whether resistance was weaker in regions with larger Vietnamese popu-
lations because of preexisting political preferences (as political dislocation theory would expect),
because of impediments to mobilization (as opportunity structure theory would expect), or due
to other factors altogether. However, since few resisters organized within Cambodia proper, it is
doubtful ethnic homogeneity was the prime determinant of resistance.
Opportunity structures alone are insufficient to understand variation in resistance. Cambo-
dia’s weather patterns and mountain ranges did not change between Vietnam’s occupation and
UNTAC’s. Yet the level of resistance was radically altered. Even military factors cannot explain
variation in resistance, absent an understanding of the political context. As Lt. Gen. Sanderson
notes (1995, 32) and as the theory of political dislocation would predict, troop strength must be
calibrated to the political objectives sought. Vietnam deployed over 13 times the number of troops
of UNTAC. However, Vietnam’s political objectives were far more sweeping than those of UN-
TAC and therefore required far more troops to enforce them. In sum, opportunity structures help
understand those factors that facilitate or hinder resistance, but not those that motivate it.
7.4.3 International Context
International context theory of resistance posits that foreign threats play an important role in shap-
ing incentives to undertake resistance. When occupied societies face a greater threat from a third-
party state than from their occupiers, they will accept the lesser evil of occupation rather than
undertaking resistance. However, this theory fails to explain variation in resistance to occupation
in Cambodia.
According to Edelstein (2008a, 188), there was no commonly perceived threat to Cambodia
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during the Vietnamese occupation between 1979 and 1989. Therefore, in line with international
context theory, there was significant resistance in Vietnam. During the UNTAC occupation, which
Edelstein does not include in his definition of occupation, it could be argued Cambodia faced
the continued threat of Vietnam. Therefore, in line with predictions, there was little resistance to
occupation.
However, a closer examination of the case demonstrates that international factors played a
secondary role, at best. First, contrary to Edelstein, many Cambodians did perceive a third-party
threat during Vietnamese occupation. This perceived threat was not a state, but the Khmer Rouge
itself. If anything the fear of the return of the Khmer Rouge pushed many towards collaboration
with the PRK government. Second, it is not clear that Vietnam constituted a commonly perceived
third-party threat during the UNTAC occupation. The international environment became notably
less threatening with the close of the Cold War. If this were the case, we should expect to see
more resistance to UNTAC, not less. Moreover, it was the end of the Cold War and international
isolation that pushed Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia in 1989. The subsequent civil war led
to calls for the deployment of a multinational force to oversee a ceasefire and the organization of
elections. Cambodians were willing to stomach UN occupation because the alternative was civil
war. Thus, it was not the threat of Vietnamese occupation that led to UNTAC, but precisely the
security vacuum caused by its departure.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter studied the case of Cambodia to test various theories of resistance to occupation.
First I described the context of Vietnamese occupation between 1979 and 1989 and UN occupa-
tion between 1991 and 1993. I noted that Vietnamese occupation generated significant resistance
whereas the UN occupation generated relatively little resistance.
Second, I argued that the theory of political dislocation helps explain the composition of re-
sistance groups. As predicted, those groups that stood most to lose politically from Vietnamese
occupation took up arms. Moreover, as the corollary of factional politics would expect, resistance
groups were not unified, but divided along political lines. When the occupation ended and Viet-
namese troops withdrew, these factions turned against each other. Indeed, resistance served not
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only to expel foreign occupiers, but also to preserve and enhance the relative position of political
contenders. Conversely, the UN went to great lengths to minimize political dislocation, and as
a consequence faced less resistance. Furthermore, I argued that trust theory of resistance could
shed light on the sources of resistance. Specifically, the UN could better credibly commit to treat-
ing the local population benignly and vacating Cambodia and therefore faced less resistance than
did Vietnam.
Third, I took stock of alternative theories of resistance to occupation. I found that national-
ism, while offering a superficially plausible explanation of resistance, fails to explain variation in
resistance between the Vietnamese and the UN occupations. Opportunity structure theories of
resistance, in particular those relating to terrain and foreign sanctuary, help understand the loca-
tion of resistance, but not the origins of resistance itself. Opportunity structure theories relating
to economic conditions and community structure provide limited explanatory power. Lastly, the
predictions of international context fail to account for patterns in resistance. The greatest threats
to the Cambodian population were domestic, not international. There is little evidence that Cam-
bodians took into account foreign threats in deciding whether to resist occupation.
Chapter 8
Resistance to Occupation in Lebanon
(1976-2010)
”We want to know if Lebanon is a sovereign state or a whorehouse.”
-President Camille Chamoun, March 19781
8.1 Introduction
Lebanon has lived under foreign occupation for centuries. During the 19th century France, the UK,
and Russia intervened in Ottoman Lebanon to protect Maronite, Druze, and Orthodox communi-
ties, respectively. Following the First World War, Lebanon and Syria became French protectorates
under a League of Nations mandate. Soon after Lebanon became an independent republic in 1943,
Syria, Egypt, and Israel all began meddling in Lebanese politics (Winslow 1996, 208).
This chapter focuses on the years between 1976 and 2010, a particularly painful era in Lebanon’s
history, marked by devastating intra-communal warfare and foreign occupation. By the early
1980s, Lebanon was occupied by no less than three different foreign armies: Syria, Israel, and the
Multinational Forces. These simultaneous occupations provide a useful within-case comparison
for various theories of resistance to occupation because it holds temporal and socio-economic fac-
tors constant while allowing for variation on the key characteristics of the occupiers and type of
1Fisk 1990, 140.
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occupations. Indeed, occupations varied in force size, political dislocation, civilian victimization,
religion, regime type, and international mandate. Moreover, although occupation forces operated
in the same country in the same time frame, they attracted varying levels of resistance from dif-
ferent groups. As such, Lebanon provides a unique opportunity to understand the dynamics of
violent resistance.
Because Lebanon was afflicted by civil war for much of the period under study, it also rep-
resents a critical test for political dislocation theory and the factionalism corollary. Recall that
political dislocation theory predicts that resistance will be most acute when it alters the domestic
balance of political power in an occupied society. Polarized societies, notably those engulfed in
civil war, should be particularly sensitive to political dislocation caused by occupation and there-
fore more likely to generate resistance. As will be demonstrated, this was indeed the case. In
fact, the theory of political dislocation performs better than alternative theories of nationalism,
opportunity structures, and international context.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a brief overview of the civil war in
Lebanon. The second section provides the context of the Syrian, Israeli, Multinational Forces, and
UN occupations of Lebanon and patterns of resistance. The third section assesses the theories of
political dislocation and trust. The fourth section compares the predictions of political dislocation
and trust to the prediction of alternative theories of resistance to occupation, namely: nationalism,
opportunity structures, and international context.
To preview the results, the case of Lebanon provides strong support for the theory of political
dislocation. Resistance was not a spontaneous reaction to occupation. Factions of Lebanese society
adopted strategies of resistance, neutrality, or collaboration toward different occupiers depending
on the perceived effect of each on the domestic balance of political power. Moreover, resistance
factions competed to improve their political fortunes. I also find evidence of the impact of trust
on resistance. Although no foreign occupier entered Lebanon with the purpose of victimizing
the population, the failure to distinguish civilians from insurgents led to indiscriminate violence,
which in turn was used to mobilize resistance. Religious affinity did help close the trust gap
between occupiers and occupied, but there is limited evidence that an international mandate and
regime type could compensate for instability caused by political dislocation. Importantly, I find
little evidence to support the assertion that resistance was motivated primarily by nationalism.
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8.2 Historical Context
8.2.1 Origins of the Civil War
To understand the causes of both occupation and resistance in Lebanon, it is important to un-
derstand the schisms within Lebanese society. Lebanon is half the size of Connecticut with a
population of 3,250,000 in the mid 1970s. Though ethnically and linguistically Arab, it contains
a wide array of religious groups, including Christian Maronites, Sunnis, Shias, Druze, Orthodox,
and Catholics, among others (see Figure 8.1(a)). Upon independence in 1943, Lebanon’s power
brokers agreed to manage this sectarian diversity through what was known as the National Pact.
This Pact was an unwritten agreement by which the main political positions were to be distributed
according to religious affiliation. Under this Pact, the President would be a Maronite, the Prime
Minister would be a Sunni, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies would be a Shia (Russell
1985, 17). The National Pact reflected the demographic composition of Lebanon at the time, and
the Maronites’ dominance within it.2
Over time, the Pact came under strain due to differential birth rates between sectarian groups
and a massive influx of Palestinian refugees. Where Maronites represented some 54 percent of
the population in 1956, they were only a third of the population by the 1970s (Collelo 1988). The
Maronites’ predicament was aggravated by the influx of some 120,000 (Sunni) Palestinian refugees
who were expelled from Jordan in 1971. In southern Lebanon and in the refugee districts of Beirut,
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) assumed quasi-sovereign authority, using Lebanese
territory to conduct periodic raids on Israel (Weinberger 1986, 123). Maronite leaders came to see
Palestinians and their associated Fedayeen as threats to the National Pact and their preeminent
place within it. The PLO provided manpower and weapons to help the Maronites’ Muslim rivals
in Lebanon press for greater power and representation (Friedman 1989, 17).
Gradually, Lebanon became polarized between the status quo Maronites and revisionist Pales-
tinians, Druze, and Sunnis. Maronites formed private armies such as the Phalangists, the Tigers,
and the Guardians of the Cedars to protect the status quo. The revisionists camp, in turn formed
2The literature on Lebanon frequently uses the terms Christian and Maronite interchangeably. Maronites, Orthodox,
and other Christian groups usually allied during the civil war, and the founder of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), was
led by the Greek Catholic Saad Haddad. I use the term Maronite since they were the driving force within the Christian
bloc.
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Figure 8.1: Sectarian groups and occupation zones of Lebanon
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its own private armies including the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Lebanese Com-
munist Party, and Sunni Nasserites who allied with Palestinian militia (Badran 2009, 43).
These tensions came to a head on 13 April 1975 when gunmen opened fire on a Maronite con-
gregation outside a church in suburban Beirut. Suspecting Palestinians were responsible for the
attack, Maronite Phalangists retaliated against a bus of Palestinians setting off a spiral of violence
that became the civil war (Collelo 1988; Friedman 1989, 17). Druze, Palestinian, and other Mus-
lim revisionist factions launched a series of coordinated attacks, pushing back Maronite forces. It
soon became clear that revisionist factions not only intended to punish Maronite militias, but also
to overthrow President Franjieh and replace him with a leader more amenable to reforms. As the
Druze leader of the PSP Kamal Jumblatt stated: the other side had ruled for 140 years and now
”it’s our turn” (Winslow 1996, 197). By 1976, Christian and government forces were on the defen-
sive against revisionist forces. In such dire straits, the President of Lebanon called upon Syria to
help.
8.2.2 Syrian Occupation (1976-2005)
Invasion
Lebanon’s slide toward civil war worried Syria. If it didn’t heed the Maronites’ call for assistance,
Israel would invade Lebanon in order to forestall a leftist Palestinian-led government. Such a con-
tingency would expose Syria’s western flank to Israeli attack (Rabinovich 1984, 48; Hinnebusch
2005, 151). Moreover, if the sectarian conflict spilled over into Syria, it could have dire conse-
quences for the ruling Alawite regime. Thus, although Syria had previously supported Palestinian
and Muslim groups in Lebanon, more immediate security concerns dictated that Syria intervene
on behalf of the Maronite government.
On 9 April 1976, some 3,000 Syrian regulars crossed the border into Lebanon. Syrian forces
deployed throughout Northern and Central Lebanon, principally in areas outside Maronite con-
trol (Colleleo 1988; Seale 1990). In the initial stage of the occupation, Syria faced resistance from
Palestinian and leftist groups along the Beirut-Damascus highway, the mountains surrounding
Beirut, Sidon, and parts of Tripoli (Winslow 1996, 202; Fisk 1990, 85; Rabinovitch 1984, 55; Pollack
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2002, 514-520).3 On 1 June 1976, Assad dispatched an additional 12,000 troops and 300 tanks to
forestall a PLO-leftist victory against the Christian led government. Over time, Syria’s commit-
ment escalated to 25,000 troops and 800 tanks (Clodfelter 2002, 657). By October 1976, Syria and
its Maronite clients had caused significant damage to leftists and Palestinian groups.
Syria did not completely eliminate the resistance. Peace conferences held by the Arab League
in Riyadh and Cairo in October 1976 secured a temporary halt in fighting among Lebanese fac-
tions and with Syria. Importantly, the conferences created an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), which
provided the fig leaf of multilateral legitimacy and funding for Syrian forces already in Lebanon
(Fisk 1990, 187).
Resistance
Syria faced initial opposition from members of Lebanon’s Palestinian and Sunni communities. As
Syria settled into a more permanent role in Lebanon under the aegis of the ADF, relations with
the Maronite community began to collapse. Hostilities between Syrian occupation forces and
Maronite factions broke out in February and again in July 1978 in East Beirut. On 27 September
1978, Syria escalated the conflict by shelling Christian East Beirut. When the clashes ended on
7 October 1978, 200 Syrian soldiers were dead and several hundred wounded (Clodfelter 2002,
648). 1978 marked the clear break in the alliance between Maronite Lebanon and Syria. Further
hostilities between Maronite militias and Syrian troops erupted in April 1981 in East Beirut and
Zahle.
The mandate of the ADF was renewed several times until 26 September 1982, when President
Amine Gemayel announced he would not be asking for a renewed mandate (Cassese 1986, 156).
In 1986, the Lebanese government formally requested an end to the Syrian presence in Lebanon
(Von Glahn 1992, 688). However, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon is a textbook case of how
invited intervention can turn into imposed occupation. Syrian forces generally concentrated in the
east and north of the country, particularly during the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions of Southern
Lebanon. As Israel retreated to South Lebanon, Syria reestablished itself westward, entering West
Beirut with 7,000 troops and 60 tanks on February 1987. There it encountered minor resistance
3It could be argued that Palestinians could not constitute resistance groups, properly understood, since they them-
selves were outsiders in Lebanon.
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from Hezbollah as it attempted to seize control of the group’s headquarters (O’Ballance 1998, 174).
Gradually, Lebanon became dominated by Syria, with the threat of force and the fear of renewed
civil war deterring political leaders from challenging Syria intrusions in Lebanese politics.
The last major armed resistance campaign against Syria occurred in 1989, as Lebanon’s civil
war was reaching its own bloody crescendo. In 1988, the term of President Amine Gemayel ex-
pired. Unable to convene a quorum in the chamber of deputies, Gemayel appointed Michel Aoun,
commander of the Lebanese army as interim leader of Lebanon. Salim al-Hoss, the Sunni Prime
Minister countered that if a quorum could not be reached to constitutionally appoint a new presi-
dent, he should be the interim executive (Winslow 1996, 258). Faced with gridlock, Lebanon ended
up with two governments, both based in Beirut and neither fully controlling much of Lebanon.
With the assistance of Iraq, Aoun embarked on a ”war of consolidation” to bring Lebanon under
his control (Mackey 2008, 262). Faced with a hostile Maronite Prime Minister allied with Iraq,
Syria sided with the government of Salim al-Hoss. In March 1989, the Syrian army and its local
allies launched an attack on Aoun’s forces and shelled East Beirut (Winslow 1996, 259). Finally, on
13 October 1990, Syria launched a major operation defeating Aoun’s forces and sending him into
exile (Clodfelter 2002).
The removal of Aoun marked the beginning of the end of the civil war. Slowly with the support
of the Syrian army the Lebanese army gained control of a greater part of the country. All militias,
with the notable exception of Hezbollah, agreed to disarm. Despite the end of the civil war, Syria
remained in Lebanon with 30,000 troops. The visibility of Syrian troops in everyday life, however,
was greatly diminished. Much of the management of checkpoints and traffic was being handed
over the reconstituted Lebanese army (Winslow 1996, 281). In 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed
a Treaty of ”Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination,” which legitimized Syria’s military
presence in Lebanon. It stipulated that Lebanon would not be made a threat to Syria’s security and
that Syria was responsible for protecting Lebanon from external threats, essentially formalizing
Lebanon’s status as a protectorate of Syria (Fisk 1990, 223).
Syria’s presence began to be challenged, albeit peacefully, in the late 1990s. In 1998, Syria
rigged presidential elections in favor of Emile Lahoud. Syria also increased its intrusion into the
affairs of Lebanon, such as harsh repressions of student demonstrations and censoring of criti-
cal Lebanese media (International Crisis Group 2010, 5). On 9 September 2004, the UN Security
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Council passed resolution 1559, calling for noninterference of all parties in Lebanese affairs and the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon (Mackey 2008, 208). On 14 February 2005, popular
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed by a massive car bomb. Although the involvement
of Syria was not confirmed, Hariri had only recently resigned from his positions as Prime Minister
as a protest against Syrian support for President Lahoud. Hariri’s assassination provoked strong
reactions from all segments of Lebanon, in what came to be known as the ”Cedar Revolution.”
On 28 February, protests ousted Syria’s handpicked Prime Minister, Omar Karami (Mackey 2008,
209-210). On 14 March 2005, a million Lebanese participated in an anti-Syrian Lebanese indepen-
dence demonstration (Blanford 2006, 161). Faced with the largest protests in Lebanese history,
Syria removed all its troops from Lebanon on 26 April 2005.
8.2.3 Israeli Occupation (1978, 1982-2000)
Operation Litani
Israel viewed the establishment of the PLO during the 1970s on its northern border with even
greater alarm than Syria. As early as 1976, Israel started arming and training Christian militias to
attack Palestinians in South Lebanon (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984; Winslow 1996, 204, 210). This proxy
warfare proved insufficient to prevent Palestinian attacks on Israel. On 11 March 1978, Fatah gun-
men hijacked Israeli buses in Tel Aviv, resulting in the death of 35 Israelis. On 15 March 1978, Israel
retaliated by attacking PLO positions in South Lebanon. The invasion was known as Operation
Litani, referring to the Litani river at the north most tip of the invasion. Fighting involved mainly
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) allied with Maronite militiamen from the South Lebanon Army (SLA)
against the PLO and its leftist allies. On 19 March 1978, the UN Security Council called for Israel
to withdraw from Lebanese territory and on 21 March Israel accepted a UN-sponsored ceasefire.
The war had succeeded in temporarily dislodging the PLO from most of its positions south of the
Litani with the UN patrolling a buffer zone on the Lebanon-Israel border (Clodfelter 2002 639-640;
Winslow 1996, 213).
CHAPTER 8. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN LEBANON (1976-2010) 283
Operation Peace for Galilee
Operation Litani only temporarily solved the issue of Palestinian infiltration of South Lebanon.
The Lebanese government, crippled and divided as it was by sectarian warfare, could not credibly
commit to restraining the PLO. The UN was seen as too weak militarily and politically to make up
for Lebanon’s deficiencies. Thus, Palestinian forces simply redeployed to Southern Lebanon after
the departure of Israeli forces. Meanwhile, all parties fanned the flames of Lebanon’s civil war by
providing weapons to sectarian factions. Arab states continued to supply the PLO through their
Druze allies, whereas Israel had negotiated a weapons deal with Bashir Gemayel, the head of the
Maronite Phalangist militia (Fisk 1990, 139).
By 1982, Israeli Prime Minister Begin had decided more drastic action was necessary. As Fried-
man notes: ”The idea that Israel might finally be able once and for all to bring an end to the phys-
ical and existential challenge of the Palestinians was an intoxicating notion that touched the soul
of the vast majority of Israelis.”(1989, 143). The question was not whether to occupy Lebanon, but
only how much and when. On 3 June 1982, Palestinian riflemen from the Abu Nidal Organiza-
tion gravely wounded Israel’s Ambassador Schlomo Argov in London. Although the PLO was
not responsible for the attack (Abu Nidal was its rival) Israel used this incident as a pretext for a
long-planned invasion of PLO-controlled South Lebanon (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 98).
On 6 June 1982, Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee with 60,000 troops (Clodfelter 2002,
653; Winslow 1996, 222). The war quickly escalated, as the IDF engaged Syrian forces in the Bekaa
valley. Syria sent 35,000 troops to reinforce the 30,000 troops already present in Lebanon. Israeli
and Syrian tanks clashed while the largest air battle since the Second World War raged overhead.
On 11 June, Syria and Israel agreed to a ceasefire. At this point, Israel controlled Southern Lebanon
including the cities of Sidon and Tyre (Clodfelter 2002, 653). Israeli forces reached Beirut on 14 June
1982 and began to lay siege to Muslim West Beirut, demanding the expulsion of the PLO. The siege
was lifted on 21 August 1982, when the PLO agreed to evacuate the city under the supervision of
a Multinational Force.
Israel’s occupation of Lebanon was set back on 15 September 1982, when newly elected presi-
dent Bashir Gemayel was killed in an explosion at the Phalange party’s headquarters. To prevent
full-scale war between leftists and their Palestinian allies and Maronites, Israel occupied West
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Beirut. The incursion proved to be disastrous. Phalangists, operating under the watch of Israeli
forces, entered the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila in southern Beirut, and massacred be-
tween 700 and 2,000 Palestinians (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 282).4 Although it had entered Lebanon
seeking to counter the PLO, Israel was quickly being drawn into the broader Lebanese civil war.
Israel faced a classic occupier’s dilemma (Edelstein 2008a). Staying in Lebanon would only ag-
gravate resistance, adding to the human, financial, and political costs of the war. Exiting Lebanon
would jeopardize hard-earned gains. To extricate itself from this predicament, Israel attempted
to normalize relations with the newly elected government of Amine Gemayel (the late Bashir’s
brother). On 17 May 1983, Israel and the government of Amine Gemayel signed a peace treaty.
However, the treaty was extremely controversial, both within Lebanon and throughout the Arab
world. Massive domestic and Syrian pressure forced the Lebanese government to abrogate the
treaty in March 1984 (Dassa Kaye 2002, 564).
Security Zone
Faced with these setbacks, Israel began pulling back from Lebanon. In August 1983, Israel with-
drew from the Shouf surrounding Beirut south the Awali river. Following the formation of a new
government of national unity in January 1985, Israel announced a further withdrawal to Southern
Lebanon (Mowles 1986, 1361). By 7 June 1985, Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon
except for an 850-square kilometer stretch of land known as the security zone alongside the Israeli
border (Byman 2011, 219). Israel considered this security zone, representing some 10 percent of
Lebanon’s territory, as an essential buffer protecting Israel from direct attacks. Instead, the secu-
rity zone became a magnet for attacks by Lebanese militias, predominantly Hezbollah (Norton
2007, 41).
The security zone prevented ground infiltration of Northern Israel but failed to prevent mor-
tar and rocket attacks from Hezbollah and Palestinian groups (Luft 2000). In response, Israel
launched Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. As Israeli casu-
alties in Lebanon mounted —eventually surpassing those of the Six Day War— domestic support
in Israel for the occupation dried up. By 1999, a majority of Israelis saw the presence of the IDF
4Israeli intelligence estimated between 700 and 800 casualties, whereas the Palestinian Red Crescent put the death
toll at over 2,000.
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in South Lebanon as a major liability (Dassa Kaye 2002). Finally, on 24 May 2000 Israel completed
a unilateral withdrawal of South Lebanon, fulfilling a campaign pledge made by Prime Minister
Barak (Norton 2007, 115).
Resistance
Israel entered Lebanon with simple —if unrealistic— objectives: drive out the PLO, neutralize
Syria, prop up a friendly regime led by Bashir Gemayel, and normalize relations through a peace
treaty (Friedman 1989, 1). Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon predicted the whole operation
would last six weeks (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 46). Such simple objectives soon faced stiff resistance
from Palestinian and Shia militants.
During the first stages of the 1982 invasion, Israel faced the bulk of resistance from the some
6,000 Palestinian militants in the mountains, orchards, and refugee camps in South Lebanon, Tyre,
Sidon, and West Beirut (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 121, 134; Rabinovitch 1984, 135). During its siege of
Beirut in 1982 and 1983, Israel faced continued ambushes, snipers, and roadside bombs set up by
Palestinian militants and the Shia group Amal. By the time the PLO evacuated Beirut, Israel lost
some 400 troops in combat with Palestinians, Amal, and the Syrian army.
The evacuation of the PLO and the retreat of Syria did not end the conflict. Soon Israel faced
stiff resistance from Shia groups in South Lebanon. On 11 November 1982, a suicide bomber blew
up the IDF’s headquarters in Tyre, killing 75 Israelis. The attack was claimed by Islamic Jihad, a
front for Hezbollah. On 4 November 1983, a Hezbollah operative detonated another massive car
bomb in Tyre, killing 28 Israelis (Byman 2011, 209-210). During the course of Israel’s occupation of
Lebanon, Hezbollah would pioneer the use of suicide attacks. Between 1982 and 2000, there were
35 suicide attacks aimed at the IDF causing 709 Israeli and Lebanese deaths (CPOST 2011).
Following Israel’s withdrawal to the security zone in June 1985, the IDF faced relentless am-
bushes, rocket attacks, and roadside bombs from Hezbollah (Blanford 2011a). By the end of April
1983, Israel had lost 476 in Lebanon and by September 1983 it was 516 (Clodfelter 2002, 654). Fol-
lowing the Taif accords in 1989, and the disbanding of most sectarian militias, resistance against
Israel was mainly conducted by Hezbollah and other smaller Shia and Palestinian groups. Hezbol-
lah did not limit its attacks to Lebanon. It struck the Israeli embassy and a Jewish cultural center
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in Buenos Aires, a synagogue in Istanbul, and Israeli officials in Ankara (Byman 2011, 222-223).
It also engaged in hostage taking to coerce Israel and Western countries to cease their support of
Israel and the Maronite regime in Lebanon. By the time Israel finally withdrew from Lebanon, the
IDF sustained some 901 fatalities (Clodfelter 2002, 654).
8.2.4 MNF Occupation (1982-1984)
Crisis Deployment
In 1982, as Israel besieged Beirut, diplomatic efforts were undertaken by US special envoy Philip
Habib to defuse the confrontation between Israel, Syria, and the PLO. Eventually, Habib negoti-
ated a ceasefire and the evacuation of Syrian and PLO troops from Beirut, overseen by a multi-
national peacekeeping force (MNF). The MNF’s one-month mandate was to assist the Lebanese
army in the safe evacuation of the PLO and to help restore the Lebanese government’s control
over Beirut (Kelly 1996, 192). The MNF deployed between 20 and 25 August 1982 with some 2,300
troops from France, Italy, and the US (Colleleo 1988; Cimbala and Forster 2010, 36). After succeed-
ing in its initial objective of overseeing the departure of the PLO on 30 August, the MNF withdrew
in 12 September 1982.
Second Deployment and Resistance
The deployment of the MNF helped to address the Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the Lebanese
conflict, but failed to resolve underlying sectarian grievances. Less than a week after the departure
of the MNF, president-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. The subsequent Phalangist mas-
sacres of Sabra and Shatila and Israeli deployment to West Beirut led Bashir Gemayel’s brother,
Amine, to call on the MNF to defuse the crisis. The MNF (known as MNF-II) returned to Beirut
on 29 September 1982 as a symbol of support for the government. Like its predecessor, MNF-II
served as a buffer between the IDF and the Lebanese population and was tasked with assisting the
central government in reestablishing control of Beirut. The MNF-II consisted of 4,800 American,
Italian, French, and UK troops (Collelo 1988).
Welcomed at first, the MNF was surprised by the amount of resistance it soon faced. During
its first deployment to Beirut, the MNF felt so safe that Italian and French soldiers could be found
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dining at local restaurants (Fisk 1990, 444-447). The second deployment would prove to be more
controversial because the MNF was now seen as supporting the Maronite government of Lebanon
at the same time as this government was battling Druze and Shia militias with strong support from
Syria. In March 1983, French, Italian, and American contingents were hit by grenade attacks. On
18 April 1983, a suicide car bomber struck the US Embassy in Beirut, killing 63. The attack was
claimed by the Hezbollah front, Islamic Jihad. In August, US forces stationed near the Beirut
International Airport came under frequent attacks by Shia and Druze militants. Responding to
these attacks, President Reagan approved a change of the MNF rules of engagement to allow
for greater use of force in support of the Lebanese army (Kelly 1996, 99). Thus, when Druze
forces attacked US positions on 8-9 September, the 6th fleet shelled Druze position near the town
of Souk al Gharb, five miles south of Beirut (Winslow 1995, 234). On 13 October 1983, suicide
bombers from Islamic Jihad struck the US and French barracks, killing 241 US marines and 58
French soldiers. On 14 December 1983, French soldiers were again targeted by a truck bomb. By
early 1984, the MNF was sinking into Lebanon’s civil war. On 7 February 1984, President Reagan
ordered the withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon. In total, the US, France, and Italy suffered
265, 89, and 2 fatalities respectively (Clodfelter 2002, 654).
8.2.5 UN Occupation (2006-2010)
UNIFIL
Following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the 1978 Litani Operation, the UN Security Council
established the 2,000-person United National Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the
withdraw of Israeli forces. Because this first UNIFIL deployment served primarily as a buffer
between Lebanon and Israel, it is not coded as a formal occupation in this study. UNIFIL largely
failed to fulfill its mandate during the 1980s and 1990s, and remained in Lebanon in an observer
role following Israel’s formal withdrawal in 2000.
In July 2006, hostilities between Israel and Lebanon flared up again when Hezbollah launched
rockets at IDF positions in Northern Israel, killed three Israeli soldiers, and took two hostages
within Israeli territory. Israel retaliated by launching massive airstrikes on Hezbollah positions
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and Lebanese infrastructure, imposing a maritime blockade, and invading Southern Lebanon.5
On 11 August, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1701 calling for a cessation of hostilities.
As a consequence of resolution 1701, the mandate of UNIFIL expanded considerably. The number
of UN troops increased from 2,000 to 15,000. These troops were to accompany and support the
Lebanese army and help ensure the area of South Lebanon be free of armed personnel, assets, and
weapons. This second UNIFIL deployment is coded as an occupation in Southern Lebanon.
Resistance
UNIFIL faced far less resistance than other occupying forces in Lebanon. In some instances it was
attacked by those who opposed the UN’s presence in Southern Lebanon, while in others it was
targeted to send a signal to the international community. On 23 June 2007, six Spanish peace-
keepers were killed when their armored personnel carrier was struck by a car bomb. Although
many suspected Hezbollah was responsible for the attack, there was also evidence the attack was
orchestrated by a local affiliate of al Qaeda in response to Spain’s participation in the Iraq War
(Chassay 2007). On 13 July 2007, a roadside bomb was detonated beside Tanzanian military police
north of Tyre. On 8 January 2008, an Irish UNIFIL jeep was struck by a roadside bomb (Blanford
2011a, AFP 2007). In sum, UNIFIL suffered relatively limited resistance since 2006.
8.3 Theoretical Explanations
The conflict in Lebanon is remarkably complex, involving thousands of fighters and hundreds
of groups. How does one understand resistance to simultaneous occupations in the context of
intra-communal conflict? As this section will demonstrate, political dislocation and trust theories
5The 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon does not count as an occupation by the definition of this study because the
ground campaign lasted less than one month. Israeli forces only entered Lebanon on 17 July 2006 and the ceasefire came
into effect on 14 August 2006. The conflict is also rather unusual because it directly involved non-state resistance rather
than an interstate war followed by non-state resistance. Yet, even for the short duration of the conflict, it corresponds
to patterns identified by political dislocation theory. The vast majority of resistance to the Israeli ground invasion was
carried out by Hezbollah, as opposed to the state or the other sectarian groups of Lebanon. In fact, several Lebanese
politicians were critical of Hezbollah for provoking Israel. Resistance, and therefore Lebanese combat fatalities, was
borne primarily by Hezbollah. An estimated 500 fatalities were Hezbollah against some 43 Lebanese Armed Forces and
Police fatalities (Bishop 2006, 12; AFP 2006). This is unsurprising since the IDF was targeting Hezbollah specifically,
Hezbollah was the only major militia left in Lebanon after the civil war and thus already armed and mobilized, and
the Lebanese Armed Forces reckoned they stood little chance of success in holding back an Israeli invasion and largely
avoided direct clashes with the IDF (for an excellent military analysis of the conflict, see Biddle and Friedman 2008).
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provide valuable lenses to understand the conflict.
8.3.1 Political Dislocation
Political dislocation theory posits that resistance is a function of the disruption of the domestic bal-
ance of political power in occupied societies. In Lebanon, occupiers caused political dislocation
by aligning with various domestic factions. Indeed, occupiers such as Israel and Syria hoped to
secure their long-term political interests by strengthening local allies. In the context of Lebanon’s
sectarian tensions, such political dislocation was extremely destabilizing. The MNF, for its part,
appeared to stumble into political dislocation by supporting what it saw as the legitimate Maronite
government, only to find its position challenged by Shia, Druze, and Palestinian resistance. Par-
ticularly telling in all cases were the varying responses to foreign occupation by different groups.
Syria
Syria occupied most of Lebanon from 1976 until 2005 and faced significant resistance. Variation in
the timing and intensity of resistance provides important insight into its causes. Syria’s occupation
faced stiff resistance from Palestinian, Sunni, and Druze militants, the targets of Syria’s initial
intervention. Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze PSP, condemned Syria‘s ”blatant military
invasion” (O’Ballance 1998, 50). Conversely, the Maronite community welcomed Syria’s initial
intervention. Upon arriving in the Christian suburb of Hazmiyeh, Maronites threw rice and roses
at incoming tank crews (Fisk 1990, 87).
Despite their misgivings about Syrian rule, Maronite leaders calculated that foreign occupation
was preferable to being defeated by leftist forces. After all, Syria was fighting and disarming its
enemies. Within a week of the initial Syrian intervention, Christian militias issued a statement
supporting the invasion (Winslow 1996, 202). Maronite leader Pierre Gemayel initially opposed
Syrian intervention promising to ”fight to the last man.” Eventually he reconsidered his stance
stating: ”it would be pigheaded to oppose the entry of foreign forces that can save the homeland
from disintegration” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 19). Following Syria’s assassination of Druze leader
Kamal Jumblatt, the Phalangist Bashir Gemayel went out of his way to praise President Assad
(Fisk 1990, 119).
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However, Syrian and Maronite political objectives were not perfectly aligned. Syria’s objec-
tive was not to prop up the Maronite regime but rather to control Lebanon by pitting factions
against each other. The Maronites, for their part, sought to use Syria to weaken the PLO, expand
their territorial control, and (for some) to create an independent Maronite state. Such frictions
explain eventual Maronite resistance to Syrian occupation. Following peace negotiations between
Egypt and Israel, Syria saw an opportunity to increase its influence in the Arab world by realign-
ing with the PLO rather than with Lebanon’s Maronite community. Moreover, Syria resented the
Maronites collaboration with Israel during Operation Litani (Rabinovich and Zamir 1979, 605).
When Phalangist and Tiger forces sought to take advantage of the Syrian invasion to expand ar-
eas under their control, Syria kept them in check (Rabil 2003, 54). Syrian forces were bombed
in Beirut by Christian forces following rumors that they would take control of Maronite neigh-
borhoods (O’Ballance 1998, 72; Fisk 1990, 140). When Syria responded by setting up a series of
checkpoints, a Christian soldier from a nearby barrack lowered his anti-aircraft gun and blasted
a Syrian checkpoint, killing 15 soldiers (Winslow 1996, 212). Clashes spiraled once Syria sought
to disarm Maronite militias. By the end of February 1978, former Lebanese President and influen-
tial Maronite power broker Camille Chamoun was denouncing the Syrian forces as an ”army of
occupation” and asking: “We want to know if Lebanon is a sovereign country or a whorehouse”
(O’Ballance 1998, 73; Fisk 1990, 140). Thus, Maronites cooperated with Syria as long as it acted
on their behalf but turned against it as soon as Assad challenged Christian supremacy in Lebanon
(Winslow 1996, 206).
In some circumstances, political dislocation occurred within sectarian groups themselves. For
example, in 1981 Syria promoted a ”Program of National Reconciliation” to install Suleiman Fran-
jieh —a powerful and more pro-Syrian Maronite— as president. Rather than promoting recon-
ciliation, this program triggered clashes between Syrian forces and Phalangists from Franjieh’s
Maronite rival Bashir Gemayel (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 32).
The effects of political dislocation can also be seen in Michel Aoun’s resistance against Syria in
1989. Starting in 1988, Aoun sought to consolidate his control over Lebanon, not to confront Syrian
occupation. Only once Syria sided with the rival government of Salim al-Hoss did Aoun publically
call for a ”war of liberation.” al-Hoss, in contrast, did not believe resistance to occupation was a
priority. As he argued: ”We need political reform. After this we can talk about sovereignty.”
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Aoun and al-Hoss’s different views on occupation stemmed from the differential impact of Syria
on the bargaining power of each. Syrian occupation increased al-Hoss’ bargaining power vis-a`-
vis the Maronite government and weakened Aoun’s. Consequently, Aoun wanted the Syrians out
before negotiating, whereas al-Hoss wanted the reverse (Fisk 1990, 634). Tellingly, Sunni, Shia,
and Druze communities —those who would most benefit from the dilution of Maronite power in
Lebanon— did not heed to Aoun’s call for liberation. For Jumblatt, national liberation concerns
were secondary to domestic politics: ”It is impossible to reach a common denominator with Aoun:
he wants to skip the internal conflict” (Harris 1997, 245).
Following the end of Lebanon’s civil war, different views persisted with regards to Syria’s
occupation. Pax Syriana prevailed domestically and Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty of Broth-
erhood, Cooperation, and Coordination in 1991. Certain newspapers stated that Syria provided
stability and continuity in Lebanon whereas others emphasized the need for more Lebanese inde-
pendence (Sakr 2005, 90).
Political dislocation can be positive or negative. Indeed, certain members of the Shia commu-
nity held very favorable views of Syrian occupation. While Hezbollah, a self-proclaimed resistance
movement, confronted Israeli occupation in the South, it praised Syria’s long-standing presence in
Lebanon. According to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah: ”We emphasize the need to maintain
the distinguished relations between Lebanon and Syria, for they are a common political, secu-
rity, and economic needs dictated by the interests of the two countries and the two peoples, the
needs of political geography, and the requirements of Lebanon‘s stability and the confrontation of
common challenges” (Addis and Blanchard 2011, 12). When massive anti-Syrian demonstrations
rocked Lebanon in 2005, Hezbollah organized a million-man counter-demonstration in support of
Syria (Norton 2007, 7; Mackey 2008, 209-210).6 Even following the withdrawal of Syria, Hezbol-
lah stated: ”We want to keep our special relationship with Syria” (Blanford 2005). Hezbollah had
good reason to support Syrian occupation. Syria was an important patron as well as a conduit for
Iranian weapons. Similarly, the Druze chose to work with Syria in Lebanon if it would keep their
Maronite rivals in check. According to Jumblatt: ”You have to understand that as a leader of a
minority group, I had to make a deal with the devil to counter Maronite ambitions” (interview, 24
6Hezbollah not only supported Syria but some of its members have been indicted for carrying out the attack itself
(Chulov 2011).
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May 2012).
Israel
Political dislocation provides a powerful explanation for resistance to Israeli occupation. Unlike
Syria, which acted as an external balancer among Lebanon’s factions, Israel sought to promote
Maronites, and Bashir Gemayel more specifically, as the leader of Lebanon.
Israel’s occupation of Lebanon was such a quagmire that it is often forgotten that many Ma-
ronite and Shia groups actually welcomed the initial invasion. Indeed, the 1978 and 1982 inva-
sions were aimed at dislodging the PLO from Lebanon. Working in Israel’s favor was Lebanon’s
simmering frustration towards the Palestinian presence. The PLO had ruled parts of Southern
Lebanon, complete with military police and ”revolutionary courts.” Palestinian gunmen manned
roadblocks, collected customs, extorted villagers, and expropriated buildings. Among the lower
ranks, rape and robbery were common (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 80). Some Shias went so far as to
form a self-defense militia known as the National Front for the Safeguard of the South (O’Ballance
1998, 72). Shias also saw Palestinians as a major liability since Israeli strikes aimed at Palestinians
often ended up hitting Shia homes. As Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the first leader of Hezbol-
lah, stated:
”There was political, material, and spiritual weariness; and chaos dominated the south
as a result of the disorderly Palestinian political expansion. . . The situation became suf-
focating: a breathing space, any breathing space, was needed irrespective of its nature”
(Fadlallah 1987, 4).
Similarly, Musa al-Sadr, the founder of Amal said of the PLO: ”It is not a revolution. . . it is a
military machine that terrorizes the Arab world” (Byman 2011, 61).
The Shia community generally supported the objective of removing the PLO from Lebanon
and therefore did not resist the initial Israeli occupation. Mahmoud Ghadar, the military com-
mander of the Shia group Amal, ordered his men not to resist the entry of Israeli army and even to
surrender weapons if necessary (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 134). Just as the Maronites had originally
greeted the Syrians in 1976, Shia villagers showered incoming Israeli troops with rice and flowers
(Mowles 1986, 1352). More than the Shias, Maronites tended to welcome Israeli intervention. The
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Maronite community had closer links to Israel than any other Arab group in the region. As far
back as the 1919 Paris peace conference, Zionists had supported the objective of an independent
Maronite homeland (Weinberger 1986, 278). Both Israel and Lebanon’s Maronites had come to re-
sent the Palestinian community. Founder of the Phalangist party Pierre Gemayel saw Palestinians
as the ”filthiest people” and its alliance with leftists a threat to Maronite rule (Byman 2011, 61).
The convergence of interests led to military support. At the beginning of the civil war Israel
provided Maronite militias with weapons and ammunition (Badran 2009, 49). Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Begin considered the Maronites to be full partners in the struggle against the PLO. Israel went
so far as to plan its 1982 invasion in coordination with certain Maronite leaders and planned for
the IDF to link up with Phalangists in East Beirut (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 61). Months before the
invasion, Chamoun pressed Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon: ”Will you really come to Beirut
as you have said, or is this just really talk?” Sharon replied: ”We’ll get there! Don’t you worry”
(Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 50).
Maronites had strong pragmatic reasons not to resist Israeli occupation. When Israeli troops
arrived in East Beirut in June 1982 ”local Christian families ran into the street, some of them crying
with happiness, their faces wreathed in smiles. . . There was no apprehension, rather a sense of
relief, almost merriment, combined with the sort of suspense that accompanies a meeting with a
potential lover” (Fisk 1990, 234). A Christian villager in South Lebanon stated: ”The Israelis came
here to save us. They saved us all. Now we no longer live in fear of the terrorists” (Fisk 1990, 545).
When the IDF sought to withdraw prior to the evacuation of the PLO, Bashir Gemayel countered:
”Under no circumstances you should do it [withdraw]. . . The terrorists will never leave the city”
(Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 209).
Militants from the Druze community took a more passive approach. Consistent with political
dislocation theory, in the initial stages of the Israeli occupation, they thought it better to wait than
fight. Although the PLO had been an ally of the Druze, the PSP was less concerned about Israeli-
Palestinian conflicts than preserving their own power in Lebanon. Therefore, Jumblatt ordered
his men to take off their uniforms, hide their weapons, and not to fire on the IDF. Meanwhile, he
spoke to Arafat and counseled him that it would be best if he left Beirut (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984,
134, 208).
The positive or neutral attitude of certain Lebanese communities reflected the limited objec-
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tives of Israel’s initial campaign aimed at dislodging the PLO. However, Israel’s 1982 occupation
went beyond those limited objectives. For the first time, it conquered an Arab capital and installed
a new regime. Common to many occupiers seeking to overcome credible commitment problems,
Israel planned to anchor its gains by strengthening a local ally, in this case Bashir Gemayel. Israeli
Defense Minister Sharon did not believe the PLO could be permanently routed from Lebanon
without establishing a ”new political order” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 43).
Israel invested massively in Bashir Gemayel and his Phalangist militia. It armed and clothed
its soldiers (Fisk 1990, 191). Over the years, Israel pumped some $150 million to support the Ma-
ronite community (Byman 2011, 62). During the siege of Beirut, Sharon treated Maronite and non-
Maronite groups differently: ”The northern part of Beirut [Christian Maronite neighborhoods]
should be pampered with electricity, water, food, every possible comfort. . . but the southern part
[Palestinian camps adjacent to Shia neighborhoods] must be destroyed, razed to the ground”
(Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 211). Most importantly, Israel embarked on a campaign to get Bashir
Gemayel elected president. Gemayel did not expect to win the election against other Maronite
candidates such as Chamoun, Frangieh, or Sarkis without direct Israeli intervention. Worse still,
the Muslim faction of parliament specifically opposed the election of Gemayel. So long as both the
Muslim bloc and Gemayel’s rivals boycotted parliament, he could not be elected. Israel therefore
pressured all those delegates it could to form a vote for Bashir (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 46, 230).
Israel’s strong support of the Maronites, and Bashir Gemayel specifically, was tremendously
provocative in the context of Lebanon’s civil war. Israel appeared to have overestimated the mili-
tary and demographic strength of the Maronites, and underestimated the deep political grievances
of Lebanon’s under-represented sectarian groups that were driving the civil war. As Israel laid
siege to Beirut, Gemayel met Walid Jumblatt who warned him: ”I don‘t deny that you’re likely
to emerge the big winner from Israel’s intervention. . . but this is not the time to exploit the situa-
tion for political gain” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 200). Meanwhile Jumblatt told the Israelis: ”You’re
turning the majority of Lebanon against you, which is hardly politic if you hope to obtain a peace
treaty. You entered Lebanon to solve the Palestinian problem and succeeded at it. . . But now you
are acting against your interests!” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 243). Similarly, the leader of Shia Amal
complained that Maronites ”want the foreign and internal occupation to stay. They want to use
Israel as a backup for them” (Wright 1984).
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Rather than using Israel’s support to stabilize Lebanon and try to address the grievances of the
other communities, Gemayel sought to maximize his political and military power (Friedman 1989,
176). He saw no reason to make concessions that would give Muslims a larger role in the govern-
ment or to relinquish the power of the Phalanges (Fisk 1990, 471). Thus, under Israel’s watch,
the kidnapping of Sunnis continued unabated and Shias were offered a pittance for reconstruc-
tion in South Beirut. During the 1982-1983 ”Mountain War,” the IDF allowed Phalangists to enter
the Druze heartland of the Shouf, where they attacked local villagers. In South Lebanon, Israel
handed over territory to the SLA and allowed it to extend its control further north to the Awali
river (Mowles 1986, 1351-1354). Most tragically, Phalangists massacred thousands of Palestinians
in Sabra and Shatila.
Israel’s support for the Maronites was especially ill-timed given the political and demographic
ascendency of the Shia community. Before the civil war and before the occupation, Lebanon’s Shia
community had been mobilizing for greater power and representation. Israel’s occupation ended
up being the spark that lit the flame. War in South Lebanon had led Shias to migrate to the slums of
South Beirut, where many were radicalized (Ajami 1986; Rabil 2003, 56). The Israeli invasion had
replaced the tyranny of the PLO with that of the Maronites. Shia villagers in the south resented
the extortion of the Israeli-appointed SLA (Fisk 1990, 546). When Israel was occupying Beirut,
the Higher Shia Council met to condemn the ”establishment of local administrations in South
Lebanon under various names and pretexts” (Fisk 1990, 541). Similarly Hezbollah’s 1985 politi-
cal manifesto clearly states its opposition to Maronite hegemony: ”The politics followed by the
chiefs of political Maronism through the ’Lebanese Front’ and the ’Lebanese Forces’ cannot guar-
antee peace and tranquility for the Christians of Lebanon, whereas it is predicated upon ’asabiyya
(narrow-minded particularism), on confessional privileges and on the alliance with colonialism”
(Norton 1987, 167-187). By allying with the Maronites and supporting the SLA, Israel was stand-
ing in the way of greater Shia political ambitions. Indeed, it is only in the second phase of Israel’s
occupation of Lebanon, in which it openly supported Bashir Gemayel, did Hezbollah emerge as a
powerful force of resistance.
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MNF
In a meeting with US Secretary of State George Shultz in the spring of 1983, Yitzhak Rabin warned:
”Lebanon is a quagmire. . . Anyone there will get drawn deeper and deeper into the engulfing
morass” (Shultz 1993, 233). Indeed, the fate of the multinational peacekeeping mission in Lebanon
is in many ways a microcosm of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. As with the Israeli occupation,
the MNF occupation of Lebanon had two stages. In the first stage, MNF-I oversaw the evacuation
of the PLO from Beirut. The MNF faced no significant resistance during this stage. Aside from
a US marine killed by a landmine on 30 September, MNF-I was generally welcomed by the long-
suffering population of Beirut. In line with political dislocation theory, many groups in Lebanon
had come to resent the presence of the PLO and welcomed international efforts at removing them.
However, the MNF returned to Beirut 18 days later to help cope with the crisis triggered by
Bashir Gemayel’s assassination. Unlike MNF-I, which addressed the Israeli-Palestinian dimension
of the Lebanon conflict, MNF-II propped up the government of Amine Gemayel. By responding
to the invitation of the Gemayel government to intervene, the Reagan administration thought it
was supporting the right of a sovereign government to control its territory. To the Druze and
Shia faction of the Lebanese civil war, who contested the very legitimacy of this government, the
MNF was simply perpetuating Christian domination of Lebanon (Fisk 1990, 450; Friedman 1989,
200). For example, the MNF worked with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to collect weapons
from Muslims in West Beirut but did not touch the Phalangists who were responsible for Sabra
and Shatila (Fisk 1990, 462). MNF and Maronite troops had co-located command posts and con-
ducted joint patrols (Pelcovits 1991, 51). US soldiers provided khaki uniforms to Maronite militias
they were training, making the two almost indistinguishable at checkpoints (Friedman 1989, 194).
Rather than an impartial peacekeeping force, the Lebanese newspaper Al Safir began to refer to
the MNF as the ”international militia” (Norton 1991, 226). As such, by backing Gemayel the MNF
became entangled in the Lebanese civil war.
The effect of political dislocation becomes clearer when comparing the reaction of different
sectarian groups in Lebanon to the presence of the MNF. Hezbollah warned: ”We tell the United
States, don‘t expect that the people of this region will welcome you with roses and jasmine. The
people of this region will welcome you with rifles, blood, and martyrdom operations” (Norton
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2007, 118). Jumblatt, for his part, originally welcomed the MNF but told Al Shiraa at the end
of January 1984 that the MNF should withdraw unconditionally, since it had come to represent
support for a ”hated system” (Pelcovits 1991, 67). Maronite leaders held a more positive view
of the MNF. Reagan noted: ”During a visit to Washington, [Amine Gemayel] urged me to keep
marines in Lebanon while efforts continued to reach a settlement” (1990, 439).
Once political antagonisms were set, an endogenous conflict dynamic emerged. Attacks on
the MNF were meant to remove a powerful supporter of the Maronite regime. However, the US
perceived these attacks as endangering their credibility, pushing them to retaliate, therefore deep-
ening their involvement in the conflict and their perceived support for the Maronites. President
Reagan wrote in his diary: ”Our problem is do we expand our mission to aid the Lebanese army
with artillery and air support? This could be seen as putting us in the war” (1990, 446). For
instance, following attacks on American positions near the Beirut Airport in May 1983, US battle-
ships shelled Druze positions in the Shouf Mountains (Kelly 1996, 99). As the veteran Lebanon
reporter Robert Fisk noted: ”The very second that the first US navy shell landed among the Druze
at Souq al-Gharb, the Americans would have aligned themselves with the Phalange in open war
against the Muslims of Lebanon” (1990, 505). When ordered to fire on Druze positions, US MNF
commander Col. Geraghty argued: ”Sir, I can’t do that. This will cost us our neutrality. Do you
realize if you do that, we’ll get slaughtered down here?” (Wright 1985, 78).
Political dislocation theory therefore explains why the MNF encountered resistance during the
second stage of the mission, but not the first, and why it encountered resistance exclusively from
Shia and Druze groups.
UNIFIL
Unlike the MNF, UNIFIL did not face significant resistance in Lebanon. UNIFIL was initially de-
ployed in 1978, following Operation Litani in 1978 to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces
and to serve as a buffer between Israel and Lebanon. The 2,000-person was military weak and po-
litically constrained. Its principal task was to observe and record violations of the ceasefire agree-
ment. From the standpoint of political dislocation, UNIFIL held a major advantage compared to
MNF because it was not deployed in Beirut. As such, it was less likely to become embroiled in the
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domestic politics and policing highly contested territory (Weinberger 1995, 158).
Hezbollah initially opposed UNIFIL, in part because its existence was a tacit acknowledgement
of the legitimacy of Israel. In its 1985 manifesto, Hezbollah stated: ”With special vehemence we
reject UNIFIL as they were sent by world arrogance to occupy areas evacuated by Israel and serve
for the latter as a buffer zone. They should be treated much like the Zionists.” Similarly, some
in the PLO opposed the deployment of UNIFIL to areas that had not been occupied by Israel.
This posturing did not result in much resistance since UNIFIL accommodated the Palestinian
demands (though clashes resulted when the UN sought to disarm Palestinian militias) (Fisk 1990,
136; Go¨ksel 2007, 55). UNIFIL also worked a quid pro quo with Hezbollah. A longtime UNIFIL
spokesperson recounted a discussion with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah: ”I told him: ’Look,
we don‘t have to like each other, but we don‘t have to shoot at each other either. We can talk.’ He
says ’Yes. That‘s what I want also.”’ UNIFIL’s weakness and unwillingness to confront the PLO or
Hezbollah in South Lebanon ensured that the political cost of resistance outweighed its military
benefits (Go¨ksel 2007, 72).
To Israel and its SLA proxies, UNIFIL was not an enemy of Hezbollah and the PLO, but in
fact an unwitting ally. The Israelis saw UNIFIL as less than useless. It did not stop or attempt to
stop attacks on Israel. It merely recorded attacks and in Israel’s view provided a human shield
for Palestinian and Hezbollah strikes (Byman 2011, 64). Indeed, most of the attacks conducted
against UNIFIL were undertaken by Israel or by the SLA. The SLA’s resistance was not based on
nationalism, but rather on the assessment that UNIFIL was protecting its enemies the PLO and
(later) Hezbollah.
The second stage of the UNIFIL deployment after 2006 was potentially more provocative be-
cause it was mandated to extend the control of the Lebanese army. As the new force debarked in
South Lebanon, UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping Operation Jean-Marie Ghehenno said: ”The
UN of 2006 is not the UN of ten years ago. . . We have drawn lessons from past experience” (Blan-
ford 2011b, 419). At first, Hezbollah took a wary wait-and-see approach, adopting a lower profile
and instructing residents not to interact with the new peacekeepers. In an interview Nasrallah
stated: ”The task of UNIFIL today is not disarming the resistance. As long as this is not the task,
and as long as its main task is backing the Lebanese army —and we approve and support the role
played by the Lebanese army— I do not think there will be any problem at all” (Noe 2007, 384).
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As it became clearer that the ”new” UNIFIL mandate would not challenge its dominant political
position in South Lebanon, Hezbollah accepted foreign occupation.
8.3.2 Factional Politics
The factional politics corollary of political dislocation theory states that resistance is not only a re-
action to foreign occupation but also a way to attain power itself. The political vacuum sometimes
created by departing occupiers can allow resistance groups to seize power for themselves. The
factional dimension of resistance looms large in the context of Lebanon. Groups were already mo-
bilized and engaged in an armed contest for power because of an ongoing intra-communal civil
war.
First, despite strong nationalist rhetoric and pragmatic reasons to pool resources, resistance
groups were not integrated. Rather than unifying the nation, resistance exposed its internal
fissures. Resistance groups were divided along sectarian lines, usually with several resistance
groups per sectarian group.7 Although some groups did coordinate, there was no major instance
of any unified cross-sectarian resistance. For instance the Tigers, Phalangists, and Guardians of
the Cedars fought for the Maronite camp, whereas Amal and Hezbollah sought to represent the
Shia community. When some factions did band together, it was often against their will. For in-
stance, between 1978 and 1980 Bashir Gemayel launched a brutal unification campaign against
fellow Maronite militias of the Tigers and the Marada Brigades. In the process, he eliminated
Tony Franjieh and Danny Chamoun, the heirs to rival Maronite political dynasties.
Second, factional politics can be seen in the highly partisan nature of resistance, by which mili-
tias were tied to political parties. As Lebanon descended into civil war in the mid 1970s, political
parties formed armed wings to protect their interests. Due to preexisting social organization and
funding, political parties were particularly able to mobilize resistance to occupation. They also had
much to gain politically from resistance. For example, Hezbollah surged in popularity for leading
a successful resistance campaign against Israel (Mackey 2008, 181). In 1992, it entered mainstream
politics and won 12 seats in Lebanon’s 128-seat parliament. Hezbollah electoral signs declared:
7During the initial stages of the sectarian civil war, different militias within the same sectarian groups often failed to
unify. For example, the Tigers under Tony Chamoun and the Phalangists under Bashir Gemayel refused to coordinate
against leftist forces. Indeed, each militia represented a contender to the leadership of the Maronite community (Schiff
and Ya’ari 1984, 20).
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”They resist with their blood. Resist with your vote” (Norton 2007, 152). In 2005, Hezbollah even
entered the coalition government of Fouad Siniora. Long after the withdrawal of Israel, Hezbol-
lah maintained an independent ”resistance” force in Lebanon, which provided useful leverage in
domestic politics.
Hezbollah’s success also pushed Amal to turn against Israel (Winslow 1996, 216). As Fisk
notes: ”At first unwilling to become involved in the war against the Israelis, Amal was now anx-
ious to establish itself as the principal nationalist movement in southern Lebanon. . . The guerrilla
organisations cooperated, but their desire to assault the retreating Israelis was prompted as much
by the need to earn political credentials and hold territory for the future as to prove their patrio-
tism” (1990, 571). Most political parties involved in the civil war and resistance persisted following
the end of occupation. In fact, the greatest expansion in Hezbollah’s military power occurred after
the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
Third, as predicted by the factional politics corollary, Lebanon experienced fratricidal clashes
among resistance groups. Such clashes are to be expected in the context of Lebanon’s civil war.
Yet what is notable in Lebanon is that clashes persisted among factions that were ostensibly allied
against a common foreign occupier. As noted above, Maronite militias fought each other in 1980
and again in 1989 as they sought to expulse Syria. Hezbollah and Amal, both opposed to Israel,
fought each other between 1988 and 1989. Similarly, the PSP and Palestinian militias fought Amal
between 1985 and 1989. At times, the withdrawal of occupiers increased violence, as rival groups
filled the void. For instance, the retreat of the IDF from the Shouf in 1983 precipitated clashes
between Maronites and Druze. When Israel withdrew further in 1985, heavy fighting broke out
between Christian militias and Amal and the PSP near Sidon (Fisk 1990, 571; Winslow 1996, 251).
Thus, rather than causing Lebanese factions to rally around the flag, as predicted by nationalism,
foreign interventions highlighted sectarian divisions.
8.3.3 Trust
A fundamental problem faced by occupiers is maintaining trust with the occupied population.
Occupiers tend to have coercive superiority without lines of accountability. Therefore, occupiers
are unable to credibly commit to leaving the territory or to treating the occupied population be-
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nignly. According to trust theory, resistance will emerge when there is a fundamental breakdown
in trust between occupiers and occupied. For instance, if individuals in occupied territory run a
high risk of being victimized regardless of their behavior, then resistance will be seen as a practical
survival strategy. Did the occupiers of Lebanon face resistance because of a breakdown of trust?
The case of Lebanon provides some evidence in support of trust theory. Lebanese elites were
suspicious of the true intentions of foreign occupiers. Moreover, while neither Israel nor Syria
occupied Lebanon with the objective of victimizing civilians, conventional warfare and counterin-
surgency set off endogenous processes of victimization that alienated the Lebanese population.
Syria
Intentions
Consistent with trust theory, Syria struggled to gain the trust of the occupied population in
Lebanon. While grateful of Syria’s intervention in the civil war, many Lebanese were wary of Syr-
ian intentions. Syria gave assurances that the occupation was ”temporary, legal, and necessary.”
Yet Syria had often adopted an ambiguously irredentist policy towards Lebanon. It refused to
establish diplomatic relations after Lebanese independence and bandied the notion of a ”greater
Syria” that included Lebanon (Weinberger 1986, 60). Assad had given a speech in 1976 where
he stated: ”throughout history, Syria and Lebanon have been one country and one people. . . our
history is one, our future is one, and our destiny is one.” In May 1982, he referred to Lebanon as
”Arab land that belongs to us” (Pipes 1992, 119). Ironically, proximity, co-ethnicity, and cultural
affinity worsened Syria’s credible commitment problem.
Such statements were cause of concern, particularly for the Maronite community that saw an
independent Lebanon as a bulwark against minority status. The Maronites had invited Syrian in-
tervention, but only to forestall defeat at the hand of revisionist forces. As Bashir Gemayel fretted:
”History is rife with examples of armies that come to aid their neighbors in distress and stayed as
occupiers” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 22). Upon the arrival of Syrian forces in 1976, some Christian
residents noticed that the Syrians had come prepared for more than just a few days’ stay. With such
suspicions, some Maronite factions were alarmed by Syria’s call to disarm in 1976. Some turned
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against Syria fearing that disarmament would be a first step toward eventual Syrian annexation
(Clodfelter 2002, 647). The mandate from the Arab League provided some assurances that occu-
pation would be temporary, but Syria’s presence continued well beyond the expiration of the ADF.
Victimization
Victimization played a role in the intensity and scope of resistance to Syrian occupation in
Lebanon. Syria did not enter Lebanon with the aim of victimization. Rather, consistent with
Kalyvas’ (2006) theory of violence in civil wars, victimization was a function of territorial control.
In this regard, Syria’s occupation can be divided into two stages. The first stage, from 1976 until
1989, was marked by indiscriminate violence as Syria sought to quell resistance factions. The
second stage, from 1989 until 2005, was marked by brutal but more targeted killings of dissidents
as Syria consolidated its control.
In the first stages of its intervention in Lebanon, Syria caused extensive civilian casualties.
Such casualties were the result of a heavy-handed military strategy aimed at quelling resistance
factions, such as heavy shelling of densely populated areas. For example, Syria and the Lebanese
Forces laid siege to the 30,000 person refugee camps of Tel-al-Zaatar killing some 2,000, including
many civilians (Clodfelter 2002, 647). Similarly, Syrian forces turned against Maronite factions in
1978, extensively shelling East Beirut and causing at least 700 casualties (Fisk 1990, 144). Accord-
ing to Colleleo: ”Syria’s heavy use of artillery, both against Muslim factions in earlier fighting
and against Christian factions later, caused widespread criticism that the bombardments were in-
discriminately killing civilians and that Syrian troops were pursuing a policy of genocide toward
Lebanese Christians” (1988). The behavior of Syrian troops, especially the rising incidence of pil-
lage and rape, arbitrary arrests, and confiscation of property, also alienated otherwise sympathetic
Lebanese civilians (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 23). Pierre Gemayel warned of ”popular [anti-Syrian]
sentiment rising” if Syrian and ADF forces became a ”source of threat and fright for the citizens”
(Rabinovich 1981, 609).
The end of Lebanon’s civil war in 1989, led to a gradual disarmament of most armed fac-
tions with the exception of Syrian-backed Hezbollah. As the militias disarmed, Syrian control of
Lebanon tightened. Syrian military intelligence (Mukhabarat) extended its network of informants
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and operatives. As territorial control increased, repression became more targeted, albeit still bru-
tal. In the decade following the end of Lebanon’s civil war, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International documented extensive imprisonment, torture, assassination, and forced disappear-
ances conducted by Syrian officials, often in collaboration with the government of Lebanon (Hu-
man Rights Watch 1990, 1997b; Amnesty International 1990). According to a lawyer interviewed
by Human Rights Watch (1997b): ”No one in Lebanon will talk about the reality. Our government
is not a government. Syrian intelligence forces are controlling this country. We are moving toward
a police state. Here in Lebanon, there are masters and servants. Lebanese government officials are
the servants of Syria.”
Overall, resistance to Syrian occupation was greatest in the first stage of the occupation when
Syrian victimization was most indiscriminate. As Syria gained greater control of Lebanese terri-




As with Syria, Lebanese elites worried about Israel’s long-term intentions. Such concerns were
cultivated by decades of Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the anarchy of the international system. Is-
raeli officials frequently gave assurances regarding the nature and duration of occupation, only to
break them soon afterwards. At the onset of the 1982 invasion, Israel proclaimed its purpose was
to gain control of a zone only 40 kilometers deep to remove PLO fighters. By the end of the sec-
ond day of the invasion, however, the IDF had proceeded beyond its self-proclaimed 40-kilometer
limit and was on its way to Beirut (Winslow 1996, 222-224). Israel stated its objectives in Lebanon
were limited but ended up occupying Beirut and installing a new regime. When the IDF rede-
ployed south in 1985, Defense Minister Rabin stated: ”The IDF will deploy in the security zone in
South Lebanon, north of the Israeli border for one month” (Brilliant 1985). That month turned into
8It must be noted that changes in the type of victimization alone cannot account for differences in resistance. By
many accounts, militias were simply exhausted after the civil war and Syria had deftly penetrated, divided, and weak-
ened most opposition groups (interview with Lebanese Forces member, 24 May 2012).
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15 years. Added to this mistrust was Israel’s decade-long occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and
the Golan Heights (the latter formally annexed in 1981). Lastly, how could Lebanese trust Israeli
intentions when the Israeli public and Prime Minister Begin himself had been misled by Defense
Minister Sharon on the scope of the mission? As predicted by trust theory, Israeli promises were
cheap talk. Even Lebanese allies such as Bashir Gemayel worried about Israeli intentions: ”Per-
haps I’ll come out the winner and perhaps not. . . I still haven’t forgotten our experience with the
Syrians you know. Everyone thought their intervention would work in our favor, but in the end
fate reversed itself” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 200).
Victimization
Civilian casualties were a major issue during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Although Is-
rael did not embark on a systematic campaign of victimization, many Lebanese saw it as less than
careless in its treatment of civilians. During the invasion of Lebanon, Israel extensively bombed
the city of Sidon where PLO fighters were based. Similarly on 12 August 1982, on the eve of the
agreed withdrawal of the PLO, Israel launched a massive artillery campaign against Beirut (Schiff
and Ya’ari 1984, 225). Both campaigns were seen as largely random by Lebanese civilians (Fisk
1990, 255, 321). In many incidents, cluster bombs and phosphorus shells were employed in civil-
ian areas. There were reports of abuses of prisoners. Attacks on the Ain’ al-Hiweh refugee camp
in 1982 left some 40,000 Palestinians homeless (Mowles 1986, 1353). The invasion of Lebanon in
1982 resulted in 9,583 killed among the Lebanese and Palestinian population, with another 16,608
wounded (Clodfelter 2002, 647).9
Civilian victimization was partly caused by an identification problem, which prevented Israel
from distinguishing insurgents from civilians. Unlike Syria, the IDF did not share any linguistic or
close cultural affinity with Lebanon. In order to overcome the identification problem, Israel would
employ local informants. However, as is often the case informants would use information asym-
metry to advance their own interests. For instance, informants would accuse innocent Lebanese
civilians in order to get friends through lineups (Fisk 1990, 251). In part because militants would
9Israel claimed only 331 civilians were killed during this phase of the conflict.
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mingle with civilians, some victimization was inevitable. For example, during the initial stages of
the occupation, the IDF would often round up Shia along with Palestinians suspects. In the later
stages of the occupation, Israeli forces would fail to distinguish Amal from Hezbollah supporters.
The IDF often blew up the houses of Amal supporters after Hezbollah attacks on Israeli troops
(Byman 2011, 216). The identification problem gave the appearance that the application of vio-
lence was random, thereby pushing Lebanese into the arms of resistance forces. At the same time
the identification problem eroded Israeli morale and discipline, spurring further civilian victim-
ization.
Collateral damage was often accidental, while in other circumstances collective punishment
was used as a deliberate strategy to separate civilians from insurgents (B’tselem 2000). In 1993,
Defense Minister Rabin told the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the point
of Operation Accountability was to “provoke an exodus of inhabitants from Southern Lebanon
towards the North in order to put pressure on the Lebanese government” (Jones 1997, 106).
Many of the worst atrocities were undertaken not by Israel but by its local allies. Human Rights
Watch (1999) reported on systematic abuses carried out by the SLA, a proxy of Israel, including
murder, extortion, and forced displacement. Under the watch of the IDF Phalangists committed
massacres in Sabra and Shatila. Prime Minister Begin initially dismissed the massacres as “goyim
killing goyim” [Non-Jews killing non-Jews]. However, many Lebanese blamed Israel for enabling
such abuses (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 278).
Physical violence was accompanied by economic hardship. In 1985, Israel implemented an
“Iron Fist” policy in South Lebanon, imposing dusk till dawn curfews and barring travel by car or
motorcycle (Fisher 1985). The IDF arbitrarily imposed bans on the import of certain types of goods
such as building materials and medicine. Villages suspected of supporting the resistance were
subjected to weeklong blockades (Mowles 1986, 1359-1362). Following suicide attacks against the
IDF headquarter in Tyre in 1983, Israel closed the Awali bridge, a critical conduit between Beirut
and South Lebanon. According to Clinton Baily, Israel’s liaison officer in the South: “The basis of
the Southern economy collapsed. It was this event that finally smashed the last friendly sentiment
toward Israel” (Ajami 1986, 202-203).
Above all, victimization encouraged individuals to join the resistance. Hezbollah’s 1985 Man-
ifesto stated: “They invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children,
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violated our sanctuaries and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst mas-
sacres against our umma.” Amal threatened to punish Israel itself for civilian abuses in Lebanon:
”If the razing of houses and killing of innocents continue, we are obliged to transfer it. . . The more
arbitrary practices that Israel takes, the more energetic our action will get” (Wright 1985, 235).
What is notable is this and other quotes is anger at the perceived arbitrary nature of Israeli vi-
olence. In fact, such indiscriminate violence became a rallying cry for resistance groups. Khalil
Jerardi of Amal said:
“The brutality of the Israelis has proved to everyone in southern Lebanon that the Is-
raeli want to humiliate them. . . so they are more determined to resist the occupation
—both civil resistance and military resistance. . . The arrests Israelis make are of ordi-
nary people. When this happens, the people become more united” (Fisk 1990, 578).
Resistance groups sought to capitalize on such indiscriminate violence. For example, Haj
Ibrahim, the head of a Palestinian resistance faction in Sidon, prevented civilians from surren-
dering to the IDF by warning that they would be shot: “The Jews are killing everyone. . . Better to
die in the camp, at home, bearing arms, than on your knees in front of a firing squad!” (Schiff and
Ya’ari 1984, 148). Nasrallah noted that victimization boosted support for Hezbollah: “the fact that
the resistance cared about the people on the Lebanon side of the border has helped them carry
out their operations with a greater degree of precision, and has made the people like them and
feel the need to protect them” (Noe 2007, 201-202). Indeed, Operations Accountability and Grapes
of Wrath had devastating effects on Shia villages in South Lebanon, and drove many into the arms
of Hezbollah, which promised protection, social services, and revenge (Mackey 2008, 175).
MNF
MNF faced stiff resistance in Lebanon, an anomaly for trust theory. First, prior to embassy and
barrack bombings, the MNF did not undertake any systematic victimization of civilians. There
were few, if any, reports of MNF civilian abuses. US shelling of Syrian and Druze positions in
the Shouf close to populated areas undoubtedly caused civilian casualties, but this occurred at the
end of the occupation, well after the initiation of resistance. Second, the MNF benefited from
a multinational mandate. This mandate was essential to the legitimacy and credibility of the
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mission. The PLO saw the US as a guarantor of its safe withdrawal and Italy as sympathetic to its
cause. Israel was opposed in principle to the MNF, but could accept a US-led MNF (Cimbala and
Forster 2010, 36-39).10 Third, the MNF was initially seen as relatively benign. To the resident of
Beirut, suffering under siege and civil war for two months, the MNF were initially seen as saviors
and were welcomed by non-combatants from all parts of Lebanese society (Fisk 1990, 447). French
troops helped clear mines from the streets and Italy committed billions of Lira to humanitarian
aid. A semblance of normalcy was reestablished, albeit temporarily. While counterfactuals can
never be verified, its likely that the benign conduct of the MNF reduced or at least delayed the
onset of resistance against the MNF.
Although the treatment of non-victimization was constant for both MNF-I and MNF-II, trust
is not the only factor affecting resistance. The degree of political dislocation varied significantly
between MNF-I and MNF-II. By publicly backing the regime of Amine Gemayel, the MNF became
a party to the conflict. Indeed, the MNF provides a cautionary tale about how intervening powers
can face resistance even when they take care not to not mistreat civilians and provide humanitar-
ian assistance. Unfortunately, American forces would face a similar fiasco a decade later during
UNOSOM II in Somalia.
UNIFIL
As for all other occupiers of Lebanon, UNIFIL faced some initial wariness from domestic warring
factions. Hezbollah worried that “certain contingents” of UNIFIL would spy for Israel (Andoni
2010).11 Consistent with trust theory, UNIFIL engaged is no systematic civilian victimization and
consequently suffered limited resistance. Although UNIFIL largely failed in its political mission,
it was seen as a source of protection by many in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL provided humani-
tarian assistance and protection for civilians. According to former UNIFIL official Timur Go¨ksel
(2007, 76): ”I think UNIFIL‘s biggest success. . . was its relations with the people. When UNIFIL
came in 1978, nobody else was coming to south Lebanon. . . In those days you could almost say
that those who remained needed UNIFIL to survive. . . we helped them in every way we could.
10Although supportive of a UN force, the USSR opposed the US-led MNF.
11Interestingly, some members of the IDF also thought UNIFIL was working with Hezbollah and Palestinian groups
(Nachmias 1999, 105).
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We helped them with their schools; we provided their medical services. . . The Lebanese govern-
ment could not return to the south because the civil war was still going on. But even in these
conditions, UNIFIL brought a sense of security.” These sentiments are reflected in what little
polling is available. A 2006 Gallup poll found that 75 percent of Lebanese favored the presence of
UN peacekeepers and a 2008 public opinion survey indicated 86.77 percent support for UNIFIL,
although this support was stronger among Christians and Druze than among Sunnis and Shias
(Gallup 2006; Kumetat 2008, 5)
Overall, I find general support for trust theory. Consistent with trust theory, Lebanese civilians
were concerned about the intentions of foreign occupiers due to limited information and leverage.
Moreover, victimization is found to be a partial explanation of resistance. UNIFIL was extremely
circumspect in its interactions with civilians and faced very little resistance. Syria and Israel did
not enter Lebanon with the objective of victimizing civilians, but did engage in indiscriminate
violence in response to resistance caused by political dislocation. The identification problem, ex-
acerbated in the case of Israel by cultural and linguistic differences, led to civilian casualties. In
this regard, the process of victimization was endogenous. Political dislocation was the prime
driver of resistance, but victimization hardened antipathy towards occupying forces. Lastly, the
MNF mission was an anomaly for trust theory. The MNF did not victimize civilians but faced stiff
resistance due to their association with the contested Maronite regime.
8.3.4 Credible Commitment
According to trust theory, factors such as religious affinity, international mandate, and regime type
can reduce credible commitment problems for occupiers. The case of Lebanon provides partial
support of these theories.
Religion
Consistent with trust theory, Syria faced greater resistance from Christian factions in Lebanon
than Muslim factions (Shia, Sunni, and Druze). Notwithstanding the significant differences be-
tween Shia, Sunni, Druze, and Alawi Islam, the Maronite community saw potential annexation
by Syria as a serious challenge to its way of life. Indeed, an independent Lebanon (preferably
CHAPTER 8. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN LEBANON (1976-2010) 309
with a Christian or Maronite majority) provided guarantees of religious freedom. Conversely,
many of Lebanon’s Muslims had initially pushed for unification with Syria upon gaining inde-
pendence from France (Weinberger 1986, 55-56). Different sectarian reactions to foreign occupa-
tion were also magnified by the ongoing civil war. A survey conducted in 2000 indicated that
a majority of Christians supported a redeployment of Syrian forces whereas Muslims, with the
exception of the Druze, called for maintaining the status quo and for complete engagement with
Syria (Haddad 2001, 469). Members of the Maronite church were some of the harshest critics
of Syrian occupation. For example, Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir complained: ”Syria’s interference
exhausted Lebanon. . . Syria is the one that rules, appointing rulers and organizing elections and
bringing to power whoever it wants” (UPI 2004). During the civil war and Syrian occupation,
wealthy Maronite monastic orders provided financial assistance to Maronite militias (Rabinovitch
1984, 68).
Religion played a prominent role in resistance to Israeli occupation. Israel faced the bulk of
resistance from Sunni (PLO) and Shia militants (Amal, Hezbollah), those same groups that largely
accepted Syrian rule. Hezbollah was founded by the conservative Shia clerics Sayyed Abbas Mus-
sawi, inspired by religious mentors Musa Sadr and Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, and the 1979
Iranian revolution. Hezbollah originally sought to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon and saw
its Shia rival Amal as too corrupt and secular. Defense of religion figured prominently in Hezbol-
lah‘s justification of resistance. It‘s 1985 manifesto stated:
”We declare openly and loudly that we are an umma which fears God only and is by
no means ready to tolerate injustice, aggression and humiliation. . . This is why we are,
more and more, in a state of permanent alert in order to repel aggression and defend
our religion, our existence, our dignity.”
Religious symbols formed a rallying point for resistance. For instance, on 16 October 1983, during
the Shia day of Ashura marking the death of the Imam Hussein, an Israeli armed convoy provoked
a riot by insisting on driving through a crowd of 50,000 worshippers. The Israelis were stoned,
their trucks overturned and burned. Facing a frenzied crowd, the soldiers opened fire, killing
seven (Fisk 1990, 557; Norton 2007). The following day, Mahdi Shams al Din, the deputy leader of
the Shia high council, issued a fatwa calling for ”civil disobedience” and ”resistance to occupation
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in the south” (Ajami 1986, 202). The Ashura incident was a turning point for Shia-Israeli relations,
spurring fence sitters to take up arms against what they saw as a religious affront. However,
the IDF was not always so ham-fisted in dealing with sensitive religious issues. For example, it
selected Israeli-Druze soldiers (the Herev Battalion) to deploy to Druze villages in the Shouf at the
beginning of the conflict. Thus, for the most part the Druze in the Shouf ”had watched the arrival
of the Israelis armored columns with complete docility” (Fisk 1990, 213, 215).
Religion played an undeniable role in fostering resistance in Lebanon. However, an anomaly
for trust theory is Maronite cooperation with Israeli occupation. Israel and Lebanon’s Maronites
shared little other than their antagonism towards the Palestinians and Syria. It is one of the many
ironies of the Lebanon War that Israel ended up cooperating so closely with the Phalange, a na-
tionalist group originally inspired by European fascist parties (Colleleo 1988).
Though religion figured less prominently in attacks on UNIFIL, it still influenced the targets.
Hezbollah regularly accused UNIFIL of acting in support of Israel and drew on divine inspiration
in its defiance of the MNF. According to Mousavi: ”God is capable of giving Muslims victory,
whether the aggression comes from France or America or Italy or any other force” (Fisk 1990,
521). The gravest resistance to UNIFIL appears to have come from jihadist groups affiliated with
al Qaeda. Some months before a devastating attack on a UNIFIL convoy in 2007, al Qaeda‘s
deputy leader, Ayman al Zawahiri encouraged attacks against UNIFIL, seen as Western forces on
Muslim land. Moreover al-Zawahiri said: “What I want from the generation of jihad in Lebanon
is to prepare itself for getting in Palestine and expelling from Lebanon the invading crusade force,
which claims to be a peacekeeping force. They should not accept Resolution 1701.” He also ac-
cused UNIFIL of being “enemies of Islam.” Western troop contributors were keenly aware of the
effect of religion on perceptions of the mission. In discussions regarding the formation of UNIFIL,
Europeans countries and the UN agreed the force must have a strong Muslim component to give
it credibility (Associated Press 2006). Moreover, French Defense Minister Miche`le Alliot-Marie
explicitly called on Muslim countries to contribute: “Certainly, we want European, but also Mus-
lim countries as we must absolutely avoid giving the impression that it is the Western countries
imposing peace on the Muslim world” (KUNA 2006).
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International Mandate
The constraints of international mandates did not appear to have stemmed resistance. Lebanon
is a useful —and somewhat unique— case study of occupation because it experienced two occu-
pations under an international mandate with Syria also operating under a more ambiguous Arab
League mandate. Despite international mandates, UNIFIL and the MNF experienced different
levels of resistance. UNIFIL experienced much less resistance than Israel in Southern Lebanon,
even taking into account its recent establishment in 2006. The MNF, however, experienced signif-
icant resistance from Palestinian, Druze, and Shia militants. Concerns about political dislocation
seem to have determined the level of resistance rather than concerns about credible commitment
to a long-term occupation.
A problem in examining UNIFIL and the MNF is that it is impossible to observe the counter-
factual of how much resistance each occupation would have faced in the absence of an interna-
tional mandate. Perhaps each would have faced greater resistance, even accounting for differences
caused by varying political dislocation on the ongoing civil war. The case of Lebanon provides
two ways of overcoming this problem. First, it is instructive to compare the MNF occupation to the
first stages of the Israeli occupation. Both occupations operated in Beirut and undertook similar
degrees of political dislocation. Unlike the MNF, Israel’s occupation did not have any international
mandate (in fact, UN Security Council Resolution 520 explicitly called on Israel to withdraw from
Lebanon). Yet both the MNF and the Israeli occupation experienced significant resistance from
similar groups. This would indicate that the credible commitment generated by an international
mandate was insufficient to counteract the destabilizing effects of political dislocation.
Second, we can examine the case of Syria, which operated both with and without an interna-
tional mandate. Syria obtained a mandate from the Arab League in 1976. However, this mandate
expired in 1982 after President Gemayel refused to grant an extension. With or without a mandate
from the Arab League, Syria faced significant resistance, mainly from Maronite factions in 1976,
1981, and 1989, with and without an international mandate. That Lebanon sought an Arab League
mandate is a testament to the perceived legitimating power of international institutions. However,
there is little evidence that it affected resistance, given ongoing patterns of violence. Perhaps this is
because the Arab League mandate did not constitute a true constraint on Syria. The vast majority
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of the ADF was Syrian. Although, the ADF was technically under the command of the President
of Lebanon, and the commander was meant to be Lebanese, de facto power remained in Syrian
hands. The ADF frequently overreached its mandate and broke its rules of engagement. Its neu-
trality was so compromised, that Maronite leaders called for the replacement of the ADF by an
alternative international peacekeeping force (Pogany 1987, 132, 162). For instance, on 6 July 1978
President Sarkis announced he would resign if he was not given more authority over the ADF.
He alleged that the ADF was conducting operations behind his back and without his approval
(O‘Ballance 1998, 82). Thus, overall, we do not observe a strong effect of international mandates
in the case of Lebanon.
Regime Type
Another hypothesis of trust theory is that certain occupiers will better be able to maintain trust
with the occupied population because of the constraints imposed upon them by their domestic
political institutions. Once again, Lebanon is a useful laboratory for resistance to occupation be-
cause it was occupied by different types of regimes. According to the POLITY dataset (Gurr et.
al. 2009), Israel was a democracy (score of 9) during the occupation period, whereas Syria was
largely non-democratic (-8). Multinational forces such as UNIFIL and the MNF were composed of
democratic states, with average POLITY scores of 9.67 and 10, respectively.
Consistent with the hypothesis, non-democratic Syria experienced greater resistance measured
in terms of fatalities than more democratic Israel and even more democratic UNIFIL and MNF.
However, it is not clear that differences in resistance were due to increased trust generated by
democratic institutions. Overall, I find that regime type imposed different levels of constraints
on the behavior of Israel and Syria, but there is little evidence that such constraints affected the
calculations of potential resisters.
First, democratic institutions provided some constraints on the actions of the IDF. During the
siege of Beirut, brigade commander Eli Geva refused to lead his troops into the city citing en-
dangerment to his forces and to civilians. He was dismissed from the IDF but his actions stirred
controversy and debate in Israel (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 215). During the bombing of Beirut on
12 August 1982, known as Black Thursday, Israel’s cabinet was highly critical of Defense Minister
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Sharon (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 226). On 25 September 1982, the NGO Peace Now held a 400,000-
person demonstration calling for an inquiry into the massacres of Sabra and Shatila. The protest
was the largest to be held in Israel up until that time (Byman 2011, 69). Partly as a result of such
protests, a commission of inquiry was established and headed by the President of Israel’s Supreme
Court Yitzhak Kahan. The findings of the Kahan Commission led to the dismissal of Defense Min-
ister Sharon and strong pressure on PM Begin to resign. While a majority of Israelis supported
the limited occupation in South Lebanon, protests against the occupation of South Lebanon grew
until 2000, spearheaded in particular by the ”Four Mothers Movement” (Dassa Kaye 2002).
Despite such constraints, there is no evidence that the Lebanese population saw Israel itself as
constrained in Lebanon. If anything, fears about Israel’s non-democratic behavior, such as partial
territorial annexation, was used extensively in resistance rhetoric. Hezbollah argued that Israel
could not credibly commit to a limited campaign: ”Israel’s borders stop where its arm, tanks, and
spears can reach” (Noe 2007, 189). Thus Hezbollah argued that without resistance, Israel would
have no incentive to withdraw. Similarly, according to Ajami:
”There had always existed in Lebanon as suspicion that Israel coveted the lands of the
south and the waters of the Litani river. A body of literature had popularized that
theme. There was enough Zionist literature scripture around, and enough Palestinian
reiterations of it, to make men wonder and worry. Israel could never provide sufficient
assurance that its presence would be temporary. And the longer Israeli troops stayed,
the more credible the suspicions became” (1986, 200).
Indeed, Israel is unique among democracies for undertaking territorial annexation after the Sec-
ond World War. In this sense, Israel is the exception that proves the rule.
As an autocratic regime, Syria did not experience the same restrictions as Israel during its oc-
cupation of Lebanon. The decision to deploy troops to Lebanon were not made by an elected
body. Unlike Israel, there were no protests in Syria against the occupation of Lebanon although
Syria suffered far greater casualties than Israel, nor against large scale shelling of civilian neigh-
borhoods. It wasn’t until 2005 that Syrian newspapers even criticized the behavior of Syrian forces
in Lebanon (Jerusalem Post 2005, 12). If anything, a major concern for Assad was that having troops
in Lebanon would divert resources needed to subdue his own population (Seale 1990). Some in
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Lebanon took note of Syria’s regime in calling for the end of occupation. According to Jumblatt:
”The explanations given to us by our leaders, as by the Syrian leaders, regarding the need for
the continued Syrian presence in Lebanon as stemming from the shared destiny both nations are
unsatisfactory. After all, we have a democracy in Lebanon and Syria has a one-party system, and
therefore we cannot understand what this shared destiny is that Bashar al-Asad preaches to us”
(Zisser 2007, 188).
Yet, when Syria was ultimately forced out of Lebanon, it was under pressure from Lebanese
protesters, not domestic ones as was the case in Israel. Insofar as regime type affected Lebanese
calculations for resistance, it goes opposite predictions. Precisely because Syria was autocratic,
it was able to deploy a lethal intelligence apparatus in Lebanon to monitor, arrest, and eliminate
opponents of Syrian occupation (Deeb 2004, 181). Therefore, in the case of Syria if anything,
the lack of democratic constraints in Syria may have deterred resistance. Overall, while there is
evidence that regime type affected the constraints faced by the occupying states, there is little
evidence that the Lebanese population perceived these constraints in deciding on resistance.
A summary of occupier characteristics is provided in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Occupier characteristics in Lebanon
Syria Israel MNF UNIFIL
Political Dislocation • • •
Victimization • •
International Mandate  • •
Common Religion •
Democratic Occupier • • •
Troops (peak) 30,000 60,000 5,200 12,455
Timeframe 1976-2005 1982-2000 1982-1984 2006-2010∗
Fatalities 18,000 664 515 8
 Syria operated under an Arab League mandate between 1976 and 1982.
∗ UNIFIL is ongoing, but the analysis in this study is limited to pre-2010.
8.4 Alternative Theories
So far, I’ve argued that political dislocation and victimization help explain the phenomenon of
resistance to occupation in Lebanon. This section briefly assesses the validity and drawbacks of
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alternative theories.
8.4.1 Nationalism
Nationalist themes permeated the rhetoric of resistance in Lebanon. The Phalanges, an ultrana-
tionalist militia and one of the principal resistance groups fighting Syrian occupation, claimed to
be safeguarding the Lebanese nation (Collelo 1988). Maronites tried to frame their sectarian ac-
tion through a nationalist lens. For instance, when fighting broke out with Syria in 1978 Chamoun
stated: ”It is absolutely wrong to say that we are fighting because we are Christian. . . It happens
that those fighting for the freedom of Lebanon are Christians” (Fisk 1990, 141). Hezbollah de-
scribed resistance to Israeli occupation as a ”national cause” and ”duty” which is waged on behalf
of all Lebanese. Hezbollah flew the Lebanese flag next to its own and played the Lebanese na-
tional anthem before holding prayers (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002, 84). Similarly, in its 1985 open letter,
Hezbollah stated: ”We have risen to liberate our country, to drive the imperialists and the invaders
out of it, and to determine our fate by our own hands” (Norton 1987, 170). Lastly despite their
many differences, most warring militias clung to the concept of a unified Lebanon, not divided
along sectarian lines.
Pan-Arab nationalism was also a potent force in the occupation of Lebanon. Linguistically
and ethnically Arab Syrian forces, initially operating under the mandate of the Arab League were
seen as more legitimate than Israeli forces. The Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war,
emphasized pan-Arab bonds. Such pan-Arab nationalism also undermined cooperation with Is-
rael. When Amine Gemayel signed a peace treaty with Israel in May 1983, it was so unpopular in
Lebanon and the broader Arab world, that he was forced to renege. As Amine Gemayel’s father
Pierre stated: ”If we open one gate to Israel, we will lose twenty gates to the Arab world because
of it” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 291).
Generally, however, nationalism is a poor predictor of resistance in Lebanon. Nationalist
rhetoric did not translate to a coherent political program or a cohesive military effort. Civil war in
Lebanon had hardened sectarian factions. Lebanese resistance groups were primarily concerned
with advancing their relative position within Lebanon, and were only secondarily concerned with
safeguarding Lebanese sovereignty.
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First, violent resistance was not a nationalist reflex or an ”antibody response” to foreign occu-
pation. Most groups adopted a wait-and-see approach to foreign invasion. When resistance was
undertaken it was not by a representative cross-section of the population, but rather by specific
political factions. Thus, Druze and Palestinians and later Maronites resisted Syrian occupation.
Conversely, Maronites did not resist Israeli occupation unlike the Palestinians and Shias. Con-
trary to the predictions of nationalism, many groups in Lebanon celebrated the arrival of foreign
troops and actively collaborated with occupying forces. Nor was this collaboration always an en-
dogenous reaction to territorial control: in the case of the Phalangists, collaboration with Israel
preceded the actual invasion. Hezbollah fought bitterly against Israel, while praising Syria: ”No
one can expel Syria from Lebanon, or from the Lebanese people’s minds, hearts, and future” (Noe
2007, 321).
Second, Lebanon expressed not one form of nationalism, but four: sectarian nationalism,
Lebanese civic nationalism, ”Greater Syria” nationalism, and pan-Arab nationalism. Maronite
nationalists had pushed for an independent Maronite enclave centered on Mt. Lebanon. Syr-
ian nationalists, found mainly among Shia and Sunni groups, advocated union with a Greater
Syria. Finally, pan-Arab nationalists saw states in the Middle East as constructions of Western
imperialism designed to weaken Arabs (Salibi 1988; Firro 2003). Without well-defined bound-
aries, nationalism provides contradictory predictions for resistance to occupation. Pan-Arab and
Syrian nationalism would predict collaboration with Syria whereas sectarian or state nationalism
would predict the opposite. Which nationalism should prevail? More practically, such contending
nationalisms prevented factions from joining in fighting a commonly perceived foreign threat or
containing the fissiparous currents of religion.
Third, alternative nationalist explanations fail to account for variation in resistance. Darden
(2011) argues that nationalist sentiment is affected by the historical experience of mass schooling.
Populations will develop durable loyalties with the states that implement the first round of mass
schooling, and will be less likely to resist occupation by such states. This theory does not square
with the facts in Lebanon. The first round of mass schooling in Lebanon was implemented by the
Ottoman Empire following the 1869 Public Education Regulations (Masters and A´goston 2010,
203). By the 1980s, Lebanon had one of the most literate populations in the Middle East, albeit
with major disparities between sectarian groups (Collelo 1988). Darden’s theory is indeterminate
CHAPTER 8. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN LEBANON (1976-2010) 317
in predicting resistance since neither Syria, Israel, nor the members of UNIFIL or the MNF im-
plemented the first round of schooling in Lebanon. Despite the common null treatment in mass
schooling, there was variation in the incidence of resistance.
In sum, nationalist resistance was not automatic, nor unified, and alternative measures of na-
tionalist sentiment do not explain resistance. Thus, although nationalist sentiment was prevalent
during the period under study, it provides limited traction in understanding variation in resis-
tance to occupation.
8.4.2 Opportunity Structures
According to opportunity structure explanations, variation in resistance can be explained by those
military social, economic, and geographic factors that facilitate mobilization and combat. Overall,
I find only partial support for opportunity costs theories.
First, military factors provide partial explanations of variation in resistance. Actors in Lebanon
were eminently pragmatic and chose their battles carefully. For instance, most militant groups
stood aside while Israel —the region’s dominant military power— waged war against Palestinians
on Lebanese soil. So long as Israel did not weaken their political base, it was best to preserve
strength for the ongoing civil war where the real political power was at stake. Thus the Druze
army of Walid Jumblatt did not resist Israeli occupation of the Shouf during the siege of Beirut
(interview, 24 May 2012). In other instances, militants chose to hedge until it became apparent who
would ultimately prevail. For example, Amal tacitly cooperated with Israel, the MNF, and Bashir
Gemayel until Hezbollah began a major campaign against the Maronite government (Byman 2011,
211). Therefore, as Kalyvas (2006) has argued, resistance and collaboration was partly endogenous
to the degree of military control.
The impact of opportunity structures can be observed through exogenous changes to the mil-
itary capability. The clearest exogenous changes in military capability occurred through foreign
sponsorship. For example, prior to 1982, the Shia population of Lebanon was a secondary player
in the civil war and the resistance struggle. Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, Iran and
Syria began arming and financing Shia groups such as Hezbollah, turning a rag-tag militia into a
competent military force. In addition to dispatching advisors, weapons, and members of the Is-
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lamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), it is estimated that Tehran provided Hezbollah $10-15
million a month for several years (Byman 2011, 213). The consequence of this foreign sponsorship
was a significant increase in the military capability of Hezbollah and a concomitant surge in re-
sistance to Israeli occupation. Nasrallah acknowledged the impact of foreign sponsorship: ”The
Lebanese resistance and the handful of Palestinians would have not succeeded in doing what they
did, had there not been a presence to protect, support, defend, and strengthen them, as President
Assad’s leadership has done” (Noe 2007, 205). Hezbollah was not the only group to receive foreign
sponsorship. The ”war of liberation” undertaken by the Christian General Michel Aoun in 1989
followed a large influx of weapons from Iraq. The regime of Saddam Hussein sought to weaken its
Syrian Baathist rival and the end of the Iran-Iraq War allowed it to export more weapons (Winslow
1996, 262).
Despite such examples, Lebanon provides limited evidence of any direct relation between mil-
itary capacity and resistance. At its peak, Syria deployed 25,000 troops, Israel 60,000, the MNF
5,200, and UNIFIL 15,000 to occupy Lebanon. Even taking into account the duration of occupa-
tion, the quality of troops, and force-to-space and force-to-population ratios (see Figure 8.1), mil-
itary strength is a poor predictor of resistance. Moreover, opportunity structures cannot explain
why different groups decided to resist or collaborate with different occupiers.
Second, there is only limited support for the effect of terrain on resistance. Lebanon has ideal
terrain for resistance warfare with two mountain ranges (the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon moun-
tains) stretching north to south. The hills, shrubs, and woods of South Lebanon and the Mt.
Lebanon range provided extensive cover and concealment for Hezbollah and Maronite forces,
respectively. The Druze were able to exercise disproportionate leverage due to their strategic
position in the Shouf Mountains overlooking the capital as well as the Beirut-Damascus high-
way. Despite the undeniable advantages provided by Lebanon’s mountainous terrain, geography
fails to explain subnational variation in resistance. Mountainous terrain is basically a constant in
Lebanon (see Figure 8.2). With such a universal treatment, it cannot explain why specific groups
in Lebanon elected to resist specific occupations at specific times.
Third, evidence points against the role of economic factors in spurring resistance in Lebanon.
Liberman (1998) argues that the division of labor in modern urban societies makes individuals
less self-reliant and therefore more vulnerable to coercion by occupiers. In theory, this would in-
CHAPTER 8. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN LEBANON (1976-2010) 319
















Figure 8.2: Terrain of Lebanon
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dicate that Lebanon, one of the more urbanized countries in the Middle East should be easier to
dominate. The evidence seems to point to the contrary. Resistance in Lebanon was an unusually
urban phenomenon (Kalyvas 2004, 2). While much of Hezbollah’s resistance took place in rural
or semi-rural areas in South Lebanon, Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation and Maronite
resistance to Syrian occupation took place largely in the cities of Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre. Indeed,
the concentration of troops in cities is what made Hezbollah’s use of suicide tactics so devastat-
ingly effective. The Shia population was disproportionately rural and disproportionately active
in resistance to Israeli occupation. However, most scholars agree that the radicalization of the
Shia grew precisely out the social anomie caused by migration from rural villages to urban slums
(Ajami 1986; Blanford 2011b).
Economic factors do not appear to have played a consistent role in stoking resistance. As
would be expected by economic models of mobilization, the vast majority of militants partaking
in resistance were young, with lower opportunity costs for fighting. Data on deceased Hezbollah
fighters reveals that 41 percent were 18-20 years old or less, and another 42 percent were ages 21-25
(Krueger and Malecˇkova´ 2003, 131). When it comes to levels of income, however, resistance was
undertaken both by Maronites (Lebanon’s economically dominant group) and Shias (traditionally
one of Lebanon’s most destitute). Poverty rates among Hezbollah fighters were actually lower
than average: 28 percent for Hezbollah against 33 percent for the general population (Krueger
and Malecˇkova´ 2003, 131). According to Kavanagh (2011), this anomaly might be explained by
an interaction effect between poverty and education in the recruitment of insurgents. Because
highly skilled individuals are considered more effective insurgents, groups such as Hezbollah
seek educated recruits. However, more educated recruits also tend to have higher incomes, which
increases their opportunity cost for participation in high risk activities such as insurgency. Using
Krueger and Malecˇkova´’s data on Hezbollah fighters, Kavanagh therefore shows that it is highly
educated, yet poorer, recruits that are more likely to fight.12
Fourth, consistent with Petersen (2001), sectarian homogeneity was correlated with resistance.
12Similarly, examining terrorism in colonial Bengal, Lee (2011) finds a non-linear effect for poverty. Whereas the
poorest and least educated members of a society are less likely to be politically engaged, and therefore to undertake
political violence, the very wealthiest members of a society have higher opportunity costs for undertaking political
violence and are also unlikely to undertake terrorism. Lee finds that it the poorest members of the politically aware
class that are most likely to undertake terrorism.
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Resistance to occupation was greatest in East Beirut for Maronites, South Lebanon where Shia and
Israeli occupiers interacted, and the Shouf for Druze attacks on the MNF. As Petersen predicts,
resistance groups recruited largely through religious and political networks and depended on the
active (food, shelter, intelligence) or passive (secrecy) support of the civilian population. Coor-
dination across social groups was complicated by the civil war, which made communities mis-
trust each other. This explanation is plausible but a fundamental identification problem remains.
Did individuals fail to coordinate because their social networks were not as closely integrated or
rather because different communities had different incentives to fight, or both? Indeed, if sectar-
ian homogeneity facilitated resistance, why didn’t sectarian homogeneity trigger resistance to all
occupations rather than just some?
The case of Lebanon offers mixed support for opportunity structure theories of resistance.
While there is evidence that foreign support, mountainous terrain, and social cohesion affected the
costs of resistance, there was no clear relation between force size or poverty and resistance. Above
all, opportunity structures appeared to have been facilitators, rather than drivers of resistance.
They were contingent on the incentives to fight provided by political dislocation or victimization.
8.4.3 International Context
According to international context theory, the international threat environment shapes incentives
to undertake resistance. Occupied populations will refrain from undertaking resistance when they
face a credible third-party threat. Under such conditions, occupied societies will accept the lesser
evil of occupation (Edelstein 2008a). As its simultaneous occupations attest, Lebanon was a weak
state in a volatile strategic environment.
On many occasions, third-party threats pushed Lebanese into the arms of their occupiers. Ma-
ronites collaborated extensively with Israel. Whereas Israel sought to use the Phalangists to rid
Lebanon of the PLO, Phalangists sought to use Israel to rid Lebanon of the Syrians (among oth-
ers). Indeed, while Maronites had originally welcomed the Syrians to fend off their revisionist
enemies, they came to see Syria as a greater threat. Ongoing clashes in East Beirut, the Syrian
sponsored assassination of Bashir Gemayel, and irredentist statements only aggravated these fear.
Thus consistent with international context theory, we find strong collaboration between Maronites
CHAPTER 8. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN LEBANON (1976-2010) 322
and their Israeli occupiers. On several occasions, Maronite leaders pressured Israel to attack Syria
(Schiff and Ya’ari 1984). In December 1980, Prime Minister Begin pledged to defend the Chris-
tian community stating: ”We won’t let [Syria] perpetrate genocide in Lebanon” (Spyer 2009, 199).
True to his pledge, the Israeli Air Force downed two Syrian helicopters during Syria’s siege of the
Christian town of Zahle in April 1981.
Consistent with international context theory those groups that feared Israel aligned with Syria.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam promised to ”give support to any Lebanese that was working
to save Lebanon from the Israeli occupation” (Deeb 2004, 88). As with Israel, Syrian support was
purely pragmatic: to use local allies to control a buffer state. Regardless, such support and pro-
tection was welcomed by certain segments of Lebanese society. According to Nasrallah: ”Had
there not been a state in the region by the name of Syria, led by a president of the stature of
Hafez al-Assad, Lebanon would still be wallowing in the Israeli era” (Noe 2007, 204). When this
perceived threat receded with the Israeli withdrawal, many starting openly questioning Syrian
occupation.The Lebanese Counci l of Bishops declared in September 2000: ”After Israel‘s with-
drawal, isnt it time for the Syrian army to redeploy here in preparation for its final withdrawal
in accordance with the Taif Accord and UN Security Council Resolution 520?” (Norton 2000, 48).
Even Jumblatt, a former ally of Syria, suggested that a redeployment, other than what was re-
quired for ”strategic” and ”Syrian national security” purposes (Gambill 2000). This restlessness
exploded into massive protests, following the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005.
To a lesser extent, concerns about Israeli actions in Lebanon facilitated MNF and UNIFIL oc-
cupation. For example, Muslims in West Beirut generally welcomed the initial deployment of the
MNF since they saw the international force as a protection from Israeli shelling. Similarly, resi-
dents of Southern Lebanon initially hoped UNIFIL would shield them from Israeli invasion as well
as the collateral damage caused by Israeli attacks on Palestinian and Hezbollah militants. Some
villages wrote to UNIFIL to deploy to areas experiencing IDF-Hezbollah clashes (Diab 2001). Oth-
ers would ask for UN assistance in dealing with the SLA extortion. According to a Shia villager:
”If we don‘t [pay protection money], there will be trouble for us from the Israelis and the Haddad
men. Haim says he wants the money from twenty-eight villages and that he needs the money to
pay people to protect us from terrorists. But we want United Nations soldiers here” (Fisk 1990,
547). During fighting between Hezbollah and the IDF, Lebanese civilians would congregate on
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UN bases. Consistent with international context theory, some of the sharper criticism of UNIFIL
emerged when it failed to protect the local population (interview with Timur Go¨ksel 19 August
2010).
On the surface, international context theory performs well in explaining variation in resistance
to occupation in Lebanon. However, a closer examination reveals major anomalies to the theory.
First, there was no unified perception of third-party threats within Lebanon. Threats were per-
ceived through the prism of identity and political affiliation. Syria and Israel were largely seen
as threats depending on their effect on the power of different sectarian groups. Second, to the
sectarian factions engaged in civil war, foreign occupiers were often lesser threats than domestic
militias. Therefore, while international context did shape incentives to undertake resistance, it
was largely contingent on political dislocation.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has tested alternative theories of resistance in the context of Lebanon between 1976
and 2010. During the course of four different Syrian, Israeli, MNF, and UN occupations, I noted
the variation in the source and intensity of resistance. Occupiers did not all experience similar
levels of violence from the same sectors of Lebanese society.
I argued that political dislocation best explains this variation in resistance. Lebanese politics
between the 1970s and 1990s were complex, polarized, and violent. Given the circumstances, it
is unsurprising that occupiers quickly became entangled in Lebanon’s contest for political power.
As military commentator Edgar O’Ballance put it: ”Machiavelli would have been out of his depth
in this web of intrigue and violence” (1998, ix). Nationalist theories argue that foreign occupation
unifies the population in a common struggle. In Lebanon, it was precisely the opposite. For-
eign occupation exposed the deep fissures in Lebanese society as each group sought to maximize
political gains through collaboration, neutrality, or resistance.
Consistent with trust theory, I found that indiscriminate violence committed by Syrian and
Israeli forces hardened views against occupation. Moreover, there is evidence that religious di-
visions between occupiers and occupied was a source of mistrust in some cases. However, these
effects appeared to be secondary to that of political dislocation. In addition, contrary to the find-
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ings of the cross-national quantitative chapter, I found little evidence that international mandates
or the regime of the occupier affected calculations of resistance. Although democracy and inter-
national organizations did impose real constraints on the behavior of occupiers, these constraints
were not perceived as sufficient to overcome mistrust and broader concerns regarding political
dislocation.
Importantly, I found limited support for alternative theories of resistance such as nationalism,
opportunity structures, and international context. Nationalism —at least in its civic form— was
not a prime determinant of resistance. Lebanon’s factions never rallied around the flag to fend
off foreign invaders. Rather, each faction used and exploited foreign intervention to their advan-
tage against domestic rivals. To those engaged in civil war, sectarian identity trumped national
loyalty, even in the face of protracted occupation. Opportunity structures did not play a consis-
tent role in occupation. Occupier troop strength, terrain, and economic conditions did not map
to resistance. Tight social networks helped groups mobilize against occupation, but such mobi-
lization was contingent on the perceived political impact of occupation. International context is
a promising alternative explanation for variation in resistance, since Lebanese leaders sought to
balance foreign powers against each other. However, I noted that international context theory fails




”There is nothing perhaps more adverse to nature and reason than to hold in obedience remote
countries and foreign nations, in opposition to their inclination or interest.”
-Edward Gibbon1
9.1 The Puzzle of Resistance
Violence does not always cease at war‘s end. As this study has shown, foreign occupations that
follow wars can also be domains of conflict. The puzzle this study addresses is what explains the
variation in violence against foreign occupations? In the 163 cases of occupation since 1900, the
median occupation suffered 17 occupier fatalities, whereas the bloodiest occupation experienced
over 30,000 fatalities. In seeking to understand this variation, I first argued that the nationalist
explanation of resistance is unsatisfactory because it tends to over-predict the likelihood of resis-
tance. If nationalism is a constant in the post-colonial era, why do we see little resistance overall,
and so much variation within the resistance that does occur? Second, I noted that, in theory,
resistance should not be rational because resistance is dangerous and occupation is usually tem-
porary. Individuals in occupied societies should rationally decide to wait rather than fight. Third,
I have argued that resistance will emerge when assumptions regarding neutrality break down.
Specifically, resistance is more likely to emerge when occupiers take steps to alter the balance of
1Gibbon [1788]1822.
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power in occupied society. Under such conditions, certain groups will have incentives to act rather
than wait in order to forestall any permanent loss of power. This theoretical explanation has the
benefit of accounting for “novel facts,” insofar as it can explain the nationalist anomaly of collab-
oration with occupiers in addition to explaining variation in resistance. Moreover, resistance is
more likely to emerge when there is a breakdown in trust between occupiers and the occupied
population. This can occur when occupiers victimize the civilian population, or when occupiers
cannot credibly commit to leaving occupied territory promptly or treating the civilian population
benignly. I hypothesized that certain factors such as international mandates, regime type, and
shared religion can help occupiers signal benign intent.
9.2 Summary of Findings
This study has provided the first comprehensive cross-national study of resistance to occupation.
The following is a summary of the key findings.
9.2.1 Cross-national Quantitative Analysis
Chapter 4 tested these theories quantitatively by examining a cross-national dataset of 163 occu-
pations going back to 1900. The number of fatalities incurred by occupying forces was used as
a proxy for the intensity of resistance. This dataset showed that consistent with the assumptions
guiding the theory, violent resistance to occupation tends to be the exception rather than the norm.
Generally, citizens of occupied countries adopt a wait-and-see approach instead of rushing to take
up arms. When resistance does emerge, political dislocation is found to be an important trig-
ger. Indeed, those occupiers that sought to change the leadership of the occupied country faced
significantly more resistance than those that left political leaders in place. Forced political disloca-
tion provided the immediate and targeted incentives for groups to assume the risks of resistance.
The cross-national chapter also supported many of the hypotheses regarding trust. Democratic
occupiers and occupiers operating under the mandate of an international organization faced sig-
nificantly less resistance. Such occupiers could better credibly commit to treating the occupied
population benignly and vacating occupied territory promptly. Conversely, those occupiers that
were of a different religion or victimized the occupied population faced greater resistance, al-
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though the statistical significance of the latter was not robust. What these findings suggest is that
the nature and behavior of occupiers can play an important role in determining the level of resis-
tance. Practically, this would suggest that there are strategies interveners can undertake to reduce
the likelihood of resistance.
The cross-national statistical chapter also provided insight regarding alternative theories of
resistance. I found that various measures of nationalism, such as country age, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, and literacy rates failed to predict levels of resistance. The degree of foreign
threat was also not found to play a significant role. Therefore contrary to international context
theory, resistance is not generally a product of the occupied population’s pragmatic assessment of
relative risks of occupation. I did find that occupied populations were sensitive to some factors
that facilitated or hindered resistance, what I termed opportunity structures. In particular, terrain
and wealth were shown to affect the levels of resistance. Controls such as the duration of the
occupation were found to increase the number of occupying troops felled by resistance forces,
mainly by increasing exposure.
A major concern in such a study is that lower levels of resistance may simply reflect the abil-
ity of occupiers to anticipate and avoid bloody occupations. I argued that, while serious, such
selection effects are mitigated by incomplete information, cognitive biases, and issue tradeoffs.
Occupiers can miscalculate risk or undertake difficult occupations in order to further more im-
portant goals. These factors would therefore reduce systematic selection bias. In order to test for
selection effects, I developed a model of occupation onset and found that the probability of being
occupied is not statistically associated with the degree of resistance.
9.2.2 Case Studies
The cross-national quantitative data suggests a systematic link between political dislocation, a
breakdown in trust, and violent resistance. However, resistance is a complex phenomenon, quan-
titative measures are imperfect, and the results of the statistical analysis could be spurious. More-
over, certain causal processes simply cannot be observed in cross-national analysis. In order to
further probe the validity of the theories of political dislocation and trust, I complemented the
cross-national statistical data with a set of four case studies: Afghanistan since 2001, Lithuania
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between 1940 and 1953, Cambodia between 1979 and 1993, and Lebanon between 1976 and 2010.
Afghanistan
First, I developed a mixed-method case study of resistance in Afghanistan. Although usually re-
ferred to as the Afghanistan War, the vast majority of violence is in fact concentrated in the Pashtun
belt in the south and east of the country. Resistance in Afghanistan was primarily a response to po-
litical dislocation: the Taliban who were overthrown in 2001 were drawn almost exclusively from
the Pashtun population. Although not all Pashtun were supportive of the Taliban, resistance was
concentrated amongst those groups that stood the most to lose from the new regime put into place
by the US and its allies. In contrast, many Afghans welcomed Coalition forces since they broke
the Taliban monopoly on political power. By supporting regime change, I argued that Coalition
forces got caught in a civil war among Afghan factions vying for power. Violence in Afghanistan is
likely to recede not with the departure of foreign forces, but when a political settlement is reached
among Afghan groups themselves. Importantly, the effect of political dislocation was found to
be more powerful than other factors commonly thought to trigger resistance such as poverty and
terrain. Trust also played a role in shaping resistance to occupation since a number of studies have
documented how air strikes and civilian casualties increased the subsequent number of attacks on
coalition forces in the near term.
Lithuania, Cambodia, and Lebanon
Second, I undertook three within-case studies of the occupations of Lithuania, Cambodia, and
Lebanon. These cases provide strong evidence of the role of political dislocation and demonstrate
the linkages between international and domestic politics. Foreign occupation is undoubtedly an
international event, but the mobilization of resistance is fundamentally shaped by domestic poli-
tics as much as by a sense of nationalism. Indeed, one of the most important findings of this disser-
tation is that resistance is rarely undertaken by a broad cross-section of the population, but rather
by those specific groups who stand to lose domestically from occupation. Thus the Soviet oc-
cupation of Lithuania was opposed by disenfranchised wealthier landowners, industrialists, and
traditional political parties, whereas the German occupation of Lithuania was principally opposed
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by Jews and communists fearing persecution. Vietnamese occupiers in Cambodia faced resistance
from royalists and republican factions who were sidelined by Vietnam‘s local proxies and by the
Khmer Rouge who had been forcefully removed from power. Lebanese political factions, them-
selves engaged in a vicious civil war, resisted or collaborated with Syrian, Israeli, UN, and MNF
occupation based on the assessed effect of foreigners on their share of domestic power. All the
case studies also provided strong support for the corollary of factional politics. Partisan rivalries
permeated resistance struggles. In the case of Cambodia, Lebanon, and most likely Afghanistan
in the future, resistance struggles morphed into civil wars as resistance groups scrambled to seize
power.
The case studies also provide evidence of trust theory. Soviet and German victimization of
civilians through deportation and genocide respectively, played a strong role in stoking resistance
in Lithuania. In the case of Lebanon, indiscriminate violence by Syrian and Israeli forces hardened
views against occupation. Factors such as international mandates, religion, and regime type were
also found to play a significant role in the case studies. UNTAC, operating under a robust inter-
national mandate could credibly commit to withdrawing from Cambodia in a way that Vietnam
never could, and faced far less resistance. Lithuania and Lebanon provide good illustrations of the
role played by religion in building or breaking trust with occupiers. Catholic leaders in Lithuania
provided moral leadership and focal points to oppose Soviet policies and religious identity was
central to Jewish resistance to German rule. Similarly, religion was a rallying cry against Israeli
occupation and religious concerns figured prominently in Christian resistance to Syria. Lastly,
the opacity and abuses of non-democratic occupiers frayed local trust during Soviet and German
occupation of Lithuania, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the Syrian occupation of
Lebanon.
Despite strong support for political dislocation and trust, not all findings in the case stud-
ies were fully consistent with these theories. Trust was not found to be the preeminent factor
determining resistance in Cambodia and Lebanon, where Vietnamese and Multinational forces
faced resistance in the absence of systematic victimization. The role of international organizations
was inconsistent in Lebanon, where MNF forces faced significant resistance and UNIFIL did not.
Lastly, contrary to expectation, democratic credentials did not appear to dampen resistance to Is-
raeli and MNF occupation of Lebanon. In this, as in many cases, the effect of political dislocation
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may simply have been the predominant factor determining resistance.
9.3 Implications for Academia
9.3.1 The Resistance Myth
The findings of this study have a number of implications for future academic research. First, and
foremost, this study has challenged what I call ”the resistance myth.” This myth has positive and
normative dimensions. The positive resistance myth posits that resistance is an inevitable product
of foreign occupation. A number of International Relations scholars have posited that conquest
has become more costly in the modern world due to the advent of nationalism. The influential
American diplomat George Kennan was fond of quoting Edward Gibbon in predicting the Soviet
Union’s demise in Eastern Europe: “There is nothing perhaps more adverse to nature and reason
than to hold in obedience remote countries and foreign nations, in opposition to their inclination
or interest.”2 Defensive realists have picked up on this argument in arguing how nationalism
could sometimes have a pacifying effect on International Relations. If nationalism strengthens the
defense, thereby making conquest more costly, states would have fewer incentives to take pre-
emptive action against each other to forestall defeat (Jervis 1978, 195). This study challenges this
assumption. Resistance, I have shown, is not always a nationalist reflex to foreign occupation.3
The average occupation generates relatively little resistance and is sensitive the policies, behavior,
and nature of occupiers. Therefore, nationalism does not inherently confer an advantage to the
defense. The normative dimension of resistance, more commonplace in popular than academic
circles, posits that resistance is inherently good.4 The case studies have illustrated that resistance
to occupation is not necessarily selfless or heroic (although it certainly can be). In many instances,
resistance parading itself as nationalist clearly served parochial interests. Furthermore, resistance
groups have often been used against domestic rivals in addition to occupation forces. Thus re-
sistance should be seen as an extension of domestic politics, rather than a democratic symbol of
2This passage was misquoted by George Kennan, and subsequently re-cited, as: ”There is nothing more contrary to
nature than the attempt to hold in obedience distant provinces.”
3Of course, most occupations in the modern world also do not result in annexation.
4See, for example, Gannon 2008.
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national unity.
9.3.2 The Ghost of Nationalism
In this study, I have been critical of nationalism. The concept is notoriously difficult to measure
because it is ideological, not material. Thus the ”ghost of nationalism” can animate collective ac-
tion without being observed directly. Moreover, nationalism as a cause of resistance is frequently
confused with nationalism as a product of resistance. Because we can only observe the effects
of nationalism, rather than its presence, there is a strong potential for bias. That being said, na-
tionalism is one of the most important organizing principles of International Relations. Just as
importantly, nationalism emerges time and time again in resistance discourse. Thus nationalism
may simply be a poorly measured cause of resistance rather than an invalid one. The task ahead
for scholars is therefore how to find meaningful and reliable ways to measure variation in nation-
alism cross-nationally.
Part of the answer may lie in recognizing that nationalism itself is not unitary. As noted by
Snyder (2000), nationalism can take civic, ethnic, revolutionary, or counterrevolutionary forms. In
the case studies of Lebanon, Lithuania, and Afghanistan, I noted that different conceptions of na-
tionalism could lead to diametrically opposite predictions regarding the likelihood of resistance.
Recent scholarship by Schrock-Jacobson (2012) has shown that different types of nationalism have
different effects on the prospects of inter-state war initiation. What’s a stake in the definition of
nationalism goes beyond semantics. Strong civic nationalism impedes the ability of occupiers
to dominate occupied societies. Ethnic other sub-national forms of nationalism can be exploited
by occupiers to divide and rule occupied societies. Once again, whether nationalism provides
dominance to the defense or the offense in International Relations hinges to some degree on this
distinction. Future research would do well to explore how different types of nationalism affect re-
sistance to occupation. This would involve coding types of nationalism across occupied societies.
9.3.3 Paths of Resistance
In several case studies, I have shown that indiscriminate violence can galvanize resistance to occu-
pation as civilians are forced to fight to survive. In theory, victimization and political dislocation
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should have different effects on the shape and composition of resistance groups. For instance, in-
discriminate violence may trigger broader-based resistance groups, organized territorially to pro-
tect the greatest number of civilians. In contrast, we might expect political dislocation to trigger
narrower resistance groups, organized territorially to maximize the chances of protecting political
interests. Further data on the composition and location of resistance groups should be collected to
test these hypotheses.
While under many circumstances victimization can trigger a violent response from the occu-
pied population, under other circumstances, particularly brutal repression succeeded in deterring
resistance altogether. For example, the Soviet Union faced fierce resistance in Lithuania between
1945 and 1953, but relatively little between 1953 and 1991. Resistance disappeared, not because
the Soviet Union abandoned political dislocation or victimization, but precisely because it exe-
cuted, imprisoned, and deported most resistance fighters. Similarly, Syria managed to dominate
Lebanon with relatively little resistance after 1990 by killing and exiling Maronite leaders and de-
ploying a ruthless intelligence service to deter further dissent. This would suggest that repression
has a non-linear effect on the likelihood and intensity of resistance. Further research could exam-
ine under what circumstances ruthless repression succeeds in cowing an occupied population or
stirring revolt. It should also be noted that such research could apply to foreign occupations as
well as domestic dictatorships.
9.3.4 The Domestic Politics of International Threats
In one of the main theories of resistance to occupation, Edelstein (2008a) posits that variation in
resistance can be explained by the occupied societies’ assessment of foreign threats. Occupied
societies are less likely to resist occupation when the occupier is seen as protecting from greater
threats. In this view, incentives to undertake resistance are shaped by the international environ-
ment. The theory is powerful and intuitively convincing. However, it was not confirmed in the
cross-national study. Part of the reason, I argue, is that threat assessments are not unitary. Parts
of the occupied society may perceive foreign threats differently, leading to varying reactions to
occupation. As the Lithuania and Lebanon case studies demonstrated, this theory could be signif-
icantly improved by not treating the occupied territory as unitary, but rather formed by different
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political groups. Domestic fissures matter in assessing international threats, as groups may lever-
age foreign powers to achieve domestic political objectives. International context theory could
therefore be improved by integrating political dislocation theory.5
9.3.5 Strategies of Survival
In some cases of occupation, resistance emerged as a way to protect civilians from occupier victim-
ization. However, aside from resistance, civilians actually have a much broader range of strategies
available to them to reduce their exposure to risk in the course of conflict. These strategies can in-
clude exit (migration), concealment (hiding), and collaboration, in addition to violent resistance
against occupiers. While security studies have tended to focus on why states and armed groups
adopt certain offensive measures (e.g. terrorism, mass killing and genocide, rape, indiscriminate
violence), relatively little cross-national research has examined what defensive measures civilians
adopt in times of conflict. Thus, further studies could examine why civilians adopt different types
of strategies or combinations thereof, and which strategies hold the most chance of success un-
der different circumstances. As such this research could advise governments and NGOs on how
to better protect civilians in the course of conflict, or at a minimum better predict the location of
civilians in order to better assist them. Importantly, such studies could go well beyond the case
of occupations to include interstate and civil wars. Presumably, the selection of different survival
strategies might be shaped by factors such as the type of war, the environment, and the expected
duration of conflict.
9.3.6 Outliers
Lastly, further research could examine outliers in resistance to occupation. The case studies in this
dissertation have focus on those countries that were well predicted by the cross-national model
in order to verify the different theories. However, greater theory development could be achieved
by examining ”off-the-line” cases, that is, those cases poorly predicted by the model (Lieberman
2005). Indeed, the theory can over and under predict resistance. First, states in the Middle East
remain major outliers, with levels of resistance far greater than other states with similar socio-
5Edelstein has acknowledged this much in more recent work (2008b, 31).
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economic characteristics and levels of political dislocation. Although the volatile nature of the
Middle East is now well known to policy makers it is not entirely clear why this is the case. Sec-
ond, some other cases present real outliers in terms of non-resistance to occupation. A notable
example is post-Second World War Japan where the US unilaterally occupied a social homoge-
nous and strongly nationalist state, and carried extensive political reforms, all this after conduct-
ing extensive bombing of civilians (Dower 2000). The theories of trust and political dislocation
would predict extensive resistance to US occupation. It would be of great interest to understand
why resistance was so muted, in particular because the US experience in Japan appeared to have
informed US thinking about occupation prior to the largely failed occupations of Afghanistan and
Iraq.
9.4 Implications for Policy
9.4.1 The Future of Foreign Occupation
The study was conducted with the explicit aim of better informing public policy. However, be-
fore presenting policy recommendations, a fundamental question is whether the issue of foreign
occupation is still relevant. Superficially, it would seem not. Since 1900, the risk of foreign occupa-
tion has declined. While occupations remain, they tend to be less bloody, more multilateral, and
rarely annexationist. The value of territorial control has decreased as societies have moved from
resource extraction and centralized manufacturing (which can be pillaged) to services and de-
centralized technology industries (which cannot) (Brooks 1999). While the benefits of occupation
have declined, the costs have risen. Waves of democratization have increased the cognitive disso-
nance associated with ruling other people outside accountable institutions. Democratic states are
therefore more reticent ideologically to undertake occupation. Foreign occupations have become
politically toxic following the bruising experiences of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Indeed during the 2012 US presidential debate on foreign policy, Republican challenger Mitt Rom-
ney stated: “We don‘t want another Iraq, we don‘t want another Afghanistan. That’s not the right
course for us” (New York Times 2012). Public support for these missions has dwindled across the
West. Such ”occupation fatigue” is also reflected in recent US military policy. The US Department
of Defense 2012 Strategic Guidance, states bluntly: ”U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 335
large-scale, prolonged stability operations” (DOD 2012, 6). In sum, many would argue foreign
occupations are costly, unpopular, and anachronistic. We should therefore not expect the issue to
remain relevant to International Relations.
Such optimism would be misguided. The age of imperialism and territorial conquest may be
closing, but the age of foreign intervention is far from over. Although the number of occupations
relative to the number of states has declined over the past century, the absolute number remains
constant. Occupation remains a tool of statecraft because states often have little choice but to en-
gage in it. As Leon Trotsky said: ”You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”
The US military sought to forget the painful experiences of counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War
and in the 1990s, no one expected the US to become involved in such a strategic backwater as
Afghanistan. Yet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan consumed vast political, military, and finan-
cial resources since 2001. In the future there will remain scenarios where occupation is likely to be
used.
First, some form of occupation is likely to be used to address humanitarian emergencies. Faced
with massive human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, or genocide, states may feel compelled to de-
ploy ground troops to put an end to violence. Such interventions have been legitimated by the
concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P). One of the pillars of R2P is that if the state fails
to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international
community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures including military in-
tervention in the last resort (ICISS 2001). Such forms of intervention were seen in Kosovo in 1999
and were advocated by some in Syria in 2012. Second, occupation will persist in certain types of
robust peacekeeping. First generation peacekeeping during the Cold War was generally ”inter-
positional” designed to halt inter-state conflict along borders. Second generation peacekeeping
since the end of the Cold War has tended to deploy to civil war environments, where peace en-
forcement may be necessary in the absence of consent from all parties. In other words, second
generation peace enforcement is much closer to foreign occupation, and demand for such mis-
sions has not dissipated. Third, short-term occupation may be necessary to secure weapons of
mass destruction in failed or failing states or in states afflicted by civil war. Such concerns are not
farfetched: consider Pakistan‘s gradual slide into chaos, a catastrophic collapse of the North Ko-
rean state, or fears that Syrian chemical weapons might be seized by Islamic extremists (O’Hanlon
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2005, 95-120). In 2013, France launched an intervention in Mali to prevent Islamist groups affili-
ated with Al-Qaeda from overthrowing the government. Fourth, states may choose to undertake
occupation to stabilize strategically critical regions. Potential scenarios could include a coup in
Saudi Arabia that would send oil prices soaring, a shut down of the Panama Canal that would
cripple international trade, or an intervention to stabilize border regions of Mexico overwhelmed
by drug violence. Lastly, occupation may be necessary to stabilize opposing states in the wake of
interstate wars. States may prefer containment, but faced with aggressive leaders, occupation and
regime change will remain appealing options. It is instructive to remember that neither Vietnam
nor the US sought a war with Cambodia or Afghanistan. Cross-border violence and terrorism
pushed them to commit troops. In sum, occupation remains a necessary tool of statecraft in an
age of transnational threats and humanitarian emergencies.
9.4.2 Policy Recommendations
If occupations are likely to reoccur, what can be done to minimize the loss of life caused by occupa-
tion and resistance?6 This study provides some recommendations for future foreign interventions.
Avoid set formulas. Interveners should be wary of simple force-to-space and force-to-population
ratios in planning occupations. Although population and geography are relevant factors, force
planning must also be calibrated to the political objectives being sought. As Eric Shinseki said in
his farewell address as Army Chief of Staff: ”Beware the twelve-division strategy for a ten-division
Army” (Baumgardner 2003). A smaller force may be sufficient in occupations with limited politi-
cal objectives, but may be insufficient for more ambitious ones.
Cultivate diplomatic and intelligence assets. Interveners should cultivate extensive diplomatic and
intelligence assets to understand the potential political impact of occupation. Ideally, such assets
should be deployed prior to military engagement. Intelligence agencies are used to estimating
the military capabilities of their opponents. This study suggests it may be equally important to
weigh the interests of political, social, and religious groups and identify potential spoilers and
their capabilities. When possible, states should consult extensively with local parties to solicit
their views prior to intervention.
6Note that such recommendations are not meant to condone occupation, only to minimize unintended violence.
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Leverage local contacts, but beware of capture. Foreigners often rely on local contacts to understand
political dynamics of occupied countries and to address identification problems (distinguishing
civilians from insurgents). While this local knowledge is critical, it comes with risks of its own.
Occupiers face a principal-agent problem with those actors who volunteer to assist them. Such
local allies can help occupiers overcome information asymmetries while simultaneously exploit-
ing such asymmetries to their own advantage (Kalyvas 2003). When such capture occurs, political
dislocation can occur against the wishes of the intervening forces. Information asymmetries can
never be totally avoided, but the risk of capture can be mitigated by diversifying local contacts
and triangulating information among sources from different political, ethnic, regional, and reli-
gious groups.
Minimize political dislocation. All other things being equal, interveners should minimize polit-
ical dislocation. As such occupiers should keep political objectives limited, accommodate local
actors, and plan for an early exit. Of course, in some circumstances political dislocation is not
only inevitable, but actually the purpose of the occupation. As noted, political dislocation can
help occupiers overcome the credible commitment problem among leaders of occupied states.
When political dislocation is necessary, occupiers should seek to divide potential spoilers with
side-payments. If side-payments are insufficient to placate spoilers, or politically unpalatable, oc-
cupiers should deploy sufficient forces early on to deter or defeat them. In short, occupiers should
seek to avoid, accommodate, compensate, divide, deter, and defeat spoilers, in that order.7
Democracy is no panacea. Interveners have occasionally sought to establish democracies, with
varying degrees of success. Democratization retains strong normative appeal, especially among
democratic interveners. Elections serve as focal points, deliverables, and exit strategies. They can
provide a face-saving measure for faltering missions. However well-intentioned, and at times
effective, democratization itself can be a major source of political dislocation. Elites may lose priv-
ileges and influence as they are forced to compete with other constituencies for political power.
Rather than welcoming democracy, these elites may turn to resistance against occupation to safe-
7It should be noted that the pursuit of limited political objectives dovetails with most US public opinion. In an
analysis of 1,092 survey questions in public opinion polls from 1981 until early 2005 during 22 episodes of conflict,
Einchenberg (2005) found that Americans are more likely to support the use of military force for ”foreign policy re-
straint” (i.e. preventing states from undertaking undesirable actions) than to support what is coded as internal political
change.
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guard their political influence (in some circumstances such spoilers have the courtesy to wait
until the departure of occupiers to reassert themselves). Indeed, democratization can sometimes
lead to conflict, as opportunistic elites drum up nationalist sentiment. Importantly, the interests
of spoilers are often better organized and more strongly incentivized than those of the broader
public. Therefore, although democratization may still retain strong normative appeal for foreign
interveners, it can’t be assumed the occupied population will necessarily welcome it.
Similarly, occupiers can face resistance by backing fledgling democracies in occupied states.
Newly elected governments may undertake policies that counter the interests of certain domestic
constituencies. Such constituencies may undertake resistance against what they see as the gov-
ernment’s foreign enablers. Thus, occupiers face a quandary. Although they may wish to avoid
resistance, occupiers are committed to supporting the new regime to secure the gains of interven-
tion over the longer term. Moreover, occupiers may find it harder to openly criticize the demo-
cratically elected leaders of the occupied government. Thus, occupiers may become “tethered” to
new democracies in occupied states, even as they face the prospect of violent resistance (interview
with Jean-Marie Ghe´henno, 19 October 2010).
Winning hearts and minds is necessary but not sufficient. Recent American COIN doctrine has
emphasized the importance of winning hearts and minds (US Army 2007). Similarly trust theory
indicates occupied societies are more likely to resist foreign occupation if they see themselves
as being victimized by occupying forces. However, political dislocation theory argues that even
well-behaved occupying forces may face resistance from those who stand to lose from occupation.
Therefore, winning and hearts and minds may not be sufficient to prevent or quell resistance. That
being said, occupying forces need to use care and discrimination in responding to factionalized
resistance in order to avoid broadening the resistance’s base of recruitment.
Beware of cheering crowds and initial calm. Many cases in this dissertation described instances
where occupiers were initially welcomed by cheering crowds. Occupiers took such crowds as
symbols of support for their mission when in fact they were precursors to violent resistance. The
cheering crowds were not representative of the broader population, but rather those groups who
stood to gain from political dislocation. Similarly, occupiers should not be lulled into complacency
by initial calm in occupied territory. Most individuals prefer to sit on the fence. Domestic actors
will wait and see what policies occupiers intend to promote before deciding to take action. In
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addition, aggrieved parties may take time to assemble and generate a fighting force. The initial
calm of occupation is the best time to reach out to potential spoilers.
Send costly signals. Trust theory argued that major asymmetries of power and information be-
tween occupiers and the occupied could generate fear and mistrust. Occupiers should therefore
not assume that their motives and objectives will be clearly understood by the occupied popu-
lation (especially if there are elites who stand to gain by sowing fear). Efforts to alleviate fears
are cheap talk since powerful occupiers pay no price for rescinding on their promises. Occupiers
can better signal benign intentions by sending costly signals, that is, signals that a more predatory
occupier would refuse to send. These can include seeking a mandate from an international organi-
zation, setting up multinational forces, and undertaking extensive and public local consultations.
Such actions can be complex, cumbersome, and time consuming.8 But it is precisely because they
are inconvenient that they make occupiers more credible.
Timing is essential. The timing of political engagement with potential spoilers is essential. Polit-
ical accommodation is much harder to achieve once violent resistance has occurred. Insurgencies
can generate endogenous cycles of violence. Responding to resistance, occupiers will often cause
collateral damage. Collateral damage, in turn, can inflame resentment, generating further resis-
tance. Thus, an insurgency driven by a narrow set of grievances by a certain set of the population
can widen as civilians react to what they see as an arbitrary exercise of force by occupiers. As Betts
(1994, 23) notes, once violent conflict begins: ”emotions intensify, sunk costs grow, demands for
recompense escalate.” Issues of credibility, honor, and face-saving can unnecessarily prolong con-
flict. Therefore, occupiers need to engage potential spoilers early to prevent factional resistance
from turning into broad based resistance against perceived victimization.
Plan for post-occupation. States frequently descend into civil war following foreign occupations.
Interstate war can destroy the state’s coercive apparatus and economic infrastructure while oc-
cupation can create political dislocation. Moreover, rival resistance groups may vie for political
power upon the withdrawal of foreign troops. Resistance does not necessarily end once occupiers
have left. To minimize the chances of post-occupation civil war, occupiers should seek to bolster
state capacity, reduce political dislocation (e.g. reconciling potential spoilers), or both. Interna-
8Vocal skepticism of the UN notwithstanding, Americans tend to be more supportive of the use of military force
when it is undertaken in a multilateral context (Jentleson 1992; Einchenberg 2005).
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tional and regional organizations may be required to monitor and mediate among post-occupation
factions.
Maintain COIN capabilities and training. Lastly, states such as the US should maintain coun-
terinsurgency training and doctrine. Foreign occupations will remain a tool of state policy, albeit
a difficult one. Having ground forces trained in community relations, human intelligence, and
cultural sensitivity, as well as being capable of navigating the challenges of insurgents operating
amongst foreign civilians will be essential. Importantly, these are skills that cannot be ramped up
quickly or easily; they require years of training. At the same time, as mentioned above, the timing
is essential in stemming resistance. It is therefore necessary to have adequately trained forces de-
ployed to theaters of operations early in order to preempt spirals of violence caused by potential
political dislocation and civilian victimization.
As I have sought to demonstrate, foreign interventions and occupations are likely to persist in
world politics not only because of predatory states, but also due to ongoing humanitarian and se-
curity challenges. Occupation remains a necessary tool of statecraft, but is still an extremely com-
plex undertaking, often tied to the vagaries of local politics. Powerful armies have been defeated
by resistance forces, and even“successful” occupations have often only done so at an extremely
high sacrifice. Even when fatalities are low, economic and political costs can be great. Whatever
policy recommendations may be given, occupation must be employed with the utmost caution.
The findings of this study are not the first nor the last word on the subject, but hopefully a modest
contribution to reducing unintended violence.
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